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Abstract 
The Repertory Grid: A Critical Appraisal 
George Kelly claims a scientific status for Personal Construct Theory, 
but I argue that it is more appropriately characterised among the 
interpretive human sciences. Examination of the theory from the point 
of view of the grid user discloses a number of weaknesses, the most 
directly relevant being Kelly's assumption of the dichotomous nature of 
constructs. Even when this assumption is weakened by allowing grading 
between oppositional poles, the grid matrix retains a positivism that 
appears at variance with the main thrust of Kelly's theorising. 
The central chapters appraise technical aspects of grid methodology, 
dealing sequentially with elements, constructs, bipolarity, the 
completion of a grid matrix, analysis, and the stability of grid data. 
Analysis of underlying assumptions, reflection upon the 'grid literature', 
and some empirical studies indicate that grid methodology is often 
flawed in both conceptualisation and practice. While some improvements 
may be made regarding technique, element X construct interactions 
radically undermine the grid as a research instrument, as does Kelly's 
later claim for the importance of events. 
I further argue that short verbal labels are inadequate to bear the 
load of meaning that respondents wish to convey, and that grid 
vi 
methodology excludes the richness of figurative language: developments 
based upon fuzzy set theory are unlikely to improve matters. If, as I 
suggest, communication of meaning is a prime requirement of construct 
theory research, then alternative approaches to the elicitation of 
constructs are necessary. 
I conclude by sketching a possible response to the criticisms that 
have been advanced, and argue for a 'personal construct hermeneutics' 
in which theory and method are brought into a closer alignment. 
Indications are given of how this might be operationalised in terms of 
'accounts methodology' and of some of the implications for the conduct 
of research in the human sciences. 
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1 Introduction 
... 
in order that [a man] may have 
any success in learning he must be 
penetrated with a sense of the 
unsatisfactoriness of his present 
condition of knowledge. 
C. S. Peirce 
Collected Papers, 5.583" 
1.1 GENESIS 
In my beginning is my end. 
The opening line of T. S. Eliot's 'East Coker', in capturing the 
ambiguity of 'end, is simple and yet profound. We can foretell but 
a minute fraction of what will unfold in our lives, yet we often insist 
on planning with the utmost attention to detail, using as a foundation 
the current and imperfect state of our knowledge. Such a picture might 
constitute a vignette of much research conducted within the realm of 
the human sciences, 
I in which a particular theoretical stance is 
adopted, empirical work is conducted, and the findings are interpreted 
in the light of the grounding theory. Events which were not anticipated 
at the outset become 'error noise' to be ignored or to be explained away 
by further ad hoc theorising. This positivistic approach to research 
lacks a genuine openness to aspects of 'end' as yet unrevealed and, I 
shall argue, is inappropriate to research conducted within the framework 
of Personal Construct Theory. 
The problem of 'end' has pervaded the research described in the follow- 
ing pages. My intention was to use the repertory grid merely as a tool, 
but the difficulties I came across in using it led me ever deeper into 
an investigation first of the grid and its theoretical substrate and, 
second, of how theory and method might evolve to the benefit of future 
research. In Radnitzky's (1968) terms, this has meant a shift from a 
predominantly T-type (technical) piece of research mainly concerned with 
solving a relatively small problem to a Q-type (question raising) study 
which problematises that which it often taken for granted. 
2 
My original end was to investigate what kind of staff development 
programme might be most beneficial to science schoolteachers newly- 
2 
embarked on their careers in secondary schools. The first, probationary 
year in teaching is a critical time in that it involves a process of 
socialisation more far-reaching than is likely within short periods of 
teaching practice, and at the same time the probationer is under scrutiny 
regarding his or her acceptability as a member of the teaching profession. 
The Manchester Local Education Authority has given consistent support to 
in-service education in a variety of ways: the focus of my interest in 
1978 was an LEA-sponsored induction course for science teachers which 
drew upon a range of expertise within schools, institutions of higher 
education and the authority's on advisers and inspectors. The questions 
uppermost in my mind were the extent to which the course programme matched 
the needs identified by the course participants, and whether the course 
content might be changed in order to accommodate any unmet needs. 
George Kelly's psychology of personal constructs seemed to offer an 
approach to exploring the way in which these probationary science teachers 
construed the task of teaching without the imposition of my own 
categorisations and prejudices upon them3. Moreover, the repertory 
grid seemed an admirable instrument for systematising in a rigorous way 
the collection of the teachers' constructs. 
Fourteen teachers agreed to participate in a study of their construing 
of first year science teaching during their probationary year (1978- 
1979). Nine came from Manchester and five from a nearby authority 
which did not run a comparable induction programmes there seemed to be 
potential advantages in contrasting the two groups even though nothing 
could be done to control the variables involved. Repertory grids were 
administered as near to the beginning and end of the academic year as 
was possible, the elements being fifteen previously piloted aspects of 
science teaching and the constructs being elicited on each occasion by 
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Kelly's method of triads. After each grid elicitation feedback was 
provided based on INGRID analyses (Slater, n. d. ), and this provided a 
measure of cross-checking on both computer output and the inferences 
which I drew. Many of these teachers found the repertory grid 
procedure interesting in itself, and some commented that it made them 
think in new ways about what they were doing as science teachers. 
However, during the year in which this study took place it became 
apparent to me that the repertory grid, as a research instrument, was 
more problematic than the literature had led me to believe. Whilst 
a grid could be subjected to sophisticated statistical analyses, it 
seemed to be giving a very limited depiction of the respondents' 
construing. Further, a scrutiny of the elicitation process revealed 
that there were a number of serious flaws in the technique that either 
had been glossed over in the literature or had simply not been 
recognised. Given that I was becoming increasingly uneasy about the 
quality of the information I had acquired by means of the repertory 
grid (even though this was supported by recordings of conversations I 
had had with respondents), it seemed that there was insufficient warrant 
for drawing the 'staff development' conclusions I had originally hoped 
to make. Were I to write up the research as it stood (and thereby 
strongly imply its substantiveness), I would be in a morally untenable 
position. 
1.2 TOWARDS A CRITIQUE OF METHOD 
The alternative option (which rapidly became Hobson's choice) was to 
invert my original intentions. Instead of using the repertory grid 
to investigate the personal constructs of science teachers, I could use 
the understandings gained from my work with them as the basis of a 
critical appraisal of grid methodology. Returning for a moment to 
14. 
T. S. Eliot, the 'obvious' original end to which I had devoted the 
initial phase of my research had become subverted, confronted and 
overwhelmed by a latent end which had only become manifest after a 
couple of years of research and reflection. 
By now highly critical of my on work I began to turn my attention to 
that of others, which I had hitherto accepted rather unquestioningly. 
Had they found similar difficulties, and 
- 
if so 
- 
had these been 
marginalised or overlooked? Fundamental questions arose. What does 
a grid actually elicit, and what does it fail to elicit? How valid is 
grid methodology, and could any general estimate of validity be made 
despite the assertion that each grid is inevitably unique? To what 
extent does the repertory grid cohere with its parent theory - and how 
does the theory itself stand up to scrutiny in the light of some of the 
problems thrown up by my inquiry into methodology? 
Questions such as these have a range of implications that is too vast 
to be tackled within the scope of the present work. I have chosen to 
make the repertory grid the initial focus of convenience of this study: 
this has entailed a limited critique of Kellian theory, but a full 
appraisal has not been attempted. Similarly, matters which bear upon 
grid-methodology (such as memory and linguistics) are discussed more 
brielMy than their potential importance warrants. As my account 
develops, it will become increasingly obvious that its focus shifts from 
the plane of the grid itself to that of a different methodology which is 
nevertheless consistent with what I take to be the central tenets of 
Personal Construct Theory. 
1.3 ARCHITECTONIC 
The transformation of this study (from one in which a particular method 
was chosen to collect evidence to one in which the evidence collected 
is used to support a critique of the generative method) has been rather 
like taking one turn around a Möbius strip. But even this simile 
implies an ordering of thought far greater than occurred as the study 
unfolded. In exploring the repertory grid I worked 
- 
often haphazard- 
ly 
- 
from mainstream considerations to tributaries and then back to the 
mainstream again. It is only in the writing of this account that the 
full shape of my argument has begun to emerge with a measure of coherence 
from a series of rudimentary sketches ranging from the distant peaks of 
philsophical abstraction to local artefacts of empirical investigation. 
I have chosen an approach to presentation which I hope the reader will 
find bath logical and helpful. Rather than provide a review of the 
literature at the outset (and this would have been lengthy indeed), it 
seemed preferable to subdivide this appraisal into a sequence of 
thematic chapters, each with its on evidence, review of literature and 
discussion, my own empirical work being drawn upon where appropriate. 
As I worked on this study the empirical work diminished in importance 
when set against the theoretical argument I was developing: rather 
than overburden the text with a plethora of empirical detail, I have 
collected the main data from this side of the study into a series of 
appendices for the reader who wishes to examine it in greater depth. 
There is a price to be paid for this mode of presentation, but it 
seems to be small: there is some duplication of material between 
chapters in the interests of both the continuity of argument and cross- 
referencing. I have nevertheless endeavoured to keep this to a minimum. 
The text has been written with three types of reader in mind. First, 
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some readers will be interested in appraising (and perhaps improving) 
the quality of the grids which they are using. These aspects of grid 
method are fundamentally technical, and the relevant material is 
concentrated in Chapters 5 to 10. A summary of the main methodologic- 
al findings is given in Section 12.2. 
In view of the comparative lack of criticism of Kelly's theory in the 
literature, some readers may be interested in the discussion presented 
in Chapters 2 to 4 and Chapter 11, which provides the framework for 
the appraisal of method mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 
Finally, those readers who share my unease regarding theory and method 
(or who come to share it-) may also be prepared to accept the radical 
aspects of my critique which emerge at certain points in the text (for 
instance, in Section 8.4). These confront the "established orthodoxy" 
of the repertory grid and deem as totally inadequate the mere tinkering 
with the details of a methodology that stands in fundamental contra- 
diction to its parent theory. 
Taken as a whole, Chapters 2 to 12 can be read as a sustained antithesis 
to the "received view" of construct theory and grid method. Chapter 13 
is an attempt to go beyond the contradictions in theory and method and 
to sketch a new synthesis suggestive of a direction in which research 
within the Kellian tradition might begin to move. 
1.4 INFRASTRUCTURE 
Kelly is rather coy5 about the writers who influenced his philosophical 
and methodological position, save for John Dewey (perhaps the most 
acclaimed figure in American philosophical circles, though the mantle 
of greatness may turn out to have been the original property of 
7 
C. S.. Peirce). In Chapter 2I make a limited attempt to track Kelly's 
thought back through the American tradition of Iragmatism and to 
indicate where the Kantian metaphysics of personal construing 
constitutes a departure from the realist assumptions of much pragmatist 
thinking. The metaphor of 'man the scientist' is discussed, and this 
leads into a consideration of the 'goodness of fit' between Personal 
Construct Theory and modern developments in the philosophy of science. 
A comparison between Kellian and Lakatosian theorising emphasises 
that, in much construct theory research, there is a gap between super- 
ordinate theory and practical methodology. I propose that the way in 
which Kelly appears to operationalise his theory (and hence the 
theoretical substrate itself) suggests a more appropriate home within 
the domain of the interpretive human sciences. This proposition 
indicates that I intend to 'read' Kelly in a critical, and at times 
unorthodox, way: the philosophical and methodological implications are 
left in abeyance until Chapter 13. 
In Chapter 3 the focus is the assumptive structure of the theory itself. 
The user of repertory grids necessarily employs Personal Construct 
Theory from a cognitive stance, and my appraisal emphasises the 
cognitive aspects of the theory in so far as they are relevant to grid 
use. A number of counter-arguments are developed against Kelly's 
assumptions, the most important for the grid user being the challenge 
made to the Dichotomy Corollary. At this point I develop a rather 
lengthy argument that, in essence, dichotomous construing is but a 
subset of the ways in which construing may take place. If this argument 
is valid, it exposes the repertory grid as imposing unwarranted 
restrictions upon the ways in which information may be gathered from 
respondents. 
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A fair proportion of Chapter 4 is given to a discussion of the 
inability of the repertory grid to reveal much about the structure of 
a construct system (or, put another way, to capture the intention of 
the Organization Corollary). This is not a fault to be laid at the 
door of the repertory grid, for structural considerations largely lie 
outside its terms of reference: however, the discussion is necessary 
because of the number of studies that have made structural claims on 
the basis of repertory grid data. More pertinent to research grounded 
in construct theory is the linguistic impoverishment 'imposed' by the 
repertory grid. I press the argument that, if communication of meaning 
is the prime consideration, then the short verbal tage typical of grid 
method are inadequate. (Linguistic aspects of grid methodology are 
treated more fully in Chapter ii. ) There is a further, and more 
fundamental, point made in this chapter: the use of such labels to 
define the ends of scales gives the grid a positivistic orientation 
that renders it incompatible with the major tenets of Kellian theory. 
Chapters 5 to 10 embrace a sequence of technical matters relating to 
grid use. Chapter 5 is given to a consideration of the choice of 
elements to be used in a grid, a matter to which little attention has 
been given in the literature. I argue that this is a critical issue 
for the grid user and that it is important that elements be carefully 
selected, bearing in mind the context of the research and their 
adequacy as a sample from the domain being studied. Other issues 
discussed include the decision regarding the elicitation or provision 
of elements, and problems relating to the elements' meaningfulness, 
salience and stability. 
Constructs are the theme of Chapter 6.1 begin by examining Kelly's 
assumptions regarding constructs before turning to the practicalities 
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of eliciting constructs from respondents. As with elements, whether 
to elicit or to supply constructs is an issue for the grid user. 
After a fairly lengthy discussion of the matters involved (which 
includes that of the relationship between personal relevance and 
extremity of rating) I come down on the side of elicitation. Kelly 
pragmatically identifies a number of types of construct, and other 
workers have attempted similar classifications in the light of 
particular problems: such evidence as I have found suggests that 
research claiming to support some of Kelly's typal distinctions is 
inadequately grounded, and that the ad hoc classification of constructs 
is of limited value. At the end of the chapter I suggest that the 
existential status of many constructs is ambiguous and that, without 
considerable care on the part of the researcher in specifying the 
context of the research and the nature of the elements, a grid will 
contain a pot-pourri of constructs whose ontological significance is 
indeterminate. 
Kelly argues strongly in favour of dichotomous construing (combining 
both opposition and relevance), and equally strongly against the notion 
of 'concept' enshrined in classical logic. In Chapter 3I make a 
challenge to Kelly's position at the level of theory, and Chapter 7 
offers an elaboration from the standpoint of practical utility. The 
evidence adduced by Kelly in support of his claim is shown to be meagre, 
and I advance a number of objections by considering how some ostensibly 
bipolar constructs in both repertory grid and semantic differential 
research have been, or might be, used. 
The cells of a grid matrix may be filled in a number of ways 
- 
by 
dichotomous allocation of elements to construct poles, by ranking, or 
by ratings each method has its particular advantages and disadvantages. 
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Whilst all three methods are considered in Chapter 8, I give the bulk 
of my attention to rating since this seems to be the most widely used 
in research. The evidence I present suggests that, far from being a 
simple linear psychological continuum, a rating scale (whether in a 
repertory grid or in some other instrument) can subsume complex 
relationships between its metrical, semantic and evaluative aspects. 
Further, and given the existence of rating scales, it seems likely that 
there is a variety of ways in which respondents actually use rating 
scales 
-a matter that seems to have been overlooked in previous 
research. As with the semantic differential there seems to be a 
strong possibility of interaction effects in a grid, particularly 
between elements and constructs: it is in respect of this issue that 
the radical aspect of my critique begins to manifest itself with some 
sharpness. If element X construct interaction is a major feature of 
repertory grids, then the whole concept of the repertory grid is 
drastically undercut. 
Given a completed grid matrix, and ignoring the doubts about the validity 
of rating scales, there arises the problem of analysing it in such a 
way as to preserve the maximum aznmunt of information in the minimum 
of space 
- 
the 'minimax problem', as Kelly put it. A number of 
analytical routines are available for grid data, but only Slater's 
INGRID principal components analysis and Thomas and Shaw's FOCUS two- 
way cluster analysis are widely accessible. Chapter 9 surveys the 
advantages and disadvantages of these two approaches (concentrating on 
the analysis of single grids), and of an alternative approach combining 
one-way cluster analysis and profiling. All of the routines discussed 
are in difficulty when a grid has blank cells (or when it contains 'not 
applicable' responses), and I argue that a modified version of the 
'cluster and profile' method is best able to cope with the problems 
11 
involved. Whichever analytical approach is adopted, the researcher 
is faced with the interpretation of the output: I suggest that this 
is not always a straightforward matter for an individual grid, and 
that the aggregation of grids is likely to, highlight commonality to 
the almost complete exclusion of individual differences. Towards the 
end of the chapter I discuss some unresolved issues in analysis, and 
then conclude by arguing that if my radical scepticism regarding the 
grid is accepted, then an entirely different approach to analysis is 
required. 
The last of the technical chapters, Chapter 10, deals with the notions 
of stability and change. Whilst Kellian theory sees virtue (and not 
vice) in change, I argue that, if a grid is to have other than a 
transient meaning, there must be a core of stability around which 
change may take place. A review of the evidence, coupled with some 
empirical investigation on my part, suggests that the concept of 
stability is underlain by a"complexity that is ill-recognised in the 
literature. A number of factors are tentatively put forward as likely 
influences on stability, but these await a more rigorous investigation 
than has been possible here. As with analytical routines, missing 
data makes it difficult to complete meaningful stability coefficients 
based on correlational procedures, and I suggest that stability is best 
calculated on the basis of the summation of 'per cell' changes compared 
with the maximum change possible in the original grid. 
The problem of language, adumbrated in Chapter 4 and at other points 
in the succeeding chapters, is addressed directly in Chapter 11. 
Taking a deterministic perspective, I argue that construing is profound- 
ly influenced by language norms but that the coexistence of an 
idiolectic overlay makes wive interpretation of a respondents 
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construing a questionable procedure. Further, natural language 
contains far more communicative potential than can be actualised 
through the short construct labels typical of grid use. Taking as 
axiomatic the Kellian researcher's desire to maximise an understanding 
of a respondent's construing, I suggest that an approach to research 
which acknowledges speech act theory is more appropriate than grid 
methods, whilst fuzzy set theory is leading to a methodological cul- 
de-sac. Speech act theory offers a prospect of congruence between 
method of inquiry and interpretation, although the latter ultimately 
requires the broader perspective of hermeneutics. 
In Chapter 12 I discuss the validity of repertory grid methodology 
and summarise the main technical points that have arisen in preceding 
chapters. I suggest that many of the problems of the repertory grid 
threaten its validity as a research instrument, but that the threats 
I have identified extend to other instruments as well. At the end of 
the chapter I return to the ihilosophical conflict between theory and 
method identified in Chapter 4. Holding the discussion back to this 
point allows me to use it as a lead into Chapter 13 by taking 
up Pepper's (1942) contextualist root metaphor and by developing the 
theme of Kelly the historian in contrast to that of Kelly the scientist. 
Chapter 13 is frankly speculative, but necessary in the light of the 
criticism spread throughout the preceding chapters. Despite its 
length it is no more than an outline sketch for a possible reorientation 
of theory and method which retains the standpoint of existential 
phenomenology whose fundamental coherence with Kelly's intentions I 
believe has not been compromised by my critique. This reorientation 
allies Personal Construct Theory to Heideggerian ontology and emphasises 
the radical historicity of 'the events as they appear' (contra 
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Husserlian phenomenology). It is also hermeneutic in Dilthey's sense 
and, if a few liberties are taken with the so-called 'hermeneutic 
circle', it seems possible to draw into the sketch some of the 
exploratory aspects of pragmatist thinking and thereby to combine the 
retrospection of verstehen (and its inward spiral towards understand- 
ing) with the outward spiral of exploration. 
In this sketch the natural and applied sciences, with their experimental 
and observational methods, are treated as a subset of human endeavours6. 
I argue that, although experimentation has a part to play in a 
humanistic psychology, the understanding of another's construct system 
is based upon a hermeneutic process which draws upon a quasi-legal 
approach to 'procedural evidence'. An important component of this 
process is the appreciation of the other's intentions. These 
constitute the link between construing and purposive behaviour (action)- 
a link that is sparsely represented in the research literature (apart 
from clinical studies), perhaps because it is unavailable to experiment- 
al method. 
The outline of what I have chosen to call 'personal construct 
hermeneutics' has drawn on theoretical perspectives in which under- 
standing, interpretation and explanation are foregrounded, notably from 
analytical history and that branch of literary criticism in which 
authorial intentions are allowed as legitimate. Whilst both respond- 
ent and researcher are seen primarily as interpreters of their inviron- 
ments, the demands of research make the latter's approach a far from 
naive process which calls upon, and ultimately goes beyond, 
phenomenology and phenomenography, 
It seemed to me that I would be ducking the Issue of research practice 
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were I to leave the argument at the level of abstraction, and the 
second phase of the chapter attempts to indicate how what is largely 
an 'accounts' based methodology might be operationalised. Following 
a consideration of some of the problems and practicalities regarding 
the elicitation of accounts, I propose a systematic approach which has 
as its focus the respondent's construing of salient events and the 
implicative relationships surrounding and connecting them. Not being 
satisfied with testimony alone, I indicate where cross-validation 
might be undertaken, and this leads to an examination of some of the 
problems of interpretation. 
The methodology which I propose is not without its broader implications 
for research, and I conclude my account by considering some of these. 
Perhaps the most critical to methodological individualism is the issue 
of generalisation, and I argue for an abductive approach (using C. S. 
Peirce's terminology) in contrast to the actuarial-inductive approach 
typical of research conducted under the rubric of sampling statistics. 
Abductive generalisation emphasises the building of theory, rather 
than its confirmation: given the fragmented state of theory in the 
human sciences, this would seem to be a not unreasonable aim. 
1.5 ON CRITICISM 
The conceptual and methodological research described in the following 
pages is partial in at least two senses. It is partial in that it 
is based firmly on a cognitive perspective despite Kelly's claim for 
the unification of the cognitive, conative and affective within his 
theory. It is also partial in the sense that I have emphasised the 
historical side of Kellian theory and practice in contrast to the 
scientific. The reader must judge whether the case I have attempted 
to make is sufficiently convincing to merit further exploration, despite 
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its acknowledged incompleteness. 
At this juncture I must anticipate two criticisms. 
Since I have centred this inquiry upon the repertory grid it might be 
felt that I have indulged myself in a lengthy, and at times violent, 
attack on a straw man. Many users of grids might wish to contend 
that grid data are only part of the information which they collect 
from their respondents. Two points need to be made here. First, 
the literature contains a considerable number of studies in which 
reference is only made to grid content, and hence the reader may be 
justified in inferring that these reflect a mono-methodic approach. 
Second, in many cases where information derived from interviews is 
incorporated into the research report it is strongly implicit that 
this is a subsidiary aspect of the methodology which is used to support 
the (primary) grid findings7. In either case the researcher is view- 
ing the respondent from what is tantamount to a fixed point: what is 
seen may be an illusion determined by the standpoint, rather like the 
Posso ceiling of the church of S. Ignatio, Rome. If, as I claim, 
8 
the grid is seriously flawed as a research instrument it will be 
insufficient for a critic to offer the defence that the repertory grid 
is but part of the Kellian's methodological equipment: what the grid 
user must do is to give the main points of my argument against its 
validity a convincing rebuttal. 
The second potential criticism relates to the empirical work which is 
largely documented within the appendices. The investigations which I 
have undertaken have not been tightly controlled psychological 
experiments. A number of problems of fieldwork in social research 
(such as differential co-operation and 'mortality') have not been 
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overcome, although I have minimised their effects as far as has been 
feasible. It might have been possible to have been more rigorous in 
this respect, but this would either have required more time than was 
available to me or, crucially, would have curtailed the conceptual 
span of this study. My choice has been for broad brush-strokes on a 
large canvas and against the detail of a miniature: the empirical 
work, therefore, has been used to aid my conceptualisations and does 
not pretend to offer a filigree of finely-wrought conclusions. (There 
is something of a methodological parallel with Bartlett's, 1932, work 
on remembering, though at a less exalted level). 
What I have written will probably be contentious to many working in 
the field of personal construct psychology, and perhaps particularly 
so to grid users. In developing my arguments I have found it necessary 
to criticise the work of others 
- 
at times quite trenchantly. 
Nevertheless, the writings I oppose have been a vital stimulus to my 
thinking, and I owe their authors a considerable debt. I hope that, 
in turn, my writing will be treated likewise by others. Controversy 
is essential to progress in research and is surely consistent with 
constructive alternativism. 
All that I have read of Kelly leads me to picture a man with a mind 
open to alternative possibilities and to the challenge and counter- 
challenge of argument. No doubt he would have vigorously taken issue 
with many of the points I make in this text, and he would probably have 
insisted that I have badly misconstrued aspects of his theory. He 
would, I am sure, have recognised that my spending a great deal of time 
in criticising both method and theory is an indication that I take his 
formulations very seriously: despite his likely disagreement with my 
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analysis and conclusions my guess is that, all things considered, he 
would have approved the intention 
- 
if not the outcome. 
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2A scientific theory ? 
Construct theory and the 
philosophy of science 
Behaviour is indeed a question posed 
in such a way as to commit man 
to the role and obligations of an 
experimenter. 
G. A. Kelly 
1970 b: 260-261. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
George Kelly is at pains to make the point that Personal Construct 
Psychology is a scientific psychology concerned with people's life- 
experiments in the interests of prediction and control. This 
chapter explores the pragmatist background of his thinking and 
indicates where the notion of personal construing departs from the 
realist assumptions of the pragmatist tradition. 
The guiding metaphor of 'man the scientist' is discussed, and this 
leads into the largest section of the chapter which attempts to look 
at Kelly's theory in the light of developments in the philosophy of 
science. During this discussion a number of problems emerge whose 
solutions may lie beyond the scientific realm within which Kelly 
construed his own theory. 
2.2 THE PRAGMATIST BACKGROUND 
Kelly's Psychology of Personal Constructs owes much to 'America's 
natural philosophy' 
1, the tradition of pragmatism. Kelly specifically 
acknowledges his indebtedness to the philosophy of Dewey2, but it is 
posible to detect in his work echoes of ideas from other pragmatist 
philosophers (notably C. S. Peirce and William James), though the 
routes by which this thinking has entered Kelly's writing are unclear. 
The pragmatist tradition deriving from Peirce's pioneering work is 
realist and empiricist in character: Peirce made explicit his rejection 
of ontological metaphysics as a 'meaningless gibberish' of verbal 
circularity or absurdity, and asserted that what remained was a series 
of problems capable of being investigated by the observational methods 
of the true sciences3. Truth, for the pragmatist (James's 
'satisfaction' criterion notwithstanding 
4), 
was a reality which could 
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only be approached asymptotically through a series of approximations 
and could never be reached in practice. But while truth might rest 
on an ultimate consensus reached as a result of progressively refined 
experimentation, it would not necessarily have any practical utility, 
as Peirce was aware5. In practice, people accept some things as 
"true"6 (the provisional nature of this being often unacknowledged) 
in order to explore other things: in terms of Neurath's metaphor?, 
we replace the rotting timbers of our ship, one by one, as it sails 
along, trusting the while in the structural integrity of the remainder. 
Kelly charts a similar course. Though he makes a claim for the 
reality of the universe 
, 
in practice he is more concerned with the 
psychological processes of existence and development than in the quest 
for absolute truths. For Kelly truth is a relativistic construct; 
not a stationary achievement, but something provisional and dynamic9. 
Why should one wish to explore the reality of the world? Both Peirce 
and Dewey stressed the importance of a sense of doubt, uncertainty or 
perplexity as a stimulus which people sought to eliminate through 
solving the manifested problem. Such a position is fundamentally 
homeostatic and would appear to be the philosophical ground-bask for 
cognitive dissonance theory10. The cognitive aspect of the problem- 
solving activity set in motion by a sense of uncertainty was clearly 
outlined by Dewey (1916a) in his description of the stages of what he 
termed 'reflective experience'. These stages are worth recording 
here because of the implicit parallel with Kelly's guiding metaphor 
of 'man the scientist'. 
Dewey's five stages of reflective experience are 
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' (i) perplexity, confusion, doubt, due to the fact that 
one is implicated in an incomplete situation whose 
full character is not yet determined; 
(ii) a conjectural anticipation 
-a tentative interpretation 
of the given elements, attributing to them a tendency 
to effect certain consequences; 
(iii) a careful survey (examination, inspection, exploration, 
analysis) of all attainable consideration which will define and clarify the problem in hand; 
(iv) a consequent elaboration of the tentative hypothesis 
to make it more precise and more consistent, because 
squaring with a wider range of facts; 
(v) taking one stand upon the projected hypothesis as a 
plan of action which is applied to the existing state 
of affairs; doing something overtly to bring about 
the anticipated result, and thereby testing the 
hypothesis. ' 11 
Dewey went on to observe that the extent and accuracy of stages (iii) 
and (iv) marked off a distinctively reflective experience from trial 
and error, though he recognised that, in practice, one could never get 
away completely from trial and error since no hypothesis could ever be 
constructed which would take into account all the impinging factors. 
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Kelly's metaphor of 'man the scientist' catches the empiricism present 
in pragmatist thinking. Following Dewey, he makes the central 
assumption that people are inherently active13 and seeking to explore 
their environment in order to predict and control it. Acting in the 
manner of scientists (albeit loosely, as will be argued later), their 
behaviour is purposive, an on-going experiment 
14, involving the testing 
of hypotheses implicit in the ways in which they construe the world. 
The notion of personal construing is crucial to Kelly's formulation of 
Personal Construct Theory: he sees people as examining the world 
through 'transparent patterns or templets' (constructs) which they 
create for themselves and which they attempt to match to the reality 
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of the world15. In Kellian terms, this is a dynamic activity in 
which people are continually seeking to improve this 'match' by 
adjusting their systems of constructs in the light of corroboration or 
refutation of their hypotheseslý'. While much of this experimentation 
necessarily involves sense-data, it is important to note that Kelly 
sees construct systems as involving hierarchical abstractions which 
may well be removed a considerable distance from the sense-data to 
which they relate. It is thus possible to conduct 'thought 
experiments' 
- 
and hence influence construct systems - without making 
direct reference to sense-data: in this, Kelly is close to Dewey's 
(1933) later description of the phases of reflective thought11. It 
is evident that Kelly's theoretical position (his own transparent 
templets) is tinted by a Kantian metaphysics which pulls it away from 
the empiricism predominant in pragmatist philosophy, though not to the 
point of total separation. 
Kelly recognises that construct systems (or, to be more accurate, parts 
of construct systems) can be communicated and hence shared17. In this 
he is in harmony with the pragmatist view of knowledge as public and 
general; pragmatism as a social theory of truth, reality, knowledge 
and meaning18. However, Kelly's-emphasis on the personal, individual 
nature of construing19 (some of which may never be verbalised) has led 
him towards a position of methodological individualism which is at 
variance with mainstream pragmatist assumptions and which - as Holland 
(1970) suggests 
- 
has much in common with existentialism20. This can 
be seen, for instance, in the opening pages of 'The Psychology of 
Personal Constructs' where Kelly is at pains to draw attention to the 
autonomy of all people within democratic systems21, contrasting this 
with the asymmetry of power in systems 
- 
religious or otherwise 
- 
of 
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rulers and ruled. This 
- 
almost Nietzschian 
- 
view of self- 
responsibility runs like a leitmotiv through the psychology he has 
constructed. 
2.3 THE BOUNDARIES OF KELLIAN THEORY 
It must be stressed here that Kelly does not presume to offer any kind 
of universal theory. He makes it clear that his theory has a 
restricted field of application, limited to the field of human 
personality and having a specific focus on interpersonal relationships. 
He also indicates that his theory represents an interim position which 
might become extended or contracted in the course of time. Since 
1955, when the theory was formally published, there has been a steady 
growth of interest in his work, and the range of convenience of the 
theory has been widened to subsume a diversity of human activity far 
beyond that discussed by Kelly in either his original work or his 
later writings. As a result, it is necessary for those interested in 
Personal Construct Theory to consider whether widening the aperture of 
the theory has restricted its depth of focus and led to greater 
conceptual and empirical fuzziness 
22. 
The arguments presented in the following pages offer partial answers 
to the questions of conceptualisation and empirical investigation, 
the greater emphasis being given to the latter in that this study 
centres on repertory grid methodology 
- 
an offshoot of Kellian theory 
that seems to flourish even where it is severed from its parent plant. 
However, an appraisal of methodology cannot ignore theory, and, 
although a full critique of Kelly's position is not attempted, the 
theory is examined in Chapter 3 largely from the perspective of its 
implications for the repertory grid. 
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In taking the view that people are active explorers of their 
environment, Kelly indicates that he was, in part, reacting against 
what he termed 'push' theories based on stimuli and 'pull' theories 
based on inner needs23. He sees both of these types of theory as 
failing to take account of the contribution that people (qua persons) 
make to the determining of their own behaviour. The general tenor 
of Kelly's writing. suggests that he set up his own theory in 
contradistinction to others (in particular, behaviourism). To do 
this, however, is to treat the respective theories as comparable in 
terms of both level of conceptualisation and practical utility, and 
hence to claim a polarisation which, from another perspective, might 
be less easily justified. 
An alternative construal might see Kelly's theory and, for example, 
behaviourism as complementary. Throughout their lives people are 
bombarded with sought and unsought stimuli in immense profusion and 
variety. Kelly's theory (in its concern with purposiveness, 
anticipation, prediction and control) emphasises the sought at the 
expense of the unsought, whereas in a behaviouristic psychology the 
reverse is the case. The position sketched in Chapter 13 is located 
in the complementarist's perspective. 
It may be that Kelly's opposition to behaviourism accounts for his 
giving relatively little space in his writing to unintended happenings 
impinging on the person, for Dewey (1916a) had earlier made a point 
of drawing attention to both the active and the passive components of 
3xperience, seeing activity as relating to 'trying' (and made explicit 
in the term 'experiment') and passivity as 'undergoing' 
. 
Or, as 
2 
Rychlak (1973) observes (in the context of existential analysis, and 
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using a terminology closer to Kelly's), 'activity' could be seen as 
the self's conceptualisation of its experience, and 'passivity' as 
the experience's impact on the self: one can learn either way25. The 
point is important because of its implications for Kelly's Fundamental 
Postulate, which is discussed in Chapter 3. 
The point is also important because of its implications for the 
development of construct systems themselves. Kelly makes it clear 
that, for his purposes, the physiological aspects of psychology are 
largely taken for granted. The focus of convenience of his theory is 
interpersonal relations as seen through human explorative and inter- 
pretive activity. But in order to interpret one has to have a 
framework for interpreting, and there is a serious gap in Personal 
Construct Theory in that it has very little to say about the establish- 
went of an interpretive framework (i. e, a construct system), despite 
offering rather more about how an already existing system may be 
modified in the light of experience26. Had Kelly addressed himself 
to the problems of relating Personal Construct Theory to developmental 
psychology (thus going beyond the boundaries of his clinical experience 
with adults), he would have been faced more directly with the questions 
of, first, the origin of construct systems27 and, second, their 
subsequent elaboration through interactions between individuals and 
between individual and environment. In this wider frame of reference 
it would be expected that more attention would have been given to 
the internal dialogues between perception and conception ('construction' 
in Kelly's terms) and thought and word (in Vygotsky's, 1962 , sense), 
the act of construing itself developing the construct system. Such 
an approach would not deny the essential activity inherent in human 
existence and would subsume more clearly both the responsive and 
purposive aspects of human functioning. 28 
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Criticism has been levelled against Kelly on the grounds that he gives 
inadequate consideration to the power of social forces to influence 
construct systems29, and it may be as a result of this that recent 
writing (for example, Stringer and Bannister, 1979; Bannister and 
Fransella, 1980) has begun to foreground the more broadly social 
aspects of the theory which Kelly, with his clinical interests, does 
not develop. For the present purpose it is sufficient to indicate 
that the 'transparent patterns or templets' through which people see 
the world are not wholly self-constructed (as Kelly strongly implies), 
but are to a very considerable extent determined by the cultural 
environment30. The crucial factor here is language. The importance 
of language to construing, and to repertory grid methodology in 
particular, is discussed in Chapter U. 
2.4 THE METAPHOR OF 'THE SCIENTIST' 
Kelly is well aware of the limitations of his metaphor and makes it 
clear that he is referring to the scientist-like aspects of all people 
in their attempts to explore their environment with the aim of 
predicting and controlling it. The danger with metaphor is that it 
can be pressed too far. It is doubtful whether people are as 
explorative as Kelly suggests, and it can be argued that construct 
systems provide the framework for a set of rules for behaviour as well 
a basis for exploration31. Maier's problem-solving experiments (such 
as the 'hatrack problem': Maier, 1945) and Hudson's (1966) work on 
convergent and divergent thinking are two examples which demonstrate 
what might be termed 'inertia in construing', the former showing the 
inertia to persist even when it was apparent that the constructs being 
used were failing to lead to an adequate solution. 
In addition, Luchins's (1942) work on the Einstellung effect showed 
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how, once a particular way of solving the 'water Jug' problem had been 
worked out, alternative 
- 
and quicker 
- 
solutions were not seen. 
Peterson and Beach (1967) examined the cognate metaphor of the 
'intuitive statistician' who seeks to behave optimally. They pointed 
out that it is very difficult to sample events multidimensionally, 
and that the likely outcomes would be a failure to extract all the 
information that was available, resulting in a conservative approach 
to behaviour. The complexity of human experience would seem to take 
the 'intuitive statistician' far from the simple, unidimensional 
tasks that Attneave (1959) found to be undertaken with remarkable 
degrees of accuracy32. Postman and Tolman (1959) argued that people 
were forced to adopt a flexible strategy of subjective probability 
regarding cues enabling inferences to be made about objects capable of 
varying multidimensionally. 
Taylor and Fiske (1978), in criticising H. H. Kelley's (1971) notion of 
the naive scientist, take a more jaundiced view of human behaviour 
and suggest that, instead of using scientist-like processes, 'many 
perceivers seek a single, sufficient and salient explanation for 
behavior, often the first satisfactory one that comes along'33 
They suggest (reminiscent of Newcomb's, 1931, 'logical error') that 
positive instances weigh heavier than negative instances in the 
subjective estimation of correlations. 
The view of Taylor and Fiske receives some support from a study by 
Wason (1960) who presented psychology students with the set of 
integers 2,4,6 and asked them to identify the underlying rule. 
There was a strong tendency for respondents to use strategies which 
were confirmatory rather than refutational, and some of the 
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respondents therefore found considerable difficulty in ascertaining 
the rule which was simply 'three integers in ascending order'. 
More recently, Snyder and Swann (1978) found a similar confirmatory 
bias when students had to outline a strategy to gain evidence as to 
whether a "target" person who had been labelled extrovert or introvert 
actually was so. They found that, even when the probability of 
confirmation was as low as seven in thirty, confirmatory strategies 
were typically employed34. 
The evidence presented here suggests that it is doubtful whether 
people typically follow to the full the stages of reflective thinking 
outlined by Dewey (see page 22 above), since it seems that stages (iii) 
and (iv), relating to problem clarification and the refining of 
hypotheses, tend to be underused and may even be absent. This 
effectively short-circuits Dewey's schema and would seem likely to 
lead to the testing 
- 
in stage (v) 
- 
of a very loose, perhaps implicit 
hypothesis derived from stage (ii). Invalidation would then allow 
the loose hypothesis to be maintained with little or no change whilst 
other aspects of the problem were explored. Alternatively, and as 
Dewey himself suggests, the effect is to reduce the problem-solving 
process to trial and error, the trials being ill thought-out in the 
first place. 
Kelly recognised that a good scientist would wish to put a theory to 
the test and would be prepared to change it in the light of 
invalidation. Presumably a very good scientist would wish to put 
the theory to the most carefully thought-out and stringent test 
possible. On the evidence it seems plausible to conclude that, in 
general, people are not very good scientists, being given to 
inadequate testing of their hypotheses and to a reluctance to change 
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them even when they are disconfirmed. One might further conclude 
that there is a tendency for construct systems to be possessed of a 
psychological inertia which manifests itself as a resistance to 
change. 
The point of this discussion has not been to invalidate Kelly's 
metaphor, but rather to point out that more may be read into it than 
can be justified in practice. Everyday human behaviour is partials 
if this be construed as a failing, perhaps it is as well to remember 
that scientists are human beings too. 
2.5 PERSONAL CONSTRUCT HEORY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
At various points in his writing Kelly strongly suggests that his 
theoretical formulation is scientific35, and the reflexivity embedded 
in the metaphor of 'man the scientist' extends the scientific attitude 
across the breadth of human action. His point of view implicitly 
invites the reader to construe the theory in scientific terms, and 
in this section I examine construct theory in the light of recent 
developments in the philosophy of science. 
It may be objected that it is unfair to appraise a theory published 
in 1955 against the tenets of more recent philosophising. However, 
Kelly made only minor modifications to the theory before his death 
in 1966 and, despite some subsequent attempts to add statements to 
the theory, it still remains substantially unaltered. The theory 
continues to attract new followers, further suggesting that an 
examination be conducted in the light of current thinking rather than 
be grounded within its historical horizon. This course of 
action is potentially to Kelly's advantage, given the shift of 
emphasis in the philosophy of science from the structure of scientific 
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theory to the life-world within which the scientist acts. 
For the moment, though, I wish to focus briefly on the structure of 
theory. Nagel (1961) draws attention to the painstaking care with 
which a scientific theory needs to be stated and to the necessity 
for precision in the articulation of the interrelationship between 
its component parts36, and Popper (1972a) points to the importance of 
consistency, arguing that a self-contradictory system allows any 
conclusion to be derived from it37. Tested against the cutting 
edge of this view of scientific theorising, Personal Construct Theory 
can only be construed as inadequate. The formal content of the 
theory, expressed through its Fundamental Postulate and eleven 
Corollaries, is imprecise in the articulation of its components and 
their interrelationships. There is sufficient slack in the 
theoretical framework to absorb the shock of challenges from empirical 
investigation 
- 
not that all of its statements are open to empirical 
appraisal, for the empiricist would find considerable difficulty in 
testing (for instance) the tautologous Commonality Corollary, and 
also the Choice and Dichotomy Corollaries which can always be 
defended by appealing to the existence of initial conditions of 
which the researcher was unaware. 
Kelly emphasises in his writing that a good theory 'provides an 
explicit framework within which certain deductions may be made and 
future events anticipated'38 and, more loosely, 'a general framework 
within which certain facts may be held in place, pending one's 
induction of some specific principle among them'39. Either way, 
the emphasis is towards the future, towards prediction and the 
testing of hypotheses. In Kelly's eyes, the nature of a scientific 
theory coheres with his metaphor of people as scientists who test 
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hypotheses: it entails experimentation 
- 
though, as was pointed out 
earlier 
40, the experiment may be conducted in the mind as well as 
through observable actions. 
Kelly's view of scientific theorising is ambiguous, and it would be 
unfair to attack the theory for its lack of scientific rigour when 
he may be intending to offer only a climate (or Weltanschauung 41 
within which theorising can take place, rather than a 'completely 
logic-tight' system 
2. However, such an open-textured approach to 
theorising undermines his assertion of the virtue. of testable 
hypotheses (cf. Popper, 1972a, above) when he writes: 
A criterion of a good psychological theory is its 
production of hypotheses which are testable. In 
contrast to other construction systems, any scientific 
theory should enable one to make predictions so precise 
that they are immediately subject to incontrovertible 
verification. This means that the hypotheses which 
are deduced from the theory should be brittle enough to 
be shattered whenever the facts they lead one to 
anticipate fail to materialize. 
The theory itself need not be so fragile as its offspring 
hypotheses. If it is a comprehensive theory it is 
likely to possess some degree of elasticity even though 
the hypotheses deduced from it are brittle. Rarely 
does a scientific theory wholly stand or fall on the 
outcome of a single crucial experiment. 43 
Here Kelly fails to disentangle the development of a network of 
theoretical statements from the practicalities of testing hypotheses. 
There is always a disjunction between statements in the language of 
theory and those in the language of observation; as Nagel (1961) points 
out, the co-ordination between observations and theory is 'comparative- 
ly loose and imprecise' 9 involving further theoretical assumptions 
which are very often left unarticulated. In other words, hypotheses 
are more difficult to shatter than Kelly would lead one to believe 
- 
but such is a problem for all scientific inquiry. 
1%0% 
Kelly places great value on the fertility of a theory 
45 (its 
capacity to subsume creative ideation), thus implicitly denying his 
earlier claim that a good theory offers an explicit framework for 
deduction. His later writing emphasises the polarisation when he 
contrasts the narrowness and rigidity of 'accumulative fragmentalism', 
in which nuggets of truth are collected piece by piece, with his own 
position of 'constructive alternativism'46 
-a kind of liberal 
pluralism in respect of the individual's supposed freedom to construe 
the universe in his or her own way. Kelly does not say that 
accumulative fragmentalism is wrong; indeed, he points out that it 
is not inconsistent with constructive alternativism. The implication, 
however, is that it is trivial and of short range compared with the 
broad sweep of constructions of the world. 
But his colourful presentation again over-polarises the issues. 
Construct systems evolve with time as the individual reinterprets the 
life-world. For the most part, this evolution is likely to be slow, 
and to take place in peripheral rather than core constructs. 
Occasionally the construer may, like Saul, undergo a quantum shift 
to a new world view 
- 
but this can hardly be more than infrequent 
without implying mental instability. I would argue that most change 
is more akin to accumulative fragmentalism, in that people test their 
construction-hypotheses in limited ways (Kelly himself says that 
people try them out 'in test-tube proportions' 
47): 
what emerges is 
not a closer approximation to some absolute truth but 
- 
perhaps 
-a 
more coherent world-view. 
Whilst a strong case can be made for the fertility of a theory, the 
operationalisation of construct theory has been accompanied by 
considerable variation in interpretation and hypothesis generation. 
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As cases in point, the very flexibility-of the theory has permitted 
workers to claim on'its behalf the validity of various indexes of 
cognitive complexity48 and structure 
49 
which appear to bear little 
relationship to each other within their respective domains. 
The critical issue for construct theory is the conceptual gap between 
the formal content of the Fundamental Postulate and Corollaries on 
one hand, and testable hypotheses on the other. What is missing is 
a set of related subordinate theoretical statements capable of being 
formulated as testable hypotheses: D. E. Bolton (1978) half makes the 
point when he observes that, whilst construct theory is capable of 
subsuming much of empirical psychology, there is a difficulty when 
one tries to tie it (as a metatheory) to experimental procedures. 
Kelly is well aware of the gap51, but defends his position by saying, 
in effect, that it is not his problem: operationalisation is a 
primary concern for the experimenter, but only a secondary concern 
for the theorist52. What this does is to thrust the burden of 
middle-level theorising on to the experimenter since, by his own 
admission, his theoretical framework does not entail particular 
deductive statements53. Bannister and Mair (1968) admit that the 
high level of abstraction of the theory will be considered a weak 
point by some, but point to the advantages of a theory which deals 
with the way that people organise their experience and anticipate 
events, rather than with the minutiae of existences. To judge 
from the literature, researchers basing their work on construct theory 
have responded to its general conceptual attractiveness without paying 
much attention to its inadequacies regarding middle-level theorising. 
To be fair to Kelly, the criticism advanced in the preceding 
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paragraphs is a little too sweeping. Kelly acts as his own middle- 
level theorist and experimenter in the domain of interest dealing 
with dimensions of transition. In Chapters 9 and 10 of 'The 
Psychology of Personal Constructs' he not only locates his theory 
at the focus of its convenience, clinical psychotherapy, but also 
' gives the clinician a set of professional constructs within which 
he can subsume the personal constructs of his clients'55 
- 
to all 
intents and purposes, a middle-level theory. It is at this point in 
his book that Kelly's writing begins to communicate to me some of 
the implications of his theoretical position and to bridge the gap 
between theory and method that, for me, yawned wide in the preceding 
451 pages. 
Kelly's descriptions of constructs such as 'threat', 'anxiety' and 
'guilt' are elaborations of the basic theory, but are limited to 
transition within a psychotherapeutic setting. They provide 
theoretical statements at a level low enough for correspondence rules 
to be articulated linking them to statements in the observational 
language 
- 
that is, the client's behaviour. These relationships 
are not free from ambiguity, and Kelly's explications of clinical 
practice in the second of his two volumes indicate that he has had to 
incorporate concepts from outside construct theory in order to 
maximise its usefulness. Indeed, Kelly openly admits to an eclectic 
subsumption of psychotherapeutic procedures within the framework of 
his theory5', observing that the appropriate procedures vary from 
case to case and that 'a procedure which is used predominantly with 
one client may never be used in precisely the same way with another' 
57. 
In other words (and in tune with the Individuality Corollary) each 
client is a unique 'event' 
-a point to which I shall return later. 
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Mackay (1975) sharply criticises therapy grounded in construct theory 
as being supported by an assortment of plagiarised techniques which 
are used in an ad hoc manner'-. In so far as techniques are not 
given a rationale within the theoretical framework, the criticism is 
fair. However, if psychotherapy is construed in terms of experiment 
and observation one can expect, following Nagel's point noted earlier, 
that it may well involve theoretical assumptions and techniques from 
outside the articulated theoretical framework. Theory in the human 
sciences generally is subject to a multiplicity of interrelating 
perspectives, and is unlikely to be adequate to its purposes if it 
is developed deductively from a limited number of basic postulates59. 
Or, turning the point round, any item of data from the human sciences 
is likely to be interpretable from a- probably indefinite 
- 
set of 
theoretical positions: this issue of 'overdetermination' of data by 
theory will recur at various points, and especially in Chapter 13. 
Although, as will be noted in Chapter 3, criticisms have been levelled 
against the detail of Kelly's theory, these have been sporadic and 
fragmented and have dealt with specific aspects of the theory rather 
than with the theory as a whole. The evidence of the literature 
suggests that these have been insufficient to stimulate an appraisal 
of the strengths and weaknesses of stating a theory at a high level 
of absträ. ction. It-must be said straightaway that there is a strength 
in centring theory on personal construing since it reflects the now 
widely acknowledged 'theory-ladenness' of observation and 
60 interpretation. It is when interpretations diverge under Kelly's 
licence that problems appear. 
The literature to be cited in the subsequent chapters provides plenty 
of evidence for divergence as far as grid-based studies are concerned, 
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perhaps the weightiest being in the (already identified) area of 
cognitive complexity where, in the name of Kellian theory, a wide 
range of indexes is manifested 
- 
and few high intercorrelations appear 
to obtain. There is little guidance from the theory as to which of 
these indexes is most compatible with it 
- 
making the assumption that 
the notion of cognitive complexity is itself compatible (a matter which 
is open to debate). 
In the light of my reading of the literature pertaining to construct 
theory and its application I am tempted to suggest that methodological 
developments (and, by inference, middle-level theory) have tended to 
develop radially from the hub of Kelly's original formulation with 
little attempt having been made to link the radii through a web of 
interconnections (that is, where the theoretical acknowledgement to 
Kelly has been more than a cursory nod towards the virtue of 
respondents 'telling it as it is'). 61 Hence there has been a failure 
to establish the meshing of theoretical statements that Nagel sees as 
an essential part of scientific theorising. 
To make this point is not to imply that a psychological theory which 
claims to be formulated scientifically can be stated in terms as precise 
as those used in, say, physics: all I am arguing is that there is a 
need for cross-links to be established in order that the coherence of 
the theory may be made more explicit. With people as the 'objects' 
of such a theory it seems unrealistic for this articulation to be 
feasible at other than a fairly broad level. 
Kelly's theory, then, has to be appraised at two levels: at that of 
psychotherapy, and within the broader context claimed for it by its 
growing band of adherents. Drawing parallels with the work of 
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Lakatos (1970) on 'research programmes', and for the moment consider- 
ing the theory from the point of view of psychotherapy, the 
Fundamental Postulate and Corollaries can be construed as components 
of the 'hard core' (or 'negative heuristic') to which the modus 
tollens of classical logic is not applied. Kelly, it will be 
remembered, asks his readers to accept the Fundamental Postulate 
(and by implication the Corollaries) as the basis upon which the 
theory is constructed. 
The hard core has to be oriented towards the actual testing of 
theory, and lakatos gives the term 'positive heuristic' to the 
(often loosely articulated) set of framing devices which suggest the 
paths to be pursued by the researcher. It is only where Kelly 
explicates the dimensions of diagnosis and transition62 that there 
is a reasonably clear indication of the psychotherapeutic direction 
which he wishes his theory to take: here, perhaps, is best captured 
the idea of the positive heuristic. The third element of Lakatos's 
characterisation, the 'protective belt', refers to the body of theories 
which are the specific instantiations of the general research 
programme. In Kellian terms these can be construed as the theoretical 
statements made by the therapist about the client, which are tested 
in the light of the latter's acts and actions 
63. 
Outside the domain of psychotherapy 
- 
and Kelly makes it clear that 
he does not draw the same boundaries as other psychotherapists 
- 
the 
Lakatosian parallel is of value in that it highlights the inadequate 
development of positive heuristics to cover, for example, the social 
aspects of construing in the life-world. This weakness renders 
research beyond the confines of the psychotherapist's room vulnerable 
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to being criticised as ad hoc and inadequately grounded in theory. 
So, whilst Kelly's claim for his theory 
- 
that it is in keeping with 
'the model of the modern philosophy of science' 
64 
- 
would seem to be 
broadly justified in the context of psychotherapy65, the extension 
of the theory into other milieux has yet to attain that status. 
But the Lakatosian simile must not be pressed too far. Laudan (1977), 
for one, has pointed to the difficulties associated with Lakatos's 
assumptions regarding the inviolability of the hard core and the 
cumulative entailment of successive theories subsumed by the research 
programme66. Iaudan puts forward the idea of 'research traditions' 
which offer a "broad steer" for theory and method, and which overcome 
the rigidities in Lakatos's position 
67. 
Laudan observes that, 
although some theories may be acceptable at the empirical level, they 
may nevertheless fall into question at the level of conceptualisation; 
that is, in respect of the way they fit into broader frameworks of 
assumptions 
. 
Empiricism alone, according to Laudan, is insufficient 
to account for movements in the conceptualisation of theory. He might 
have gone on to draw attention to the often implicit 
- 
and sometimes 
well concealed 
- 
assumption of absolute truth in empiricist method- 
ology69 which believes that conjecture and refutation will result in 
successive approximations to, or increasing correspondence with, 
"reality" (rather in the manner of those mathematical problems which 
have snails climbing up the slippery walls of wells)70. 
Laudan's theorising is broadly in harmony with three points I wish 
to make. First, although a number of studies involving repertory 
grids can be said to have 'worked' (in that broad support has been 
given to the predictions made) the relationship between empirical 
findings and theoretical position is often far from clear. One has 
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only to examine the various 'grid measures' employed by researchers to 
recognise the point being made: the difficulty lies in trying to assess 
whether theory and method are coherent or, if the empirical and the 
theoretical appear discordant, whether this is due to a disjunction 
between theory and method or to flaws within the theory itself, In 
Chapter 3a number of challenges will be made to basic tenets of 
construct theory which have serious implications for methodology and 
hence for empirical findings. Laudan's suppression of the negative 
heuristic's immune defence system legitimates the questioning of basic 
theory and its evolution in the light of conceptually-grounded criticism. 
Second, there is no need for successive refinements of theory to subsume 
progressively greater amounts of empirical and logical content. As a 
theory develops, some initial assumptions may be eliminated as new 
assumptions are found to be more coherent with the theoretical structure: 
the theory, while remaining within the ambit of its research tradition, 
grows at one boundary as it decays at another (the processes sustaining 
lenticular clouds above and to the lee of hills offer a useful physical 
analogy). In making this switch of emphasis the notion of truth has 
moved away from 'correspondence' to 'coherence', the latter position 
being more congenial to the theoretician in the human sciences given 
the complexity embedded in the simplest piece of research involving 
people. The 'coherence' theorist seeks the most internally consistent 
set of statements that is possible against a background of knowledge 
that is currently sparse 
- 
and likely to remain so for the foreseeable 
future' 
. 
Although Kelly wants it both ways, his hankerings for a 
correspondence theory of truth (in the pragmatist sense of Peirce) are 
ultimately subordinated to a coherence theory based on the validation 
of constructs by reference to others in the same person's system72. 
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Laudan makes it clear that the relationship between a research 
tradition and theories is not one of entailment in either directions 
'A research tradition, at best, specifies a general 
ontology for nature, and a general method for solving 
natural problems within a natural domain. A theory, 
on the other hand, articulates a very specific ontology 73 
and a number of specific and testable lawa about nature' . 
Kelly would probably have been happy with Iaudan's distinction 
74 
although many working in the human sciences, whilst accepting the 
general thrust of Iaudan's point, might jib at the precision implicit 
in his elaboration of 'theory'. Laudan emphasises the looseness of 
fit between research tradition and theory: 
'... there are a number of mutually inconsistent theories 
which can claim allegiance to the same research tradition, 
and there are a number of different research traditions 
which can, in principle, provide the presuppositional 
base for any given theory'? 5. 
This leads me to the third point I wish to make. If a researcher is 
working within the ambit of a specific theory, it is likely that the 
work will be informed by a particular research tradition and that 
the outcomes will be construed in terms of the chosen framework. But 
Laudan's perspective allows the researcher to track back along other 
paths to different research traditions which offer the prespect of 
illuminating the work being undertaken. Atkin's (1981) idea of 
overlapping cover sets at different levels of abstraction neatly 
captures the point76, and indicates that it would be a false 
polarisation to suggest that interpretations of data need be mutually 
exclusive according to the particular theoretical tributary being 
followed. Kelly, with his emphasis on dichotomous construing at all 
levels of cognitive activity, runs the grave risk of elevating differ- 
ence above commonality 
77. 
If, following Laudan, one can tap into a range of research traditions, 
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the question of scientific prediction becomes more problematic. The 
physical scientist may not experience any difficulty, in that there 
may be a tightly intermeshed set of theoretical statements which lead 
to predictions subsequently confirmed by experiment. There may be 
no need to raise the eyes beyond what is happening on the laboratory 
bench: such might characterise a Kuhnian paradigm of 'normal science' 
in action. A 'scientific revolution' can only come about when the 
theories in use are realigned against other conceptual frameworks78. 
Successful prediction in science depends upon a determinate structure 
of theory. In the human sciences theory is much less tightly 
articulated and, taking into account the fact that the subjects of 
research are people who construe and react to situations in their own 
individual ways, prediction is an altogether more hazardous undertaking. 
Kelly emphasises prediction and control in his writing79, but most of 
this is related to the somewhat ad hoc predictive activities of people 
in the life-world and is not of any great help to the researcher 
concerned with the framing and testing of formal research hypotheses. 
In the context of theorising in psychology, the Kellian standpoint 
on prediction can only be described bluntly as inadequate and 
unconvincing. 
But not all scientific endeavour is directed towards control in a 
practical sense. The observational sciences, of which astronomy is 
perhaps the best example 
80, 
stress the building of theories through 
which the universe may be better understood and explained 
- 
for instance, 
the 'big-bang' theory of the origin of the universe. The opportunity 
to test hypotheses may present itself (as witness Eddington's test of 
Einstein's prediction that light rays are bent by gravitational fields), 
but this involves an opportunistic recognition that circumstances are 
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favourable rather than a conscious manipulation of those variables 
believed to have an influence on the situation being studied. 
Moreover, prediction is not an essential aspect of scientific inquiry. 
Sophisticated analytical techniques are employed to determine the 
origin of oil slicks found on the surface of the sea. The analysis 
will identify the type of oil, enabling those with a wider perspective 
to set that information against the knowledge of the vessels recently 
in the area. The purpose of the investigation is the attribution of 
origin and the explanation of how the slick came about 
- 
no doubt with 
a view to the apportionment of blame and the institution of legal 
proceedings. 
The point of the two preceding paragraphs is to begin to shift the 
discussion of construct theory from the original ground chosen by 
Kelly to a ground which takes greater cognisance of the explanatory 
function of science. Work conducted within the framework of Kelly's 
theory has acknowledged the explanatory function of empirical inquiry 
in addition to the predictive, and Adams-Webber (1979) speculates that 
the growth of constructive alternativism derives from its offer of 'a 
viable approach to psychologists who are interested in making sense 
of human experience as well as anticipating behaviour'81. To emphasise 
'making sense' is to accentuate the commonality of interest of science 
and history at the expense of their differences. 
When one examines Kelly's descriptions of how he operates as a 
psychotherapist one is struck by the way in which he seeks to explore 
why clients axe as they are, in order that they might 'conduct 
82 
experiments' through their subsequent behaviour. In other words, 
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by seeking to uncover the antecedents and current existential position 
of individuals Kelly is acting more in the manner of a historian than 
a scientist83 
Thus there seems to be a major contradiction between what Kelly claims 
for his theory in the name of science and the way in which he 
operationalises his'rtheory. The elevation of eclecticism to a 
virtue84 undercuts his attempt to construct a scientific psychology 
grounded in humanism, and reveals the epistemological flabbiness of 
his thinking. Yet the pluralism of constructive alternativism could 
be turned to better account were Kellians to recognise the strength 
of subsuming his theory under the philosophical banner of the 
interpretive and explanatory human sciences. This is too large a 
challenge to be taken up here: signposts towards this goal appear at 
various places in the following chapters, and an attempt is made in 
Chapter 13 to re-read Kelly from a human sciences perspective and to 
sketch out some of the methodological implications of this "paradigm 
shift". 
2.6 SUMMARY 
In this chapter the pragmatist substrate of construct theory was 
examined, the stress on personal construing being shown to be a 
deviation from mainstream pragmatist thought. The metaphor of the 
scientist was shown to be less persuasive than is implied in Kelly's 
writing, in that research indicates that people tend to show'a bias 
towards confirmation rather than refutation 
- 
in other words, they 
tend not to test their theories in the scientific sense. 
The case was argued that Kellian theory has much in common with the 
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comparatively flexible philosophical position of Laudan"s 'research 
traditions'. The main difficulty with the theory was shown to be 
associated with its high level of abstraction and the failure of 
workers within the Kellian tradition to produce a coherent middle- 
level theory which could be translated unambiguously into a programme 
of hypothesis-testing. 
Constructive alternativism is both epistemologically and methodologic- 
ally pluralistic, allowing data to be overdetermined by theory -a 
position shared by the human sciences, notably history. There is a 
strong filament of historical method running through the operation- 
alisation of construct theory, implying that a historical perspective 
might suggest ways of resolving the contradiction between a Kellian 
world-view oriented towards prediction and a methodology strongly 
grounded in understanding, interpretation and explanation. 
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3 Construct theory 
A cognitive perspective 
[Constructive alternativism] does remind us 
that all our present perceptions are open to 
question and reconsideration... 
G. A. Kelly 
1970 a: 1. 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Before embarking on an apparaisal-of Personal Construct Theory it is 
necessary to indicate that this appraisal will concentrate upon those 
aspects of the theory which have the most direct implications for 
repertory grid methodology. Apart from the Fundamental Postulate, 
these are taken to include the Construction, Dichotomy, Range and 
Organization Corollaries. This is not to deny that the other 
Corollaries have implications for grid uses however, their 
implications lie at a remove from grid methodology per se, and 
they will hence be considered more briefly. 
Though admitting that his theory was built upon an intellectual model, 
Kelly himself rejects the subdivision of psychology into cognition, 
conation and affection, since he sees all three as falling within the 
range of convenience of his theory. As far as repertory grids are 
l 
concerned, the manifestation of construct systems through them is 
largely limited to what can be communicated through language2. And 
whilst that language may express conative and affective aspects of a 
person's being, these are necessarily filtered through cognition into 
the overwhelming majority of grids. For the purposes of the present 
study, therefore, Personal Construct Theory will be examined through 
templets that are coloured with cognition. 
3.2 THE FUNDAMENTAL POSTULATE 
'A person's processes are psychologically channelized by 
the ways in which he anticipates events'3. 
If Kelly had been asked to indicate which single word of his Fundamental 
Postulate was the most important to him, it is likely that he would 
have chosen 'anticipates'. He saw anticipation as the driving force 
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('the push and pull') of personal construct psychology and, in using 
this word, he built into his theory its predictive and motivational 
features. The metaphor of the scientist is hardened here when he 
writes 'Like the prototype of the scientist that he is, man seeks 
prediction'. This is the nub of the Fundamental Postulate; but is 
Kelly's assertion wholly sufficient? 
Kelly pointed out that a postulate was an assumption, taken to be true 
for the purposes of developing a theory: to question the postulate 
would mean the use, explicitly or implicitly, of other postulates. 
And though, in presenting his theoretical structure, Kelly asks the 
reader to accept his postulate as an ad interim statement of truth, 
there is no reason why it should not be held up to scrutiny from an 
alternative perspective 
- 
indeed, one can imagine the philosophy of 
constructive alternativism welcoming it. 
There are two ways of examining Kelly's Fundamental Postulates first, 
to consider it within its own terms and, second, to look at it from an 
external perspe tive. Examination from an internal perspective suggests 
that the linear way in which the postulate is stated is an inadequate 
representation of what Kelly tries to convey in the bulk of his 
writing. In his elaboration of the Fundamental Postulate he makes it 
clear that it is the ways in which a person anticipates events that 
determine behaviour, appropriate psychological channels being establish- 
ed in the light of anticipation. The linearity of Kelly's statement 
seems to conceal a circularity, for how can a person anticipate events 
without in some way having already established psychological channels 
towards them? 
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The circularity is not necessarily vicious, but the imprecision in Kelly's 
writing does not help the reader to avoid viciousness. A reading which 
avoids the trap might focus on the ambiguity inherent in Kelly's terms 
and his failure to. give adequate weight to past experience. For the 
present, attention will be given to terminological ambiguity: experience 
will be considered shortly when the Fundamental Postulate is examined 
from an external perspective. 
Take, for example, 'processes 
4 
. 
This subsumes a range of levels of 
meaning, from which I shall select but two 
- 
cognition and purposive 
behaviour. Kelly asks the reader to construe the behaving organism 
as a process which operates through a network of pathways (a construct 
system). In the Organization Corollary he makes it plain that he views 
this network hierarchically: some constructs are superordinate to 
others. Kelly would probably have argued that all processes were 
interlinked in the construct system, and it would be difficult to 
challenge such a view. I would wish to argue, however, that treating 
'processes' in this undifferentiated way is fundamentally unhelpful. 
Purposive behaviour is a function of prior cognition. Construed in 
psychological terms, cognition is superordinate to purposive behaviour 
both structurally and temporally, even though new cognitions depend 
upon the outcomes of behaviour. This circularity can be represented 
diagrammatically5 as in Figure 3.1. 
Events have meaning only in so far as they can be construed, thus 
requiring the person to attempt to map them on to the existing construct 
system. A close matching at this point is unlikely to make much 
difference to the construct system and the event is assimilated: one 
might say that the event is a further corroboration of the existing 
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inductive generalisation(s) already made, and the implicit personal 
theory can be maintained. Further behaviour is undertaken on the 
assumption of the truth of this implicit personal theory (which is 
treated as a rule, or law). However, when the existing construct 
system is inadequate to subsume the event, the search strategy fails, 
and the person is forced to adapt the construct system to accommodate 
the discrepant aspects of experience. The personal theory has to be 
revised, implying the development of new hypotheses (though the rigour 
with which this test is conducted is open to some doubt, bearing in mind 
the earlier discussion of the metaphor of 'the scientist'). 
It is worth pointing out that Figure 3.1 represents the growth of 
construct systems since the number of events construed inevitably 
increases with time. The 'assimilation cycle' comes close to Kelly's 
description of 'definition' (of which more later, when the Choice 
Corollary is discussed), whereas the 'accommodation cycle' relates 
more closely to the extension of construct systems. 
6 
Had Kelly been more explicit about action in his theoretical formulation, 
perhaps acknowledging Dewey's (1916a) idea of the 'end-in-view' as a 
hypothesis or plan guiding activity7, his theory might have gained in 
clarity. Schütz (1967*) makes the distinction between levels of 
'process' when he suggests that action is always carried out in accord- 
ance with a 'plan more or less implicitly perceived'8. The plan is 
seen by Schütz as an intuitive advance picturing which is quite vague 
when compared with the real action that finally occurs, and it can be 
subdivided into a series of intermediate goals, the action towards each 
of which can be pictured in advance in the same way. Schütz's plan 
clearly implies a prior psychological channelling towards the projected 
event, whether or not the person is capable of articulating it. 
So far the argument presented has been concerned with purposive, 
intended behaviour, reflecting Kelly's emphasis on anticipation. But 
Figure 3.1 acknowledges that the world can 'happen to' the person 
(Dewey's recognition that people 'undergo' as well as 'try' was noted 
on page 25 ). To be fair to Kelly, it must be recorded that he 
discusses experience in terms of undergoing9, making the point that 
people can only make sense of events if they construe them: this is 
consistent with the schema of Figure 3.1. Yet if a person is to make 
sense of the world by construing it, it may be that he or she is seek- 
ing an explanation for the features of the world being as they are, 
rather than using the constructions in an anticipatory way. There is 
clearly a potential for anticipation in any explanation, since it is 
implicitly a theory, but it does not seem necessary to cast the 
Fundamental Postulate solely in terms of anticipation: I would wish 
to argue that the role of 'undergoing' experience should be given 
greater prominence when the sedimentation of a construct system is 
considered. 
Kierkegaard once observed that we live life forwards, but understand 
backwards, implying a model of cognition and action that contains both 
anticipatory and explanatory features. It can be argued against Kelly 
(as Pepper, 1942, argues against pragmatists in generall0) that he gives 
insufficient weight to the explanatory function of the scientist, and 
hence generally to the role of explanation in human experience. 
The following vignette, drawn from personal experience, illustrates 
the point I am trying to make here. 
I am riding my motorcycle, in the small hours of a wet November 
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morning, along a familiar road through a wood. The journey is routine, 
Rounding a sharp left-hand bend the motorcycle slides from under me, 
and I suddenly find myself bumping along, face-down, among the fallen 
leaves on the muddy verge. Uninjured, I pick up my stalled machine 
in order to restart it, only to find that something is preventing the 
engine from turning over. I push the motorcycle to the top of the 
rise and begin to coast down the slight hill on the other side. I let 
in the clutch, and to my surprise the engine fires and continues to run, 
albeit making ominous clattering noises. Nevertheless, it gets me 
home. Subsequent examination of the engine reveals a number of teeth 
broken from cogwheels in the gearbox. 
There are two points to be made here. First, I learn that wet leaves 
on roads are a hazard to motorcycles: I learn this not as a result of 
any anticipation (clearly such was lacking, or at least unavailable, 
in my construct system), but because, from my point of view, 'the world 
happened to me'. My processes have, as a result, been psychologically 
'channelized' 
- 
and that channelization now influences the way in which 
I anticipate further motorcycle riding. In other words, Kelly's 
Fundamental Postulate is reversed: my anticipations have been 
psychologically channelized by the ways in which I have construed 
ilý 
events 
The second point relates to my curiosity regarding why an engine which 
has apparently suffered a seizure can suddenly return to life. I am 
puzzled (Peirce and Dewey might have said I was in a state of doubt) 
but the puzzlement is removed once the crankcase is split open and the 
internal damage is revealed. I have an answer to the implicit question 
'why did it happen? ': the explanation that broken cog-teeth temporarily 
jammed the mechanism seems wholly reasonable. This does not add any 
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markedly new construct to my system, for I am already aware- that loose 
bits can jam intricate machinery: all that is added is another 
instance falling into an already defined category. Kelly might well 
have argued that the event would have helped me to define further my 
construct system and to anticipate future events (in that I would be 
better able to hypothesise the cause of jammed machinery), but in this 
case the argument reverts to that made in the previous paragraph: the 
construing of events influences my anticipations. For my part, the 
emphasis is on the defusing of what can be construed as a situation of 
cognitive dissonance, the function of science being explanatory rather 
than predictive in this case. 
It may be felt that it is inadequate to use a relatively simple 
explanation of a physical event as the starting-point for an argument 
for the role of explanation in the development of construct systems. 
However, in this wider human context, questions dealing with why people 
fall in love, commit murder, and suchlike are typically answered by 
sentences beginning with 'because'. In a court of law a lawyer might 
claim that a killer was not responsible for the action on the grounds 
of diminished responsibility; or a person might claim to have fallen in 
love with another because of the latter's similarity to a parent. Such 
explanations may be grossly simplistic12, yet may satisfy the questioner: 
whatever their level of sophistication, they are constructs of events in 
the world, whose potential for prediction may never be realised. 
Explanations are qualitatively different from hypothetico-deductive 
procedures in that they seek to identify the causal influences on an 
event that has already taken place, instead of testing the effect of 
selected variables believed to have a causal influence on a situation. 
Explanations are retrospective, whilst experimentation 
is prospectivet 
both fall within the realm of the scientist, and require painstaking 
investigation and the careful weighing of evidence. I labour the 
point because Kelly's view of the scientist seems unwarrantedly 
restricted in its emphasis on experimentation, prediction and control, 
and because the explanatory function of science receives little 
attention in his writing. In later writing Kelly 
(1970b) gives more 
weight to eventsl3s I shall argue in Chapter 13 that the explanation 
of events is a major concern for the personal construct theorist and 
researcher, and that the scientist and the historian are a lot closer 
than Kelly may have believed. 
3.3 THE COROLLARIES 
Kelly develops his Fundamental Postulate by stating eleven propositions 
which are partly derived from it and are partly further elaborations of 
his theoretical position. He admits that his theory is not logic-tight, 
but he sees greater importance in a theory's capacity to be provocative 
and to stimulate fertility of thought. The consequence of this 
- 
as 
he is well aware 
- 
is that everyone starting from the Fundamental 
Postulate will not necessarily make the same deductions from it 
14 
this presents difficulties for those who wish to test the theory. 
Kelly's theory is perhaps best construed as a metatheory15, a theory 
about theory making, which requires the user to provide theoretical 
content at an appropriate level for empirical testings the problems 
presented by this were discussed in the preceding chapter. 
It is not, however, proposed here to attempt to assess the relationship 
of the eleven Corollaries to the Fundamental Postulate, nor to offer a 
different set of derivations. Rather, in the pages that follow, an 
attempt is made to appraise the Corollaries as they stand 
from the 
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points of view of their internal coherence and of their standing in 
the light of cognate research. 
3.3.1 The Construction Corollary 
'A person anticipates events by construing their 
replications'l 
. 
In his discussion of this Corollary Kelly construes 'construing' as 
'placing an interpretation', a construct system being a framework for 
interpretation. Within this framework that which is being construed 
(in Kelly's terminology, the 'element') takes on meaning. He points 
out that it is the person, not the element, who is responsible for this 
structure. 
However, Kelly is not entirely consistent in his use of the term 
'construct'. In addition to its discriminative meaning17, constructs 
are described as 'being imposed upon events'18, as 'controls'(defining 
and limiting the options open to the person)19, and finally as 'pairs 
of hypntheses' which may be applied to any new element which the person 
wishes to construe 
20. But a construct cannot in itself constitute a 
control or a hypothesis, for these require the intersection of a 
construct with an element before the construct's potential for action 
can become meaningful. To criticise Kelly's own example of construct- 
as-hypothesis21, the construct 'black-white' can only become part of a 
hypothesis when brought into contact with an element. Offered a 
clenched fist containing a chess piece (and initially construing this 
as non-violent in intent), I can hypothesise that the piece is black 
(or white) on such grounds as are available to me: the hypothesis depends 
upon both element (chess piece) and construct (black-white). On this 
'reading', it is clear that T. Nischel (1964) is technically incorrect 
in his discussion of whether constructs can or cannot 
be falsified22. 
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Mischel takes the view that constructs are rules for making decisions 
about action23, and, as with hypotheses, this view is open to the 
objection that it does not take into consideration the element(s) to 
which the rule is potentially applicable. Kelly would probably have 
argued that to claim a construct to be a rule is to indulge in 
oversimplification. He makes the point that one should avoid the 
pre-emptiveness of construing elements as nothing but elements, and 
constructs as nothing but constructs, since this closes off options 
that might be explored with benefit. Why not, then, construe 
constructs as elements, abstracting from them those features to be 
taken as determinants of behaviour? The point can be illustrated in 
the following way. 
I have a view of Mediterranean resorts which subsumes the following 
construct poles: sunniness, warmth of sea, good night entertainment, 
interesting food, and so on. However, I am also aware of reports of 
pollution in the Mediterranean Sea. Wanting a holiday in which I can 
enjoy sea-bathing, I construe the constructs in terms of a superordinate 
construct 
'constructs which I will treat constructs which I will not 
as determining my choice treat as determining my choice' 
under which I assign to the left hand pole the negatively evaluated 
aspect of pollution, and to the right hand pole the other (positively 
evaluated) features of a Mediterranean holiday. The original constructs 
are not the rules: the rules arise from construing the original 
constructs in the light of a situation in which I need to act. 
Nischel is on stronger ground when he points out that constructs contain 
both descriptive and evaluative components 
24 
, 
the distinction being 
implicit in the illustration presented above. Harre and Secord 
(1972) 
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present a threefold dissection of constructs in their analysis of the 
description of a person as a coward: the description 
(i) states what the person is like (descriptive/interpretative); 
(ii) indicates the sort of behaviour the person is likely to 
show (anticipatory); and 
(iii) is a negative evaluation of the person25. 
The construct could be said to 'resonate' at different levels in the 
system in that it interacts with a different set of constructs in 
respect of (i), (ii) and (iii). Whilst the sets for (i) and (ii) 
might be quite similar, that for (iii)would seem to include a range of 
culturally-embedded constructs and might imply operation at a higher 
level of abstraction. 
Description (ii) can clearly be regarded as predictive in interest, 
and the prediction can only be appraised if the person is placed in an 
appropriately testing situation and due consideration is given to the 
person's behaviour in the light of the prevailing circumstances. This 
appraisal, as Kelly suggests, is likely to involve constructs at a 
different level from that at which the prediction is made. 
26 
The role of constructs in interpretation has yet to be considered. 
In Figure 3.1, following Kelly, the construct system was presented 
as a framework on to which incoming events were mapped, with varying 
degrees of success. Much of that framework may lie beneath 
consciousness, leaving the person to produce some form of post hoc 
rationale as a plausible reconstruction of the interpretation already 
made. Hirsch (1967) suggests, in the context of literary criticism, 
that an initial guess is made as to the 'genre' of the meaning-complex 
being confronted, this being done on a gestalt-like sense of the whole. 
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This genre then acts as a heuristic framework for the further 
investigation and interpretation of the event27. It is the initial 
guess that is of main interest here, for it is an implicit hypothesis 
that the event being construed is of a particular type. This 
hypothesis can only be grounded in prior experience, that is, in the 
construct system already established (whether that be substantially 
available to consciousness or not). The guess, as a provisional 
identification of type, will tend to divert processes into the 
assimilation cycle until such time as the subsequently-unearthed 
evidence is discrepant - in which case a different genre may be 
substituted, or the existing construct system may be revised. 
Hirsch's view is hermeneutic, and it seems capable of being extended 
into the broad area of cognitive psychology. Interpretation begins 
with an act of categorisation, the category system being, in Bateson's 
(1973*) terms, 'comparatively hard-programmed' to enable human 
functioning to be economical through the establishment of habits 
. 
As Bruner et al (1956) observe, categorisation 
(i) provides a means by which objects may be identified; 
(ii) allows the ordering and relating of classes of events; 
(iii) reduces the complexity of the environment, and hence 
the necessity for constant learning; and 
(iv) provides directions for human instrumental activity29. 
But categorisation is not a static, one-and-for-all activity. Memory 
is active and constructive, as Bartlett (1932) showed. Whilst people 
may store genres or standard episodes 
('scripts' as Schank and Abelson, 
1977, term them), these are open to revision in the light of experience 
since no event can be identical to any previous event or 
'ideal type': 
deviation from the norm is the norm, and modification of the norm 
is 
the consequence. 
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Some of the disagreement over the status of constructs may have its 
origin in a semantic ambiguity. Though Kelly writes of 'construction 
systems', the literature generally seems not to make a distinction 
between 'construction systems' and 'construct systems'. At the level 
of system there-may well be little pragmatic difference, but when events 
are being considered the distinction may be of greater importance for 
the theorist. If a construct is a dimension of discrimination, it can 
be argued that a construction relates to the application of the construct 
to an event. A construct may, in Tulving's (1972) terms, be laid down 
in semantic memory, whereas a construction (an event-having-been- 
construed) would be stored in episodic memory. A system will contain 
both constructs abstracted from events and constructions of the actual 
events themselves. One can then talk of invalid constructions without 
calling the construct into question30. 
In this discussion of the Construction Corollary there has been a crucial 
omission, paralleling an omission in Kelly's writing: that is the 
importance of language in construing. The question of language is also 
a critical one for repertory grid methodology and I defer the main 
discussion of this issue to Chapter 11, since I wish to treat it at 
greater length than would be appropriate here. 
3.3.2 The Dichotomy and Range Corollaries 
'A person's construction system is composed of a finite 
number of dichotomous constructs-3 
. 
'A construct is convenient for the anticipation of a 
finite range of events only'32. 
One word of the Dichotomy Corollary has stimulated an immense, and still 
unresolved, debate: 'dichotomous'. Had Kelly omitted this word from the 
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Corollary it is quite likely that the Corollary would have been accepted 
without much dispute. The debate regarding the dichotomous nature of 
constructs is of great importance for repertory grid methodology, much 
of which is explicitly based upon the assumption of dichotomy. 
The Dichotomy Corollary is based upon a contrast theory of meaning 
coupled with the notion of relevance33. For Kelly, a construct is a 
discrimination which involves both similarity and contrast: this 
requires a minimum of three elements in order that two may be seen to 
be similar in respect of some relevant subjective criterion and to 
stand in contrast with the third. The criterion may be, for example, 
an attribute or a function. 
Kelly's triadic method of elicitation produces both explicit negations 
and oppositions. Resnick and Landfield (1961) draw a different 
distinction between 'logical' and 'peculiar' constructs, but their 
categorisation obscures the subdivisions within the 'logical' category 
which have implications for both the completion and analysis of a grid 
matrix. These different types of distinction are shown in 
Figure 3.2 35. 
Traditional logic operates on the principle of set inclusion: elements 
are assigned to a set if they possess the relevant property X36, and are 
excluded from it if they do not. The constructs in traditional logic 
are strict negations, 'X - not V. 
Kelly attacks this method of approach on the ground that it lumps 
together everything that is 'not X', irrespective of the elements' degree 
of relevance to the situation being construed: one would not wish, 
for 
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TYPE OF CONSTRUCT 
(Resnick and DIAGRAMMATIC NATURE OF 
Landiield) REPRESENTATION BIPOLARITY EXAMPLE 
X Negation happy 
- 
not happy 
Logical 
Negation/ happy 
- 
unhappy 
opposition 
Opposition happy 
- 
sad 
Peculiar 
x 
n'; Non-contiguous happy 
- 
businesslike 
iti oppos on 
Figure 3.2 Negation, opposition and non-contiguous opposition. 
The shaded area in the diagrams represents 'not V. 
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example, to construe a rainbow in terms of 'trustworthy - untrustworthy'. 
He replaces the negation of the`X 
- 
not X'construct by the opposition 
of the 'X 
- 
Y' type of construct, in which X and Y represent contrast- 
ing properties within a superordinate framework to which the 
distinction between X and Y is relevant37. The Kellian 'X 
- 
Y' 
construct thus excludes as outside its 'lange of convenience' anything 
to which the distinction could not be applied - hence the Range 
Corollary. 
Kelly pays little attention to non-contiguous opposition, making the 
assumption that the oppositional poles remain subordinated to a 
framing concept and that the respondent does not give, for X and Y, 
the emergent poles of two different dimensions. My experience of 
administering grids shows that non-contiguous oppositions can occur, 
particularly if the administrator remains detached from the elicitation 
procedure38. The variation in types of construct has considerable 
implications for the ways in which grid matrices are completed and 
analysed, as will be discussed in Chapters 8 and 9. 
Setting aside the problems introduced by non-contiguous opposition, 
Kelly's claim that his approach to constructs departs from that of 
classical logic must be examined. An analysis of an example which 
Kelly himself gives39 suggests that he may be closer to formal logic 
than he recognises. 
Four elements are presented: A and B are men, C is a woman, and 0 is 
the time of day. Kelly suggests that, faced with these four elements, 
an aspect of A, B and C is abstracted 
(e. g. sex), which is not applicable 
to 0: in other words, Kelly implicitly sets up the construct 
'have sex 
- 
do not have sex'. He then takes A, B and 
C (subsumed under the 'have 
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sex' pole) and differentiates them in terms of 'male - female' (or, to 
a first approximation, 'male - not male' or 'female - not female': in 
terms of logic, it makes no matter which). The correspondence of 
Kelly's explication with the canons of classical logic is highlighted 
in Figure 3.3 
" 
Have sex (A, B, c) 
Not 
Male male (A, B) (C) 
Do not have sex (0) 
Figure 3.3 An example of Kellian construing construed in terms 
of classical logic: cf, 
. 
Kelly (1955160)- 
It will be noticed that, in my interpretation of Kelly's example, I 
have injected a change: I have replaced 'sex' by the bipolar construct 
'have sex 
- 
do not have sex'. Kelly introduces 'sex' without any 
indication of what its contrast might be, and in doing so glosses over 
the problem of opposition being applied to noun forms. His discussion 
of proper names as constructs implicitly indicates the uneasiness of 
his position, in that he only refers to noun contrast in a negating 
'X 
- 
not X' sense rather than in an oppositional'X 
- 
Y' sense 
40 
, 
Elaborating the point, what is the opposite of, say, 'table'? The 
logician would answer 'not table', whereas a Kellian reply would 
perhaps be 'chair, within the range of things called furniture'. To 
this, the questioner might ask for the opposite of 'furniture', and I 
suspect that sooner or later the Kellian respondent would be forced to 
use a 'not X' negation. 
Ogden (1967*' indicated the difficulties associated with noun 
ö-r 
opposition 
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and it would seem that similar difficulties obtain with 
verbs. However, where linguistic qualifiers (adjectives and adverbs) 
are concerned the problems seem markedly reduced, though not completely 
eliminated. It may be that repertory grid methodology, which tends 
to concentrate on the antonymy of adjectives or adjectival phrases 
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has masked the difficulties associated with the Kellian perspective 
on contrast43. 
Whilst it is clear that words can have a number of semantic opposites 
depending on the context (for instance, 'woman' may be oppositional 
to 'man' or 'girl ')4, and whilst naming a functional opposite may be 
helpful to researchers and clinicians 
45, 
the use of bipolarity does 
not entail that all construing is dichotomous 
46. 
The difficulties 
associated with such an assumption suggest that a search beyond the 
confines of dichotomy might prove fruitful. 
Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) advance the notion of 'contrastive 
sets' of mutually exclusive terms existing within the same semantic 
field47. Thus, in the realm of metals, one can identify gold, silver, 
copper, aluminium, iron, and so on. For many practical purposes the 
criterion of mutual exclusivity may be necessary even when the 
boundaries are fuzzy 
- 
for instance, in the realm of colour terms. 
Returning to the discussion of Figure 3.3, the category-division 
'male-female' is simplistic: hermaphrodites require a third category 
of 'both' under the 'have sex' pole. 
Kelly himself implicitly uses the'idea of contrastive sets from time to 
time. In delimiting his psychology of personal constructs he contrasts 
48 
psychology with both sociology and physiology ; and later, when 
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considering contrasts to red hair, he refers to the non-redness of the 
(categorically-equivalent terms) white, yellow, brown and black. 
In the latter case he ducks the issue when he observes that 'Our 
language gives no special word for this nonredness, but we have little 
difficulty in knowing what the contrast to red hair actually is 
9. 
Of course there is no difficulty: the contrast is any or all of the 
shades Kelly mentions and - to judge from observations of the 
hairdresser's art 
- 
not a few others besides! 
The contrastive set gets the construer off the hook of having to 
reconcile dichotomous construing in circumstances where a number of 
semantic items inhabit the same realm of meaning. Reverting to the 
previous concrete example of the metals, how, under a dichotomous 
construing model, do I come to construe a particular sample as being 
of copper? I could make a series of pairwise comparisons in my mind 
until I arrive at a plausible identification. The sequence might go 
'Gold or silver? Not silver. Gold or copper? Not gold. Copper 
or iron? Not iron.... ' and so on until it emerges that copper is the 
most likely option. Alternatively, I might work through a series of 
questions of the form 'Gold or not gold? ' until I come up with an 
answer that satisfies me5O. Neither approach would seem parsimonious. 
Work on recognition of category membership suggests a strategy of 
matching the stimulus to reference exemplars or ideal types stored in 
memory. Collins and Quillian (1969) propose a network model of memory 
in which instances are subsumed under hierarcMcaUy-ordered sets of 
increasing abstraction, a typical example being the subsumption of 
'canary' and 'ostrich' under 'bird', which is in turn subsumed under 
'animal'. Each level in the hierarchy is associated with particular 
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properties; thus an animal has skin, 'eats, breathes, and so on, 
whilst a bird is additionally specified in terms of the possession of 
wings and feathers. Collins and Quillian recognise this as an over- 
simplification when they note that people seem to store certain 
properties at more than one level, and in a later paper they indicate 
that concepts may be stored in terms of encyclopaedia-like knowledge 
instead of limited dictionary-like information51. Reaction-time 
studies suggest that, in general, recognition of an instance as a 
member of a category takes longer, the greater the number of levels 
between instance and category. The model is not entirely satisfactory, 
since there are exceptions: 'mammal' is, in reaction-time terms, 
more distant from 'dog' than is 'animal': Rips et al (1973) observe 
that familiarity of the concept, and commonsense usage might have a 
determining influence on the results52. They go on to suggest a 
feature-comparison model of memory in which each instance presents 
both defining and functional features, the latter being common to all 
members of the category whilst the former allow discrimination between 
instances53. As Collins and Loftus (1975) point out, the model 
presents problems regarding the extent to which defining features are 
recognised as such: and one might ask how many slow worms are killed, 
for instance, on the assumption that they are snakes? 
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The trouble with natural concepts is that most of them are ill-defined 
and have no simple set of criterial features, leaving them open to 
confusion when salient but non-characteristic features are present55. 
Rosch (1977), having worked extensively in the field of category 
recognition, concludes that focal examples ('prototypes') of categories 
are developed in the mind and act as reference standards against which 
stimuli may be judged56. The work of Posner and Keele (1968) and 
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and Reed (1972) on pattern recognition suggests that prototypes can be 
mentally constructed ('abducted', in Peirce's terms57) even though the 
basic pattern is not actually presented, or even does not exist 
58. 
Rosch points to the advantages to the individual of being able to 
discriminate finely and to integrate information into cognitively 
manageable proportions and suggests that the most cognitively economical 
strategy to resolve the conflict between the demands of differentiation 
and integration is to encode a category in terms of an image of an 
average category member. Rosch's 'prototypes' can be seen as combining 
aspects of both the network and feature-comparison models whilst over- 
coming at least some of their deficiencies. In her experiments Rosch 
has demonstrated that 'good' instances of category membership are 
recognised more quickly and more accurately than 'poor' instances, and 
Shepp (1978) notes that 'sameness' is processed too fast for multi- 
dimensional consideration59. These findings suggest that the initial 
recognition strategy is holistic (involving simple wholes, templates 
or configurations in pattern-matching: Garner, 197860), which is 
followed, should the matching process fail, by comparisons of component 
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attributes. In other words the pattern-matching embedded in the 
gestalt notion of the ideal type would appear to have a critical part 
to play in cognitive funtioning 
- 
even though the process is likely to 
be much less sharply defined in the world beyond the psychological 
laboratory, where abstractions and highly complex stimuli have to be 
processed. 
This has been a lengthy digression from the problem of construing a 
sample of metal as copper. In Rosch's terms, 'copper' becomes a 
category subsuming a disparate range of exemplars of copper metal, 
such as polished copper, a freshly exposed fracture surface of copper, 
green-tarnished copper and black oxidised copper. The first three 
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might match the 'prototype' of copper quite well, but the last is likely 
to be ambiguous1 for example, when cleaning the blackened interior of 
a central heating pump, I was surprised to find the metal to be copper. 
Then there is the problem of brasses and bronzes, which are less good 
members of the category 'copper'..... 
To return from the problems of cognitive metallurgy to that of whether 
one construes dichotomously, it is necessary to refer again to the 
notion of the 'contrastive set'. The argument presented above points 
fairly strongly to the conclusion that, for physical instances at 
least, construing in terms of a contrast theory of meaning does not 
require the restriction to dichotomy and that contrast in terms of 
multiple oppositions (some of which may be 'submerged'; that is, 
unavailable to awareness) is a plausible extension to Kelly's position. 
It may be that, in construing a sample of copper, I restrict the range 
of multiple oppositions to those metals of a yellow/pink hue 
- 
in which 
case I may merely be using an intermediate multiple opposition involv- 
ing colors as a filtering criterion, setting yellow-pink against light 
grey and dark grey. 
To restrict the argument to physical examples is not enough, for much 
construing takes place in terms of abstractions. Is there, then, a 
case to be made for extending the notion of contrastive sets to encompass 
abstractions? Reflection suggests that this might be justified, 
though the argument needs the support of formalised research if it is 
to be considered more than speculation. 
Take, for instance, a literary critic reading a book. He or she might 
construe it as reflecting a Marxist 
(or liberal, or conservative, or 
whatever) standpoint on the part of the author. How would such a 
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construal take place? There might be clues in the language (such as 
the use of words like 'struggle' or 'bourgeois') and in the subject 
matter (which might highlight exploitation and oppression under 
capitalistic circumstances). To return to Hirsch (1967), the 'genre' 
of what is printed would be recognised through a series of cues, some 
of which may lie outside the text itself (the rhetoric of the dust- 
jacket) and many of which will certainly lie within it. The initial 
presumption as to genre may or may not be a good one (as Kelly 
recognises in his explication of constructs), and may need to be 
revised as more of the text is read. The categories of judgment in 
this example are likely to be fuzzy since boundaries between rival 
political philosophies are typically imprecise. 
The use of cue validity as a probabilistic concept (Rosch and Mervis, 
1975: Rosch, 1977) would seem helpful here. The validity of a given 
cue X as a predictor of membership of category Y increases with the 
frequency with which, in general, X is associated with Y and decreases 
with the extent to which X is associated with categories other than 
Y62. On this probabilistic model the cue validity of a category would 
depend on the summation of the cue validities of the attributes used 
in judgment which, in turn, may be influenced by expectancy and context. 
Work by Tversky and Gati (1978) shows that judgments are influenced by 
context. As an example, when the pair of countries Portugal and Spain 
was provided, and the respondents were asked which one of France, 
Argentina and"Brazil was most like the pair, the respective percentages 
of choice were 45,41 and 11i.. On introducing Belgium in place of 
Argentina, the percentages were altered to France 18, Belgium 14 and 
Brazil 68. The change in context of judgment exercised a marked 
shift on the (implicit) weightings in Tversky and Gati's set theoretic 
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equation for similarity. 
Findings such as this 
- 
and the authors present a number of others 
- 
are consonant with those from experiments in recognition which show 
the power of a contextual expectancy set: one need look no further 
for examples than Bruner and Postman's (1949) aberrant playing cards; 
Abercrombie's (1960) X-ray photographs; Anderson et al's (1977) 
ambiguous prose passages, and 
T/-\E CA-AT 
which probably caused no problems as far as recognition is concerned63. 
Tversky and Gati's (1978) features-based set theoretic model of 
similarity/difference assesses the similarity of a pair of instances 
A and B in terms of three variables: the features common to A and B, 
those possessed by A but not by B, and those possessed by B but not 
by A. Each variable is weighted for salience in judgment and 
similarity is assessed by subtracting the weighted last two variables 
from the weighted first. This model considers the effect on 
similarity of the context, the direction of comparison, and whether 
the task is formulated in terms of similarity or difference. It also 
makes the assumption that people attend more to shared features in 
judgments of similarity than in judgments of difference, that they 
attend more to the subject than the referent of the comparison, and 
that features having a classifactory significance are more salient64. 
The work of Rosch and of Tversky and Gati emphasises judgments of 
similarity in respect of both concrete and abstract referents. If 
recognition tasks are processed too fast for multidimensional 
consideration59, then the suggestion of construing by a holistic, 
positive pattern-matching strategy must be seriously considered. 
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If people store in their memories 'prototypes' of concrete objects, 
and schemata or 'scripts' regarding human actions (and 
- 
perhaps 
- 
complex abstractions), construing may take place by selection of the 
most subjectively probable from a range of possible referents. The 
cases of the slow worm, the marsupial mouse and the helium atoms 
indicate that instances can exist on the borderlines of categorial 
distinctions (at the subjective level, if not with respect to more 
objective criteria). 
I have to agree with Kelly that, in construing an element as 'X', I 
am implicitly denying its iaembership of all the possible 'not X' 
categories within the relevant field. This is a weak and 
pragmatically unhelpful form of bipolarity. To articulate a specific 
contrast in the Kellian fashion may be satisfactory for some contrasts 
(say, 'beautiful' versus 'ugly') but not for others ('iron' as opposed 
to other-metals; colour terms; and so on). The articulation of a 
specific contrast may help in the communication of meaning but, as I 
argue later 
65, 
this is likely to be of value in respect of a particular 
element rather than a range of elements. 
So far in this section I have argued that Kelly's rejection of the 
'concept' is unjustified, as is his assumption that constructs are 
pragmatically dichotomous. Bannister and Fransella (1980) suggest 
that Kelly is not asserting that constructs are bipolar but, rather, 
that it might be more useful to think about them as if they were 
bipolar66. Maybe: Kelly admits to having been influenced by the 
propositional 'As if' philosophy of Vaihinger (1924*) 
67. However, a 
reading of Kelly reveals that he presses very hard the case for 
dichotomy in construing and in action - too hard, in my opinion, for 
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although many constructs can be viewed in dichotomous terms 
(particularly linguistic qualifiers) some involve multiple oppositions 
and others, like 'sex' and 'statistics', seem to have no meaningful 
opposition at all. 
The strength of Kelly's claim for dichotomy in construing may partly 
derive from his experience as a clinician. To focus on people as 
elements, and to ask his clients to construe them in terms of 
similarity and contrast is likely to produce a vast majority of 
adjectival or quasi-adjectival constructs regarding personal qualities 
and capable of being used in a dichotomous way 
68 
. 
Kelly makes the 
assumption that all the elements fall within the range of convenience 
of his constructs, and implicitly assumes that 'unticked' elements in 
his repertory grid protocol are appropriately located under the 
contrast pole69. In such circumstances it is possible that problems 
of dichotomous construing, such as membership of both category poles 
would not emerge with sufficient acuteness for him to feel the point. 
For Kelly, an object cannot be both black and white 
- 
yet he must surely 
have seen a chessboard, black-suited playing cards, and heads of 
'greying' hair. 
Why go to such lengths to challenge Kelly's notion of dichotomous 
construing? My reasons lie in the importance of communication of 
meaning in research and the limiting effect of the dichotomy assumption 
on methodology. 
If one thinks of sentences, it is a truism that they develop their 
meanings cumulatively, only closing their signification with the last 
word. Each word is understood against the context of those preceding 
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it, its meaning being sealed only by the retroactive effect of those 
that follow70. Consider the following sentence; 
The tall man stood and looked at the grey mouse. 
'Tall' only becomes meaningful when its referent 'man' is read, and 
'tall man' implies (within the limits of fuzziness: Lakoff, 1972) 
the contrast with shortness, but at this point in the sentence, what 
is the contrast of 'man'? With no guidance from context (and no 
guidance is subsequently available) it is most likely to be drawn 
from 
- 
or to consist of 
- 
the contrastive set of human beings, a 
contrastive set in which the categories may overlap since there is 
no evidence on which to include or exclude certain members. This 
contrastive set may_ in these circumstances include 'child' as well 
as 'boy' and 'girl', for example. In the Kellian sense of 
'submergence', all of this contrastive set may never be evoked, in 
which case the argument for prototypic pattern-matching is strengthened. 
The rest of the sentence may be treated similarly, noting that 'grey' 
(as a colour term) is likely to be a member of a set of colour terms 
that are appropriate to mice. 
The oppositional forms of the sentence might take any paradigmatically 
substitutive route through the basic syntagmatic chain, using the 
contrasting terms shown below: admittedly, some of the routes make 
more sense than others. 
The tall man stood 
short woman sät 
child walked 
boy ran 
girl jumped 
baby 
and looked 
shot 
cursed 
swore 
shouted 
at the grey mouse 
behind brown cät 
in front of white dog 
away from black rabbit 
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The point being made rather laboriously here is that whilst a Kellian 
dichotomous contrast theory of meaning may be logically valid, the 
complexity of meaning of even a simple sentence implies that cognitive 
operations upon such lines would not be parsimonious. If the 
contrastive sets and dichotomies are submerged as the sentence is 
construed (even though they may be identified upon reflection), in 
practical terms the construer is tending to operate prototypically. 
If this argument is valid, it calls into question Kelly's assumption 
that the dichotomous approach 'comes near the way people actually 
think' 71. It also raises serious questions about the capacity of a 
research instrument that restricts itself to dichotomous constructs 
to elicit the richness and complexity of human thinking. 
3.3.3 The Organization Corollary 
'Each person characteristically evolves, for his 
convenience in anticipating events, a construction 
system embracing ordinal relationships between 
constructs'72. 
On logical grounds it is, strictly speaking, unjustifiable to discuss 
the Organizational Corollary at some length within a context of 
repertory grid methodology since the repertory grid does not address 
the question of structural relationships between constructs (save in 
the sense that it can highlight cophenetic relationships). Any claims 
regarding structure are necessarily inferential. Yet over the years 
claims have been made, both explicitly and implicitly, that the 
repertory grid reveals aspects of structure: for instance, Fransella 
(1972) writes that all existing forms of repertory grid 
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.... 
are such that statistical tests of significance 
can be applied to the rankings, sortings or comparisons 
that each individual has made. This implies the basic 
assumption that the statistical relationship reflects 73 
the psychological relationship between two constructs. 
But a statistical relationship tells nothing of the implicative 
relationship that may obtain between two constructss to imply otherwise 
is to confuse correlation with causation. A study reported by 
Landfield (1982) illustrates the point that near-zero correlations 
can reflect a uni-directional implicative relationship, and he indicates 
the need for new methodologies in the approach to superordinate- 
subordinate relationships. 
With regard to the Organization Corollary, Kelly is generally construed 
as saying that construct systems are hierarchically organised, but it 
may be that he was rather less pre-emptive in his thinking. A hierarchy 
suggests metaphors such as 'pyramid', with superordinate constructs at 
the top and the remaining constructs subsumed at progressively lower 
levels. Yet Kelly contrasts the notion of 'pyramiding' of ideas with 
the penetration of ideas with insights 
- 
an ambiguous proposition which 
he does not develop. Stated as a contrast to pyramiding, it suggests 
a more recursive model in which superordinate constructs subsume 
subordinates themselves. Such a model would be characterised 
metaphorically by the flexible woven metal cross-ply tyres of the 
American astronauts' moon buggy or the geodetic airframe of the 
Wellington bomber of the Second World War. It is outside the scope 
of this work to explore this issue further; I mention it merely to draw 
attention to the possibility of structural models other than the 
hierarchical. 
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It is not surprising that structure is typically construed in 
hierarchical terms, for Kelly writes that; '... man systematizes his 
constructs by concretely arranging them in hierarchies and by abstract- 
ing them further'7. The key word here is 'systematizes', and Kelly 
shows that the ordinal relationships may be developed either by 
elaborating the meanings of the two poles of a construct taken separately 
or by subsuming the whole of a construct under a superordinate. 
In the quotation presented in the preceding paragraph Kelly is not 
describing the totality of a construct system's formation. Arrangements 
and abstraction are only part of the process, and the risk in over- 
emphasising them is that it might distract attention from the refining 
of comparatively gross distinctions; and in the Choice Corollary Kelly 
makes it clear that improving the definition of a construct system is 
one of the options available. Kelly's position is not inconsistent 
with developmental theorists such as Piaget, Werner and E. J. Gibson 
who see systems being developed in two directions from what are 
initially rather crude discriminations 
- 
'upward' by increasing 
abstraction (i. e. integration) and 'downward' by increasing different- 
iation75. And increasing differentiation may provide a basis for the 
generation of new, or the redevelopment of old, superordinate constructs. 
The more cognitively complex the person is, presumably the greater the 
integration and differentiation in the construct system, as Zimring 
(1971) recognised. The difficulty is to find an instrument that 
measures both adequately, and this (together with some rather shakily- 
grounded conceptualisations) seems to have resulted in a literature on 
cognitive complexity that can be charitably described as highly 
differentiated76. 
In Kelly's view it is inappropriate to use the canons of classical logic 
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to construe the organisation of construct systems, since these would 
produce nested sets of categories and classes which would approach 
immutability and rigidity. In contrast, if the system is construed 
in psychological terms it is much more open to shifts in relationships 
between superordinate and subordinate constructs. The context in 
which the system is being used may well overturn a hierarchy, as Kelly 
made clear. 
Relatively little empirical work has been done truly focusing on the 
hierarchical aspects of construct systems, though rather more is 
claimed in the literature. For the moment it is sufficient to note 
Hinkle's (1965) limited attempt to probe the nature of structure 
through the use of a grid (the 'implications grid' or 'impgrid') which 
elicited implicative relationships between constructs. Ten Kate ` 
(1981) has attempted to extend the discussion of Hinkle's theoretical 
position, but his analysis is flawed first by the nature of the 
questions he asks regarding the superordinate-subordinate relationship, 
and second, by his limitation of discussion to constructs of the 
'X 
- 
not X' type77. Given the structural complexity implicit in both 
Hinkle's and ten Kate's positions, it would seem that empirical 
investigation of structure would be a brave and hazardous undertaking. 
It is likely that the structural relationships between constructs are 
more complex than the scanty literature on the subject tends to suggest. 
Hinkle's own work, and that of others, suggests that there may be 
circularities and intransitivities78 inconsistent with the rather 
static notion of hierarchy that is often an implicit assumption 
(despite Kelly's on recognition of the vulnerability of hierarchies79). 
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The question of structure is a crucial issue for adherents of Personal 
Construct Theory. The relationship of repertory and implication grids 
to the Organization Corollary is discussed further in Chapter k, and 
some leads forward for the researcher are proposed in Chapter 13. 
This consideration of the Construction, Dichotomy, Range and 
Organization Corollaries covers those parts of Kelly's theory which 
impinge most directly on research involving repertory grid technique. 
In the interests of completeness the remaining Corollaries are 
considered briefly below, in the recognition that a fuller appraisal 
lies beyond the boundaries of the current work. 
3.3.4 The Individuality and Experience Corollaries 
'Persons differ from each other in their constructions 
of events 80. 
'A person's construction system varies as he successively 
construes the replications of events' 81. 
Kelly is wont to point out that the psychology of individual differen- 
ces often turns out to be the psychology of group similarities. In 
the Individuality Corollary he draws attention to the impossibility 
of any two people experiencing events identically, in that they have 
both different standpoints and different construct systems with which 
to cope with their experiences. That is not to deny the similarities 
in human experiencing and behaviour for, as Bakan (1956) writes, 
'after all, we are all pretty much alike'82. What might have been 
added here is that much of the similarity is due to the influence of 
the cultural environment, especially implemented through the medium 
of language. Kelly indicates his awareness of cultural relativism 
when he writes of the possibility of people living in 
'altogether 
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different subjective worlds'83, but his own interests seem to have 
led him away from pursuing the matter. 
The Experience Corollary emphasises the dynamic aspect of construct 
systemss people reconstrue in the light of a succession of events 
unfolding with time. The changes are not necessarily for the goods 
they are pragmatic and productive of interim positions open to further 
change in the light of experience. To construe the replications of 
events does not, in itself, imply the necessity of changing, for the 
replications may be consonant with the construct system already 
erected. Kelly observes that continual change would be chaotic, 
and that parts of construct systems can be expected to remain stable 
whilst others vary. Stability and change coexists excess of either 
is pathological. For the user of personal construct theory, and a 
fortiori the repertory grid, it is important to know where stability 
exists and where change is taking places stability and change are 
discussed in Chapter 10. 
3.3.5 The Fragmentation and Modulation Corollaries 
'A person may successively employ a variety of construction 
subsystems which are inferentially incompatible with each 
other'. 65 
'The variation in a person's construction system is limited 
by the permeability of the construgis within whose ranges 
of convenience the variants lie'. 86 
In these two Corollaries Kelly develops his ideas regarding change, 
The Fragmentation Corollary indicates that a subsystem may vary in 
such a way that the relationship between the later state and an 
earlier state may not be directly inferable. What may happen is 
that the earlier state contributes to a change in its superordinate 
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relationships and the revised superordinates then permit a revision 
of the subordinates: a dialectic between the levels is involved. 
(One can imagine, loosely, the parallel with a branch bank manager's 
initial refusal to accede to a customer's request for a loan but, 
after consulting head office, a change in his or her position: the 
latter position is not directly inferable from the former). Thus 
the states of the subordinate system may be only indirectly related, 
whilst consistency lies in the superordinate levels above those at 
which the change is made manifest, and depends upon the 'permeability' 
of the superordinate system (i. e. its capacity to assimilate change 
at subordinate levels). 87 
Bannister and Mair (1968) give the Fragmentation Corollary a somewhat 
different reading from Kelly's explication which (as is evident from 
the above) focuses on change in subordinate systems, and hence suggests 
development. Bannister and Mair concentrate upon selection from a 
range of possibilities when they discuss fragmentation in terms of 
behaviour which, though it is at first glance inconsistent, is never- 
theless consistent within a superordinate setting. They see 
fragmentation when 'A parent may kiss and hug achild at one moment, 
smack him a little later and shortly afterwards ignore him when he 
insists on showing off 
... 
', all of which are consistent when the 
parent's superordinate constructs regarding child training are 
considered. 
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This example does not entail change on the part of 
the parent: he or she may merely be selecting the behaviour construed 
to be appropriate. Given that Kelly links the Fragmentation and 
Modulation Corollaries, and that he explicates the latter with 
reference to the former, it would appear that the interpretation 
offered by Bannister and Mair fails to capture Kelly's original 
intention. 
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In discussing the Fragmentation Corollary, an implicit consideration 
has been given to the Modulation Corollary. The degree of permea- 
bility in superordinate constructs is a determinant of the capacity 
of the construct system to change. Permeable constructs can cope 
with elements and subordinate constructs not yet construed within 
their framework: taking the example in the paragraph above, the 
espoused theory of child training could be considered permeable if 
it allowed other training behaviour (such as 'rewarding with tokens') 
to be subsumed. 
But permeability has systemic implications, which go beyond individual 
constructs, Weick (1968) suggested that a highly interconnected 
cognitive system would be resistant to an inconsistent element, but 
if the element 'penetrated' it, the system would be more vulnerable 
than its more sparsely-connected counterpart which could incorporate 
inconsistent information by fewer systemic changes89. Crockett and 
Meisel (1974) subsequently found that the amount of structural change 
triggered by disconfirming information varied according to the'degree 
of interconnectedness' of the system and to the closeness of the 
discrepant information to the persons most central (highly inter- 
connected) construct. These findings are summarised in Figure 3.4. 
Crockett and Meisel's work, which depended on Hinkle's (1965) 
implication grid method for its identification of centrality, is one 
of the few studies to tackle empirically the questions of structure 
and change, and their findings give support to the model of cognition 
and purposive behaviour summarised in Figure 3.1. These findings lead 
me to offer the thought that the notion of systemic permeability/ 
impermeability may be rather more important than Kelly's explication 
of Modulation Corollary seems to allow. 
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Extent of change 
Degree of (i) (ii) 
'Centrality' of Highly connected Sparsely connected 
disconf irmation system system 
Invalidating most central Large change Little change 
construct. 
Inferentially invalidating 
most central construct. Moderate change Moderate change 
Peripheral: respondents 
merely told they were 
relatively inaccurate in Slight change Moderate change 
their construing. 
Figure 3.4 A summary of Crockett and Meisel's (1974) results 
regarding interconnectedness and systemic permeability. 
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3.3.6 The Commonality and Sociality Corollaries. 
'To the extent that one person employs a construction 
of experience which is similar to that employed by 
another, his processes are psychologically similar to 
those of the other person' 9' 9 
'To the extent that one person construes the 
construction processes of another, he may play a role 
in a social process involving the other person. '91 
It is in these Corollaries that Kelly addresses himself to the social 
aspects of personal construing. In the Individuality Corollary he 
maces the point that every individual has a unique standpoint from 
which to construe events. The Commonality Corollary presents the 
other side of the coin in that it focuses upon the fact that, despite 
idiosyncratic differences, there nevertheless exist broad similarities 
in the construing of experience. It was noted earlier (page 79-80) 
that whilst Kelly was aware of cultural relativism, his interest in 
developing a psychological theory may have led him away from the 
social dimension of construing. After all, the Commonality Corollary 
leads towards a psychology of group similarities 
- 
and Kelly chose to 
attack this in setting up his individualistic psychology. 
A problem with the Commonality Corollary is the level at which 
commonality is to be recognised. Kelly might well have said that 
the degree of 'overlap' between two systems would be a suitable 
criterion, but a criterion of this sort does not help when one is 
faced with the practical problems of research. Two people might, 
let us say, support the Labour Party with sufficient fervour to 
become activists, yet one of them may see this support in terms of 
working class solidarity whilst the other may see the party as the 
best bet for the attainment of a socialist utopia. Pressing the 
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implications of this potential schism might reveal the first person 
as conservative and the second as radical in their construings of 
possible futures. The critic would no doubt make the point that 
it would besimplistic in the extreme to accept party affiliation as 
an index of political support without exploring the foundations upon 
which that support is grounded: one can but agree. However, the 
suspicion remains that conceptually similar examples probably exist 
at a range of hierarchical levels in construct systems and may be 
altogether more difficult to tease out. So, from a research point 
of view, at what point is it acceptable to claim commonality of 
construing? It is very doubtful that a single, unequivocal answer 
can be given, but the question indicates the need for the researcher 
to be alert to the &nger of being satisfied by apparent manifestations 
of commonality. 
Given that the Commonality Corollary and the Individuality Corollary 
together provide a basis for exploring similarity and contrast in 
individuals, the Sociality Corollary provides the ground on which 
similarity and contrast can be seen in action 
- 
or, at least, it is 
Kelly's statement of the conditions for meaningful social action. 
Holland (1970) is particularly critical of this Corollary92. First, 
he argues that the statement is tautologous in that 'taking the attitude 
of the other' is itself the definition of a role-based social process. 
Kelly would no doubt have countered Holland's criticism by saying 
that construing the construction processes of another was rather 
different from what appears to be a psychologistic empathy in that 
the construer has to subsume the relevant parts of the other's system 
under his or her own. He might also have said that this subsumption 
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was a necessary condition, and not a definition, of a role-based 
social process93. 
Holland's second criticism is that in a number of social processes 
it is not necessary for a person to construe the construct system of 
another: for example, the confidence trickster in respect of the 
victim, and some doctors in respect of their patients. But here he 
seems to have overlooked Kelly's emphasis on the constructive nature 
of the social process. One might well criticise Kelly for not 
exploring social processes other than the constructive, but within 
Kelly's own conceptualisation (however limited it is) Holland's 
critique is wrongly directed. 
The construing of the construction processes of another was fore- 
shadowed by Dilthey who observed that we understand others by 
transference from our own inner life, making the assumption that they 
have a broadly similar mental structure to ours. This does not 
entail an assumption of psychological isomorphism, for it can be 
argued that understanding is based on analogising and extrapolating 
from personal experience (or episodic memory: Tulving, 1972). Thus 
if I have suffered the death of a close relative I can 'understand' 
another person's cognate loss even though the details are very 
different. I am then in a position to offer support in a much more 
deep sense that if I had only read about and 'intellectualised' how 
people feel after a bereavement: on this argument semantic memory 
would appear less satisfactory than episodic memory as regards the 
playing of a constructive part in a social process. 
In this type of approach 'understanding' and social process might be 
sketched in the following way. On hearing of another's existential 
circumstances, a person searches his or her store of cognate 
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experiences and abstracts such superordinate constructs as seem 
appropriate. These are then communicated to the other who construes 
the superordinates in the light of his or her (subordinate) 
existential position. In practice this may well be a more complex 
hermeneutic dialogue through all the channels available to the 
participants. As the dialogue deepens understanding, so the actors 
are enabled to involve themselves in a constructive social process. 
The tone of the whole of Kelly's explication of the Sociality 
Corollary is consensual 
- 
he is interested in people getting along 
with each other. But outside the sheltered environment of the 
clinician's room not all dialogue is harmonious and constructive. 
In their explication of the Corollary Bannister and Fransella 
intimate the possibility of conflict in social processes when they 
write about confusing and defeating others95. It may be that conflict 
for Kelly is the submerged contrast pole of consensus, since conflict 
emerges obliquely in some of his definitions of constructs relating 
to transition (in particular, those of 'threat', 'fear', 'guilt' and 
'hostility') if they are read with social processes in mind. 
Kelly sees the Sociality Corollary as the take-off point for a social 
psychology. A more apt metaphor might be "in the hangar, under 
construction" since he does not elaborate the 'group' aspects of a 
social psychology. But this would require additional theoretical 
formulation, and there is little evidence yet that this is being 
pursued by personal construct theorists. 
3.3.7 The Choice Corollary 
'A person chooses for himself that alternative in a 
dichotomized construct through which he anticipates 
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the great r possibility for the elaboration of his 
system'. 9o 
In the Sociality Corollary Kelly partially develops the relation of 
action to personal construct systems, but the relationship is 
strengthened in the Choice Corollary. In this Corollary, too, there 
is the most explicit recognition of people as being active and 
exploratory within their environment. However, as Tyler (1981) notes, 
it is not easy to accept that people are always sufficiently energetic 
to follow the implications of the Corollary97 which, at the root 
level, offers the person Hobson's choice regarding elaboration. 
The underlying construct of the Choice Corollary is something like 
'anticipates less possibility anticipates greater 
of elaboration possibility of elaboration' 
and, in Kelly's formulation, the option is limited to the right hand 
pole98. Once this pole has been 'chosen', it is fair to consider 
whether that choice relates to the extension of the construct system 
beyond its previous boundaries, or to increasing the degree of 
definition within its existing scope. The argument presented above 
can be illustrated with reference to the following hypothetical 
situation. 
Suppose I have had a hard day at work followed by a good evening 
meal, and it is now seven o'clock. I could go to sleep early, go 
to the bridge club with my regular partner, or go to a dance club in 
the hope of meeting up with a new partner (among a range of other 
possible actions). Going to the bridge club may offer me the 
opportunity to increase definition in that I might learn more 
accurately when to use certain techniques - say, a Vienna Coup and 
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squeeze. Going to a dance club might have considerable potential 
for extension, but it is difficult to see how going to sleep would 
increase either definition or extension of my construct system. 
It might be felt that such an exemplification is unfair to Kelly's 
intentions, but he implicitly acknowledges the point being made when, 
in discussing experience, he gives the example of the veteran school 
administrator who had 'one year of experience - repeated thirteen 
times'90. According to the letter of Kelly's writing this cannot be 
strictly true, but the spirit suggests that the administrator did not 
seek greatly to elaborate his construct system as far as school 
administration was concerned. Bannister and Fransella (1980) remark 
that people can over-define to the point of boredom1 , but they seem 
to be confusing repetition of experience with the development of an 
increasingly defined (refined? ) system: the two are not identical. 
I can go to an air display merely to enjoy the sight and sound of 
aircraft, but I can also go to develop my discrimination of types and 
sub-variants. The first, though anticipatory, offers far less for 
intentional elaboration than the second. 
Bannister and Fransella are themselves unhappy with the Choice Corollary, 
seeing it to be in need of both definition and extension itself. There 
is no indication as to why the individual should choose definition in 
preference to extension (or vice versa); all that is suggested is that 
the person will try to move away from confusion and towards understand- 
ing. There seems, as Holland (1970) suggests, no way in which the 
Corollary can be tested empirically 
101, 
and Bannister and Fransella 
(1980) seem overoptimistic when they suggest that the Corollary is 
testable provided enough is known about an individual's system in order 
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for predictions to be made in terms of that system 
1021 
such a 
proviso is of a truly enormous magnitude. 
It will not have escaped notice that the 'evening out' example used 
a few paragraphs ago did not involve a dichotomous choice. If one 
does not accept the Dichotomy Corollary as it stands, the implications 
reverberate through other aspects of the theory, and particularly 
loudly in respect of the Choice Corollary. There is no particular 
reason to suppose that decisions about action are taken on a 
dichotomous basis (though any multiplex of possibilities can be 
presented in terms of a binary algorithm). The 'evening out' 
decision related to a series of categories (as often does judicial 
sentencing), but decisions are not necessarily 'digital' in character. 
It is quite possible to construe some decisions in 'analog' terms 
- 
for instance, choosing one's speed in driving along a motorway. 
Action does not necessarily imply only opting for one construct pole 
or the other. 
Returning to Tyler's (1981) point, on the whole it seems improbable 
that people constantly act to maximise the elaboration of their 
construct systems: there might be anarchy if they did! Critiques 
of the notion of personal freedom from a variety of standpoints are 
united in their recognition of the power of social forces to limit 
elaboration103, in some cases coming close to adapting the 
Structuralists' claim for language to say that "our culture behaves 
us". Kelly's theoretical framework, with its emphasis on individual- 
ity, betrays its country of origin 
- 
in which the. espousal of 
individual freedom is encapsulated in the idea of the 'American Dream'. 
And yet, as Ward (1974) points out, there is a paradox - if not a 
9o 
contradiction 
- 
in a society which enshrines individualism as an 
ideal whilst at the same time socialising individuals to accept as 
their own the demands of the society in which they live, and yet 
from which they believe themselves to be independent. 
3.4 SUMMARY 
It must be reiterated that this review of Personal Construct Theory 
is but partial. It is partial in the sense that it has not sought 
to submit the theory to searching scrutiny through a variety of 
philosophical templets. It is partial, too, in the sense that its 
broad perspective is that of the user of repertory grids, with the 
inevitable bias towards cognition that is entailed. 
Whilst the fundamental Weltanschauung of Kelly's theoretical position 
has much to offer the researcher in the human sciences (and this theme 
is taken up later, in Chapter 13), this review has been critical of a 
number of aspects of Kelly's specific formulations (not least because 
there seems a tendency amongst adherents of the theory to accept its 
propositions uncritically). The main points of criticism are 
summarised below. 
1. The Fundamental Postulate is inadequate in that it 
gives insufficient weight to the effect of adventitious 
experience upon psychological 'channelizing'. 
2. The socially determined aspects of construing are 
consistently underestimated. 
3. Construing is not necessarily limited to a dichotomous 
operation: both (classical) conc3pts and multiple 
oppositions may well coexist with dichotomous constructs 
in a construct system. 
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4. Construct systems may contain features (such as 
vicious circles) which are not easily subsumed 
under the notion of hierarchy. 
5. The relationship between construing and action is 
insufficiently developed. 
Of these points, (3) has immediate implications for the user of 
repertory grids, whilst (1) (2) and (4) 
- 
as amplified in the review - 
refer to problems which may not surface during the administration of 
a repertory grid, but which may colour the interpretation of any grid 
data collected. Where research relating grid data to action is 
envisaged, (5) assumes importance. 
In the following chapters the focus is narrowed more specifically to 
repertory grid methodology, and, in that context, to some of the 
practical strengths and weaknesses of Kelly's Dewey-eyed method- 
ological individualism. 
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4 Theory and method 
In essential tension? 
What we observe is not nature itself, 
but nature exposed to our method 
of questioning. 
W. Heisenberg 
1962*: 58 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main content of this chapter is an initial consideration of the 
links between repertory grid methodology and Kelly's theoretical 
formulation, and the view is advanced that grid and theory are 
reciprocally related 
- 
but only to a limited extent. In this outline 
sketch attention is given to three general issues which bear upon the 
use of grids: the nature of the cognitive task, language and meaning 
(which is treated more fully in Chapter u), and the relationship 
between researcher, respondent and task. 
The question of the structure of construct systems looms disproportion- 
ately large in the middle of the chapter. The length of this 
discussion 
- 
which argues that repertory grids elicit little, if 
anything, about structure 
- 
is justified on the grounds that a 
persistent confusion exists in the literature regarding the grid's 
capacity to capture the intentions of the Organization Corollary. 
In considering the relationship between theory and grid some of the 
implications of the challenges made to theory in Chapter 3 are explored, 
but the broader purpose of this chapter is to set the scene for the more 
detailed appraisal of repertory grid methodology in Chapters 5 to 11 
- 
and for the alternative position advanced in Chapter 13. 
4.2 REPERTORY TEST AND REPERTORY GRID 
In presenting his original Repertory Test1, Kelly refers to it as 
being methodologically an application of concept-formation test 
procedures. However, instead of sorting into categories items such 
as the blocks of the Vygotsky test, the person sorts people - people 
with whom he or she has a role relationship. Kelly suggests that 
this direct approach through the construing of relations and 
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acquaintances is very appropriate to the investigation of problems 
presumed to be of an interpersonal nature. 
In the Repertory Test Kelly asks the respondent to supply names to 
fit a number of role titles. He then presents triads of these names 
(chosen to suit the purposes of his investigation) and requests the 
respondent to construe the triads in terms of the similarity of two 
of them and the contrast of the third, hence producing a dichotomous 
construct. This could be seen as a disadvantage, in that the procedure 
relates only the triad of elements to the construct and does not seek 
to generalise the construct to the remaining elements. A particular 
verbal label might be elicited in response to other triads, but the 
picture of relationships between elements and constructs as revealed 
by this procedure seems very 'patchy', to judge by Kelly's example of 
Mildred Beal's repertory test2. 
The grid form of the testa allows each element to be located 
dichotomously on each construct (or, possibly, to be judged to be 
outside a construct's range of convenience), thus creating a complete 
element X construct data matrix which is open to mathematical analysis. 
Kelly himself developed a form of nonparametric factor analysis to help 
reveal the relationships between the constructs, and between the 
elements, in the grid. 
Kelly's grid test has been adapted in the course of time to cater for 
the demands of research in a wide range of fields. Elements and 
constructs have been elicited from the individual in a variety of ways, 
or have been provided by the researchers. The original dichotomous 
allocation has been largely superseded by other ways of relating 
elements to constructs, notably by ranking and rating procedures, and 
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increasingly sophisticated methods of analysis have been developed to 
cope with the information captured in the grid matrix. What remains 
common to all forms of repertory grid is the interpretation of the 
full range of elements (stimuli) in terms of the full range of 
constructs (dimensions) and the presentation of the data in the form 
of a complete element X construct matrix. 
Much has been claimed for this methodology: for instance, Thomas 
(1978) writes that the repertory grid 'is an obvious choice for 
exploring [personal construct] systems', and Salmon (1978) goes 
rather further when she claims that 
'... the whole range of systematic enquiries that 
Kelly called the repertory grid technique can 
reveal the structure underlying major aspects of 
intuitive personal understandings'-. 
Others are less optimistic about the potential of repertory grid 
methods. D. E. Bolton (1978), for example, points to the grid's 
inability to tap the historical development of constructs and to 
investigate both memory-processes and the relationship between speech 
and action6. Watts and Pope (1982) are much more cautious about 
claims such as Salmon's when they indicate that the grid is too often 
seen as the only methodology compatible with Kellian theory, and that 
the numbers in the matrix are too easily congealed into absolute 
statements about people?. The arguments presented in the following 
pages will be found to be more in accord with the sceptic than with 
the believer. 
In repertory grid methodology a number of issues appear to have been 
taken for granted. Little attention has been given, for example, 
to the nature of the task of completing a repertory grid, to the 
96 
implications of language, and to the effects of the interaction 
between researcher and respondent during grid administration: these 
matters are taken up in the succeeding sections. 
4.3 REPRODUCTION OR RECONSTRUCTION? 
As far as cognition is concerned, a definitive answer can probably 
never be given, but it is worth exploring the issue to see what the 
researcher might be collecting through the use of the grid. 
If the elements are concrete objects placed in front of the respondent 
and he or she were required to construe selected triads in the standard 
Kellian manner, it is probable that the constructs would reflect 
discriminations previously made (explicitly or implicitly), rather 
than be new constructs made up on the spots in effect, following the 
assimilative cycle set out in Figure 3.1. The elicitation, as far 
as the grid is concerned, would seem to be limited by the language 
already acquired. In these circumstances, construing is likely to 
depend very heavily on constructs already stored in the systems. 
Research using the grid in this way has been conducted in the area of 
marketing (e. g. Frost and Braine, 1967) in which the objects of 
interest have been placed before the respondents. It can be argued 
that the use of photographs of people as elements comes close to this, 
but the constructs elicited in this case are likely to be mediations 
of 'social' constructs projected on to the photographs: photographs, 
in themselves, do not have personality characteristics. 
In mentioning photographs, the problem begins to surface. Suppose, 
instead, that the respondent is asked to construe people from a list 
of named acquaintances. He or she cannot construe them 'in the flesh', 
but must rely upon aggregated conceptions of them as people developed 
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through interaction and observation. These peo p le are reconstructions, 
probably based on the existing construct system, but subject to the 
distorting effects of selective sedimentation in memory9, constructive 
processes in memory10, selective retrieval, recency of meeting, the 
context in which the grid is elicited, and so on. They may, in some 
cases, be very good reconstructions, but they are nevertheless 
reconstructions in the mind and inaccessible to scrutiny by the 
researcher. The same is true of other elements drawn from episodic 
memory (Tulving, 1972), such as critical incidents. 
The point is made not in criticism of the grid, for such validity as 
this argument has extends to other elicitation procedures and 
instruments. It is made in order to emphasise that the grid task is, 
in the majority of cases, likely to be reconstructive at more than one 
level, despite the use of the existing system as a framework for the 
reconstructions. 
As I argue in Chapter 6, it seems rather unlikely that developments 
in the construct system (other than minor) take place during grid 
administration. 
Is the situation any different when the elements are presumed to be 
drawn from semantic memory? Take, for instance, the general teaching 
situations which were the elements I used in my work with the science 
teachers (Appendix 1). Here the teachers were asked to construe 
elements such as 'teacher exposition' and 'pupil practical exercises' 
with the help of a short sentence amplifying each in respect of shat 
I, as researcher, sought to investigate within the framework of my 
study. In these circumstances what the respondents did is more 
uncertain. They may have located practical work in terms of a 
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specific (perhaps untypical) instance, a generalisation derived from 
a number of specific instances (like a 'prototype'), or a more 
abstract characterisation derived from the theoretical side of teacher 
education: the categories are unlikely to have been so clear-cut in 
practice11. They would. all, however, be reconstructions of one sort 
or another. There is a further possibility in that, beginning with 
one of the generalisations, the respondent may have constructed a 
hypothetical 'scenario' of practical work in operation. To construe 
this would be to construe a construction, a fabrication, rather than 
to reconstruct 'relatively straightforwardly' from memory12. These 
are difficult matters for the researcher to probe. 
In most cases the researcher is collecting a picture of the past as 
seen through the eyes of the present. The further the elements are 
from direct experience both temporally13 and through the level of 
abstraction, the more problematic becomes the nature of the sorting 
task of the grid, and the greater the risk of the researcher collect- 
ing a picture incongruent with the intentions of his or her work 
- 
and 
perhaps of being enchanted by the distant view. 
4.4 LANGUAGE AND MEANING 
Kelly makes a most curious statement when he observes that the 
researcher's understanding of the respondent's verbal labels is less 
crucial in the grid form of the test than in the original Role Construct 
Repertory Test. He goes on to remark: 
The use of the grid permits the psychologist to make 
a rather extensive analysis of the protocol without 
once looking at the terms which the client has 
employed. It is this advantage that argues strongly 
for the use of the grid... ' 14 
A little later, when writing about his homespun version of factor 
analysis, the point is amplified: 
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'.... we have suggested a type of analysis.... 
which transcends both the subject's verbiage 
and the particular individuals who make up his 
personal-secial milieu. The test protocol can 
be meaningfully analyzed even if one clips off 
the names from the top of the test blank and the 
constructs from the side. ' 15 
To take Kelly's statements at face value would be to do him an 
injustice, given his interest in what his respondents chose to tell 
him in their own words. What is meant is that the researcher can 
identify statistical associations between elements and between 
constructs without having to make inferences from the language used 
by the respondent: the mathematical potential of the data matrix 
makes this possible. 
Yet Kelly's own language hints at a bias towards the (objective? ) 
mathematical and away from the (subjective? ) linguistic. The 
connotations of 'verbiage' are somewhat slighting, and to say that 
a grid can be 'meaningfully analyzed' without reference to its 
linguistic frame is to make a claim for the meaningfulness of a 
structure devoid of content - if such a thing exists. Here, and 
elsewhere in the exposition of his psychology, Kelly betrays a 
fascination with the binary mathematical to the extent that one 
suspects it on occasion of determining the nature of the psychology. 
Statistical associations, irrespective of the formulae used to 
compute them, are very crude indexes of the relationships of meaning 
between rows and between columns of the grid matrix. Such associations 
may be adventitiously cophenetic, in that the sample of elements and/or 
constructs may be too small to permit differentiation: Kelly himself 
recognises that the patterns of interrelationships can be idiosyncratic 
manifestations of the particular elements and constructs 
in the grid. 
16 
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There are many possible implicative relationships between constructs 
(Hinkle, 1965; ten Kate, 1981) and these may be embedded in measures 
-of statistical association. As Landfield (1982) shows, the relation- 
ship between implication and association is complex. It is simply 
not good enough to process a grid matrix through a program which 
computes associations and to make claims for relationships thus 
'revealed'17. A much more penetrating analysis is necessary to 
substantiate any inference beyond the reporting of statistical 
association. That analysis must make use of language. 
It is in the realm of language that repertory grids exhibit 
substantial weakness 
18. 
In the previous section of this chapter, 
attention was drawn to the need for a clear understanding between 
researcher and respondent regarding the basis on which elements are 
being construeds such understanding is inevitably based in language. 
Elicited constructs (and 'supplied' constructs, for that matter) very 
often take the form of adjectives or short adjectival phrases, and 
this presents difficulty for the intersubjectivity of understanding. 
There is an indefinite set of connotative meanings for each such 
verbal label, and, without further elaboration, the researcher has no 
guidance as to which the respondent does and does not intend. 
Further, the researcher's (personal) indefinite set acts as a filter 
for interpretation. 
It is almost a commonplace for users of repertory grids to discuss 
elicitation in terms of a structured conversation: if practice is 
consonant with rhetoric, and appropriate records are made (perhaps 
using a cassette recorder) much amplifying detail can be obtained 
and used in conjunction with the linguistically-restricted grid data: 
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this would be consistent with Ziff's (1972) point that the continued 
modulation of meaning is characteristic of all discourse in natural 
language19. Given the complexity of the task of grid administration, 
and its lengthiness, it is difficult for the researcher at this stage 
systematically to explore structural relationships, though some initial 
intimations might be obtained. It would seem that the identification 
of structural relationships embedded in grid data depends upon a 
subsequent retrospective evaluation, unless the elicitation procedure 
can incorporate-the systematic exploration of them. The practical 
difficulties of so doing are considerable: the work of Eden and his 
colleagues, though not aimed at eliciting complete grid matrices 
20 
suggests that a computer program may well be the most efficient 
administrator in this respect. 
A further problem, which also has linguistic implications, arises 
when a construct is applied to elements beyond those (typically three) 
in respect of which the construct is elicited. The assumption is made 
that the construct can be applied consistently to all the elements being 
subsumed. In other words, the construct is being used invariantly 
(like the physicalist scale of length) and hence in a manner strongly 
reminiscent of Hempel's (1949*) positivistic covering laws. This point 
is discussed in more detail in Chapters 8 and 13: it is sufficient for 
the present to adumbrate the opposite view 
- 
that a construct is likely 
to shift in meaning as different elements are successively considered. 
language and meaning are critical issues in repertory grid methodology, 
and yet they have been very little explored to date. The points made 
in the preceding paragraphs are in the manner of abstracts of the 
explorations undertaken in Chapter 11, in which I elaborate upon some 
102 
of the communication problems associated with grid methodology. 
4.5 INTERACTION BETWEEN RESEARCHER AND RESPONDENT 
The advantages of treating grid administration as a conversation 
were pressed in the previous section of this chapter. There is 
another side to this particular coin: the disadvantage that, the 
more the grid data is augmented through conversation, the more open 
is the procedure to 'contamination' from the researcher. The dilemma 
is captured by Rosenthal (1969) when be observes that the interaction 
of experimenter and subject is a major source of knowledge in the 
behavioural sciences 
2i, 
yet is open to the profound influence of 
nonverbal cues such as nods, smiles and glares 
- 
and a whole host of 
direct and indirect experimenter expectancy effects. Orne (1962, 
1973) indicates the importance of understanding how the respondent 
is construing the situation with which he or she is faced, since this 
can be radically different from what the researcher thinks is taking 
place. Bannister and Fransella (1980) indicate clearly the reflexivity 
of construct theory when they remark that the respondent, like the 
researcher, is construing the interaction 
22 
: the closeness with 
Orne's point here is marked. 
There is, inevitably, an asymmetric power relationship whenever a 
researcher asks a respondent to complete a grid, though this is true 
of any circumstance in which the researcher solicits the assistance of 
a respondent. Weick (1966) observes that a respondent makes two 
decisions in respect of participating: the first is whether to 
participate, and the second relates to the level of commitment to be 
given 
23. 
Although some respondents become very interested and 
involved in repertory grid work11, this is not always the case. 
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Murphy (1978) for instance found difficulty in using grids with 
organisational consultants, Armstrong and Eden 
(1979) obtained a 
similar response from Local Authority professional valuers, and 
Scott 
(l962) avoided potential problems of this sort when he rejected 
Kelly's original Role Construct Repertory Test as too cumbersome for 
a non-captive audience. It has to be pointed out that a 
lot of grid- 
based research has involved students whose participation is rewarded 
by some form of course credit. One might surmise that grid methods 
will be maximally acceptable where respondents see some kind of 
'payoff' for themselves, provided that the cost-benefit equation is 
not adversely affected by the particular procedures chosen by the 
researcher. 
To complete a grid is an act of self-disclosure. Cozby (1973, 
reviewing the literature, indicates a number of points which may 
have a bearing on grid administration though the evidence is rather 
equivocal. Situational variables, including the relationship between 
researcher and respondent, consistently influence what is disclosed. 
Positive encouragement, and disclosure on the part of the researcher 
both appear to encourage the respondent to disclose more. There is 
conflicting evidence regarding the effects of race, acculturation24 9 
and the sex of researcher and researched 
- 
and a positive correlation 
between disclosure and extraversion is reported. As far as repertory 
grid research is concerned, Reid (1976) remarks on differences in 
'openness' in his interviewees25, and Lipschitz (1972) observed that, 
when a 'familiar female experimenter' was replaced by an unfamiliar 
male, less 'private' information was given 
26. My own experience in 
eliciting construats has been mixed in this respect. Some of my 
respondents have been very frank - even indiscreet - in their 
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comments on their colleagues and on the systems operating within their 
schools, trusting my commitment to confidentiality and finding it 
helpful to discuss issues that concerned them as probationary teacher, 
with someone who would not, at some later date, don the mantle of 
institutional judge. Others have been less open in this respect, 
limiting their responses to the specific task in hand. Having read 
Labov's (1972*) account of interviews with alienated black children 24 
(and the asymmetries involved)'it seemed important to make some 
attempt to find out how my respondents had perceived my role as 
researcher. At the outset, two of the fourteen probationary science 
teachers had seen me as something akin to an inspector, but after the 
first grid administration and feedback session none of the respondents 
appear to- have construed me in terms other than those of a researcher 
with no axe to grind as far as their careers were concerned. 
The completion of a grid, particularly where this involves the 
elicitation of elements and/or constructs, can be a demanding process 
in terms of both the nature of the task and the time taken for its 
completion. This leads to pressure on researcher (as I have 
experienced) and respondent, since both are likely to be aware of 
constraints such as the time available and the other's patience, and 
there may be temptations to take short cuts in the interests of 
completing the grid. The respondent may work superficially and 
carelessly, whilst the researcher may 'lead' the respondent towards 
the 'provision' of information that otherwise might not have emerged. 
There is a danger that 'getting the grid completed' could become a 
more dominant interest than meaningful communication about the 
problems towards which the research is directed. 
The user of grids, like any other researcher in the human sciences, 
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is not immune from the conflicts between social process and 
'objectivity'. If meaningful data are to be gathered, this can only 
be done at the risk of the researcher's influence-on that which he or 
she seeks to investigates the human sciences' analogue of Heisenberg's 
uncertainty principle in physics. Fiske (1971), writing about 
'personology' (and whose comments are broadly generalisable within 
the field of the human sciences), suggests that one way to resolve 
the problem is to recognise that the data collected are inseparable 
from both the observer and the methods used in its collection. As 
with a standard laboratory experiment in physics, some attempt can be 
made to assess the magnitude of the 'errors' involved. This problem 
of 'contamination' raises a number of theoretical and methodological 
issues which it would be inappropriate to pursue at this point, and 
discussion of them is deferred to Chapter 13. 
4.6 THE REPERTORY GRID AND COGNITIVE STRUCTURE 
It will be recalled that earlier in this chapter Kelly was taken to 
task for overvaluing the mathematical relationships that could be 
derived from a grid matrix at the expense of understanding the embedded 
relationships through the medium of language. Some users of repertory 
grids27 have taken the further step of assuming that statistical 
analysis of the grid matrix can reveal aspects of cognitive structure. 
This assumption can only be true in the weak sense of indicating 
"what goes together" and structural claims beyond this are at best 
inferential 
- 
hence the title of this section is not a little ironic. 
Repertory grids alone can provide no indication of a construct's degree 
of superordinacy or subordinacy, or whether it is a core or peripheral 
part of the construct system, and so on. Hinkle (1965) recognised 
this and devised 'implications grids' and 'resistance-to-change grids' 
in order to explore issues relating to the hierarchical status of 
constructs and their psychological salience. 
As was noted in the previous chapter, a consideration of structural 
aspects of construct systems is - strictly speaking - outside the 
remit of a study of repertory grid methodology. However, in this 
and the next sedtion I explore some of the inadequacies of repertory 
grids as far as structure is concerned, and also Hinkle's work on 
structure, since these are essential precursors to the arguments I 
present in Chapter 13. 
Some of the blame in respect of the overvaluation of statistical 
association can be laid at Kelly's own door. In Chapter 6 of 'The 
Psychology of Personal Constructs', which is entitled 'The 
mathematical structure of psychological space', he is concerned to 
explore the factor analysis of grids in order to point up the 
relationships between elements and between constructs. Although Kelly 
does not claim in his book that the psychological structure can be 
revealed by factor analysis, it tight well be inferred that this is 
what is in his mind when a statement such as the following is met: 
'Thus we may have a mathematical basis for expressing 
and measuring the perceptual relationships between 
the events which are uniquely interwoven in any 
person's psychological space' 28. 
The assumption in factor analytic procedures (whether based upon 
correlation coefficients or upon nonparametric matching scores) is 
that all the rows (or columns) of the grid matrix are of equivalent 
status. In most uses of the grid this is more likely to be true of 
the elements than of the constructs, and the following discussion 
is 
directed towards the latter rather than the former. 
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Factor analysis, then, would treat the following (hypothetical) 
constructs relevant to life-situations as equivalent: 
(a) 'vital to my well-being 
- 
unimportant to my well-being' 
(b) 'encourages tidiness 
- 
does not encourage tidiness' 
(c) 'social aspect of living 
- 
individual aspect of living' 
despite the fact that it could be argued that (a) was of more central 
importance in most, if not all, contexts. 
Suppose, now, that (b) and (c) correlate + 0.9 whilst each 
individually correlates zero with (a). Factor analysis would produce 
a first factor accounting for the bulk of the variance and relating 
the encouragement of tidiness to the social aspect of living. The 
psychologically more central construct (a) would, in effect, constitute 
a much smaller second factor. The example is patently artificial, 
but if a grid were to contain a number of constructs that could be 
subsumed under 'good-bad' (i. e. that are evaluatively 'loaded'), 
these might intercorrelate to produce a very heavy first factor which 
would 'background' other dimensions29 (the weight of the 'evaluation' 
factor consistently found in semantic differential research comes to 
mind in this respect). The problem is that the researcher, without 
further information from outside the grid, has no way of interpreting 
the outcome of the factor analysis. The corollary to this argument 
is that it is invalid to presume that factors derived from an 
analytical routine represent superordinate constructs: to do so is 
grossly to confuse statistical association with psychological 
structure. 
Considering the issues at a more abstract level, the congruence 
between Kelly's Organization Corollary and the notion of integrative 
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complexity3° proposed by Schroder et al. (1967) seems quite close. 
The latter, as difficult to validate as Kelly's corollary, nevertheless 
contributes as a heuristic to the argument. Schroder et al. see the 
integratively complex person as possessing four levels of cognitive 
organisation rising from basic dimensions for discrimination via 
rules for combining dimension scale values and rules for comparing 
results to 
- 
at the highest level of abstraction 
-a structure for 
generating complex relationships31. Inverting their diagram of these 
relationships allows it to be aligned with Kelly's notion of hierarchy, 
given the addition of elements (implicit in the Schroder et al model), 
as shown in Figure 4.1. 
0 
00\ 
00 0' 
Structure for generating complex 
relationships 
Rules for comparing results 
Rules for combining dimension 
scale values 
Dimensions 
(a) Psychological structure of the integratively complex person (after Schroder et al, 1967122). 
etc. etc. 
z1 
(b) 
3rd order constructs 
2nd order constructs 
1st order constructs 
E2 E3 E4 Elements. 
An illustration of the Kellian notion of hierarchy in construct 
systems 
Figure 4.1. The relation between integrative complexity and Kelly's Organization Corollary. 
Figure 4.1 gives a rather rigid, mechanistic impression and does not 
attempt to portray the inconsistencies apparent between subsystems 
or the general flexibility that Kelly describes. Kelly sees 
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construct systems as very much open to change, perhaps even reversing 
superordinate-subordinate relationships from time to time. It may 
also be that the relationships between constructs are not rigidly 
hierarchical, allowing direct links between some subordinate constructs 
and some superordinate constructs, or the location of constructs at 
mezzanine levels in the structure: there seems no particular a 
priori reason why one hierarchical model should be preferred to 
another. 
Hierarchies are probably far more complex than can be represented in 
a simple two-dimensional model. Kreitler and Kreitler (1976), in 
considering the nature of responses, construe orienting, defensive, 
adaptive and conditioned responses as not only very complex behaviours 
involving high neuronal centres, but also as differing from each other 
in so many respects that it is doubtful whether they all belong to 
the same class or represent the same level of behaviour32. One 
might conclude that, if behaviours are complex both in themselves 
and in the ways in which they are related, any model that can be 
drawn on paper is likely to be the grossest of oversimplifications. 
These criticisms notwithstanding, the Kelly 
- 
Schroder et al heuristic 
has value in that it can show why factor analysis or any other 
clustering algorithm is inadequate to reveal hierarchical aspects of 
construct systems. 
With reference to this model, an elicitation procedure might result 
in the production of a number of constructs (a) to (i) at different 
levels in the person's system. Without showing the elements and all 
the interconnections of Figure 4.1 (b), the situation might be 
represented as 
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Yet, when analysis is undertaken, the implicit structural assumption 
is equivalence of level: 
abcdefhi 
overlooking the fact that the constructs stand in different 
implicative relationships with each other 
- 
which may be more 
important to an understanding of the system than the various 
statistical associations thrown up by the analysis33. For example, 
what could be inferred from a correlation coefficient of + 0.5 between 
constructs (i) and (f)? And what might have been the effects on 
analysis had the "missing" constructs been elicited? 
4.7 HINKLE'S WORK ON rTRUCTURE 
Hinkle's (1965) work falls outside the purview of 'standard' repertory 
grid procedures in. that he is interested in the superordinate- 
subordinate relationships between constructs, rather than in the 
associative relationships capable of being derived from the repertory 
grid matrix. Whilst his study is open to criticism34, his methods 
highlight matters unapproachable by way of the repertory grid: a 
brief summary is offered here35 since his work is of intrinsic interest 
and, more importantly, some features are drawn upon in the construction 
of the arguments presented in Chapter 13. 
In his research Hinkle elicited ten constructs from each of his 28 
III 
respondents, using the triadic 'difference' method 
36. He then asked, 
in respect of the first of these, which pole the person preferred and 
followed this by asking for the reason for the preference. This led 
to (what Hinkle interpreted as) a superordinate construct which was 
then treated in the same way, the procedure being repeated until the 
respondent ran out of superordinates: the process was then begun 
afresh with another of the original constructs. Ten superordinate 
constructs were elicited by this technique. 
The constructs elicited (now 20 in number) were taken one at a time, 
the respondent being asked on which of the remaining 19 he or she 
would need to change preference if forced to change on the selected 
one. This gave Hinkle a full matrix of implicative relationships in 
which asymmetry of implication could be accommodated. In general, 
he found that the superordinate constructs had more implications for 
change than did the subordinates, supporting the suggestion that 
superordinates really did exist at a higher level in the system. 
Hinkle also devised the 'resistance-to-change' grid. In this type of 
grid the respondent was first asked to indicate the preferred pole for 
each construct, after which each construct was paired once with each 
of the remaining constructs37: the respondent was then asked on 
which of the two preferred poles he or she would be more prepared to 
give way if forced to choose. It was open to the respondent to 
indicate that it was impossible to make a choice, or that change on 
one logically entailed the necessity of changing on the other. This 
procedure enabled the rank order of 'resistance-to-change' to be 
computed for the 20 constructs. Hinkle found that the superordinate 
constructs were, in general, more resistant to change and that the 
rank orders of constructs, using the two separate criteria of number 
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of implications and resistance-to-change, were highly significantly 
correlated. 
In the light of criticisms of his methods it is clear that Hinkle's 
work must be adjudged as a pioneering study opening up new terrain 
for others, rather than as providing any definitive statement on 
structure in construct systems. The 'resistance-to-change' grid, for 
instance, is not as simple to interpret as might seem the case at 
first sight. First, there is no guarantee that 'laddered' constructs 
are superordinate to 'unladdered' constructs and, second, the nature 
of some constructs may make them more resistant to change than their 
apparent degree of superordinacy might suggest. Having used 
'resistance-to-change' grids with science teachers, there were 
occasions when they wished to use constructs like 'compulsory- 
voluntary' and 'in school activity-home activity' which are, in a 
sense, 'situational' constructs. These proved to be very highly 
resistant to change, yet it is plausible to infer that this resistance 
derives from the broad context in which the teachers were operating 
(reflecting curricular decisions taken at a level beyond their power 
to exert much, if any, influence) and not from the ways in which they 
construed science teaching per se. 
Resistance-to-diarege and implications grids do, however, offer some 
insights into the structure of construct systems. It is not 
surprising that Hinkle's findings from the two were significantly 
correlated, for they seem to overlap considerably regarding what they 
were tapping. In the absence of further evidence it must be presumed 
that such grids collect data about 'ought' aspects of structures, 
rather than those aspects reflected in some sort of action. The 
resistance-to-change grid asks the respondent to indicate preferences 
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and then to give evidence regarding the strength of those preferences, 
thus establishing the order of importance of constructs on a personal 
basis. The implications grids, in contrast, seem less personally 
involving once the initial elicitation has been completed, despite 
Hinkle's use of the 'if you were to be changed... ' type of questionings 
the task can be approached in a more detached manner than can that of 
the resistance-to-change grid. 
It may be that these two types of grid are, somewhat loosely, 
investigating the salience of the respondents' constructs. Under- 
lying aspects of structure would appear to be being tapped 
(particularly in the implications grid), but the implications of 
Hinkle's findings for hierarchy in structure are rather less clear- 
cut than might be assumed. In particular, the 'laddering' proaedure 
does not necessarily elicit superordinate constructs sequentially, 
to judge from the implications grid findings: the relationship 
between laddering and structure would appear to be indeterminate. 
The example from Hinkle's work which is quoted in detail in Bannister 
and Mair (1968) serves as a case in point38. 
In his thesis Hinkle did not indicate the subordinate origins of 
particular superordinate constructs, which makes it difficult to 
produce an accurate appraisal of his work. However, it seems very 
likely that the construct 
(i) 'face problems 
- 
escape from problems' 
was laddered to produce, in ascending order of superordinacy, 
(ii) 'solve problems 
- 
can't' 
(iii) 'achievements 
- 
few achievements' 
(iv) 'boost ego 
- 
tear it down'. 
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One would expect that, if laddering does elicit progressively more 
superordinate constructs, the implicative relationships would be 
undirectional from the relatively superordinate to the relatively 
subordinate. However, although Hinkle's results show a perfect 
implicative transivity between (i), (ii) and (iii) in the expected 
direction, (iv) is shown to be implicatively reciprocal in respect 
of each of the other three 
- 
in other words, its hierarchical status 
is ambiguous. Other examples can be found, passim 
, 
in Hinkle's 
results. 
Without access to Hinkle's subject, it is impossible to do other 
than speculate, but it seems at least plausible that some sort of 
loop or circularity is present in the example, linking the development 
and effects of a boosted ego to the capacity to face and solve 
problems. Presenting only the left hand poles for simplicity, this 
situation would appear as in Figure 4.2. 
Face 
problems 
Solve 
problems 
Achievements 
Boost 
ego 
Figure 4.2. A possible circularity in Hinkle's findings. 
There: is further reason (apparently overlooked by commentators on 
Hinkle's work) to doubt that the constructs elicited by laddering 
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stand in a strict hierarchical relationship. Hinkle remarks that 
on occasion a specific construct label was given at different levels 
in the (presumed) hierarchy39, the construct 'happy-unhappy' being 
most frequently noted in this respect. Operating from an assumption 
of hierarchy he is somewhat puzzled by this, and suggests weakly that 
the meaning of the labels may have varied according to their position 
in the hierarchy. 
It could be the case that respondents 'loop' between superordinate 
and subordinate constructs40 
, 
and (if the implications of 'reciprocal 
implication' 41 between constructs are explored) between constructs at 
the same hierarchical level, in either case the constructs being 
linked by overlaps in their respective meaning-complexes. 
If looting does take place it could be reflected in 'vicious circles', 
as represented in the hypothetical example of Figure 4.3 (which is 
presented in unipolar terms in the interests of clarity). 
Feeling of rejection 
---ý Doubt of love 
Confirmation of rejection Construing loved one's 
ambiguous behaviour as 
- 
negative rather than positive 
Figure 4.3. An illustration of a vicious circle of construing 
Examples of vicious circles appear in Kelly's own writing, in Diesingls 
(1972) analysis of Baruch's (1952) detailed case study of 'One little 
boy', and by Eden et al (1979)42. 
This consideration of work on structure leads me to speculate on the 
relationships between dynamics of process and cognitive structure, 
and whether these are confounded in Hinkle's technique. What can be 
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concluded from this limited appraisal is that the relation between 
laddering and implication is likely to be more complex than seems 
generally to be accepted in the literature. It may be that Hinkle's 
technique, which probes the relationships between constructs in a 
context of abstraction rather than of practical living, is in need 
of development: some moves in this direction are discussed in 
Chapter 13. Further research in this area is difficult, but is 
necessary if the ambiguity of findings derived from laddering proced- 
ures is to be reduced. 
4.8 THE REPERTORY GRID AND PERSONAL CONSTRUCT HEORY 
Bannister and Mair (1968) define grid method in the following termss 
'A grid may be defined as any form of sorting task 
which allows for the assessment of relationships 
between constructs and which yields these primary 
data in matrix form' 43. 
The definition is broad, since it opens out beyond the repertory 
grid to include Hinkle's implications and resistance to change grids, 
as well as other possibilities yet to be constructed. Although the 
definition as stated is not specifically linked to Kelly's theory 
save, perhaps, in respect of the word 'constructs') the explication 
provided makes it clear that the authors have that theory in mind. 
But a definition as broad as this runs the risk of being construed as 
vague, and as allowing a range of superordinate theoretical formulations. 
Thus it is not surprising to find Chetwynd (n. d. ) and Slater (1977) 
pointing out that there is no necessity to relate grid methodology in 
general to Personal Construct Theory, but Chetwynd would seem to be 
going too far when she claims that grid technique is relatively free 
from theoretical assumptions and constraints 
44 
: grid-based research 
will have its underlying theoretical statements even if these remain 
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unrecognised by the researcher. It would appear reasonable to 
conclude that the relationship between grid method and Kellian theory 
is both partial and reciprocals the theory does not necessarily imply 
the use of grid method, and grid method is not necessarily subsumed 
under the theory. 
Bannister and Mair (1968) state that every aspect of grid method is 
closely related to an equivalent assumption in construct theory, 
supporting their claim by referring to the assumptions of construct 
bipolarity, finite ranges of convenience for constructs, and so on45. 
The coherence of Kelly's formulation and grid method (thus broadly 
defined) is high, though the repertory grid 
- 
as a subset of grid 
method 
- 
does not require the full range of theoretical assumptions: 
for instance, it depends upon the Dichotomy and Range Corollaries, 
but is indifferent to the assumptions specific to the Organization 
Corollary. None of the other statements of the formal content of 
the theory exert any influence on the grid, though many of them 
could be (but do not necessarily have to be) investigated by grid 
methods. 
In his elaboration of the Fundamental Postulate, Kelly makes it 
clear that the focus of interest of his theory is the individual 
6 
person rather than groups of people 
. 
The process of data-gather- 
ing, by grid or other means, is idiographic 
? 
and consistent with 
the Individuality Corollary, though Allport (1962) observes that it 
is not entirely 'free' since the respondent is obliged to fit his 
or her construing to the particular elicitation protocol devised by 
the researcher4'8. In arguing that the repertory grid requires the 
application of a construct to a range of elements in the fashion of a 
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covering law, I am claiming that the grid smuggles in a nomothetic 
positivism that Kelly's theoretical position would appear to reject 
49. 
There are further nomothetic implications in the selection by Kelly 
of role titles, and the situation becomes more complicated in this 
respect when the researcher supplies elements and/or constructs. 
If, as Kelly stresses in his later writing, events are important in 
the Psychology of Personal Constructs5O it would appear that the 
repertory grid (as it has been used to date) may be a less appropriate 
instrument than many researchers currently believe. 
The challenge to the repertory grid is increased if construing is 
seen as not necessarily dichotomous 
- 
even the limited extension to 
bipolarity threatens the grid, as is argued in Chapter 8. Where 
elements are people, as in Kelly's original Role Construct Repertory 
Test, the dichotomous constructs may apply to all 
- 
but other types 
of element increase the risk that some will fall outside the range 
of convenience of some constructs. This presents no problems for 
the grid matrix, since blank cells are permissible: the problems 
come when statistical analysis cannot accommodate 'gaps' in the data, 
as is shown in Chapter 9. 
It would be improper to attack the repertory grid for its failure to 
offer evidence on the structural aspects of construct systems (and 
hence to fail to relate to the Organization and Fragmentation Corollaries) 
since it is clearly an inappropriate instrument for such research, 
though not all researchers have appreciated the point. It may be 
that developments of Hinkle's (1965) original implications and 
resistance-to-change grids will be able to chart a way forward in this 
difficult area of research. 
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I argued in Chapter 2 that part of the problem of the relationship 
between theory and method lies in the high level of abstraction of 
the former. The eadth of view of the theory encompasses far more 
of the panorama of methodology than the narrow enclosure of the 
repertory grid 
- 
and it is interesting to note that, following the 
chapter in which Kelly describes it, there is no further mention of 
the repertory grid in Kelly's (1955) text51. 
The difficulties in which grid-based research finds itself spring in 
part from the failure of researchers to bridge the gap between Kelly's 
theory and method. Too often the assumptive structure is taken as 
the whole theory, and all that is deemed necessary is to administer 
a grid on the naive assumption that it is the instrument appropriate 
to the theory52. A substantial proportion of the b] äme for this 
state of affairs, this failure to recognise and tackle the problem 
of conceptual disjunction, must l. ie with the authors of standard 
texts on construct theory and method 
- 
including Kelly, himself. 
4.9 SUMMARY 
Three main points were made in this chapter. 
1. The latent positivism of the grid, which seems at odds 
with Kelly's general philosophical stance, widens the gap 
between theory and method that was identified in Chapter 2. 
That gap is opened still further if the challenges to 
construct theory made in Chapter 3 are taken into account. 
2. The linguistic limitations. of the repertory grid make it 
an inadequate medium for the communication of meaning. 
The researcher will need to look beyond the grid content 
and analysis in order to obtain a rich understanding of 
what the respondent wishes to convey. 
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3. The repertory grid does not provide more than scant and 
oblique evidence regarding the structure of construct 
systems, for there is no connection between grid 
methodology and the Organization and Fragmentation 
Corollaries. The researcher interested in structure 
may find Hinkle's work on implications grids a useful 
point of departure. 
Some writers have made considerable claims for the repertory grid. 
The succeeding seven chapters constitute an analysis of the degree of 
congruence between that rhetoric and reason. 
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5 Elements 
For the elemental creatures go 
About my table to and fro, 
That hurry from unmeasured mind 
W. B. Yeats 
To Ireland in the coming times 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Given the variety of grids being used by researchers it is surprising 
that relatively little has been written on the nature of elements and 
their role in grid methodology'. The elements chosen (whether by 
researchers or respondent) give an indication of the realm to be 
explored: that iss they define 
- 
if only loosely 
- 
the boundaries 
within which the respondent is expected to construe. 
The central importance of elements in grid methodology requires that 
they be considered from the points of view of 
(i) the context of the research; 
(ii) their adequacy as a sample; 
(iii) whether they should be elicited or provided; and 
(iv) their meaningfulness, salience and stability. 
These aspects are interrelated, but it is convenient to treat them 
separately from the point of view of the arguments being put forward. 
5.2 CONTEXT 
In his development of the Repertory Test, Kelly makes it clear that its 
context is the personal-social behaviour of those who came to him for 
therapy2, and this led him to construct lists of role titles (which 
varied slightly according to the circumstances), against which his 
clients could identify people who were salient in their own lives. The 
'personalised' list of elements is then used as the starting-point for 
the elicitation of personal constructs, usually by the method of triads3. 
The examples given by Kelly, however, indicate that the grid form of 
his Role Construct Repertory Test tends to elicit personal attributes 
(both concrete and inferential) rather than the elements' behaviour, 
though there are behavioural inferences to be drawn. In other 
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words, there is some disjunction between what the grid elicits and 
the context in which it is set. This is not a problem for Kelly as 
a clinical psychotherapist, since he is interested in using the grid 
as a way of revealing, inter alia, 'the pathways along which the 
client is free to move's. The grid, then, is seen as a technique 
for exploring the client's construct system, and as an interim step 
towards helping the client towards a revision of his or her personal- 
social behaviour. 
Kelly's description of the grid gives very little emphasis to the 
contextual background against which his clients are to construe their 
chosen elements, this rendering questionable the inferences that can 
be drawn from the data matrix6. To use the repertory grid as a 
research instrument in its own right implies the need for a closer 
connection between grid and context, and for the latter to be made 
more explicit than has often been the case in repertory grid research. 
Various writers on grid methodology emphasise the importance of having 
a clear definition of the context of the grid, Mair (1967), for 
instance, pointing out that failure to do so may result in the 
respondent flicking from one context to another as he or she works 
through the grid? 
-a danger which Nash (1973) failed to guard against 
in his studies of teachers' perceptions of their pupils8. I am well 
aware that had someone asked me 
- 
as a beginning teacher 
- 
to construe 
science teaching, he or she would have got a markedly different response 
from me in the safety of the staffroom than when under threat of losing 
control in the laboratory! 
There are practical limitations to the tightness with which contexts 
can be defined. In the research which I conducted with science 
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teachers (see Appendix I ), the sample was limited to teachers in 
their probationary year and sought their construing of the teaching 
of science to first-year pupils only: in my experience, science 
teaching has different problems and emphases according to the age of 
the pupils. But even specifying the context as tightly as this 
(which was as tightly as was feasible), any nomothetic analysis of 
the data gathered would be open to criticism on grounds such as 
variation in catchment area, school ethos, curriculum being followed, 
facilities available, and so on9. The analyst seeking inductive 
generalisation in such circumstances is faced with the problem of 
attempting a justification on the grounds of adequacy of 'overlap' 
between the instances studied. 
Grid contexts, as well as being defined by the area the researcher 
chooses, are also defined by the specific elements being used. If 
Nash (1973) can be criticised for imprecision in his specification of 
the setting against which the pupils were to be construed by their 
teachers, he can point to the fact that his elements were at least 
'homogeneous' (i. e. all of the same kind) in that they were all pupils. 
'Heterogeneous' elements are a weakness in grid design: Bannister and 
Mair (1968) note a tendency in grid based research to use an 
'undifferentiated' 
- 
the inference is that they mean 'heterogeneous' 
- 
list of elements originating from the respondent and they remark that 
this achieves neither specific relevance to problem areas nor general 
representativeness'. Their warning seems to have gone unheeded by 
10 
some researchers, to judge from the studies discussed below. 
In her doctoral research Pope (1977) asked student teachers for 'a 
11 
list of things which come to your mind when you think about teaching' 
This very broad interpretation of context elicited lists of elements 
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such as shown in Figure 5.1. 
SIUDENT No. 7 
Learning 
Teaching 
Communication 
Schools 
Pupils 
Teachers 
LEAs 
Books 
Classes 
Assessment 
Arts 
Sciences 
Social training 
Academic training 
Interest 
Boredom 
Discovery 
STUDENT No. 8 SNDENT No. 19 
Children To broaden a child's knowledge 
Books Widen child's interests 
Chalk Build a bridge between home and 
Headmaster school 
Classroom Work in an atmosphere of fun 
School Try to get on with the rest of 
Ability staff 
Board Relationship with the head 
Pens Plenty of space 
Exams Trying to adapt method to suit 
Worry child 
Sense of Be where the child is at 
achievement Happy relationship with children 
Film Understanding each child 
Attitudes Making allowances for individual 
problems. 
Figure 5.1. Examples of elements elicited by Pope (1977)12. 
The examples show that Students No-7 and 8 have construed 'thing' in 
terms of concepts and objects, whereas No. 19 has seen the task largely 
in terms of aims. The situation is analogous to Nash's failure to 
specify the context in his research. But the methodological problems 
are deeper than this. If the aim of the research had been to 
investigate associations of the word 'teaching', no doubt the lists 
of elements would have been of considerable interest. However, Pope's 
aim was to monitor the viewpoints of students before, during, and 
shortly after a major teaching practice, and this required the 
elicitation of constructs (beginning in Kelly's triadic fashion, but 
becoming more flexible in approach once each element had appeared in 
at least one triad). Some of Pope's respondents remarked on the 
difficulties of using heterogeneous elements in the elicitation 
procedure, and this may account for the small number of constructs in 
some of the grids and also the very general constructs that were often 
produced13. 
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It would appear that Pope obtained a diverse list of elements at the 
subsequent cost of limited construing 
- 
limited both in number and in 
insight into the problem area being investigated. To be fair, there 
is evidence that the feedback conversations regarding the grid analysis 
gave rise to a fuller exploration of 'teaching' than the grid on its 
own, 
14 but this patches up weakness in her grid method rather than 
justifies it. 
Keen (1979), in a doctoral study of physics teaching, employed 
heterogeneous elements in his grids despite the fact that all the 
elements to be construed were people. He originally intended that 
his respondents should construe, in addition to 'myself as a teacher 
of physics', a number of physics teachers known to them. Some of his 
respondents were first year undergraduates, and their lack of experience 
of an adequate number of teachers fitting the specification induced 
Keen to incorporate short videorecordings of seven physics teachers 
(employing a range of pedagogic styles) into the set of elements to be 
construed. Thus his respondents were faced with a mixture of teachers 
who were personally memorable, together with unfamiliar teachers 
mediated by videorecording. How they responded to the task of 
construing heterogeneous triads, or triads composed solely of 'video- 
elements', is not clear15. 
This mixed-element technique is developed further in the TARGET16 
project developed at Plymouth Polytechnic by Hopwood and Keen (1978), 
and my personal experience of responding to a TARGET grid provides me 
with an existential basis for arguing against the mixing of personally 
relevant elements with video-elements. 
In the TARGET procedure there are three personally relevant elements 
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(self effective and ineffective teachers) and eleven video-elements 
(short extracts from microteaching sessions): the respondent has the 
opportunity to make limited notes about each video-element. In 
construing the triads, which are selected in a predetermined pattern, 
I found difficulty in providing constructs when I was faced with the 
video-elements (who were unfamiliar to me and mainly using a lecturing 
approach in their microteaching environment). I found myself making 
discriminations on superficial criteria with regard to both the 
physical appearance of the video-elements and the pedagogic styles 
manifested. A broader range of constructs regarding teaching - and, 
as a 'staff developer', I can claim a measure of experience in 
construing teaching 
- 
was not encouraged to emerge. Whilst I am well 
aware of the danger of generalising from an isolated experience, I am 
led to suggest that the use of video-elements in a manner akin to the 
TARGET procedure may well fail to penetrate to the heart of the area of 
investigation. One might contrast the TARGET approach with an 
alternative, apparently little used, in which individual teachers are 
faced with excerpts of their own teaching17, or of teaching by them- 
selves and others in a teacher education group, in which one might 
expect a much richer understanding of the relation between the actions 
of teaching and the underlying context of aims, resources, constraints, 
and suchlike to be obtained. 
My critique of the TARGET procedure leads to a second problem, hinted 
at in the opening of this chapters that is, whether the grid method- 
ology matches the intentions of the study being undertaken. In the 
TARGET approach the emphasis appears to be on teachers' characteristics 
rather than on teaching (the personally relevant elements setting the 
orientation) and hence one would expect that constructs would focus upon 
matters such as personal appearance and style rather than upon the 
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nature of teaching itself18. A focus on teaching would seem to 
require a grid in which the elements were teaching situations presented 
in such a manner as to maximise construing in terms of pedagogy and to 
minimise "teachers' characteristics" save for those seen as salient to 
pedagogic practice19. The alternative presented in the preceding 
paragraph would make it possible to go a long way towards 'partialling 
out' superficial characteristics, particularly if the respondents were 
asked to construe, for example, in terms of underlying aims and 
ideologies. 
Although the validity of the grids used in the work of Perrott et al 
(1976) and Hopwood and Keen (1978) is compromised by the relationship 
between the elements and the intentions of the researchers, it can be 
argued 
- 
though, in my view, not persuasively 
- 
that construing 
teachers is closely related to construing teaching. The link between 
elements and intentions is much more tenuous in a study reported by 
Kevill et al (1982). In this research the authors aimed to assess 
the effectiveness of the Diploma in Literacy Development at Middlesex 
Polytechnic through the use of repertory grids during, and at the end 
of, the course. Whilst doubt might be entertained whether the time 
of administering the first grid is appropriate for what is intended to 
be a pre-course/post-course comparison, a more substantial doubt arises 
on examination of the way in which the grids were set up. 
The course members were asked to list 'all the elements which regularly 
made up their teaching job'20, and two examples of the lists are given 
in Figure 5.2. 
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Elements of a primary 
school teacher 
Teaching 
Organising library 
Socialising 
Discussing 
Duties 
NUT representative 
Out of class activities 
Relations with parents 
Elements of a secondary 
school teacher 
Teaching 
Requisition 
Testing and timetables 
Liaising with staff 
Discipline 
Visits 
Preparing school leavers 
Form teacher. 
Figure 5.2. Lists of elements provided b two respondents (from Kevill et al, 1982s 47). 
To judge from the examples provided, and from the authors' failure to 
indicate that they asked their respondents to construe the elements 
from the point of view of literacy development, it is difficult to see 
how the grids 
- 
and hence the change measured by the grids 
- 
can be 
used in the context of the evaluation of the Diploma. To be fair to 
the authors, it must be made clear that a substantial contribution was 
made to their study by feedback interviews in which the grid analyses 
were explored further, but this does not absolve them from the criticism 
that their study might have been far richer had the respondents been 
asked to list, as elements, aspects of teaching (in the sense of 
extended professional role) in which the language development of child- 
ren was, or might be, involved. 
In all the examples discussed so far, the assumption has been made that 
the individual elements have been unconfounded in the respondents' 
minds. This assumption may not always be valid. Canter et al (197+), 
using photographs of people against different backgrounds, found that 
the background characteristics influenced the ratings that were given. 
The potential problem is easily seen in respect of visual elements, 
but may be more difficult to perceive where the elements are recon- 
structions in the respondents' minds. And what the respondents 
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reconstruct may not be what the researcher has in mind. 
There is a further contextual problem to be mentioned: that of the 
self. It is now a commonplace that each self in its time plays many 
parts, assuming many role relationships (often in parallel), switching 
from one to another as the occasion demands -a self-referential 
version of the problem of contextual shift noted earlier in conjunction 
with Nash's (1973) work. There is a range of past, present and possible 
future selvesr which one(s) does the element 'self' actually tap in a 
repertory grid? Some researchers are aware of the need to specify 
the 'self' they are interested in, or to specify a range of selves 
(for instance: 'self as I am now', 'self as I was', and 'self as I'd 
like to be'), in which case the context of elicitation is on rather 
firmer ground. Failure to recognise this potential problem, 
. 
or to 
anticipate it in designing a grid, could result in findings that are 
ambiguous to interpret 
- 
particularly where the relationships between 
selves, or between self and others, are a focus of the research. 
Shaw and Thomas (1978) claim that, in grid work, elements of all kinds 
are suitable. The arguments developed in this section suggest that, 
construed naively, this claim could result in findings whose validity 
is seriously compromised. There is no substitute for rigorous 
thought at the outset of designing a grid. 
5.3 SAMPLING 
Much of the discussion in the preceding section has also been implicitly 
concerned with the question of sampling, for any question about the 
validity of grid elements implies a question about the sampling of 
elements from their realm membership. Kelly assumes that the elements 
provided by his clients in response to his list of role titles would be 
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representative of their realms of social interaction22. He bases this 
assumption upon the cumulation of his experience, but it is possible 
that salient individuals might fall outside this normative framework 
- 
for instance, policemen and (in the 19 
- 
element grid) priests. In 
the United Kingdom, social workers and probation officers might be 
salient, yet not be elicited by Kelly's role titles. It might be 
useful 
- 
if the researcher intends to provide role titles 
- 
to allow 
the respondent to identify salient persons beyond those prompted, 
provided that they fall within the intentions of the grid. 
Kelly recognises that different sets of events might lead to differences 
in construct interrelationships23. From the context of his writing 
it is probably fair to say that his attention is not directed to the 
sampling of elements from a realm membership, but the point neverthe- 
less has some force for the grid user. Take, for example, the TARGET 
grid and its requirement that the respondent specify one effective and 
one ineffective teacher. It is not difficult to imagine a respondent 
wishing to specify more than one effective teacher 
- 
for instance, one 
who gains success through a traditional, authoritarian and didactic 
mode of teaching, and another who is successful by way of using a pupil- 
centred, inquiry-based approach. Whichever one is chosen to fit the 
TARGET protocol will have an effect on the construing and on the 
construct interrelationships, both of which would influence the 'self' 
and 'effective teacher' profiles which are output by the TARGET 
analytical routine: this output provides the basis for the respondent 
to reconstrue his or her teaching. One might surmise, in the light of 
the argument just presented, that the TARGET procedure would be enhanced 
by the inclusion of a greater number of designated-effective and 
designated-ineffective teachers at the expense of the video-elements. 
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The choice of effective and ineffective teachers as elements does 
draw attention to contrast in the grid. Both Pope and Keen (1981) 
and Easterby-Smith (1981) argue for the inclusion of 'good' and 'bad' 
elements among the sample 
24 
, 
though, as the latter observes, a 
strongly-made contrast might inhibit element elicitation. Drawing on 
his experience with managers, Easterby-Smith remarks that a number of 
them find it difficult to name someone they dislike, and he suggests 
that the category 'a colleague you dislike' might profitably be 
amended to 'someone you like less'25. 
It may be the case that element-specifications are irrelevant to some 
respondents. Easterby-Smith gives the example of the element 'chairing 
meetings', which may be highly relevant to a works manager but irrelevant 
to a graduate trainee26. Similarly, I found, whilst working with 
probationary science teachers, that very few of them made any use of 
the provided elements 'outside visits' and 'science club' in the context 
of their teaching of science to first year pupils. There is a tempt- 
ation, when providing elements on the basis of both experience and pilot 
work (as was the case here) to assume their general applicability to 
the sample being studied. In this case the pedagogic relevance of each 
element was tested by the use of the provided construct 'used a lot in 
my teaching 
- 
not used in my teaching'. To use a construct of this 
type allows the 'irrelevant' element(s) to be eliminated at the outset, 
or, less satisfactorily, during analysis 
. 
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The representativeness of sampling of elements is a problem for grid 
users which, in most cases, is not susceptible of resolution. In a 
few cases the sample is the population (for instance, all the pupils in 
a particular class28), but in the majority of circumstances it is im- 
possible to define the population of elements objectively and hence be 
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sure of extracting a random sample29. Here the best that can be done 
is to make a reasoned case for the appropriateness of the chosen 
elements to the problem being investigated. 
Despite the force of this argument, Keen (1979) and Hopwood and Keen 
(1978) claim to be able to determine when the sampling of elements has 
been unsatisfactory, the criterion being the dispersion of the elements 
in the component space computed by principal components analysis301 
this criterion has been used to reject grids. But if one supposes 
that the 
- 
largely normative 
- 
sample of elements is a representative 
sample in the majority of cases, one must question why it appears un- 
satisfactory for a minority. The answer, one might speculate, could 
lie in the constructs elicited and the way in which the elements were 
located on them: the problem does not necessarily lie in the columns 
of the grid, but might reside in the rows, or in the interaction between 
rows and columns. Although the sampling may be suspect, it would seem 
to be invalid to reject grids on the grounds of their failure to fit 
the normative model that these writers' decision-making processes imply. 
5.4 ELICITED OR SUPPLIED ELEMENTS? 
Should the grid user elicit or provide elements? The question can 
only be answered in terms of the purposes of the research. For Kelly 
the answer is a midway position in which he goes as far as to specify 
role titles but requires his clients to give personal meaning to these 
by 'attaching' acquaintances to each role title on the list. Fund- 
a. 
. 
mentally, the elements must be adjudged to reflect Kelly's view of the 
compass of elements necessary to elicit a series of constructs sufficient- 
ly wide-ranging to provide an adequate understanding of his clients' 
construing of social relationships3l. 
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Easterby-Smith (1981) conveniently summarises the ways in which a set 
of elements can be put together32. 
(i) Supply elements to the respondent. 
(ii) Provide role or situation descriptions. 
(iii) Define a 'pool' (e. g. name five subordinates). 
(iv) Elicit through discussion of the topic of interest, prompting 
if necessary. Jointly draw up list of elements. 
Supplied elements 
- 
(i), and to some extent (ii) above 
- 
reflect the 
researcher's view of the problem. Even where the researcher has 
developed the list of elements through experience and/or discussion 
with a pilot group of people similar to the intended respondents, there 
is no guarantee that they will reflect the problem as any particular 
individual may see it, nor will they necessarily form a representative 
or sufficient sample (as was noted in the preceding section). 
To supply elements requires the respondent to construe their meanings 
before engaging in the formal operation of completing a grid. The 
level of construing required will reflect the nature of the elements. 
Olson (1981) provided sentences relating to science teaching33, 
implicitly recognising that a short verbal 'tag' would be insufficient 
to ensure that researcher and respondent were sharing a substantial 
measure öf understanding. In my work with science teachers I adopted 
a slightly different approach, choosing to give short verbal labels 
(for convenience of reference) but supporting these with amplifying 
sentences. 'Assessment', for example, was amplified in such a way as 
to indicate that this referred to ongoing, day-to-day assessment of 
pupils rather than end-of-term or end-of-year testing: formative, 
rather than summative assessment. This proved in practice to have 
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been an important precaution, since some of my respondents were disposed 
to construe assessment in terms of terminal examinations or tests, rather 
than in terms of a more informal approach to the monitoring of pupil 
progress. 
This difference in construing highlights the question raised at the 
start of this sections whose perception is, or should form, the focus 
of the research? 
34 To draw attention to the problems associated with 
the provision of elements is not to imply that there is no place for 
supplied elements in repertory grid methodology. Given an adequate 
degree of intersubjective agreement regarding the elements, they may 
prove to be a superior sample than those elicited directly from 
respondents. And where the focus of interest lies in the respondent's 
construct system alone (the implicit espoused theory rather than the 
theory-in-use), rather than in the relationship between elements and 
constructs, the provision of elements35 may be satisfactory. 
To elicit elements, however, seems more in keeping with the Kellian 
philosophy of asking how the respondent construes his or her world 
- 
or, at least, that part of it upon which attention is being focused.. 
Whilst it is highly likely that the elicited elements will be relevant 
to the respondent, the procedure is open to distortion in a number of 
ways: lapse of memory, selective attention, or fixation on a particular 
subset of the context36, for example. In some circumstances. it could 
be fruitful to analyse the elements elicited against thosewhich might 
have been expected, but most grid users would probably wish to demon- 
strate that their procedures result in a representative sample- of 
elements for the ensuing sorting procedure. Reid (1976), for example, 
draws attention to the possibility of obtaining a skewed sample of 
elements and makes the further point that this is likely to bias the 
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elicitation of constructs37. 
As Pope (1977) observes, interviewing respondents within the framework 
of a repertory grid requires considerable skill on the part of the 
researcher38, who has to be sensitive to, and empathic with, them 
whilst at the same time controlling 
- 
in a flexible way 
- 
the course 
of the proceedings. Despite her awareness of interviewing skills, 
she records that some of the students who completed grids found 
difficulty in providing a satisfactory list of elements: as was noted 
earlier39, the elements produced were heterogeneous and the problem may 
only have surfaced when the students were faced with the triads. 
The nature of interpersonal elicitation of elements opens the procedure 
to the possibility of interviewer bias, though my experience suggests 
that this is more likely to be a problem in respect of constructs, whose 
elicitation is often encompassed within an extended conversation. Shaw 
and Gaines (1979) remark that interviewer influence is eliminated when 
the respondent interacts with a computer program such as PEGASUS. 
In this program the respondent is asked to define the field of interest 
and to identify appropriate elements according to a standard routine. 
The full list of elements can be built up as the grid is being completedt 
it is not essential that the respondent specify all the elements at the 
outset. Although it is expected that the respondent will produce a 
set of homogeneous elements, there is no way in which heterogeneity or 
bias can be eliminated from the list of elements elicited. 
The iterative addition of elements to an original list is also a feature 
of Green and Tull's (1978) 'consumption grid' used in marketing research. 
They begin by presenting a set of initial stimuli (such as 'toast pop-up') 
and asking their respondents to list all the occasions when each item 
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would be considered appropriate for consumption (in effect, the constructs 
in a grid matrix). The matrix is expanded by asking, in respect of 
each occasion, for the names of other appropriate products. The ftfl 
matrix 
- 
which can by now be very large 
- 
can be completed dichotomously, 
each 'appropriate' element X occasion intersection being scored 1, and 
each 'inappropriate' intersection being scored zero. As far as the 
elements in such a grid are concerned, there would seem to be consider- 
able scope for each respondent to build on the 'core' of elements 
provided by the researchers. 
This blending of a 'core' of researcher-generated elements and a set of 
elements provided by the respondent may be an acceptable compromise 
between the requirements (in so far as they may be met) of sampling 
rigour and those of idiography. It is, however, not necessarily the 
case that the parties to the construction of a grid share a common frame- 
work of meaning 
- 
particularly at the outset 
- 
and it will be important 
to try to develop a shared understanding as the grid protocol unfolds, 
or else any conclusions that might be drawn from the subsequent analysis 
would be distinctly suspect. There is, of course, a potential problem 
regarding shared meaning when the respondent nominates elements to match 
a list of role titles, or provides from experience examples of critical 
incidents matched to given general situations. Some of the ambiguity, 
if such exists, may well be resolved in the light of the ways in which 
elements are located on constructs. 
5.5 MEANINGFULNESS, SALIENCE AND STABILITY OF ELEMENTS 
In the earlier part of this chapter reference was made, en passant, to 
the degree of meaningfulness of the elements to the respondent, particular- 
ly in those cases where the elements are provided by the researcher. 
The question of meaningfulness of elements (as opposed to that of 
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constructs) has received little attention in the literature, yet 
embedded in it are issues which the grid user might need to consider 
before embarking on research. 
The identification of specific people to fit a list of role titles 
comes closer to relating the grid to everyday life than the construing 
of the role titles themselves 
41 Easterby-Smith (1981) argues that 
results from the latter may not mean much 
42, 
though this can be 
countered to some extent by suggesting that such a grid might be very 
revealing of prejudice and stereotyped thinking. The point made here 
calls to mind Reid and Holley's (1972) work with potential university 
entrants who were asked to construe a number of universities from what 
appears to have been a standpoint of relative ignorance. 
Even when specific people or incidents are provided in response to a 
researcher's rubric, little or no evidence is gathered regarding their 
psychological salience 
- 
yet salience could influence the results 
gathered from the grid. No doubt some would wish to argue that the 
less salient or less known elements will be revealed as such by the 
ratings given to them on constructs and by the subsequent grid analysis. 
However, this is by no means a safe position to take, for such elements 
may be assigned, on the grounds of lack of definition, to either the 
mid-point or the 'not X' end of a rating scale: the researcher may 
have a difficult time trying to infer the meanings of ratings. 
It may be that part of the problem lies in a confusion between 'salience' 
and 'meaningfulness': if an element is salient it must entail meaning- 
fulness, but the reverse implication is invalid. A clergyman is 
meaningful to me, but is not salient in my life. But to identify a 
list of salient elements may not be enough, since salience may vary 
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with context' : here I revert to the theme of an earlier section of 
this chapter. 
Problems of meaningfulness and salience are likely to be more acute 
when the researcher provides the elements. Earlier in this chapter 
reference was made to the attempts of Olson and myself to define 
elements in such a way that there would be a substantial degree of 
shared understanding between researcher and respondent regarding 
meaning, but it is acknowledged that no similar statement may be made 
regarding salience. In each of these two studies the researchers were 
interested in the ways in which their respondents construed a series of 
given situations within the context of science teaching 
- 
in other words, 
the location of the elements in their context was of major importance. 
But this may be of negligible importance in other circumstances, such 
as in the Bannister-Fransella (1966) grid test of schizophrenic thought 
disorder in which the elements are photographs of minimal personal 
importance 
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in order to allow the respondents to 'project' aspects of 
their construct systems in a way that is relatively uncluttered by the 
intrusion of interpersonal matters. 
Ravenette (1975), however, points to the difficulty that may be 
experienced when a respondent tries to construe 'unknowns' 
-a problem 
I found when trying to make notes on TARGET video-elements, when npr 
attention was (paradoxically) diverted by the boring style of presentation 
of two of the teachers from the task of appraising critically what they 
were actually doing. The pressure of time in the TARGET procedure 
- 
viewing, and making notes on, eleven 'clips' of teaching in approximately 
half an hour 
- 
precluded the possibility of going back to the elements to 
answer, in a more detailed way, the question of why I had evaluated these 
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particular teachers as boring: in these instances, the potential 
salience of these elements had not been fully realised. To make the 
underlying point more generally: elements of low salience may fail to 
tap constructs of interest to the researche45 and hence be a weakness 
in the grid method being : used. 
Meaningfulness and salience are in practice not easy to disentangle in 
grid methodology, and both are likely to be partial determinants of the 
stability of ratings of elements. This raises the question of the 
stability of the element itself. 
Stated in grid terms, Kelly's notion of 'loose construing' seems to be 
expressed in terms of the shift of an element upon a construct, and he 
gives the example of 'breakfast' being loosely construed as a meal eaten 
over a wide range of time in the morning 
. 
The example is trivial, 
the point less so. Collett (1979) suggests considering the loosening 
of the element, arguing that if 'mother' invalidates predictions, one 
could dislodge the element within the 'system 
47. 
Given that the 
distinction between elements and constructs is one of convenience rather 
than of principle, it is difficult to see what Collett is adding here: 
to dislodge an element within a system is to reconstrue it, presumably 
assimilatively. 
There is a further point to be made. Element instability can be 
construed in terms of the relocation of an element or a construct: I 
may construe a person as 'distant' on one occasion and as 'friendly' as 
I get to know him, shifting the element's position on the construct 
'distant-friendly'. But many elements are complex 
- 
people and 
situations, to give two examples. What is construed as instability 
may result from differential focusing on the element's components on two 
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occasions, and not a bodily shift of the element in toto. In the 
example above, I might simply construe two different samples-from the 
person's overall behaviour, focusing on the 'distant' and 'friendly' 
aspects on different occasions 
It is probably true to say that all elements are vague, with a sphere 
of meaning rather than single unambiguous point of meaning. The 
larger the sphere of meaning is (i. e. the less well defined the element), 
the greater is the likelihood of subsequent reconstrual in either of 
the senses noted above, to the detriment of stability in the grid49. 
Given Kelly's view of people as 'a form of motion', change can be 
expected over time: the difficulty lies in identifying where the cause 
of the change might lie. The finding of low stability in the grid 
- 
and this can be assessed on a 'per element' basis51 
- 
might well lead 
the researcher to explore the respondent's construing of the elements 
(inter alia) and also the fuzziness of their definition52. 
The more abstract the element is, the more likely it is to be fuzzy. 
Carter et al (1968) provide some limited evidence to this effect. They 
asked 135 female teachers on a summer school conference to rate, on a 
semantic differential, sets of humans (e. g. the football coach), 
'inanimate objects' (e. g. 'the new math') and 'relational objects' 
(e. g. relationships between teachers and administration). Ease of 
rating was found to relate to the type of 'object' being rated, humans 
proving to be the easiest and 'relational objects' the most difficult. 
One of the difficulties with this study, however, is the confounding of 
element fuzziness with the appropriateness of semantic differential 
scales (which is likely to vary with the type of 'object' being 
construed)53. 
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On the whole, the literature suggests that the construing of people 
who are personally well known tends to be more stable than the construing 
of other elements, despite Mair's (1967) claim that such people are 
nevertheless complex. This probably reflects not only the relatively 
low ambiguity of the elements concerned, but also the use of constructs 
that are fairly well ingrained in the culture. On similar grounds, 
very familiar objects construed in terms of commonplace physical 
constructs (such as 'large-small') could be expected to provide stability 
values as high as the +0.92 found by Bannister and Mair (1968)-54. These 
authors suggest that similar stability values might well be obtained if 
people were to be rated on the same set of physical constructs, but 
that, where 'psychological'(and therefore more abstract) constructs 
are used, the stability value could be expected to fall. It is not 
surprising to find the stability of rating of photographs to be somewhat 
lower than for physical objects since there is, again, the likelihood 
of a confounding of element and construct fuzzinesss one might suspect 
the first of being responsible for the larger proportion of the in- 
stability on the grounds of the culturally-ingrained nature of the 
constructs being used. 
Whilst general issues of stability are discussed in Chapter 10 
- 
they 
are not the focus of this section 
- 
some further exploration of element 
stability is necessary, drawing upon empirical work I have undertaken, 
and which is more fully reported in Appendix 10. 
I first began to ponder on the notion of element fuzziness when I 
noticed that the stabilit. es of the grids produced by the science 
teachers 
- 
who were using relatively abstract supplied elements (e. g. 
'pupil practical exercises') 
- 
were distinctly lower than those of grids 
completed by a group of teachers on an in-service course who were using 
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self-selected pupils as elements. Assuming a degree of homogeneity 
among all these teachers, it was nevertheless unclear whether the 
difference in stability might be more attributable to differences 
between the two types of element being used, or to the difference 
between supplying and eliciting elements. 
I investigated the matter further by asking each of different groups 
of teachers to complete test/retest grids in which the elements 
consisted of one of the following: (a) pupils; (b) specific teaching 
situations from their own experience; and (c) general descriptions of 
aspects of teaching. In each case, the elements were elicited from 
the respondents. The hypothesis was that the grid stabilities would, 
in descending order of magnitude, follow the order (a), (b), (c) on the 
following grounds. In (a) the elements would be sharply etched in the 
mind, and the resulting constructs could be expected to be familiar 
characteristics of pupils; in (b) the elements might be sharp but the 
constructs might be broad and vague after the manner of those produced 
by Pope's respondents; and in (c) both elements and constructs might 
be vague. 
Up to twelve constructs were elicited for each grid using a dyadic 
rather than a triadic approach (see Section 6.5.2). Each element was 
located on a-seven-point rating ladder (cf. Yorke 1978), a 'not 
applicable' category being available. One week later the same teachers 
were asked to repeat the rating procedure on a set of blank forms of 
the rating ladders, the elicited constructs having been added, one per 
sheet. 20 grids were completed by 17 respondents, since three 
respondents found time to complete a second grid (using a different type 
of element) on the first occasion, 
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Analysis of the stability indexes showed that they were significantly 
higher for pupils than for either of the 'teaching situations' grids 
(p < 
. 
05), but that no significant difference could be detected between 
the 'specific' and the 'general' teaching situations grids55. This 
latter finding may have been influenced by the fact that there were 
fewer pairs of grids completed in these two categories than for pupils, 
reflecting the happenstance of differential absence of teachers on the 
second occasion. Although it is possible to point to weaknesses in 
the design of this investigation, the findings lend some support to the 
view that the nature of the elements exerts a considerable influence 
upon the stability of the grid. 
5.6 SUMMARY 
The main points raised and discussed in this chapter lead to the 
suggestion that it is necessary, in grid-based research, to give serious 
consideration to the following: 
(a) the relationship of the elements to the aims of the 
research; 
(b) the extent to which the chosen elements are a 
representative and adequate sample; 
(c) the justification for supplying or eliciting elements 
(or for opting for a mixture of both); and 
(d) the potential meaningfulness, salience and stability 
of the elements. 
The arguments presented in the chapter suggest that elements of all 
kinds may not be as suitable in grid methodology as some writers claim - 
and it may be necessary for considerable control to be exerted over the 
imagination in the development of novel approaches to grid methodology. 
If it has done nothing else, this chapter has drawn attention to the 
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need to subject proposed elements to a careful scrutiny before embark- 
ing on the use of a grid. 
Although the following quotation is taken out of its proper context, 
it seems to sum up the burden of this chapter quite well: a clinician, 
Kelly says, 
'... should be careful about assuming that a test which is 
concerned with the perception of ambiguous forms or the 56 sorting of objects will reveal all that he needs to know... ' 
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6 Constructs 
Without Contraries is no progression. 
Attraction and Repulsion, Reason and 
Energy, Love and Hate, are necessary 
to Human existence. 
W. Blake 
The Argument 
from The Marriage of Heaven and Hell. 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter takes a horizontal look at the repertory grid, focusing 
upon the constructs. Rather more has been written on constructs than 
on elements, necessitating a longer discussion than in the preceding 
chapter. Kelly makes explicit his assumptions regarding elicitation, 
and these are appraised before moving on to consider the methods by 
which constructs can be elicited. The question of whether the 
researcher should elicit or supply constructs is then discussed and 
this leads to the final section of the chapter, in which typological 
aspects of constructs are considered. No overall summary is offered 
to this lengthy chapter on the grounds that each subsection is fairly 
well self-contained: where appropriate a summary is given for a 
particular subsection. 
6.2 ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE ELICITATION OF CONSTRUCTS 
Kelly makes a number of assumptions in respect of his Repertory Test 
and of the grid formt. Since the first three of those relating to 
the former can be subsumed under the latter they are considered 
together. 
6.2.1 Permeability 
The constructs used are assumed to be permeable; that is, they must be 
open to the inclusion of new elements. If a construct is elicited by 
the 'triadic' method (see page 172), it is possible that the construct 
might apply only to the triad of elements which 'triggered' it (or to 
only a subsample of the list of elements in the grid): in such circum- 
stances the construct would be restricted in permeability to an extent 
consonant with its range of convenience. Two men, for example, might 
be contrasted in terms of an interest in home decorating: the 
construct 'interested in car maintenance 
- 
interested in home decorating' 
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might well be inapplicable to other people presented as elements in the 
grid. Such a construct bight be applicable to situations not yet 
confronted, but in the circumstances of the grid it is likely to be of 
little value. The question then is whether the grid methodology 
should determine the constructs to be included, or whether the constructs 
should be 'accepted' by the researcher even at the expense of gaining an 
incomplete grid matrix. The implications of this question are too 
2 
far-reaching for them to be pursued here, but there are implicit 
explorations of this issue at a number of points in succeeding chapters: 
a fuller consideration is offered in Chapter 13. 
In Kelly's repertory grid the explicit assumption is made that all the 
elements fall within the range of convenience of the constructs, and 
this assumption is made in the majority of repertory grid studies in 
the literature. The mathematical analysis of the grid demands it, as 
do the more sophisticated computer packages developed for grid analysis, 
which are discussed in Chapter 9. The problem of the non-applicability 
of a construct to an element is recognised by Kelly, but he fights shy 
of the technical problems this entails3 and, in the dichotomous 
allocation procedure that he favoured, he tacitly let the 'awkward' 
elements be subsumed under the implicit pole4 of the construct. 
More recent work, involving rating scales instead of dichotomous 
allocation, has been unable to get over the difficulty: the tendency 
is to use 
- 
and even recommend 
- 
the mid-point of rating scales as a 
kind of 'dustbin' for those elements lying unconformably5 upon the 
constructs' range of convenience, a blind eye being turned to the 
conceptual implications. The literature suggests that the problem is 
at a minimum when people are being rated on logically-opposite constructs 
of personality, and at a maximum when 'peculiar' constructs6 and 
heterogeneous elements are being used, and when elements are being 
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rated on inappropriate dimensions 
-a problem particularly acute in 
semantic differential research7. 
6.2.2 The pre-existence of elicited constructs 
Kelly makes the assumption that pre-existing constructs are elicited. 
Whilst he points out that sorting tasks are frequently associated with 
concept formation, his opinion is that it is relatively unlikely that 
new constructs are concocted in response to whatever elicitation 
procedure is being adopted. This opinion is based on the focus of 
convenience of Personal Construct Theory (interpersonal relationships) 
and, even though this may be true for the construing of familiar people, 
it is open to debate whether this assumption is generally valid - in 
fact, some grid users might wish (like Tully, 1976, in respect of social 
workers) to use the technique for heightening awareness and therefore 
seek that their respondents construe in ways other than those they 
habitually uses: the boundary between construct reproduction and 
construct formation would appear to be indeterminate, as was argued in 
Chapter i. 
Three categories of construing need to be considered, the second of 
which is often subsumed under either or both of the other two according 
to the perspective taken. The categories are, in respect of an 
element: 
(i) using a set of existing constructs found to be 
appropriate; 
(ii) using a set of existing constructs, finding them 
to be inappropriate, and thus switching to other 
pre-existing constructs; and 
(iii) producing and using new constructs. 
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Category (i) is consistent with a successful pattern matching strategy, 
in the sense of finding a 'fit' with a Roschian 'prototype', and would 
seem to be applicable to both concrete, physicalistic constructs (e. g. 
extroversion construed as subsuming a range of 'prototypic' behaviours 
such as animation, initiative, style of dress and suchlike), to the 
consistency of data to abstract theory, and to consistency between 
theoretical formulations. In respect of the last two examples 
presented here, the matching process goes further than the work on 
object recognition would strictly warrant. 
In category (ii) 'matchings' such as those exemplified in the preceding 
paragraph are unsuccessful, and the person has to search around in his 
or her system for other constructs that allow matchings other than those 
originally tried. Behaviourism, for instance, was based on a set of 
mechanistic constructs, but the 'match' of people with this framework 
proved inadequate and required the importation of some aspects of a 
Kantian metaphysics in neobehaviourism's admission of intervening 
processes. The Kantian constructs were not new: they had been in 
existence for a century and a half and were available to those who 
wished to make use of them. At the level of personal construing, an 
initial assumption based on, say, style of dress might be a construal of 
self-indulgence and amorality which might need to be tempered in the 
light of knowledge of efforts spent supporting charity work. In this 
category, as category (i) the constructs used are those already present 
in the system, and construing in both these senses is fundamentally 
assimilative (see Figure 3.1). 
Category (iii) breaks new ground. Here existing constructs prove 
inadequate for the load they are required to bear, and new constructs 
have to be developed to take the strain. At the macro-level, this 
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would correspond to 'quantum jumps' in theorising 
- 
for instance, the 
contributions of Marx, Darwin, Freud and Einstein. At the personal 
level this is the accommodative, developmental aspect of construct 
systems. People learn new discriminations in the light of experience, 
often attaching the culturally-embedded verbal labels (children often 
invent their own labels until they find they have to adapt to the 
demands of society: 'goggy goggy Boggy' becomes something more widely 
communicable in the course of time, even though the meaning expressed 
may be fairly stable). I learn, for instance that doing 'classical' 
experiments in social science is often scientistic rather than 
scientific, and I have to find new constructs such as verstehen and 
hermeneutics in order to escape from the crevasses of a pseudo-science. 
I emphasise here that these are my own personal constructions which 
may or may not find acceptance in the outside world: the transitions 
in my thinking do not have to be 'right'. I also acknowledge that 
verstehen and hermeneutics have also been in existence for a long time 
- 
however, they were constructs outside my ken until comparatively 
recently. I have grafted these on to my personal construct system, 
thus enlarging it: it remains to be seen whether experience validates 
or repudiates these for me in such research as I might in future under- 
take. 
What is the relevance of this lengthy digression to the practicalities 
of construing in repertory grids, and in particular to Kelly's 
assumption of the elicitation of pre-existing constructs? Essentially 
it forms a partial challenge to Kelly's assumption, and therefore to 
what it is legitimate to infer from the grid itself. 
Take the widely used 'triadic' method of elicitation in which the 
respondent is asked to discriminate two elements from a third. 
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Category (i) construing is unproblematic: the instances ate dis- 
criminable on the basis of readily-available constructs at the 
appropriate level of abstraction (at the levels of 'gestalt', subsumed 
characteristics, and so on). Even if, as M. T. Taylor (1976) suggests, 
people do not construe in terms of triads there would appear to be 
little cognitive strain associated with the elicitation of pre-existing 
constructs. 
Category (ii) construing provides the researcher with a problem. The 
respondent, presented with the three elements separately, might well be 
able to offer a number of constructs in respect of each. However, the 
presenting of a triad might make the original discriminations inoperable, 
and it is easy to see that this could be blatant with heterogeneous 
elements. There are also more subtle potential manifestations in that 
the researcher could collect a discrimination concocted by a respondent 
on the spot (in both senses) which, whilst drawing upon existing 
constructs in his or her repertoire, nevertheless uses them for the 
first time in respect of one or more of the elements. 'I hadn't thought 
of it that way before', reflects comments which both Olson (1980a)and I 
have heard during elicitation and sounds a warning bell that the grid 
might be eliciting novel rather than pre-existing construct uses. 
The distinction is made here between novel construct uses and novel 
constructs. As far as the latter are concerned, it seems unlikely 
that the repertory grid will induce new ways of construing (unless the 
researcher introduces them to the respondent). Reflection upon category 
(iii) construing leads me to speculate that this takes place when an 
inconsistency is noticed between two or more subsystems of a construct 
system, and something has to be done to eliminate what Dewey referred 
to as 'perplexity, confusion, doubt'9. In construct theory terms this 
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can only be done by 'taking the relevant parts of the system to pieces' 
and reassembling them in a different way, allowing a new superordinate 
structure to emerge - which may, of course, have further subordinate 
implications. This is far more than giving a new name to an old 
discrimination, since it involves major reconstruction of a section of 
a system. The repertory grid, with its reductionist emihasis on 
analysis rather than synthesis, would seem particularly ill-suited to 
the induction of category (iii) construing: hence it is reasonable 
to conclude that category (iii) construing is unlikely to be 
represented in repertory grid data. 
I have focused in this discussion on the triadic elicitation method 
since it is widely used in repertory grid methodology. The other 
methods discussed later in this chapter are likely to be differentially 
susceptible to the problems outlined above, but it would take me too 
far from the course of my appraisal of Kellian assumptions to consider 
them exhaustively here. 
So how does Kelly's assumption regarding the elicitation of pre-existing 
constructs stand? The argument presented above suggests that, at a 
general level, it is a tenable assumption, but that it may fail in 
respect of the practicalities of the grid respondent's use of constructs. 
If the research is to probe the way the respondent uses constructs, 
rather than what constructs the respondent might call upon, then, as 
an instrument, the repertory grid is on uncertain ground 
10. 
6.2.3. The functional communicability of constructs 
Here Kelly makes the assumption that the words used are adequate for 
the researcher to understand what the respondent means: it will be 
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remembered that the words themselves are not the constructs (though 
the common use of 'construct' as a synonym for the bipolar verbal 
label makes this easy to overlook); they are symbolic of the 
discrimination which the respondent is making. Put another way, the 
respondent encodes discrimination; the researcher decodes it and relates 
it to his or her own construct system. There is a potential for 
meaning to slip sideways at both the encoding and decoding stages 
because verbal labels in natural language often have multiple meanings 
and always a range of connotations. Whilst the primary meaning of a 
respondent's verbal label may be unambiguous, the connotative colouring 
may not be available to the researcher who has his or her own connotative 
concatenation in respect of the same symbol 
11. 
There are occasions when communication through the use of verbal labels 
can go remarkably wrong. I can recall the example of a science teacher 
who gave the label 'encourage interest' to two types of teaching 
activity, offering 'drollness' as the contrast. This seemed to be a 
very 'peculiar' construct so I enquired further, finding that by 
'drollness' she meant'making science seem like so many mechanical 
exercises' (my initial supposition having been that she meant something 
like 'drily humorous'). The importance of conversation for the 
elucidation of meaning is well exemplified here12, but it is a glaring 
instance of an apparently puzzling construct: how many commonplace 
'obvious' constructs pass as unproblematic when no adequate sharing 
of meaning has taken place? 
Kelly recognises that, in his repertory test, communication of meaning 
through the elicitation is a critical assumption 
- 
indeed, he goes so 
far as to state that it is the most precarious of the assumptions he 
makes13. However, where the grid form is concerned, Kelly seems to 
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see this as being of lesser importance on the grounds that the 
- 
presumably mathematical-analyses would allow the researcher greater 
access to meaningl 
. 
Some criticism was levelled at Kelly's position 
in Chapter 4, but the assumption of communicability needs further 
exploration than was undertaken at that point. 
I have already referred to the failure of repertory grids to provide 
data from which conclusions can legitimately be made about hierarchical 
structure, but it remains to be considered whether measures of 
association derived from the grid matrix can aid the researcher's 
attempts to extract meaning. 
It is often assumed that a perfect association between constructs 
implies their functional equivalence15. This may be so (for instance, 
with synonymous or near-synonymous constructs) but is not necessarily 
so. The smaller the number of elements and the more restricted the 
score-range of the construct scales, the greater is the chance of 
adventitious isomorphism of distributions of ratings given on two 
constructs16. Further, isomorphic rating distributions may reflect 
the influence of an underlying construct (which may not have entered 
the grid)17: one might find a person allocating a set of elements 
identically on the constructs 'happy-sad' and 'extrovert-introvert', 
but the claim of functional equivalence would be bold, even if the 
range of consideration were limited to the particular set of elements 
concerned. 
In practice isomorphism of rating seems to be relatively rare between 
constructs, though it is common to find some high indexes of 
association between constructs in a grid. Where this is the case, it 
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may be legitimate to infer that the constructs overlap in meaning to 
a substantial extent, but the inference cannot be taken for granted: 
cross-checking with the respondent would seem to be advisable. 
However, where a construct is not closely associated (in statistical 
terms) with others in the grid, the crutch of connotation would appear 
to be out of reach. 
Looking at the matter from a linguistic standpoint, the verbal labels 
provided by a respondent signify (at least) the specific distinction 
he or she is consciously making, yet those selfsame labels can signify 
other possible distinctions: to use the examples of a couple of 
paragraphs ago, what do the discriminations 'happy-sad' and 'extrovert- 
introvert' mean when a respondent offers them? They are by no means 
unproblematic. These signifiers are overdeterminedi8, and the 
researcher's task is to try to elucidate as far as possible which of 
the range of possible 'signifieds' is intended. 
Olson (1979a) makes the point that brief verbal labels on their own 
are inadequate to define the meaning of complex ideas. In grid work, 
constructs are often highly elliptical19. Where the researcher listens 
to the conversation that is taking place with the respondent during 
elicitation, much of the ellipsis can be rounded out: to use the 
conversation merely as a means of getting a set of grid dimensions is 
to ignore a wealth of meaning. 
6.2.4 Representative sorts 
Kelly's assumption is that the task of triadic sorting requires the 
respondent to make discriminations representative of those made in 
real life. The more heterogeneous the set of elements being used, 
the less likely this assumption would appear to hold. Even a set of 
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homogeneous elements (for instance, people) may give rise to triads 
which do not reflect the discriminations the respondent would make in 
real life, though they may elicit distinctions potentially available 
to the respondent. There is embedded in this assumption an 'is/ought' 
problem for the researcher, to which further attention is given later 
in this chapter. 
Setting this problem aside for the time being it would seem that, given 
a grid whose context is meaningful to the respondent in which the 
elements are representative and homogeneous, it is not unreasonable to 
suppose that Kelly's focus on role-relationships can be widened out to 
encompass a fax wider range of discrimination tasks. 
6.2.5 The manageability of grid completion20 
Kelly's original procedure provides the respondents with a detailed 
set of instructions to enable them to complete the supplied grid blank, 
there being no indication that Kelly intended to, or did, converse 
with them during the completion of the grid. Kelly assumes that 
respondents can cope with the 'pencil and paper' demands of grid 
completion. 
Experience with rating forms of the grid indicate that, if respondents 
are left to themselves to complete grids (as in group administration), 
2, number of errors can creep into the procedure: these are detailed 
in Chapter 8, which deals with matrix completion. The use of rating 
scales is a more complex undertaking than Kellian dichotomous 
allocation, but the latter would not appear immune from a number of 
the errors discussed. 
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Other workers, myself among them (Yorke, 1978) have described approaches 
in which all the recording is done by the researcher. There are 
distinct advantages in so proceeding: not only is some of the pressure 
taken off the respondent (grid completion shifts in emphasis from 
being a test towards being a dialogue), but also the potential for 
error is reduced in respect of response and recording. 
6.2.6 Construct stability during elicitation 
Kelly makes the assumption that constructs remain stable during the 
elicitation procedure. He might have added that the assumption extends 
to the location of elements on constructs, since this is strongly 
implied in grid methodology. Kelly's narrower assumption is that the 
respondent does not shift ground during triadic elicitation to produce 
emergent poles from two distinct bipolar constructs, one in respect of 
the pair construed as similar and the other in respect of the contrasting 
singleton. 
The tenability of Kelly's assumption seems to rest in part upon the 
precise way in which the triadic elicitation procedure is formulated. 
Kelly asks the respondent whether two of the elements are 'alike in some 
important way that distinguishes them from the third... ' 
21 Following 
Kelly, many workers 
22 have asked their respondents to discriminate 
within the triads on the criterion of difference. However, this type 
of rubric seems to undercut the assumption, producing constructs which, 
whilst having contrasting poles, are not functionally antonymic. If 
the researcher is merely concerned with the constructs the respondent 
produces, this may not be a problem; but if the completion of a grid is 
at issue, the problem begins to loom large. Although grid completion 
is discussed in Chapter 8 it is appropriate to consider the assumption 
of construct stability further at this point. 
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Resnick and Landfield (1961) found that respondents produced both 
'peculiar' and 'logical' constructs, the former referring to constructs 
in which the contrasts appeared idiosyncratic and illogical judging 
by the criterion of dictionary meaning, whereas the latter reflected 
normative antonymy. Both types of construct were found to be used 
consistently, though 'peculiar' constructs were significantly inferior 
to 'logical' constructs in this respect. Subsequently, Bonarius 
(1971) made a point of mentioning the non-oppositionality of construct 
23 
poles 
The question of bipolar opposition was pursued by Epting et al (1971) 
who found that a more marked bipolarity was obtained if respondents 
were asked to give, as a contrast,: the opposite characteristic to 
that construed as the similarity of the pair, instead of simply allow- 
ing the singleton to be 'different' in whatever way the respondent 
chose. These findings have influenced other users of grids to use the 
'opposition', rather than the 'difference' method of triadic 
elicitation. 24 
However, it would be dangerous to infer that the 'opposition' approach 
is necessarily superior to the 'difference' approach, for the logical 
opposition may not be the discrimination the respondent would wish to 
make in real life25. The psychological opposite of 'ambitious', 
'does not trample on colleagues', may be far more meaningful than the 
logical opposite 'unambitious' through the implied relationships between 
ambition and trampling, and between lack of ambition and not trampling. 
It would seem likely that this particular construct would, in Resnick 
and Landfield's terms, be classed as 'peculiar' and be the coalescence 
of two related constructs. At the level of meaning, the above 
interpretation is at least plausible, but at the level of grid usage 
16o 
there could be difficulties where the (presumed normative) implicit 
personality theory relating ambition to trampling does not hold. The 
more 'peculiar' the construct (and the example is not extreme in this 
respect) the greater the potential problem for the grid respondent 
even though the meaningfulness of the original distinction (which, it 
must be remembered, is likely to have been produced in response to 
only three elements) may have been adequately communicated. 
It would seem that the researcher, in designing the study, has to bear 
in mind the likely implications of the elicitation technique chosen. 
There is a choice between on one hand the greater chance of elements 
all lying within the range of convenience of the 'opposition' generated 
construct coupled with the construct's potentially lower psychological 
meaningfulness, and on the other the greater risk of elements not 
conforming to a 'peculiar' (though psychologically meaningful) construct 
treated as if it were a linear continuum, and hence of a potential 
increase in the incidence of 'gaps' in the grid matrix. 
The points presented here raise a number of questions regarding the 
bipolarity of rating scales. The issues are too broad to be considered 
at this point and have been deferred to the succeeding chapter in which 
there is space for a fuller treatment. 
6.2.7 Other assumptions 
Kelly also makes two other assumptions which relate to the role 
relations at the focus of convenience of his theoretical position. 
26 
First, he assumes that the person is able to construe to some extent 
the construct systems of the people serving as grid elements27 and, 
second, that the constructs elicited refer to the respondent's own 
identity and behaviour (construed in terms of Kelly's definition of role). 
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In view of the fact that grid methodology has diffused the focus of 
convenience of Personal Construct Theory $o m its origins in inter- 
personal relations, these two assumptions now pertain to only a subset 
of grid methodology, and will not be considered here. 
6.3 ADEQUACY OF THE SAMPLE OF CONSTRUCTS 
The adequacy of the sample : of the elicited constructs is a further 
assumption in grid methodology to which Kelly gives little attention, 
yet which is cognate to the representativeness of the sample of elements 
in the grid. Kelly does quote some preliminary studies conducted by 
Hunt indicating that, on the Role Construct Repertory Test, forty sorts 
of twenty figures elicited nearly all the constructs which the 
respondent was capable of expressing. In this work Hunt found that 
students produced some 70 per cent of common constructs in responses 
to two different role title lists balanced as to salient attributes. 
Kelly reports this work under the heading of 'consistency' (with respect 
to the Repertory Test, and not the grid form), and the tone of his 
writing leads the reader to infer that this indicates that this 
elicitation procedure does adequately sample the respondent's construct 
system. 
Fjeld and Landfield (1961) also investigated the ability of students to 
repeat their constructs a fortnight after completing an initial Repertory 
Test, and found correlations near to +0.80 irrespective of changes 
between test and retest in the figures nominated to fit the role titles. 
Bannister and Mair (1968) implicitly, and Adams-Webber (1979) more 
explicitly, seem satisfied by this evidence that, as far as Kelly's 
Repertory Test is concerned, the triadic elicitation procedure provides 
the researcher with adequately representative samples of respondents' 
28 
construct. systems 
. 
However, the strongest claim for adequacy is 
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made by Bonarius (1965), who writes that the directions supplied in 
respect of the test 'are such that the sampling is relevant and 
representative of the person's construction system'29. 
But consistency should not be mistaken for representativeness. If I 
go to a number of fairgrounds and find, in the light of my failure to 
hit the bull's eye in the shooting galleries, that all the gun barrels 
are slightly bent, am I justified in castigating all the gun 
manufacturers on their inability to produce a 'straight' gun? Clearly 
not. However, to challenge the equating of consistency with represent- 
ativeness it is necessary to do rather more than indulge in light- 
hearted analogies. Evidence must be produced to show that the triadic 
approach may not elicit constructs which would generally be agreed to 
be salient within the context of the problem being studied. 
At this point I draw primarily on my experience in using the repertory 
grid with science teachers. A key factor here is that the teachers 
were in their probationary year in school, at the end of which their 
head teachers would judge whether their performance was satisfactory or 
whether an extended period of probation was necessary. There is plenty 
of evidence to show that aspects of class control are a major concern 
of a beginning teacher30, and the realities of the profession make 
the ability to control a class a crucial element in the successful 
completion of a probationary year. In the teaching of science there 
is an added premium on class control because of the hazards to pupils 
from chemicals and equipment. Yet of 27 grids collected from fourteen 
such teachers, only two contained constructs relating to discipline 
and control (and at that, one construct per grid) despite a mild 
prompt in the direction of management and control issues. Further, in 
respect of one of the grids it seemed to me that the 'control' construct 
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was produced as a result of the noise emanating from an adjoining 
laboratory in which a colleague appeared to be having difficulty in 
controlling the class. On readministering the grid to this same 
teacher in a quiet classroom at the end of the year, no 'control' 
construct was elicited despite the fact that, immediately prior to 
the grid administration, he had had to take a pupil down to the deputy 
head for punishment because of receiving some 'aggro' from him during 
a lesson. This teacher subsequently remarked in conversation that 
he did have serious discipline problems and that he was aware that 
there was some doubt that he would be deemed satisfactory at the end 
of his probationary year. 
It would be going too far to claim these findings as substantive 
evidence against the ability of triadic methods to elicit a 
representative sample of constructs. Despite the mild prompt, the 
teachers appear to have construed the task much more in terms of aims 
of science teaching, subject content and its implications for the 
Pupils, and other ideological matters such as authoritarianism in the 
laboratory or classroom. It is likely that, for some of them at least, 
the issue of control was not problematic or was not construed as lying 
within the scope of the research. It must remain an open question 
whether the specification of the context was adequate to my intentions 
as researcher, or whether the teachers fell into a cognitive 'set' 
regarding the task. A more conversational elicitation procedure, rather 
than an approach which deliberately sought to avoid injecting the 
researcher's constructs (and I had had nine years of experience as a 
science teacher in schools), might have produced a very different 
pattern of constructs. 
The research reported here does have some support, though it comes 
164 
from a study not set within the framework of Kellian theory. Kerry 
(1980), in a study of primary school teachers, found they tended not to 
identify pupils' reading competence when they were asked to indicate 
important factors in classroom functioning, but this emerged generally 
as important when they were subsequently asked to complete a checklist 
containing this among a range of suggested factors. 
The problem of representativeness in the sampling of constructs is not 
a simple function of the way in which the respondent construes the 
elicitation task. The researcher may fail to recognise a critical 
dimension to a problem and hence fail to orient the elicitation 
appropriately. Bannister and Bott (1973), for example, report a 
clinical study of a married couple whose sexual relationship was 
unsatisfactory. Repertory grids were used in an attempt to understand 
the problem but failed to detect a crucial connection between the 
husband's need for control in his job and the state of the couple's 
sexual relationship. Viewing the problem as limited to sexual matters 
seems to have blinkered the therapist to other possible constructions 
pertinent to the problem. 
Pressure of time may militate against an adequate sampling of the 
construct system. Grid methods are often time-consuming, and 
respondents (for example, teachers in free periods or at the end of the 
day) may have only a limited time available. Wood and Napthali (1975) 
limited their elicitation to twelve constructs because this was 'the 
most which could reasonably be asked for in the circumstances'31. 
Taken together, these pieces of evidence raise a little disquiet that 
the sampling of construct systems can suffer from biases of which the 
researcher may be unaware. Users of Kelly's Role Construct Repertory 
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Test and its grid form may be justified in the claim of sampling 
representativeness, but such a claim is based on metaphysics and is 
not open to empirical test. Validation of such sampling is necessarily 
subjective, but the subjectivity may be reduced if the researcher seeks 
to cross-validate what appears in the grid with other evidence which 
might be available (such as might be gained by conversation, formal 
interviews or behaviour in relevant circumstances). The implication 
here is that the researcher should be existentially familiar with the 
problem area being studied in order that he or she may maximise the 
chances of detecting 'gaps' in the sampling: the risk is an increased 
possibility that the researcher's constructs will be 'injected' into the 
respondent's grid, as Shaw and Gaines (1979) point out32, But their 
preferred solution, elicitation by way of a computerised algorithm, 
gives no greater guarantee that the respondent's sample of constructs 
will be representative. 
6.4 HOW MANY CONSTRUCTS? 
The question of the number of constructs to be elicited in a repertory 
grid is one to which no satisfactory answer can be given, since it is 
very closely related to the problem of sampling discussed in the 
preceding subsection. The literature offers rule-of-thumb advice33. 
Hunt's suggestion that 40 sorts will virtually exhaust the respondent's 
capacity to produce different constructs seems to allow for constructs 
to be repeated, and so might be regarded as an upper boundary. 
Bannister and Mair (1968), having in mind the productions of a 
different construct for each sort, suggest that no set number of sorts 
need be made, but that a common range is from ten to 2535. Pope and 
Keen (1981) take a similar position, indicating that the limits are 
likely to depend upon practicalities such as the time available, the 
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stamina of the parties involved and the size of any computer program 
which might be used, as well as the exhaustion of the respondent's 
repertoire of constructs36. 
Bell and Keen (1981) have attempted to provide the researcher with a 
statistical criterion to assist in the decision of the appropriate 
time to cease eliciting constructs. They assume that the element 
intraclass correlation (which is equivalent to the average inter- 
correlation among elements) is an inverse function of cognitive 
complexity37 (differentiation). The more constructs that are 
elicited, the closer the intraclass correlation approaches to an 
asymptotic value. So, if the researcher updates this measure after 
each construct has been elicited and used as a rating dimension, it 
would appear to be of little advantage to pursue the elicitation once 
the intraclass correlation appears to have reached its asymptotic 
value. 
At first sight this approach is attractive, but closer inspection casts 
doubt upon the validity of the argument presented and on the implicit 
assumptions on which it appears to be predicated. First, Bell and 
Keen present evidence which shows that the element intraclass 
correlation is unlikely to follow the hypothesised relationship though 
it is likely to approach an asymptotic value as the number of constructs 
is increased. One would expect this correlation to fluctuate un- 
predictably when the number of constructs is small since it will depend 
on the similarities and differences in the rating patterns on the 
constructs so far used: one person may start with two or three quite 
similar constructs whilst another might differentiate quite sharply 
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between successive constructs. There seems no adequate ground on 
which the authors label four categories of relationships these seem 
merely to be artefacts of happenstance. 
Bell and Keen suggest that to cease elicitation when the element 
intraclass correlation is rising is almost certain to deprive the 
researcher of additional worthwhile data. It seems that they base 
this comment on one of two assumptions: either the fact that the 
correlation is rising implies that further elicitation will sooner or 
later cause it to decline to an asymptotic value, or that an increase 
in correlation reflects increasing differentiation. If the latter is 
the case, they are surely mistaken in that differentiation is inversely 
related to the intra-class correlation38. 
One would expect, with their method, that fluctuations in the 
correlation coefficient would tend to be damped with increasing number 
of constructs; after all, the third construct is more likely to have 
a marked effect on the correlation derived from the use of the previous 
two than is the thirteenth in respect of the previous twelve. So even 
if a salient, atypical construct is produced late in the elicitation 
its psychological significance may not be picked up by the statistics. 
It is this psychological significance which is the critical issue in 
elicitations and which a statistical approach overlooks. A respondent 
may produce a personally important construct at any stage in an 
elicitation: in 27 grids elicited by me from science teachers the 
most important construct, as identified in a resistance-to-change 
grid (Hinkle, 1965), tends to have been elicited later rather than 
earlier39. The results are summarised in Figure 6.1. 
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Most important construct elicited in the 
First third Middle third Final third 
of constructs of constructs of constructs 
Frequency 8 12 16 
Figure 6.1 Location of most important construct in 27 grids. (The 
total is greater than 27 because of constructs appearing 
jointly as 'most important' in some grids). 
It is quite possible that a number of these late-appearing important 
constructs would not have made a significant ripple in the smooth 
approach of Bell and Keen's element intraclass correlation towards an 
asymptotic value, for a psychologically significant construct is not 
necessarily distinguished by an unusual or statistically disruptive 
pattern of ratings. In other words, Bell and Keen's measure 
substitutes statistics for meaning: it is an easy but invalid way 
out of the problem of deciding when to discontinue the elicitation 
process. 
It can further be argued that the more constructs that are elicited, 
the more meaning is potentially available for the researcher to inter- 
pret. Constructs which are related statistically in the grid may 
give the researcher valuable clues as to which segment of meaning is 
intended by the respondent. In my own experience of eliciting grids, 
respondents have usually produced between ten and twenty constructs 
before 'drying up'. I have become increasingly uneasy about accepting 
these as limit beyond which the respondents might be unable to go, for 
informal conversation during and after elicitation has hinted at the 
availability of other constructs (maybe not explicitly bipolar) which 
might have emerged in a different interview format and which might 
169 
have added richness to meanings already expressed 
- 
or possibly even 
radically new meanings. 
Put another way, I have to advance the opinion that the typical 
repertory grid elicitation procedure may be such a wide-meshed sieve 
that only the broadest of constructs are entrapped by it. If, as 
Oswalt (1974) found, people are capable of exhibiting an extensive 
repertoire of person-oriented constructs in a relatively 'free' 
elicitation procedure, why is it that the repertory grid typically 
elicits a much smaller number 
- 
of the order of twenty-five? 
The, ability to construe in a more wide-ranging fashion than the 
repertory grid seems to allow is shown in other contexts than personal 
attributes. In Olson's (1979b) transcripts of his science teachers' 
elaborations of grid constructs there are other constructs (or, at 
least, single ends of constructs) which do not enter the grid. 
Rowe's (1978) work on depression exhibits a similar profusion though 
her own interests have led her away from making use of the grid in 
other than exploratory contexts. 
So how many constructs should the grid administrator elicit? The 
answer, for me, is as many as possible within the limits of time, 
patience and stamina noted by Pope and Keen (1981). It is always 
possible that the next construct will prove to be the vital one! 
More work needs to be carried out on the question of elicitation since 
such evidence as is available suggests that formal methods may limit 
the respondent's production of constructs to an undesirable extent. 
But if large numbers of constructs are elicited by other approaches, 
the grid may become unacceptably large. If this were to be the case, 
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which should be discarded 
- 
constructs, or the grid itself? In 
Chapter 13 1 offer the outline of one type of answer to the dilemma. 
6.5 METHODS OF ELICITING CONSTRUCTS 
Kelly describes a number of methods which can be used for the elicit- 
ation of constructs in the Role Construct Repertory Test, though 
these are reducible to three when variations in element content are 
eliminated from consideration. These three methods are 
(a) the minimum context form, in which the elements are 
presented in successive triads; 
(b) the full context form, in which the respondent is 
asked to discriminate among all the elements (which 
are presented together); and 
(c) the self-characterisation sketch, in which the 
respondent is not required to make specific contrasts 
in the manner of first two above. 
Some workers have amended triadic elicitation to what might be termed 
'dyadic elicitation' in which pairs of elements are presented, the 
researcher being asked initially for a similarity or a difference. 
The free form of the self-characterisation sketch has encouraged a few 
workers to experiment with elicitation procedures which have more in 
common with conversational practice than with the more formalised 
approaches. Finally, Hinkle (1965) extended the range of elicitation 
procedures to include 'laddering', which is based on the implicative 
relationships between constructs. 
These approaches to elicitation are reviewed briefly below, the main 
attention being given to triadic elicitation on the grounds of its 
commonness of use. 
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6.5.1 Triadic elicitation 
Kelly's term 'minimum context form' reflects the way in which he 
considers constructs to be formed; that is, to note features of 
similarity and contrast among a number of elements. The minimum 
number of elements to allow discrimination of both similarity and 
contrast is three, hence the sorting of triads. Kelly had a clear 
idea of the dimensions of discrimination he thought likely to be 
relevant to his clients and chose particular triads in order to focus 
the client's attention in particular directions. For example, the 
'Threat sort', comprising Brother, Ex-pal and Threatening Person, is 
seen by him as offering the client the opportunity to construe threat: 
that is, aspects of threat are more likely to surface than anything 
else when these three elements are presented. 
Keen (1979) and Hopwood and Keen (1978) describe grids in which a 
fixed protocol of sorting is adopted, though the rationales for the 
successive triads are not presented. Glossop et al (1975), who were 
studying constructs of value in a wide range of 13-14 year old child- 
ren, selected triads on the grounds of maximum potential contrast on 
the two dimensions 'good-bad' and 'valued-not valued'. Collett (1979) 
suggests that triads of dissimilar elements give rise to more super- 
ordinate constructs than triads of similar elements, but gives no 
theoretical rationalel0. If Pope's (1977) experience is anything to 
go by, one tends to get very general constructs from triads of 
dissimilar elements. Whilst these might be described as superordinate, 
they might also be described as vague. 
The selection of triads by the researcher is an indication of his or 
her perception of the problem and of the discriminative dimensions 
believed to be important in the mind of the respondent. It is reasonable 
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to suppose that the choice of a particular triad is likely to pre- 
dispose the respondent to use certain dimensions of construing at the 
expense of others, and Keen's assertion that it does not matter how 
the triads are selected 
41 
must be open to some doubt. 
Random selection of triads removes the element of bias on the part of 
the researcher, but does allow the possibility that individual elements 
may be proportionately over-represented or under-represented in the 
grid. Stratified random sampling, through the use of balanced 
incomplete block designs 
42, 
would seem to be the best way of over- 
coming the problems associated with the sampling of elements 
- 
unless, 
of course, there are strong a priori justifications for selecting 
specific sorts. Smith and Leach (1972) and the empirical work which 
I undertook both drew upon such designs. The number of triads 
required for a full balanced incomplete block design would have made 
the completion of the grid an unacceptably lengthy tasks half-designs 
were used in which the frequency of occurrence of each element was 
identical, but in which each element did not equivalently co-occur 
with other elements. 
The sequence of presentation of the triads has attracted some attention. 
Kelly suggests a list of triads for the Role Construct Repertory Test 
in which repetition of an element in successive triads is almost 
completely eliminated. In the Sequential Form two elements are common 
to any successive pair of triads, and Kelly remarks that this was a 
more exacting test of the functional adequacy of a person's constructs, 
but does not elaborate on the point. Keen (1979) for example, 
followed Kelly's sequential approach quite closely, his grids exhibiting 
considerable commonality from one sort to the next. 
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Bender (1974), noting that Warr and Coffman (1970) had unexpectedly 
failed to detect a difference in rating extremity between elicited 
and supplied constructs, decided to investigate whether the anomaly 
might have been attributable to the particular elicitation procedure 
that had been used. Warr and Coffman had used the Sequential Form 
of the Repertory Test in the elicitation of constructs, and Bender 
hypothesised that this method might tend to produce trivial constructs. 
He reasoned that few 'really meaningful' constructs could be 
verbalised and that a respondent, having produced one of these in 
response to a particular triad, might find it impossible to produce 
another such construct in response to a succeeding triad in which two 
elements remained the same as before. 
Bender individually tested 60 junior social workers, using a grid in 
which 'self' was an-element common to all triads and in which there 
were seven instances of another element being 'carried over' from one 
triad to the next and nine instances where this was not the case. He 
found a tendency for 'sequential' sorts to produce 'unimportant' 
constructs and for 'non-sequential' sorts to produce'important' 
constructs, 'important' and 'unimportant' being defined as those five 
with the highest and lowest loadings respectively on the first factor 
of Slater's principal components alalysis. Considering that 600 
constructs were elicited, ax2 value of 6.5+, though statistically 
significant at the 0.02 level, is not particularly impressive. The 
criterion of importance is open to challenge, for it could be argued 
that high loadings of constructs on the first factor are commensurate 
with high semantic correlation: though labels may vary, the constructs 
may exhibit substantial functional similarity 
44 
. 
In this case, 
'important' constructs would not necessarily load highly on the first 
factor 
- 
on the contrary, they might idiosyncratically define 
174 
subsidiary factors. 
Whilst Bender's research design can be criticised, his basic reasoning 
is not without its merits. He makes a strong case for not persisting 
with the 'self' element in all triads on the grounds that it may 
restrict the elicitation of new constructs to the two remaining 
elements of the triad, so that even if the focus of interest is the 
self, the maximally informative procedure may be one which often 
approaches the self obliquely. It would appear probable that Bender's 
argument can be generalised to other grid contexts as well. 
Nay own experience in using grids indicates that some triads seem to 
'block' rather than facilitate the elicitation of constructs when the 
task requires a new construct to be produced for each sort. A switch 
to a completely new triad has often been sufficient to overcome the 
problem, save where the respondent's flow of constructs has dried up. 
Any interaction between researcher and respondent is open to challenge 
in respect of the bias that may creep into the elicitation procedure. 
Shaw and Gaines (1979) see a distinct advantage in using a computer 
program to elicit grids, in that it interacts only in terms of what 
the task demands and does not interfere with the cognition that the 
respondent chooses to produce in respect of the triadic elicitation 
routine. An interviewer thus becomes redundant; but if such a 
procedure is built into a research design, the researcher will need to 
gain access to the grid data so remotely collected 
- 
the price being 
the loss of the individual's privacy and the diminution of meaning 
regarding the terms used in completing the grid. Post hoc interview- 
ing could help to amplify the grid information, but the amplification 
would not necessarily be the same as that which might have been 
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collected at the time of elicitation. 
The PEGASUS routine provides some instant feedback to the respondent 
regarding the associations and discriminations being made, thus 
allowing the respondent to reflect on 'the position so far' as the 
grid elicitation proceeds. Whilst there are advantages in so doing, 
the counter-argument can be advanced that such feedback can induce a 
revision in construing which might otherwise not have taken place. 
A similar balance of argument exists in respect of interviewing a 
respondent: one can be 'detached' at the price of minimising 
communication, or one can be involved in a conversation at the risk 
of 'contaminating' the data. 
Despite Kelly's logical point that a construct relates to the 
copresence of similarity and contrast, not everyone is satisfied 
with the notion of triadic elicitation 
45. M. T. Taylor (1976) 
questions whether this does tap the way people normally think, and 
the argument developed in Chapter 3 suggests that a contrast may be 
so submerged that it never surfaces or, as another possibility, it 
may be multi-categorical. If either of these two deductions is 
correct, it suggests that triadic elicitation may not be the most 
appropriate methodology in all cases. The demands of logic and of 
'psychologic' are not necessarily congruent 
- 
an assumption that is a 
foundation stone in the Psychology-of Personal Constructs. 
6.5.2 Dyadic elicitation 
Fransella and Bannister (1977), following Kelly's view that pre- 
existing constructs are being elicited, indicate that it is not essential 
to use triads of elements during elicitation and that pairs may be 
adequate. In some circumstances dyadic elicitation may be 
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distinctly superior. Frost and Braine (1967), for instance, found 
that the construing of tastes was a very difficult task for 
respondents when triads of taste sensations formed the context of 
elicitation. Both memory and 'taste-fatigue' were limiting factors 
for the respondents. Frost and Braine, for these reasons, elicited 
as many constructs as possible from each dyad. 
Fjeld and Landfield (1961) used dyadic elicitation, having found from 
clinical experience that some respondents were unhappy with the 
triadic approach, being unable to provide a similarity before stating 
a difference, yet being able to draw a distinction between two of the 
three acquaintances presented as elements. When presenting elements 
in pairs, Fjeld and Landfield asked their respondents to articulate a 
contrast between the two elements or to indicate the grounds on which 
the pair were similar (in which case a third element had to be provided 
who could be described in contrasting terms). Other users of dyadic 
elicitation include Allison (1972), Ryle and Lunghi (1970) and Smith 
(1978). 
I. too, have izsed dyadic elicitation in a study of element stability 
(see Appendix 10), in which grids were completed individually within a 
group administration. My previous experience with grids elicited 
individually from group members showed that the triadic approach 
caused difficulties for some respondents, and that these often did not 
become (or were not made) apparent until the completed grids were 
collected. As far as I am able to tell the dyadic approach did not 
give rise to similar problems. 
Easterby-Smith (1981) recognises the difficulty some people have when 
faced with triads, and implies that dyadic elicitation is particularly 
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advantageous where the elements are complex, an example being the 
relationships between people that form the elements in Ryle and 
Lunghi's (1970) dyad grid. On the other hand, there is a tendency 
for the construct elicited to embody logical opposites rather than 
psychological opposites, the comparative virtue of each being an 
unresolved issue in elicitation technique. 
In asserting a contrast between two elements one is presumably linking 
each element to at least one other stored in the memory and possessing 
attributes similar to those which give rise to the verbalised contrast. 
And the assertion of similarity, in Kellian terms, implies the existence 
in memory of at least one element which does not possess the attribute 
shared by the presented pair. Dyadic elicitation then, can be 
construed as a method which implicitly recognises the Kellian assumption 
of similarity and contrast, though it may well draw (again implicitly) 
upon a wider context than the three elements in triadic elicitation. 
Its advantages would seem to be sufficient to warrant its further study 
as a method of elicitation. 
6.5.3 '. Full context' elicitation 
The 'Full Context Form' of Kelly's Repertory Test involves the 
discrimination of similarity and contrast through the consideration of 
all the elements taken together. Kelly gives little detail regarding 
the use of the Full Context Form once the respondent has given an 
initial indication of the reason for placing the first pair of 
similar elements together, but it is possible to infer from his own 
description, and from a slightly fuller description in Bannister and 
Mair (1968), that similar elements are collated (as piles of named 
cards) according to a discrimination made by the respondent 
. 
7 
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Elements may be removed from piles or transferred to other piles as 
the basis of the discrimination alters. At each stage the researcher 
keeps a record of the location of the elements in their groups and of 
the constructs associated with the piling of the elements. 
In that elements can be shifted from pile to pile, Scott's (1962,1963a) 
approach to cognitive structure shares a likeness with the Full 
Context Form, though Scott's respondents were asked to sort elements 
(countries) into sets which were not necessarily mutually exclusive 
and he did not ask for the basis for the discriminations to be 
articulated. Zajonc's (1960) approach to cognitive structure has 
Kellian echoes in that he requires his respondents to articulate 
differentiations from a full set of elements, but his method demands 
that the elements be successively partitioned in a manner similar to 
that of divisive hierarchical cluster analysis. Thus, in contrast to 
Scott's, a strict set-inclusion principle operates in Zajonc's 
48 
procedure. 
Kelly does not describe a use for the Full Context Form in repertory 
grid methodology, but it is not difficult to see that the partition of 
elements into two groups could form the basis of a dichotomously- 
scored grid. It is probable that the instructions would need to 
specify the 'opposite', rather than the difference, form of verbal 
labelling in order to avoid the problem of elements falling outside the 
range of convenience of the construct dimension being used. Successive 
sorts, using different constructs, would enable the grid matrix to be 
built up. 
Reid (1976) describes how he used a variant of the full context form, 
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asking respondents to select two elements to exemplify the pole 
of a construct that was considered to be 'most important and most 
immediately evident'9. The location of element on the construct so 
identified was accomplished by laying out the cards on the table 
according to a five-point rating scale. 
Nash (1976), in contrast, used the full context sorting of elements 
as a preliminary to a series of dyadic elicitations of pupils' 
constructs regarding their teachers. He initially asked the pupils 
to sort into two piles cards bearing the names of their teachers, the 
criterion being whether the individual pupil 'got on with' the teacher 
or not. This preliminary sort having been completed, Nash took one 
card from each set and asked in what ways the teachers behaved 
differently. To judge from the transcript appended to his paper50, 
the subsequent comparisons did not necessarily require that the pairs 
of elements considered came from the opposite piles 
- 
and it is 
difficult to see what the original dichotomous assignment of elements 
was intended to achieve, other than perhaps to help the pupils feel at 
ease at the start of their interviews and to establish a cognitive 
'set' towards the elicitation of contrasts. It must be pointed out 
that Nash was seeking not to collect data in a format suitable for 
repertory grid analysis, but rather to ascertain the pupils' 
constructs of teachers and teaching. 
Olson (1980b)justifies the use of the Full Context Form on the grounds 
of the type of elements involved (classroom activities) and because he 
wanted to avoid the production of superficial constructs. Implicit 
in Olson's remarks is the assumption that the triadic approach, with 
which his own is contrasted, might have elicited a number of constructs 
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with a range of convenience inadequate for analysis 
- 
in other words, 
he feared that he might have obtained very 'gappy' grids. 
But Olson's argument for the Full Context Form lacks conviction, 
particularly when one looks at the constructs he elicited, which are 
often very general and parallel those which I obtained from my group 
of science teachers using triadic elicitation with slightly more 
general elements. Olson's elements are to some extent heterogeneous, 
focusing sometimes on pupils activity and sometimes on teacher activity, 
and hence one would tend to expect rather broad and general constructs. 
Olson's work has considerable strength in that he asked his teachers 
to elaborate the general constructs, and these elaborations are rich 
sources of understanding of how his respondents construed teaching 
activities. The methodological penalty (if such it be) is that the 
elaborations are so idiosyncratic that they will not fit into a 
repertory grid (not that Olson intended that they should). 
On the whole, I would suggest that the full context approach to 
elicitation is likely to collect broad, general constructs since these 
by definition have to apply to all of the elements presented. The 
triadic and dyadic approaches, whilst being more narrowly focused in 
context, offer a greater possibility of constructs that are less bland, 
but at the risk of a number of elements falling outside their ranges 
of convenience. 
The evidence indicates that, to date, little use has been made of the 
Full Context Form of elicitation in repertory grid work. Though no 
criticism of the approach has been found in the literature, its 
relative unpopularity may be connected with the difficulty of providing 
a linear dimension appropriate to a plethora of elements, each of which 
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presents its own distinctive features to the respondent's attention. 
6.5.4 Laddering 
Hinkle's (1965) 'laddering' procedure was discussed in Chapter 4 in 
connection with the limitations of the repertory grid's capacity to 
provide evidence regarding the structure of a construct system, and 
it is therefore treated briefly here. 
It will be recalled that, in elaborating the Organization Corollary, 
Kelly suggests that constructs stand in hierarchical relationships to 
each other, superordinate constructs being }field to subsume 
subordinates, the extent of subsumption depending on the hierarchical 
level of the superordinate. Kelly does not indicate whether the 
hierarchies he envisages are of the strict set-inclusion type or are 
based on overlapping sets, but he does hint that strict hierarchical 
organisation might not be the structural model upon which construct 
systems are based5l. 
'Laddering' was Hinkle's method of approaching the question of 
hierarchy, respondents being asked repeatedly why they preferred one 
pole of a construct to another, the responses being taken as 
superordinates. Sooner or later the respondent reached a point in 
this hierarchical ascent beyond which further progress was impossible, 
and Hinkle turned his attention to a different (basic) construct derived 
from triadic elicitation. Hinkle found in pilot work that students 
could usually produce, from each base construct, between eight and 
twelve superordinate constructs in this way, though Bannister and Mair 
(1968) indicate that in Britain considerably fewer superordinates are 
typically produced in an individual ladder52. 
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Although Hinkle states that there was a tendency for ladders to 
converge on common superordinate constructs, he does not present 
adequate evidence to justify the hierarchical distinction he makes 
between superordinate and subordinate constructs: some constructs 
which were not laddered may have been of high position in the system. 
Figure 6.2 gives a schematic picture of the situation. If constructs 
A, Jr P, S and T are 'base' constructs the first three may converge on 
the superordinate F whilst the relationship of S and T to F is not 
explored: in'this hypothetical illustration S, though a 'base' 
construct, is hierarchically superior to D, K, C, J, Q, T, B. P and A. 
F 
ELS 
DK 
CJ 
ýQ 
T 
tt 
BP 
Figure 6.2 An illustration of the weakness of Hinkle's assumptions 
of superordinacy/subordinacy. A, J and P are 'base' 
constructs which are laddered to a common superordinate 
F, whilst S and T are unladdered. 
Laddering is a time-consuming process. In fact, Hinkle found it so 
time-consuming that he was only able to ask his respondents to ladder 
a few of the ten 'base' constructs which they produced. 
Notwithstanding the structural and temporal problems ingrained in 
Hinkle's work, a number of workers have used laddering in construct 
elicitation though in some cases (e. g. Landfield, 1971) the laddering 
has been 'downwards', focusing on subordinate implications through 
sequential enquiry as to the rationale underpinning the poles of the 
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construct already verbalised. Honikman (1976), whose interest lay 
in the construing of living-space, laddered downwards towards the 
more 'concrete' subordinate implications of constructs such as 
'formal-informal'. When the importance of constructs was investigated 
Honikman found occasionally that a construct low in the hierarchy was 
seen as important by the respondent, and he quotes the instance of a 
librarian whose mention of 'books in the living room' came late in the 
laddering procedure yet was the second in importance among twenty 
constructs. There are a number of ways of interpreting findings of 
this sort (for instance, contrasting the statics and dynamics of 
construct systems or postulating a determining superordinate structure 
in the unconscious), but I restrict myself here to the simpler, 
pragmatic point that it appears dangerous to assume a monotonic 
relationship between importance (or perhaps salience) and hierarchical 
level as manifested through a laddering procedure. 
Hinkle's laddering focused its attention upon the preferred pole of 
the construct under consideration, asking for its superordinate 
implications, and Armstrong and Eden (1979) seem to have taken a 
similar methodological view in their study of the purposes held by 
local authority valuers. The implicit assumption here is that the 
superordinate implications of the non-preferred pole follow in parallel. 
Such a position is in accord with what Hinkle termed a parallel 
implicative relationship in which, for two constructs A-B. and X-Y 
A implies X and B implies Y. 
But, as Hinkle (1965) and ten Kate (1981) are well aware, the 
implicative relationships between constructs are not necessarily as 
straightforward as the parallelism described above53. To follow 
through the implications of a preferred pole, therefore, is not 
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necessarily to follow through the implications of its non-preferred 
opposite: the implicative pathways might diverge. 
There is little direct evidence bearing upon the problem since most 
laddering seems to have followed Hinkle's original rubric. Wright 
(1970), however, reports the study of a single case in which the 
superordinate implicative relationships of both poles were followed 
and the divergence of implicative pathways became apparent. 
Landfield's (1971) pyramiding technique, focusing on subordinate 
implicative relationships, seems likely to produce a similar divergence, 
to judge by the example given in his texts. Evidence of a more 
indirect nature, yet to the same effect, can be gleaned from 
Fransella's work with bi-polar implications grids in which the pattern 
of implicative relationships does not totally reflect parallelism in 
Hinkle's sense of the term55. 
There can be little doubt that laddering produces constructs which 
elaborate 'base' constructs both superordinately and subordinately. 
Whether this can include recursive, looping processes 
56 
remains a 
matter of debate, for it is not at all clear whether laddering elicits 
constructs of sequentially greater superordination or subordination 
depending upon the way in which the implicative relationships are 
elicited. Given the present state of the art, it may be safer to 
use the laddering as a way of eliciting elaborations of a person's 
constructs 
- 
akin to the way in which Ravenette (1977) seeks to 
explore the meaning of verbal labels 
- 
rather than to use it to 
determine hierarchical relationships between constructs in the absence 
of a specific context. 
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6.5.5 Freer forms of elicitation 
Though laddered constructs could be incorporated in repertory grids 
this seems not to have been done, researchers preferring to follow 
the implicative networks rather than the statistical associations 
that can be derived from the repertory grid. The freer forms of 
elicitation are likewise typically directed towards the constructs 
used by the respondent together with their implications (though these 
tend to be less systematically explored than is the case with Hinkle's 
approaches), and it is rare for the constructs so produced to be used 
in repertory grids. 
The work published by Nash between 1973 and 1978 indicates a marked 
shift in attitude to the repertory grid as an instrument of research. 
In 'Classrooms Observed' (1973) the grid featured prominently in his 
investigations of the ways in which pupils construed their teachers. 
The study reported in 1976 saw him move away from the repertory grid 
and use (following an initial full context sort) a dyadic elicitation 
procedure focusing on contrast. In response to a paper by Clift et 
al (1978), Nash (1978) indicates that he finds standard elicitation 
procedures eliminating some perhaps meaningful constructs and he has 
moved to a still freer form of elicitation in which he asks teachers 
to talk about pupils as if they were discussing them with a colleague. 
The discussions are tape-recorded and Nash extracts from the transcripts 
a number of constructs which are taken as central to the teachers' 
perceptions of their pupils. He finds this to be quicker and less 
threatening to his respondents and argues that, since it is less formal 
(and apparently less powerful) than other approaches, it can be practised 
with respondents such as education officials who might otherwise be 
unwilling to co-operate. How this information is used is not reporteds 
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presumably at the time of publication of this short response Nash was 
referring to work still in progress. 
Nash's description of what might be termed a 'classroom character 
sketch' is reminiscent of Kelly's use of self-characterisation as a 
method of eliciting constructs. In this approach Kelly asks the 
respondent to write a character sketch of him- or herself from the 
standpoint of an intimate and sympathetic friend. In this approach 
the constructs elicited are anchored to the construction of what one 
might call, after the existentialists, 'self-in-the-world' (or, at 
least, that part of the world of immediate interest). As Fransella 
and Bannister (1977) point out, such an approach is by no means as 
structured and 'tidy' as formal elicitation procedures57i there seems 
no reason in principle why constructs elicited in this way could not 
be incorporated into a grid format58 though, with self at the focus of 
elicitation, there could be limitations on the ranges of convenience 
of the constructs used. Nash's interviews would seem less restrict- 
ing in this respect. 
Fransella and Bannister (1977) note that self-characterisation has been 
little explored, but suggest that it tends to seek out superordinate, 
rather than subordinate, constructs when used in the self-oriented 
sense of Kelly's formulation59. It remains an open question whether 
the superordinate emphasis holds when the respondent freely describes 
circumstances exterior to the self. Bannister and Fransella (1980) 
make the point more strongly when they claim that self-characterisation 
elicits more superordinate constructs than triadic elicitation60s 
However, little evidence seems to be available to support either the 
stronger or the weaker claim. In Kelly's own account he indicates 
that he is interested in something more than superficial appearances 
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when he asks for a self-characterisation, but this does not 
necessarily imply the production of superordina. te constructs: in the 
case study of 'Ronald Barrett' it would appear that some superordinate 
constructs were elicited since the implicative evidence is present in 
61 
the sketch produced by the respondent. 
Freer forms of elicitation are not limited to self-characterisation 
and its analogues. Ravenette (1980) makes use of a 'portrait gallery' 
in which he presents a child with two schematic faces (one 'happy' and 
one 'sad') and asks the child to distinguish between them and to say 
three things about each62. C. P. Hargreaves (1979) provides 
respondents with wedge-shaped cards bearing the names of their 
acquaintances and asks that they be laid out meaningfully on a tables 
he reports that sometimes the construct emerges only after the layout 
has been completed. Honess (1978) used essays about liked and 
disliked same-sex peers to provide him with twelve frequently used 
unipolar constructs to which children had to supply the opposite 
verbal labels. Karst and Groutt (1977), like Nash, preferred to 
avoid the formal interview appearing as a psychological test, but were 
unwilling to adopt an unstructured approach. Their solution was a 
compromise 
- 
to use triads but, having presented a triad, to ask 
respondents to compare and contrast the three elements in as many ways 
as possible. 'Questions were inserted into the proceedings in order 
to keep the interaction lively and to allow for the unveiling of other 
significant constructs or for the elaborations of those previously 
articulated to be revealed. 
Perhaps the most 'element-free' elicitation was used by Bonarius (1971) 
who asked 125 students to provide two constructs by writing down what 
they felt were the 'two most important dimensions for describing people' 
63. 
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These constructs were later used in an experiment on the extremity 
of rating, but his so-called 'Free Formation Procedure' has not been 
extended to grid method proper. 
Keen and Bell (1981), echoing M. T. Taylor's (1976) doubts regarding 
the capacity of standard grid administration to reflect the ways in 
which people think, suggest that the triadic technique may be unusual 
and unnatural in this respect. They take the view that reflective 
thinking and conversing is much less syttematic than is consonant with 
triadic elicitation and in consequence have developed a computer 
algorithm, DYAD, which elicits both elements and constructs in an 
interpenetrating sequence. A computer is critical to the success of 
the elicitation of a full grid of ratings because of the difficulty a 
human interviewer would find in keeping track of all the partly-recorded 
relationships already elicited and of the remaining questions essential 
to the completion of the grid matrix. I have not worked through a 
DYAD routine, but it seems likely (to judge from the example appended 
to Keen and Bell's paper) that it is open to the same sort of 
reservations as, for example, Shaw's (1980a)PEGASUS program in respect 
of bias, linguistic impoverishment, and tedium during completion. 
6.5.6 Methods of elicitation: a concluding perspective 
Triadic, dyadic and full context elicitation rely explicitly on 
similarity and contrast, whereas many of the freer forms of elicitation 
tend to leave similarity and contrast at an implicit level. Laddering, 
which can be seen as complementary to the elicitation of 'base' 
constructs still rests upon the assumption of contrast. The question 
that has to be asked here (and that is implicit in the whole of this 
appraisal of the repertory grid) is whether the emphasis on similarity 
and contrast is sufficient for the researcher to gain an adequate 
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understanding of the respondent's world. 
Kreitler and Kreitler (1976) identify four categories of meaning- 
relationship of which only the first two seem related to the completion 
of repertory grids. The four categories are 
(i) attributive (of qualities to the referent); 
(ii) comparative (similarity, dissimilarity, complementariness, 
relational); 
(iii) e: eemplifying-illustrative (of instances, situations, scene), 
and 
(iv) metaphoric-symbolic (interpretative, metaphor, symbol 
). 
Kreitler and Kreitler suggest that categories (i) and (ii) are mainly 
appropriate for conveying interpersonally shared lexical meanings and 
that categories (iii) and (iv) are more appropriate for meanings in 
the realm of the personal-subjective and symbolic. As the authors 
point out, the latter pair are more open to error in encoding. 
Such repertory grid data as I have seen are strikingly lacking in 
category (iii) and (iv) meaning relationships when set against other 
information collected from respondents: the work of Olson (1980 a, b) who 
collected constructs explicitly in repertory grids and more implicitly 
when his respondents elaborated the rather general constructs elicited 
by his grid protocol, points up the distinction very clearly. The 
conclusion I draw from Olson's work and the range of repertory grid 
studies I have also studied is that the formalised elicitation techniques 
can at best give but a partial indication of the respondent's construing 
and that the richness of understanding is likely to accrue from freer 
approaches which allow the respondent to convey meaning through 
exemplification and metaphoric allusion. 
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This standpoint is not without its risks of selectivity and distortions 
a rigorous approach to research into personal construing requires more 
than testimony, as will be argued more fully in Chapter 13. Any grid 
user worthy of the title of researcher or clinician is aware of the 
importance of the embellishments to the grid data that conversation 
(that freest of forms of interactive elicitation) can provide, and 
much interpretation of grid data takes such information into account. 
It is in these aspects of elicitation that formalisation 
- 
exemplified 
Pax excellence by computer algorithms 
- 
is at its weakest. 
Many studies reported in the literature do little other than report 
lists of elements, of constructs and of their statistical relationships 
and couple these to interpretations which lack the vibrancy of the 
existential experience of the respondents. Leading a workshop at the 
1982 British Conference on Personal Construct Psychology, Peter 
Stringer drew the conclusion that perhaps the users of repertory grids 
did not spend enough time talking to their respondents; to which I 
would add that maybe they do not always spend enough time listening to 
the wealth of information that respondents are often willing to give. 
6.6 ELICITED VERSUS SUPPLIED CONSTRUCTS 
6.6.1 Introduction 
The question of whether the researcher should elicit constructs from 
respondents, or supply constructs to them, has received a considerable 
amount of attention. Bannister (1973) dismisses the issue as a 
pseudo-problem arguing (like Hinkle, 1965) that, whoever provides the 
verbal label, the respondent necessarily provides the underlying 
construct from his or her repertoire. Bannister further argues that 
if 'the experimenter tries to supply verbal labels which are in the 
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native tongue of the subject and which relate to constructs likely to 
be important to the subject 
... 
there will be no difference in the 
subject's ability to use "supplied" as contrasted with "elicited" 
constructs' 
65. 
Bannister's first point is well taken, but the second begs. a number 
of questions. Despite acknowledging that the second point depends 
on the adequacy of the experimenter's understanding of the subject, 
he gives no indication regarding either how this might be achieved or 
how the degree of understanding might be assessed. One is left with 
the feeling that Bannister would call upon a normative framework 
derived from experience in order to (implicitly) settle the issue. 
His position also skates over the question of whose constructions of 
the problem are being researched. 
The burden of these comments on Bannister's position is that the 
question of 'elicited versus supplied constructs' is by no means a 
pseudo-problem but is a problem that must be addressed at the outset 
of research involving repertory grids. 
Bonarius (1965), reviewing studies pertaining to the Individuality 
Corollary, concluded that individuals preferred to express themselves 
in their descriptions of people by using their own verbal labels, 
rather than by employing labels supplied by others. Later Adams- 
66 
Webber (1970) came to a broadly similar conclusion in his review of 
elicited and provided constructs, though he added that carefully 
selected lists of adjectives might be used in some circumstances as 
effectively as the verbal labels provided by respondents67 
. 
More 
recently, work by Metcalfe (1974) and Kuusinen and Nystedt (1975) has 
been interpreted as showing the desirability of allowing the 
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respondent to use his or her own verbal labels though, since both 
studies investigated aspects of cognitive complexity rather than 
construing as such, the inference is not entirely clear. As far as 
personal choice is concerned, Burgoyne (1981) observes that the 
respondent's own constructs are superior to those provided from 
outside. 
6.6.2 Extremity of rating 
Much has been made in the literature of the link between extremity of 
rating and personal relevance or importance, though it is not always 
clear whether the relationship would be better characterised in terms 
of personal meaningfulness to the respondent. 
In an early study Cromwell and Caldwell (1962) asked 44 students to 
provide six-constructs in response to a shortened form of Kelly's 
Repertory Test, and then to rate acquaintances on the six constructs 
that they themselves had provided and also on six constructs from 
other students. The respondents were divided into two groups, the 
order of presentation of elicited and provided constructs being 
reversed in the second group. As the authors had predicted, 
acquaintances were rated more extremely on the personally-elicited 
constructs than on the supplied constructs, and this is interpreted as 
support for the hypothesis that 'own' constructs are used more 
decisively than supplied constructs in judging the characteristics of 
people. Isaacson and Landfield (1965) found a similar tendency 
towards greater extremity of rating 'self' when respondents' use of 
personally-elicited constructs was compared with their use of Butler- 
Haigh Q-sort statements. And when clients were asked to rate them- 
selves on constructs which they had provided and on constructs provided 
by their therapists, Landfield (1965) found the ratings on the former 
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to be significantly more extreme than those on the latter. Landfield 
interpreted these findings as demonstrating the greater meaningfulness 
of personal constructs, but his question to the respondents was 
couched in terms of usefulness to describe people, and one would 
expect a present or ideal self to be construed more clearly (and 
therefore show a tendency to greater rating extremity) than a 
comparatively unfamiliar therapist, particularly when the respondent's 
own verbal labels formed the scales for judgment. It is not surprising 
to find that no significant difference in extremity was found between 
the two 'selves' and the therapist when the therapist's constructs 
were used. 
Other work in the area of meaningfulness and extremity tends to 
indicate that greater extremity (Bonarius, 1971; Stringer, 1972) and 
greater differentiation (Delia et al, 1971) are obtained with the 
respondent's own constructs than when the constructs are supplied. 
These findings would appear to be in harmony with Koltuv's (1962) 
finding that variance of scoring tended to be higher on traits felt 
by the respondent to be personally relevant. 
Bender (1969) used a slightly different approach to the problem. He 
elicited constructs from 52 university students using triads drawn 
from a list of eighteen people (nine 'who influence you most' and nine 
nominated against role titles). A resistance-to-change grid (Hinkle, 
1965) was used to establish the order of importance of the elicited 
constructs. Following the rating of the elements on the constructs 
(a scale from +25 through zero to 
-25 was used), Bender found that 
the range of rating was significantly higher for the five most 
important constructs than for the five least important constructs, 
and that a similar tendency existed in respect of the distance of the 
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rating of 'self' from the centre of the scale. 
An alternative to the resistance-to-change grid (which is a time- 
consuming task) is the direct rating or ranking of constructs against 
a criterion of meaningfulness or importance, though little use appears 
to have been made of it in practice. Adams-Webber and Benjafield 
(1973) asked 30 undergraduates to rank twelve supplied constructs in 
order of their perceived usefulness for describing people and found 
that the higher the perceived usefulness of a dimension, the more 
extremely respondents rated themselves and others upon it. Wood and 
Napthali (1975) used a similar ranking approach in respect of their 
study of teachers' perception of pupils, the criterion in this case 
. 
being the usefulness of the construct for a teacher taking over a new 
class. 
Tajfel and Wilkes (1964) found evidence to suggest that salient 
constructs (adjudged so on the criterion of rating extremity) tended 
to be those produced early in an elicitation routine and also frequently 
repeated, though their failure to offer any convincing explanation of 
the origins of salience attracted criticism from Eiser (1971). My 
work with science teachers suggests that early elicitation and 
importance are not systematically related, as far as nomothetic analysis 
is concerned 
69. 
The importance of constructs to respondents was deter- 
mined through the use of resistance-to-change grids (Hinkle, 1965), 
and the Spearman rank correlations, for 27 grids, between order of 
elicitation and importance ranged from +0.60 to 
- 
0.38, with a median 
value of + 0.05. Further, a Spearman rank correlation of only +0.26 
was found between the above correlation coefficients for thirteen 
pairs of pre and post-test grids separated in time by some seven 
months, implying that whatever order/importance relationship exists 
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can be at best only weakly stable over time. 
As for repetition, Shubsachs (1975) found that frequently produced. 
constructs tended to be rated as more important than other constructs, 
but his procedure may have cued his respondents into making connections 
between frequency and importance that might not have been made in other 
circumstances. Fransella and Bannister (1977) suggest that construct 
repetition might be a good index of relative superordinacy, and that, 
if the elicited constructs are to be used in a grid, the 'grid analysis 
itself will give an indication of superordinacy'70. No evidence is 
presented for either assertion: the first is at best a tenuous connect= 
ion, and the second was shown in Chapter 4 to be unjustified. However, 
the issue of frequency of elicitation does not arise in most repertory 
grid work since the vast majority of researchers ask their respondents 
for fresh constructs at each stage of the elicitation and do not 
accept repetitions. 
Other work on extremity of rating suggests that extremity and bias7l 
both tend to decrease with increasing age 
- 
at least, for the range 
6 to 17 years (Applebee, 1976); that extremity may relate to the value 
connotations of scale terms (van der Pligt and van Dijk, 1979); and 
that extremity may relate to the intensity of emotional state (Caplan 
et al, 1975), though it must be said that this last finding is the 
result of observation of a single case. 
Reflecting on the underlying determinants of rating extremity 
O'Donovan (1965) suggested that both personal relevance and psycho- 
pathology might be involved. However, Warr and Coffman (1970) found 
no relationship between extremity of rating and either sex or 
personality measures. They suggested instead that a compound of the 
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perceived importance of the stimulus and the personal relevance of 
the construct dimension might be a critical determinant of rating 
behaviour, with pathology perhaps playing a significant role under 
conditions of high personal involvement. Chetwynd (1977) reviews 
the literature on extreme response style from a different perspective 
and draws the conclusion that extremity of rating tends to rise with 
increasing pathological functioning and to fall with maturity and 
complexity of cognitive functioning. 
It is difficult to sum up this literature adequately, since in 
encompasses a range of terms whose meanings partially overlap (e. g. 
meaningfulness, salience, importance) and which appear to have been 
used interchangeably and without definition. Allowing for this loose- 
ness in conceptualisation and terminology, it would appear that a 
tentative general statement could be made on extremity of rating 
which would draw together the points made by Warr and Coffman and by 
Chetwynd. One might expect individuals to depart quite markedly from 
the general trendi my own experience suggests that rating extremity 
may result from low (rather than high) involvement, the person using 
the extremes as a way of getting through the procedure with the 
minimum of effort 
- 
effectively converting the rating procedure to a 
dichotomous allocation of elements. 
The point must also be made that whilst rating extremity may imply the 
importance, meaningfulness or salience of the construct to the respon- 
dent, the reverse implication is invalid. Slater (1977) falls into 
this type of error when he states that a low sum of squares for an 
element (an indication of a set of ratings close to the mid-points: 
of the constructs) implies that the respondent is indifferent to the 
element72. This will, in practice, depend upon the psychological 
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characteristics of the constructs involved: if the construct is 
evaluatively positive at the centre and negative at each end, a 
respondent could plump for the mid-point for an important element 
showing desirable features. Many personality constructs have this 
E-/E+/E- loading along their dimension (e. g. 'extrovert-introvert', 
'bold-shy', 'loquacious-taciturn' and so on), therefore calling 
Slater's assertion into question. A similar argument can be 
developed in terms of the variance of ratings on constructs since 
some constructs may be used dichotomously (e. g. trustworthy- untrust- 
worthy) with extreme ratings producing high variance, and others, 
equally important to the respondent, may be used in a more graded way 
and give rise to a much lower variance. 
It is clear that the issue of rating extremity is far more complex 
than many researchers have recognised. Interpretations of extreme 
ratings must be undertaken with considerable caution, and it would 
seem highly desirable that researchers try to garner additional 
information in respect of possible reasons for extremity of rating. 
6.6.3 Are elicited constructs superior? 
It is perhaps with Warr and Coffman's (1970) work that some doubts 
began to be raised regarding the superiority of elicited over supplied 
constructs73. They asked 31 students at the University of Sheffield 
to rate the same twelve stimulus persons on twelve bipolar constructs 
elicited according to Kelly's Sequential Form of the Repertory Test, 
and on twelve supplied constructs presented in semantic differential 
form. They found that the mean extremity scores were almost identical 
and suggested that their provided constructs (which had been chosen 
carefully to sample the three semantic differential factors of 
evaluation, potency and activity) were as meaningful as the elicited 
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constructs for the assigned task, Bender's (1974) attempt to account 
for this 'anomalous' finding hinged on the suggestion that the 
elicitation procedure might have produced less important constructs74I 
but his argument does not appear to be sufficiently strong to 
invalidate completely Warr and Coffman's conclusions. 
Adams-Webber (1970) takes the view that, when common adjective labels 
are used to form dimensions of social judgment, it is likely not to 
make much difference whether respondents use their own verbal labels 
or lists of adjectives provided by the researcher. Fransella and 
Bannister (1977), in a brief discussion of the issues involved, take 
a similar position in their recognition that supplied constructs have 
a place in grid methodology, particularly where clinical and education- 
al use is involved75. Their contention is supported by work such as 
that of Ravenette (1975) who, in his work with children, has 
demonstrated the usefulness of supplying constructs. 
As a researcher or clinician one does not have to opt for either 
elicited or supplied constructs since it is open to combine the two 
types. Olson (1980a), for example, used ten constructs in his grids, 
five of which were elicited from his respondents and five provided by 
himself on the basis of pilot interviews (since there were aspects of 
science teaching that he particularly wished to' investigate)76. Olson 
took the precaution of not showing the constructs he wished to supply 
before his respondents had produced their own constructs, being aware 
of the possibility of contamination. The mixing of supplied and 
elicited constructs offers a compromise between the strengths and 
weaknesses of both, but safeguards need to be built into the procedure 
adopted in order to ensure that meaningful communication takes place. 
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There is another way of combining elicited and supplied constructs, 
and that is to elicit a number of constructs from a group of respond- 
ents believed to be similar to the focal sample of the research and 
to select constructs believed to be appropriate to the rese4cch task 
using criteria such as frequency of occurrence. Clift et al (1978) 
used this procedure when they collected the twenty most frequently 
produced constructs from 130 teachers and used them in a 'supplied 
construct' grid, assuming consensus regarding meaning. Alternatively, 
the researcher might conduct an analysis of the list of elicited 
cons±ructs and 'boil down' the list to manageable proportions, taking 
advantage of such semantic similarities and overlaps as present them- 
selves. Reid and Holley (1972), for example, followed this general 
approach in their study of sixth formers' construing of universities, 
reducing 198 constructs collected from a pilot sample of similar 
pupils to nine constructs which were supplied in the grid administered 
to their main sample. 
These nomothetic procedures seem inferior to the practice of mixing 
supplied constructs with individually elicited constructs in grids 
which are then at least partly idiographic in content. To assimilate 
constructs which apparently overlap (as Nash, 1973, did in the work 
reported in 'Classrooms Observed') is to introduce a series of semantic 
mean or median constructs to which no respondent may claim allegiance 
and which reflect no more than the researcher's interpretations of the 
meanings of a cognate group. Neither rater nor analyst can have a 
clear grasp of the meanings that have been exchanged during the 
completion of such a grid, which would seem to maximise the risk of 
misunderstanding. 
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Although there is in the preceding paragraphs an implicit answer to 
the question heading this section 'Are elicited-constructs superior? '. 
a formal summing-up is delayed while the issue of communication of 
meaning is explored a little further. This is crucial to research 
within the framework of Personal Construct Theory and yet receives 
little attention in the literature. 
I shall return to Bannister's (1973) point that the supplying of 
constructs implies a need for the researcher to understand the problem 
area from the perspective of the respondent,. to supply a representative 
list of verbal labels, and to share sufficient understanding with the 
respondent of their meaning to allow a reasonable interpretation to 
be made 
-a tall order. An experienced researcher may well be able 
to draw on his or her background to offer a reasonable prospect of 
seeing the problem area from the respondent's point of view - at 
least, well enough to engage in a meaningful conversation about it. 
Representative labels may be fairly easily supplied from experience, 
and this does have the advantage of being a quicker procedure than 
elicitation: it may be unavoidable where the research is limited by 
the time available. The assumption of intersubjectivity of meaning, 
however, is not always justified even for commonplace constructs and 
it is worthwhile for the researcher to check whether the respondent is 
sharing the 'supplied meaning' 
- 
and, if not, what meaning the 
respondent is actually intending to convey. 
Research using the semantic differential is a fruitful source of 
information about the problems of shared meaning. In their original 
presentation of the semantic differential Osgood et a1(1957)drew 
attention to concept X scale interaction77, a finding subsequently 
replicated in the cross-cultural studies of Osgood et al(1975)7. 
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Here 
- 
and translating Osgoodian into Kellian terminology - it is 
apparent that the meanings of supplied constructs shift according to 
the element being rated: this is a finding of considerable importance 
for research conducted within a Kellian framework, and its implications 
are explored more fully in Chapters 8 and 13. To add to the confusion, 
Mann et al (1979) reported a concept X scale X person interaction 
which accounted for a substantial proportion of the variance on 
scales linked to the three main semantic differential factors, though 
the 24+ concepts used were sufficiently heterogeneous to lead to 
substantial two-way interactions with scales and persons taken 
separately79. 
That commonplace verbal labels may not always be consensually valid 
is indicated by the results of an exploratory study which I conducted. 
This was grounded in implicit personality theory (Bruner et al, 1958). 
Twenty-nine lecturers in further education colleges, who were attending 
a day-release certificate course in education, were asked to assess the 
probability of implicative relationships between a number of attributors 
that had been most frequently mentioned by them on an earlier occasion. 
Among the attributes listed was 'conscientious' which, on dictionary 
criteria, would not be expected to be more than marginally correlated 
with attributes such as 'intelligent' and 'creative'. Despite defects 
in the instrument, it became clear that conscientiousness was, for 
five of the respondents, systematically negatively related to the 
various positive attributes being presented, whereas no clear relation- 
ships were found for the other 24 respondents (as was expected). For 
the exceptional five respondents, 'conscientiousness' seemed to 
connote 'unimaginative' and 'dull intellectually' 
- 
yet this finding 
would not have come to light had the responses not been scrutinised 
80 
on an individual basis. 
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It is obviously dangerous to generalise too far from the evidence 
presented above, but it serves as a warning that the use of supplied 
constructs may sometimes take too much for granted regarding the 
intersubjectivity of meaning: grid analyses offer some prospect of 
retrieving a misunderstanding through the appearance of surprising 
correlation coefficients or distance measures, in which cases it may 
be possible to return to the respondent and ask for clarification of 
how a particular construct was actually used. 
The problem of intersubjectivity is not avoided by eliciting constructs, 
for the researcher needs to be sure that he or she has grasped what 
it is the respondent is wishing to communicate. A critical advantage 
of elicitation is that the flow of sentences in conversation allows 
for the cumulative development of understanding of the verbal labels 
offered when a respondent completes a grid: this interaction is 
typically absent when constructs are supplied. The process of 
elicitation may be very slow and may act as a constraint on the number 
of respondents a researcher can work with, particularly if elicitation 
is to take place on an individual basis. Olson (1979b) remarks that, 
in his study of science teachers' responses to curricular innovation, 
it was rare for constructs to emerge quickly in their final form of 
words: it appears that negotiation of meaning took place before the 
verbal label (mutually understood by both parties to the elicitation) 
was committed to paper 
1. 
The richness of understanding possible in individual elicitation is 
severely at risk when grid data is elicited simultaneously from a number 
of individuals. Simultaneous elicitation requires very clear 
instructions and also the presence of the researcher who can act as 
a resource to whom any queries may be directed. In my work with 
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groups I have found that dyadic elicitation presents fewer problems 
than the standard triadic procedure 
- 
and I can testify as a respond- 
ent to some of the difficulties of working through a triadic 
elicitation sequence. My experience leads me to conclude that 
simultaneous elicitation is not conducive to the communication of rich 
and subtly-shaded meaning, but where more abstract aspects of grid 
work (such as the stability of ratings) are the focus of attention, 
then the simultaneous approach may prove acceptable in terms of time 
and adequate in terms of the quality of the data gathered. 
Are elicited constructs, then, superior to supplied constructs? My 
answer is a qualified 'yes'. The first qualification is that elicited 
constructs treated without taking into account a conversational context 
may give the researcher too much latitude in the construction of 
interpretations of what the respondent intended to communicate. The 
second qualification relates to the purpose of the research: if the 
researcher is seeking particular dimensions of response then there is 
a case for introducing supplied constructs, but the meanings of these 
will probably need to be elaborated in order to convey to the respond- 
ent what the researcher had in mind. The third qualification also 
relates to the purpose of the research and recognises the pragmatic 
value of supplied constructs in studying matters such as-the formal 
properties of grids. 
In making this judgment I am giving the greatest weight to the 
communication of meaning which I regard as crucial to research within 
a construct theory framework. To supply a construct means that the 
respondent must construe the construct and use it accordingly, and 
that the researcher must subsequently construe this usages the 
researcher cannot assume that his or her initial construct is reflected 
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back without distortion. The elicitation of constructs eliminates 
one phase of potential distortion, but still leaves open the possibility 
that the researcher will misconstrue what the respondent is saying. 
Negotiation of understanding, which can take place in the elicitation 
conversation, can do much to minimise misunderstanding. 
The critical questions for both researchers and respondents are 'Do 
we know their code? '; 'Do we know they know our code? '; and all their 
more complex interpenetrating derivatives. On the whole, the 
elicitation of constructs appears to offer the greater prospect of 
affirmative responses. 
6.7 TYPES OF CONSTRUCT 
Kelly distinguishes between different types of construct on the 
pragmatic basis of the way in which they are used. The distinction 
between permeable and impermeable constructs has already been made in 
the discussion of the assumptions underlying elicitation, and it is 
sufficient to recall here that a construct (which may be based on the 
construing of a small number of elements, typically three) is permeable 
if it has the capacity to subsume other elements within its range of 
convenience, whereas an impermeable construct lacks this capacity. 
It was noted that impermeable constructs present problems in repertory 
grid work on the grounds of restricted ranges of convenience. 
Kelly also identifies pre-emptive, propositional and constellatory, 
constructs, of which the last appears to be most frequently mentioned 
in reports of research involving repertory grids. A pre-emptive 
construct restricts its subsumed elements exclusively to its own realm. 
Kelly gives the following example: 'Anything which is a ball can be 
nothing but a ball'82, which seems to fit more closely the canons of 
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Aristotelian logic than those of Personal Construct Theory since it 
seems to be pre-eminently a statement about class inclusion. 
In contrast, a propositional construct is a much more speculative 
affair in that it extends the range of possibilities regarding an 
element, rather than restricts them83. Here Kelly clearly draws 
upon the 'As if' philosophy of Vaihinger (1924*), allowing an element 
to be considered in terms of dimensions that might be regarded as 
unlikely. It would seem that propositional construing can incorporate 
the figurative meanings of metonymy, metaphor, symbol and myth, whose 
importance in human discourse is highlighted, for instance, by Barthes's 
(1973*)analyses. Yet, as Rowe (1978) points out, these are very 
difficult to capture in the mesh of a repertory grid8'. This failing 
has led Rowe to give the repertory grid only a limited role as a 
signposting exercise which can indicate potentially fruitful avenues 
of exploration, and her work with depressives has become increasingly 
dominated by more free-ranging conversations. 
A constellatory construct 'fixes the realm membership of its elements'85. 
In other words, if an element is located at one pole of a constellatory 
construct, its locations on other constructs are (in the mind-of the 
construer) necessarily fixed. Stereotyping86 is a good example of 
constellatoriness: for instance, if a person is construed as female 
this may 
- 
in some minds 
- 
entail that the person is sensitive, 
emotional, timid, unpunctual, and so on87. Constellatory construing 
focuses on the implicative relationships between constructs and it is 
not surprising that it receives little attention in repertory grid 
work. 
Where constellatoriness has been connected with the repertory grid it 
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has been operationally defined in terms of high loadings on a common 
factor (which is assumed to be the constellatory construct itself), 
but the operational definition seems a long way removed from what 
Kelly intends by the term. Levy (1956), in a study widely cited as 
being of constellatory and propositional construing, elicited from 
each of 55 respondents twenty-two constructs regarding acquaintances. 
He used Kelly's nonparametric factor analysis to determine both the 
major factors of the data matrix and the loadings of the constructs 
upon them. Levy defined constellatory constructs as the five loading 
most heavily on the first factor, on the grounds of their interlinkedness. 
Propositional constructs were defined as those five which had virtually 
no loading on any major factor and which appeared on their own as 
residual factors. The findings from Levy's study are of no interest 
here because of the attenuated connection between his operational 
definitions and Kelly's theoretical position. For present purposes 
it is sufficient to point out that constructs which are highly 
correlated in statistical terms are not necessarily related in any 
constellatory sense88, and that the first factor extracted in analysis 
(and any factor, for that matter) is an artefact of analytical procedure 
and not a superordinate construct. The claims for propositional 
construing can similarly be shown to be unjustified. 
This criticism of Levy's study has been made for two reasons. First, 
it is widely cited in the literature and is therefore implicitly set 
up as a model for research into constellatory and propositional 
construing. And second, it implies that the repertory grid can be 
used to investigate implicative relationships between constructs 
- 
an 
assumption that has already been challenged in Chapter 4. 
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It is likely to be difficult to recognise instances of pre-emptive, 
propositional and constellatory construing during the process of grid 
administration, and even after reflection and/or analysis these may 
well not come to light. However, some verbal formulations may alert 
the researcher to the need to probe a little further. Easterby-Smith 
(1981), following Kelly, offers a convenient summary of types of verbal 
labels which are better explored further in order to maximise the 
meaningfulness of communicatio89 
. 
(i) Situational constructs, relating to the physical location 
of people or things, are unlikely to be particularly 
informative by themselves. 
(ii) Impermeable constructs may well occur with particular 
triads or dyads, and are incapable of subsuming new 
elements (e. g. 'works on turret lathes 
- 
works on 
capstan lathes'). 
(iii) Excessively permeable constructs, which are so general 
as to be unlikely to offer any new insights except in 
special circumstances (e. g. 'male-female'). 
(iv) Vague constructs, such as 'alright 
- 
not very satisfactory', 
offer little in themselves and it may prove useful to 
investigate the discriminative criteria being used. 
(v) Constructs generated by role titles (e. g. from successful/ 
unsuccessful person) simply reflect what is in the grid 
to begin with. 
Stringer and Terry (1978) divided the realm of constructs in a different 
way when they explored the effects of 'objective' (i. e. concrete, 
physical) and 'abstract' constructs upon the analysis of repertory 
grid data.. They reasoned that these different categories of construct 
would relate to different levels of cognitive functioning in the model 
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proposed by Schroder et al (1967). Thirty-three of their respondents 
produced-more than one objective construct, and in the majority of 
cases the dispersion of the elements (as determined by principal 
components analysis) was virtually unchanged when the objective 
constructs were eliminated90. Stringer and Terry conclude from this 
that the objective constructs were either trivially significant or so 
integrated as to be redundant. The matter may not be so simple. It 
appears that the authors have not taken sufficient account of the fact 
that, in the Schroder et al model, high integrative complexity (which 
involves abstraction) subsumes the concrete functioning associated 
with low integrative complexity. The issue of objective and abstract 
constructs is not 'either/or' but 'yes/and' in this respect. 
In-the minority of Stringer and Terry's cases, the removal of objective 
constructs had marked effects, such as the virtual disappearance of 
one orthogonal component or a change in the relationship between 
elements and constructs. These effects are somewhat disturbing since 
they suggest that the simplification of the data matrix may produce a 
new data structure that is unstable in that it depends on which 
constructs (and probably elements, for that matter) happen to appear 
in the original grid. The consequent danger is that the researcher 
may over-interpret and reify the factors or clusters output by the 
analytical procedure adopted. 
Stringer and Terry acknowledge, following Kelly, that the issue of 
objective constructs is more complex than might appear at first sight, 
and that the ostensibly objective content of the constructs might be 
treated in an abstract manner in use, This is not an easy issue to 
resolve: Stringer and Terry conclude that it is preferable not to 
eliminate objective constructs from consideration since they may prove 
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to be significant. To which I am led to rejoin that one will not 
determine the significance from the grid matrix but from the way in 
which the construct meshes ontologically with others, and that for the 
researcher to explore this is to commit him- or herself to an invest- 
igation of a very different kind. 
The return to the theoretical link between Kelly and Schroder et al 
leads me to mention two other typal distinctions made by Kelly regard- 
ing constructs, those between core and peripheral constructs and 
between superordinate and subordinate constructs91. The case has 
already been argued that the repertory grid has little value in 
investigating the latter, and it can be argued equally strongly that 
it is likely to prove inappropriate in respect of the former since the 
grid is unable to offer any criterion by which one might evaluate the 
degree of centrality of a construct to a person. 
The various types of constructs discussed so far in this section are 
quasi-logical in character, but the nature of elicitation procedures 
makes typal recognition very difficult. Put another way, the 
limitations of the repertory grid as far as implication is concerned 
seem to make it an inappropriate instrument for the investigation of 
issues implied in the subsumption of constructs under types. 
Attempts have been made to categorise constructs in terms of their 
social meaning (for example, see Landfield, 1971; Glossop et al, 1975), 
but these seem to have had little success beyond the boundaries of the 
problems for which they were developed. Fransella (1981) remarks 
that when Landfield's system was used to classify constructs from 
British (rather than American) respondents there was only a partial 
success, for too many constructs were found to be unclassifiable for 
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the system to be adopted without modification92. Given the diverse 
ways in which language is used and the immense variety of personal 
experience, it is perhaps unremarkable that categorisation has been 
accounted unsuccessful. Classification involves a reduction to the 
common factors perceived by the researcher and, while it nay have its 
uses in well-defined contexts, it is inimical to the full richness 
of meaning being offered by the respondents unless precautions are 
taken to raconnect the nomothetic classification with the idiographic 
data from which it is derived. 
6.8 'AS IT WAS IN THE BEGINNING. IS NOW. AND EVER SHALL BE... ' 
- 
OR 
SHOULD IT BE 'OUGHT TO BE'? 
There is one typological distinction regarding the nature of constructs 
that seems to be unrecognised in the literature. A construct can be 
used to indicate the state of an element 
(i) as it was at some time in the past; 
(ii) as it currently is (or is believed to be); 
(iii) as it is predicted to be; and 
(iv) as the respondent thinks it ought to be93. 
Something of this distinction appears when a grid includes elements 
such as 'self as I was' and 'self as I expect to be', but for 'non-self' 
elements the ontologicä. 1 status of the element is almost always left 
unspecified. If the centre of interest is the constructs of the 
respondent and not their relationship with particular elements, the 
distinction may not matter. 
Kelly's writing emphasises the first three of these categories, in 
that he describes constructs in terms of interpretations 
- 
which would 
seem to relate to (i) and (ii) 
- 
and hypotheses, which capture the 
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prediction of category (iii). But the distinction between the 
categories is not always easy to make: Thayer (i969ý makes the point 
neatly when he remarks that statements like 'this is soft' may be the 
result of operations producing evidence, or may be predictive in the 
sense that if certain operations are performed they will reveal the 
object to be soft. 
The construing of people in a grid context would seem to be predominant- 
ly of the 'was' and 'is' types: people speak as they find (or have 
found). It is obviously possible to build predictive construing into 
grids dealing with people, though this would appear to require the 
researcher to provide a future-oriented context at the outset. 
Elements such as 'self as I would like to be' or 'self five years 
hence' would cue the respondent strongly in this respect. 
Where 'situations' are the elements 
- 
as in some of my own work 
- 
the 
basis of the construing is more uncertain, and there is an increased 
possibility that the 'ought' type of construct will enter the grid95. 
If the focus of the grid is on the aims likely to be achieved in 
particular teaching situations, for example, the reality may be very 
different from the rhetoric: without some empirical cross-validation 
(either through exploration of what the construct means to the 
construer or through observations of classroom activity) the status of 
the construct is likely to remain indeterminate. 
Looking through my records of the grids completed by the probationary 
science teachers, it is possible to detect a number of constructs which 
are ambiguous in this respect. The ambiguity is not lessened by 
referring to the tape-recordings made of the grid administration 
procedure, for at that time the possibility of 'ought' construing had 
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not crossed my mind and so the ambiguity was not recognised. There 
are, for instance, a number of constructs in these grids which stress 
opportunity (such as 'strong.... 
- 
little opportunity for feedback from 
the pupils'), and it is not clear whether the respondent was offering 
a statement of how the class was actually handled, giving out a 
received wisdom, or making a statement regarding potential yet 
unfulfilled. Such ambiguities are not the fault of the respondents; 
the blame for them lies with a researcher who did not recognise them 
until he reflected on procedure long after the grids were completed. 
In Olson's (1980a)work with science teachers involved in the innovative 
SCISP96 curriculu. he inferred from the grids he collected that there 
was an overall dimension of 'influence' (high versus low) on pupils. 
A reasonable 
- 
if perhaps stereotypical 
- 
approximation to the 
distinction between high and low influence teaching would be didactic 
transmission versus facilitation of pupil learning. Olson followed 
up the grids by probing this dimension in subsequent interviews, and 
this gave him a more elaborated idea of the ways in which teachers 
construed influence and its relationship to their role in the classroom. 
The elaborations that Olson records suggest that the emphasis on 
classroom role may have kept them within the realm of the 'is', rather 
than the realms of prediction or 'ought'. 
In both Olson's and my work with science teachers the elements were 
general teaching situations, rather than specific teaching situations 
or 'critical incidents'. Construing such elements is perhaps rather 
like construing a list of role titles, such as those listed in Kelly's 
Repertory Test, without attempting to personify them. Stringer (1979), 
whilst recognising the difficulty of construing role titles, neverthe- 
less compared the first factor produced by principal components analysis 
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of 'role-construed' and 'people-construed' grids, the respondents 
in each group being 40 students. He found a larger first factor 
arising from the role-construed grids and interpreted this as showing 
that the respondents were able to construe people in a more 
differentiated way than they were able to construe roles. However, 
roles are probably inherently fuzzier to construe than people, enabling 
the respondent to move around in the fog and identify similarities 
that, in conditions of clearer visibility, might be seen to be 
unfounded. It would also seem reasonable to suggest that role titles 
might elicit 'ought' constructs, since 'is' constructs would not be 
available unless the respondent chose to personify the role titles in 
his or her mind. One might further speculate that 'ought' constructs 
would tend to be more normative, general and diffuse than 'was', 'is' 
or 'will be ' constructs 
- 
and therefore lead to less differentiation 
in construing. Tightly specified elements such as acquaintances, 
presented physical objects and items of memorable experience or of 
actual behaviour could, in contrast, be expected to produce 
predominantly 'was' and 'is' constructs. 
The argument presented in-this section is frankly speculative, since 
it seems that no attention has been given to this particular problem 
in repertory grid research. The. hypothesis that the production of 
'was', 'is', 'will be'and 'ought to be' constructs varies with the 
elements and the context of their construing is fairly amenable to 
testing if respondents' construing of their constructs is acceptable 
as validating evidence. General and specific elements could be 
construed by respondents (due care being taken in balancing possible 
contaminating variables such as order of presentation of the two types 
of grid to individual respondents). Subsequent discussion could take 
place to establish whether the elicited constructs fall into one of 
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the four categories mentioned or whether they should be consigned to 
a fifth category labelled 'indeterminate'. 
In summing up this section it is perhaps sufficient to suggest that 
there are grounds for suspecting that the greater the generality of 
the elements being construed, the greater the likelihood that 'ought' 
constructs will be produced, the rhetoric of which may not reflect 
the reality being investigated. 
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7 Bipolarity 
.., 
or not ? 
The factual language dissects and disintegrates 
experience into categories and oppositions 
that cannot be resolved. It is the language of 
either/or... 
By contrast, the language of myth and poetry is 
integrative, for the language of the image is 
organic language. 
A. Watts 
1978 *1 15-16. 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Kelly's opinion that all construing is, at root, dichotomous in 
character1 was strongly challenged in Chapter 3, in which arguments 
were advanced for a 'mixed economy' of construing. This approach to 
construing involves the use of traditional concepts for nouns and verbs, 
whilst allowing that dichotomy might play a considerable (but not 
exclusive) part in adjectival and adverbial constructs. In most 
repertory grid work the practice is for noun-type elements to be 
construed in adjectival terms, although dependency grids2 involve a 
matrix of problem events and people who might help, and Ryle and 
Lunghi's (1970) dyad grid presents interpersonal relationships as 
elements and requires the respondent to provide verb constructs. In 
this chapter the focus is on the problems of bipolarity in construing, 
and discussion concentrates on the most common form of grid in which 
the constructs are of an adjectival type. 
In his original formulation of the repertory grid Kelly assumes that 
all the elements fall within the range of convenience of the constructs 
(i. e. there are no 'not-applicable' responses) and can be assigned 
to one or other of the construct poles. This is a strong form of 
bipolarity and, as Humphreys (1973) observes, this requires that the 
poles be mutually exclusive and that together the two poles cater for 
all possibilities of construing along that dimension3. Although Kelly 
asks his respondents to construe dichotomously, he is aware of the 
possibility that the 'space' between the poles of dichotomous constructs 
can be treated in terms of categorical (digital) or continuous (analog) 
scales4. 
The actual practice of dichotomous construing tends to conceal any 
difficulties that the respondent might have regarding the allocation 
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of elements to construct poles. Once the decisions are made and acted 
upon, the route by which those decisions were reached may well be of 
little interest to the researcher 
- 
the situation is analogous to the 
objective test item in mathematics which is scored either right or 
wrong, with no credit being given for good working even though an 
incorrect answer is due to an arithmetical slip in the final stage. 
Looking retrospectively from the outcome, the hypothesis of strict 
bipolarity is seductive: the choice had to be one thing or the other. 
The respondents wrestling with the problem of dichotomously construing 
sweet and sour pork on the dimension 'sweet-sour' becomes practically 
insignificant once the element allocation has been made. 
It is easy to produce examples which challenge the practice of strictly 
dichotomous construing, and the difficulty of plumping for one side or 
another has contributed to the development of methods of arranging 
elements on constructs, such as ranking or rating, which allow for 
intermediate shadings of opinion. The problems easily visible in 
respect of dichotomous construing do not go away, however: they are 
merely transformed into more subtle versions by the changes in procedure. 
Many of the points discussed in this chapter apply to ranked grids, but 
the emphasis is on rated grids since these appear to have become the 
most widely used form. 
Rated grids make use of bipolarity in a weaker form than Kelly's 
proposal of dichotomy, in that each pole subsumes a range of grades of 
membership. This is clearly shown in the semantic differential where 
the categories are graded 'extremely', 'quite' or 'slightly' in respect 
of the quality denoted by each pole. The principle of mutual 
exclusivity is nevertheless presumed still to hold, since on that 
instrument an element can belong to one pole or the other, or be 
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located at the mid-point of the construct. It is worth exploring the 
semantic differential a little further since it evidences problems 
which are transferable to the context of repertory grid work. 
In presenting their account of the semantic differential Osgood et al 
(1957) postulate a semantic space whose dimensionality is unknown, 
but whose underlying metric is Euclidean. This semantic space is 
composed of a large number of semantic scales, each being defined by 
a pair of polar (i. e. opposite in meaning) adjectives assumed to be 
related by a straight line function passing through the origin5 which 
is conceptualised as the point of meaninglessness 
6. 
Any semantic differential bipolar scale P-Q can be represented as in 
Figure 7.1 in which the mid-point rating of 4 implies 'neither P nor Q' 
and ratings either side imply increasing 'P-ness' or 'Q-ness' as the 
extremes of the scale are approached. There are other methods of 
representing the semantic differential bipolarity in such a way as to 
preserve the postulated collinearity, but these are less helpful when 
it comes to discussing the vagaries of rating scales in repertory grids 
in Chapter B. 
P-ness 
extremely 
quite 
slightly 
zero 
Q-ness 
extremely 
quite 
slightly 
zero 
Figure 7.1 A representation of the semantic differential scale P-Q. 
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Unfortunately Figure 7.1 is not strictly accurate as far as the semantic 
differential is concerned, since Osgood et al undermine the purity of 
their theoretical position when they allow the mid-point of the scale 
to reflect the equal possession of both P and Q. In such circum- 
stances the assumption of mutual exclusivity ceases to hold, and their 
conceptualisation of bipolarity is irredeemably compromised?. The 
implications of this for the use and analysis of scales are difficult 
to assess, in that the pattern of non-linearity thus injected is likely 
to depend substantially upon the particular scale being used and on the 
concept being rated. 
The majority 
- 
perhaps even all 
- 
of the dimensions suggested by Osgood 
et al would probably be construed as 'logical' (in Resnick and Landfield's, 
1961, sense) rather than 'peculiar' oppositions: indeed, in later work, 
Osgood et al (1975) chose to leave out qualifiers lacking cross- 
culturally agreed opposites8. In repertory grid work, where the 
respondent typically supplies the dimensions, 'peculiaz'-constructs are 
often elicited 
- 
even in response to the 'opposition' approach suggested 
by Epting et al (1971). The functional antonymy of 'peculiar' 
constructs is likely to be more questionable than that of 'logical' 
constructs, thus providing the researchers with a number of problems 
regarding analysis and interpretation. In this Chapter I concentrate 
upon the extent to which constructs appearing in grids may be 
functionally antonymic. The emphasis is on the semantic, problems 
associated with the location of elements on constructs being deferred 
to Chapter 8. 
7.2 BIPOLARITY: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Kelly indicates at various points in his writing that constructs are 
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assumed to be dichotomous in form9, but produces no empirical evidence 
other than a study by Lyle (1953) to indicate whether his assumption is 
justified 10 Lyle's method involved asking students to match a list 
of words to eight 'target' words representative of four bipolar 
dimensions, the list of words having been drawn from a thesaurus and 
found by a prior panel of student judges to be acceptably synonymous 
to the target words. Lyle recorded the accuracy with which students 
were able to recognise the target words, given the synonyms, and then 
used a modified Thurstone factor analysis to produce five factors. 
The largest of these factors (accounting for 22 per cent of the total 
variance) appears to be related to general verbal ability: however, 
Kelly concentrates his attention upon the other four (each of which 
accounted for approximately ten per cent of the total variance) which 
showed that, for each bipolar dimension, the two ends both loaded 
heavily and exclusively on a single factor. From these results Kelly 
draws the conclusion that, if a person tends to make errors in respect 
of both separated poles of a construct, this is evidence to suggest 
11 that constructs are dichotomous 
Reanalysis of Lyle's data using the factor analysis program FTAN from 
the PMMD suite (Youngman, 1976) produced an oblique solution of 
excellent factorial simplicity (index = 0.96) with four highly inter- 
correlated factors. Each of Lyle's original bipolar dimensions loaded 
heavily and exclusively on one of these four factors showing (more 
clearly than Lyle was able to do with the analytical routines 
available at that time) that the word-recognition accuracy scores 
tended to 'pair up' on the bipolar dimensions used. 
12 
However, to infer from these results that construing is dichotomous is 
to over-interpret the analysis. First, accuracy of recognition relates 
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very much to general verbal ability (shown by Lyle's Factor V and the 
high intercorrelations in the FTAN oblique factor analysis), and the 
tendency for accuracy (or error) scores to pair up is a comparatively 
minor feature. Second, to make errors in recognising 'cheerful' from 
near-synonyms, and to make errors to a similar extent with respect to 
'sad', does not necessarily show that these are bipolar. It can be 
argued that the four dimensions used by Lyle are representative of 
different facets of life-experience and, if the argument be granted, 
each respondent may have been differentially aware of the semantic 
ramifications of these facets. To summarises what Lyle may have 
found are relatively minor perturbations (in particular semantic 
directions) in the verbal ability of his respondents. Such would seem 
a more parsimonious interpretation than to claim substantial support 
for the dichotomous nature of constructs. 
Since the development of both repertory grid and semantic differential 
there have been a number of studies dealing more specifically with the 
issue of bipolarity. Some of this evidence is reviewed in the follow- 
ing paragraphs. 
In reanalysing some of Asch's work on impression formation Wishner (1960) 
found that dictionary antonyms did not necessarily correspond to 
psychological opposites13, and he proposed that antonym pairs be split 
to form separate (unipolar) scales. Mordkoff (1963,1965) investigated 
the distinction between nominal and functional antonymy by splitting 
semantic differential adjectival pairs and using these as concepts on 
semantic differential scales, the hypothesis being that the ratings of 
the two members of each concept-pair would be symmetrical on the scales 
provided 
. 
Taking the two experiments together, Mordkoff found that 
l 
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fourteen of 28 concept pairs lacked functional antonymy on the 
dimensions used: for example, both 'masculine' and 'feminine' were 
rated by his student respondents as 'good', 'beautiful' 
,, 
'pleasant' 
and 'clean', whereas the functional antonymy of 'masculine-feminine' 
would have precluded this. Mordkoff's findings anticipated 
Constantinople's (1973) point that there are serious doubts regarding 
the existence of a psychological analogue of sexual bimorphism and 
hence regarding tests that make the assumption that masculinity and 
femininity are mutually exclusive. Later, Spence et al (1975) found 
that, whilst males and females tended to rate themselves according to 
conventional sex-role stereotypes, the relationship between masculinity 
and femininity was far removed from simple bipolarity. 
Green and Goldfried (1965) drew attention to the fact that respondents 
to the semantic differential were forced to accept bipolarity, whether 
or not it suited the way they wanted to respond. Hence the semantic 
differential, with its insistence on bipolarity, could not be used to 
investigate the existence of bipolarity in semantic space. They asked 
251 undergraduates to rate concepts on a number of unipolar dimensions 
chosen to reflect oppositeness. Where the oppositeness of unipolar 
labels was 'obvious' it appeared that bipolarity applied in respect of 
certain concepts but not others. The ratings for the concept 'sin', 
for example, on the two unipolar dimensions 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant' 
correlated a remarkable + 0.39: where this type of effect occurs, the 
authors suggest that a different subset of attributes of the stimulus 
is being used for the opposing unipolar dimensions. Picking up the 
findings relating to 'sin', I would hazard the guess that someone 
engaged, say, in an extramarital affair might construe adultery as 
stimulating, exciting, satisfying (and therefore rate it as pleasant), 
and as dishonest, deceitful, immoral (and therefore rate it as 
223 
unpleasant). It may not be so much that 'pleasant-unpleasant' is not 
bipolar; rather, it may be that the two polar terms each represent 
such a loose aggregation of meanings and connotations that it is possible 
both to construe 'sin' (itself an abstract concept) in terms of a range 
of subsumed types of sin and to construe 'pleasant-unpleasant' in terms 
of a range of subordinate implications. This would give a notional 
and indeterminate matrix of 'types of sin' X subordinate constructs 
within which the respondent is able to move during the task of rating 
the superordinate element 'sin' on the superordinate construct 
'pleasant-unpleasant'. Constructs of a general nature such as 'good- 
bad' and 'pleasant-unpleasant' would seem much more open to interpret- 
ation in terms of varying subordinate implications than more concrete 
constructs such as 'sharp-blunt'. 
There is a problem of logic with Green and Goldfried's study in that 
there is the need to import an assumptive step to move from the 
unipolarity that they use to the bipolarity that they are challenging. 
Heise (1969), reviewing the literature on the semantic differential 
(including Green and Goldfried's study), concluded that on the whole 
bipolarity was justified for most semantic differential scales. 
However, Mann et al (1979) take a less optimistic view of the situation, 
suggesting that the assumption of bipolarity is only partly supported. 
Semantic differential research typically averages the findings from a 
number of respondents to produce nomothetic findings in which individual 
variations may be seen as insignificant, or even as error variance. Much 
work with repertory grids highlights the construing of the individual, 
and this demands an analysis of bipolarity as seen from an idiographic 
rather than a nomothetic perspective. 
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Resnick and Landfield (1961) noticed how many constructs seemed to 
embody 'peculiar', idiosyncratic ideas regarding contrast, being 
neither related through some commonality nor obviously antithetical. 
Examples which they found included 'clever 
- 
anti-social' and 
'artistic 
- 
happy-go-lucky'. On the other hand, some constructs 
appeared "genuinely antonymics these were termed 'logical' constructs. 
The authors were interested in investigating whether there was any 
functional difference between the two types of construct. 
They selected one 'logical' and one 'peculiar' construct from grids 
elicited from 41 undergraduates and asked them to indicate which ten of 
a list of 40 adjective pair antonyms (i. e. bipolar constructs) would 
best describe each of the four elicited poles presented separately. 
The criterion of functional antonymy was operationalised in terms of 
the extent to which the two construct poles (presented separately) 
were similar in terms of the dimensions chosen as most appropriate to 
describe them. 'Clever', for instance, would be deemed to be function- 
ally antonymic to 'anti-social' if there was a substantial similarity 
in the lists of constructs seen as most appropriate to them. Whilst 
significant functional antonymy was found for both 'logical'. and 
'peculiar' constructs, the effect was significantly higher for the 
former. It would seem reasonable to conclude, on this basis, the more 
'logical' the opposition with a construct, the greater the likelihood 
of functional antonymy15. 
Mair (1967) studied the incidence of bipolarity in the split-half 
16 
repertory grid. He supplied four adjectives to ten medical students, 
all of whom had to supply their own contrasts. Each of these oppositional 
contrasts was presented, together with six supplied constructs of the 
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'unlike self' type (not of interest here), in unipolar form: the 
students were asked to assign ten acquaintances from an original list 
of 20 to each of the fourteen poles. Bipolarity was investigated in 
respect of the specific oppositions used by each student, perfect bi- 
polarity being inferred when oppositional poles attracted completely 
different sets of ten acquaintances, giving no 'overlap' and hence a 
matching score of zero out of a possible 20. However, Mair found that 
only 22 per cent of matching scores were less than or equal to 2: in 
the majority of cases there was a substantial overlap. He concluded 
that, while people may give apparently clear-cut verbal opposites, they 
may not use the constructs consistently. Mair seems not to have given 
much weight to the students' remarks that the elements were complex and 
open to many interpretations (cf the discussion of 'sin', p. 223-224); 
it would seem that both elements and constructs may have been inconsist- 
ently construed during the procedure, and may thus have contributed to the 
finding of a lesser degree of bipolarity than might have been expected. 
Epting et al (1971), whose comparison of elicitation procedures was cited 
in respect of the 'opposition' and 'difference' poles, used a similar 
strategy to Mair. They elicited twelve constructs from each of 43 female 
undergraduates using Kelly's repertory grid procedure, 20 students using 
the 'opposite' method and 23 the 'difference'. After five days each 
student was asked to complete a 22 element X 24 unipolar construct grid 
using the split-half allocation procedure, the constructs being the 24 
unipolar labels that the student had provided herself. As with Mair's 
work, bipolarity would lead to the expectation of a low number of matches. 
Taking the criterion of six or fewer matches as indicating bipolarity, 
the authors found that 73 per cent of constructs elicited by the 'opposite' 
method met the criterion, compared with 57 per cent of those arising from 
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the 'difference' method. Four per cent of the 'opposite' and six per 
cent of the 'difference' constructs actually showed a positive overlap, 
the remainder being in the band of eight to fourteen matches. The 
results are summarised in Figure 7.2. 
METHOD OF ELICITATION FREQUENCY OF CONSTRUCTS TOTAL 
WITH MATCHING SCORES m 
m46 84m4.14 16tm 
'Difference' 156 105 15 276 
'Opposite' 175 55 10 250 
Figure 7.2 Summary of findings from Epting et al (1971) 
Epting et al concluded that the 'opposite' method produced a greater 
degree of bipolarity in the constructs elicited, but that both methods 
left room fot improvement in this respect. They speculated that the 
'difference' method was more likely to cause the respondent to shift 
to the emergent pole of another construct, rather than provide a true 
oppositional contrast to the likeness pole first elicited. One can 
easily see how the 'difference' method could produce constructs that 
might, following Resnick and Landfield's (1961) nomenclature, be termed 
'peculiar'. 
Honess (1978), working with children, found a much weaker bipolarity 
in ranked grids. Only 29 per cent of 184 constructs from 46 children 
reached his criterion of bipolarity, a correlation coefficient of 
4- 0.83 (p <0.01) whilst one per cent reached the agreement criterion 
of ö+0.83. In this case the constructs had been produced by asking 
the children to supply the opposite poles to four supplied poles that 
had been selected from essays previously written on liked and disliked 
same-sex peers. The differences in sample and methodology make it 
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difficult to compare Honess's results with those of Mair and of Epting 
et al. 
An early study by Ross and Levy (1960) tackled the problem of function- 
al antonymy in a rather different way. They provided their respondents 
with antonymic terms, such as 'most beautiful' and 'most ugly', and 
asked them to arrange nine coloured cards (five of one colour, four of 
another) in patterns appropriate to the provided term. Judging by 
the patterns produced, Ross and Levy did not find complete antonyuy, 
but it is not clear from their work whether 
- 
among other possible 
explanations 
- 
the relatively restricted range of possibilities 
available within a3x3 card layout gave the respondents insufficient 
room for cognitive manoeuvre, or whether beauty and ugliness might 
have been regarded as separate concepts with their on specific 
meaning - complexes which need not necessarily be fully antonymic17. 
The various researches reported above have produced findings which 
tend to parallel those of research using the semantic differential. 
Bipolarity appears to exist in respect of many constructs, but is not 
guaranteed whichever method of elicitation is adopted. Some possible 
reasons have been advanced in passing why constructs are less bipolar 
than one might naively expect, and the final sections of this chapter 
deal with these in more detail. Though the points below are made with 
elicited constructs primarily in mind, many are equally applicable to 
supplied constructs. 
7.3 'BENT' CONSTRUCTS 
Contrary to Kelly's assumption 
1s, the construct may be made up from the 
poles of two different constructs whose contrasts are not articulated. 
The evidence reviewed above suggests that, especially where the 
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'difference' method of elicitation is used, constructs may be of the 
form 'X-Y' where X and Y represent different attributes but have no 
superordinate rationale to link them in opposition. Such very 
'peculiar' constructs might easily be 'disconnected' at their mid- 
points: Shaw (1980, for instance, is aware of the problem, observing 
that two elements rated at the mid-point of a scale could actually be 
more different than two rated at opposite extremes19. Such a situation 
could arise if the two mid-point ratings reflected different 
unarticulated contrasts to the stated poles X and Y. Constructs of 
this sort could be said to be so bent that they have snapped in the 
middle, even though they might exhibit a considerable measure of 
functional antonymy. 
But the problem of 'bentness' can exist even where there is a super- 
ordinate relationship. Consider the superordinate construct 
'pleasant-unpleasant': this may be verbalised as such, or in terms of 
any oppositional pairing from its subordinate implications. Further, 
it is possible that the respondent may select any opposite to the first- 
identified pole from among his or her repertoire of plausible contrasts, 
including the superordinate term itself. In the hypothetical example 
given in Figure 7.3 the respondent has chosen 'repellent' as an opposite 
to 'friendly', despite the availability of the more 'logical' opposite 
'hostile'. 
SUPERORDINATE CONSTRUCT 
44 SUBORDINATE CONSTRUCTS 
PLEASANT UNPLEASANT 
Exciting Hostile 
Attractive Repellent 
Friendly Boring 
etc. etc. 
Figure 7.3 An illustration of the possibility of obtaining 'bent' 
constructs 
- 
in this case, 'friendly 
- 
repellent'. 
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Elicitation using the 'opposite' approach is likely to increase the 
chances of obtaining 'straight' constructs, but the evidence of Epting 
et al (1971) and Honess (1978) indicates that this should not be taken 
for granted. 
7.4 PSEUDO BIPOLARITY 
Many constructs in grids are bipolar only in the sense that the polarity 
reflects some gradation of magnitude of an attribute. In its more 
extreme form this could be represented in terms of a dimension 
'X-not X'; less strongly, the situation could be characterised as 
'high X- low V. In neither of these cases is the full oppositional 
contrast of the Kellian construct present, all reference being made to 
only one attribute - hence my labelling of these types of constructs as 
pseudo-bipolar. 
A number of writers have pointed to the difficulty that sometimes 
exists in trying to find a true opposite to a pole (for example, 
'jealous' and 'conscientious') without resorting to simple negation 
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In my experience there is a greater tendency than linguistic usage 
would suggest for respondents to offer the 'not X' pole as a contrast. 
It may be that, with an eye to scientific detachment regarding the 
possible intrusion of my own thinking into the elicitation procedure, 
I did not press my respondents hard enough when there might have been 
'better' oppositions available to them. There is no absolute solution 
to problems of this sort: the researcher has to make a decision on the 
approach to be adopted and to be prepared to justify it in reporting 
the findings. 
The point about the 'X-not X' construct is that it runs against Kelly's 
philosophical position, seeming to have more in common with the 
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principles of set inclusion than with constructive alternativism. 
It refers to a concept in the traditional sense, with all that implies 
about the definition of 'X-ness' and the vagueness of 'not X-ness'. 
The 'not X' pole is open to a large and indeterminate number of 
meanings, none of which may be articulated by the respondent. Asking 
that respondents provide their own opposites to a given polar label 
provides evidence enough for the potential polysemy of unarticulated 
contrasts. As a case in point, Carter et al (1968) asked 135 teachers 
on a summer school to supply opposites to a number of unipolar labels 
taken from semantic differential scales, among them being 'kind' and 
'rugged'. Figure 7.4 indicates the range of contrasts offered: 
whilst it is doubtful that any individual would be able easily to 
produce all of those collected by Carter et al, it is possible that, 
had the respondents used the provided labels as unipolar anchors to 
scales or had they treated them in 'X-not X' terms, some of the possible 
options regarding the unanchored ends might have been flickering in 
their minds. (In passing, and with the use of supplied constructs in 
mind, it is interesting to note that the antonyms given by Osgood et 
al (1957) were not the most frequently chosen contrasts). 
KIND RUGGED 
Unkind 40 Smooth 44 
Mean 39 Soft 17 
Cruel* 28 Easy 11 
(21 others) 28 Delicate* 6 (35 others) 57 
Figure 7.4 The range of contrasts given to 'kind' and 'rugged' (Carter et al, 1968). 
Note: the asterisks indicate the contrasts given for the semantic 
differential. 
The problem of vagueness remains even when the construct is presented 
in the 'high X'-'low X' form, and would seem to be particularly acute at 
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the 'low X' end since this does not provide a focusing contradistinct- 
ion to the 'high X' end. Whilst 'highly jealous' or 'highly 
conscientious' might be intersubjectively understood in a general 
(but unexamined) sense, terms like 'barely jealous' or 'barely 
conscientious' are much vaguer in their meaning. For the researcher 
to understand what a respondent means by such terms it is necessary 
that he or she elicit the implicative constructions of the terms being 
used. The repertory grid itself does not address itself to tasks of 
this sort. 
Whilst one might be able to rank elements meaningfully on dimensions 
of this sort, and thereby avoid the issue of the strength of the polar 
meanings involved, to use ratings on such dimensions seems to be claim- 
ing rather more in psychometric terms than the situation warrants. 
In summary, then, the extent to which 'X 
- 
not X' and 'high X- low X' 
constructs are bipolar cannot be convincingly assessed from a consider- 
ation of the constructs alone. It may be the case that the respondent 
has in mind a much more specific opposition 
- 
or series of oppositions 
- 
than is represented in the verbal label made manifest in the grid. 
It seems best on balance to treat such constructs as unipolar scales, 
with all this implies for the allocation of elements upon them. 
7.5 CONSTRUCT COMPLEXITY 
Some constructs, which are at first glance bipolar, may be inherently 
more complexly structured: if bipolarity is insisted upon, it may 
distort what the respondent wishes to communicate. The problem does 
not arise in Kelly's original treatment of constructs as mutually 
exclusive yet related opposites subsumed under a superordinate concept 
or construct pole, but the conversion of dichotomy to a form of scale 
232 
is not necessarily associated with a smooth gradation of meaning 
between one pole and its opposite. 
Eliciting constructs from the probationary science teachers, I found 
a number who discriminated within a triad of teaching activities 
according to a dimension best summarised as 'visual... - verbal activity'. 
A problem emerged when an element like 'pupil practical exercises' was 
to be located on this dimension: it was construed by some as both 
visual and verbal, whilst others wanted to categorise it in terms of 
manual/physical skills. The former tended to resolve the problem in 
terms of the visual aspects of practical work, apparently on the grounds 
that it contrasted with other teaching situations which were predomin- 
antly verbal (by which 'oral' was typically meant). This seems to be 
a distortion in that, dosing conversation, the emphasis was on the 
possession of both visual and verbal components 
- 
in which case one 
would have expected ratings near the mid-point. Where the emphasis 
was on manual skills the rating used was close to the mid-point since 
this reflected a neutral position on the 'visual-verbal' dimension. 
The difficulties found in using the presumed dimension suggest that 
the presumption of a simple bipolarity may not be justified, and that 
the construct might be either more complex or more simple according to 
the level of analysis employed. It will be recalled that, in discuss- 
ing the Dichotomy Corollary, the argument was put forward for multiple 
oppositions based on the notion of contrastive sets. It is possible 
to speculate that, as far as sensory perception is concerned, teaching 
acts may be construed in terms of one dominant sensory experience which, 
in the case of practical work, could be expected to be drawn from 
vision, hearing and touch. Simplistically, the construct could be seen 
as a contrastive set which might look like 
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Predominantly Predominantly (other Predominantly 
visual tactile senses) auditory 
In practice, the contrastive set boundaries would probably be fuzzy 
and the categories could be expected to overlap. 
Other similar examples appear in respect of the construing of teaching 
situations though the problem tends to be masked by the requirements 
of a bipolar rating scale, and the implicit categorisation under- 
pinning the construct may not be recognised. For instance, a 
construct like 'pupils working on their own - teacher leading pupils' 
may subsume at least one category in which co-operation between 
teacher and pupil is important: 
pupils working pupils and teacher teacher leading 
on their own working co-operatively pupils 
And 'pupils working as individuals 
- 
pupils working as a class' is 
similar in that it has an implicit intermediate category referring to 
the pupils working in small groups: 
pupils working 
as individuals 
pupils working 
in small groups 
pupils working 
as a class 
In the second of the two examples there is a stepwise gradation in the 
size of the group involved, but there are difficulties in rating 
teaching situations on a seven-point scale anchored by the left and 
right hand categories: despite the gradation, the activities being 
construed are likely to be qualitatively different and close to being 
mutually exclusive. 
It can be argued that to separate the categories in such a way is to 
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treat the matter simplistically, and the argument can be supported by 
pointing to 'pupil practical exercises' which might involve periods of 
class instruction and debriefing, both before and after group and/or 
individual work. Such an argument can but be conceded: however, in 
making it, its proponent is subdividing the event to which reference is 
being made, for practical work is being construed in terms of its 
component parts. There is nothing at all objectionable about doing 
this, but it presses the construing from a macro, gestalt-like level to 
one that might be more appropriately labelled 'micro'. The complexity 
of multiple oppositions becomes simplified beyond bipolarity to some- 
thing more in keeping with the traditional notion of concept. 
In such circumstances the categories identified can be treated as a 
checklist of possibilities, those present in respect of a particular 
activity being coded 1 in binary terms, absence being denoted by a zero 
or blank22. Each activity will have its own binary code covering the 
categories being used: 'discussion with class' and 'pupil practical 
exercises' would be coded according to the size of the group in which 
the pupils work, as shown in Figure 7.5 
Activity Pupils working as 
individuals groups class 
Discussion with class 1 0 
Pupil practical exercises* 0 1 1 
1 0 1 
Figure 7.5 Exemplification of binary coding of teaching activities in 
respect of a 'contrastive set' type of construct. 
*Note Pupil practical exercises are shown as coded in two senses 
depending on whether they involve individual or group 
activity. It is possible, of course, that they demand both. 
It might be inferred from Figure 7.5 that the principle of mutual 
exclusivity associated with contrastive sets has been abandoned. This 
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is not the case. The fact that 'discussion with class' can involve 
both the class as a whole and interaction with pupils as individuals 
merely recognises the subdivision of the element into component 'time- 
slices'. The serious question that is raised here is the size of the 
time-slice that should be construed in order to maximise the respond- 
ent's communication of meaning to the researcher. It is not appropriate 
to attempt an answer at this point: hints towards an answer appear in 
Chapter 8, and a fuller response to this difficult methodological 
question is attempted in Chapter 13. 
'Contrastive set' types of construct are not the only kind of construct 
that is more complex than. Kellian bipolarity would suggest. It is 
possible for a person to exhibit both polar characteristics simul- 
taneously (e. g. 'logical-intuitive') or an activity to require both 
intellectual and manual skills together ('thinking-doing'). 23 Gaines 
and Shaw (1981), for instance, recognise that an element may have 
memberships of the X and Y poles of the construct X 
-Y ranging from 
full membership of both to zero membership of both with any inter- 
mediate combination21'. This implies that the construct is effectively 
'split in half' and the polar memberships of each element are assessed 
separately. Roberts (1981) makes this split explicit in her 
elicitation of a fuzzy grid25. The procedure gets over the severe 
difficulties associated with the characterisation of the mid-point of 
a bipolar scale (this was mentioned on page 22) in respect of the 
semantic differential, and is explored in greater detail in Chapter 8, 
page 293f ), but introduces the semantic uncertainty of the unlabelled 
end of a unipolar scale. If there were some way of 'splitting' a 
bipolar construct without losing the directionality embedded in X-Y 
contrasts, this might be of considerable value to users of repertory 
grids 
- 
and of other scales, for that matter. Gaines and Shaw (1981) 
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outline the nature of the computer program ENTAIL which is capable of 
processing data of this type, and they indicate that it overcomes the 
problems found with missing data and multiple meanings of the mid- 
points of dimensions26. This program is, however, founded on formal 
logic and it is a moat point whether the strictness of its principles 
is applicable to the relative looseness of much natural-language 
construing. 
Some constructs seem to rest on the possession of both digital and 
analog characteristics. 'Shut-open' and 'trustworth-untrustworthy' 
can be construed as having a semantic metric like the'off-on and 
volume' knob on a radio: the left hand pole describes a particular 
state, but once the element is 'moved' from this position it is on a 
graded oppositional scale. A door is shut or not and, if not, there 
is a range of degrees of openness; a person is trustworthy or not and, 
if not, there is a range of untrustworthiness available on which the 
person can be located27. 
Some constructs seem to be underpinned by an implicit behaviourally- 
anchored scale. A construct like 'innumerate - can solve complex 
algebraic problems' could, as far as rating is concerned, be sub- 
divided into a series of categories representative of increasing 
mathematical ability 
2a 
i 
Innumerate Can perform basic 
arithmetical 
operations +-x* 
on integers 
Can perform basic 
arithmetical 
. 
operations +-xt 
on decimals and 
fractions 
Can solve 
complex 
..... 
algebraic 
problems 
As presented, this example conceals a difficulty - the uncertainty 
that behaviours or skills nest sequentially within each other to 
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produce a graded scale 
29. For instance, different pupils may learn 
mathematical skills in different sequences: one may become proficient 
in tackling fractions and decimals before basic algebraic problems, 
whereas for another the reverse may be the case. 
As regards problem-solving, a self-sufficient person is clearly 
superior to one who has to be told both what the problem is and the 
appropriate method for its solution. But which intermediate position 
is superior 
- 
being able to identify the problem but not the method of 
solving it, or being able to solve a problem once it has been 
identified? A reductionist analysis would press the researcher 
towards the binary characterisation of the presence or absence of each 
skill or behaviour in question. 
Tk4e arguments presented in this section are suggestive rather than 
conclusive. Empirical evidence is presented in Chapter 8 that 
bipolarity may be a more complex matter than a superficial analysis 
might suggest. There are implications both for repertory grid 
methodology and other methodological approaches falling within the 
ambit of Personal Construct Theory: these, together with the 
implications for analysis are discussed in Chapter 13. 
7.6 INHERENT VAGUENESS 
Many writers have pointed out that concepts tend to be imprecise, 
apart from those used in highly specialised and formalised languages 
such as those of the sciences and technology. T. S. Eliot sums up the 
situation with considerable economy in 'Burnt Norton'. 
'Words strain Crack and sometimes break, under the burden, 
Under the tension, slip, slide, perish, 
Decay with imprecisioiö will not stay in place, 
Will not stay still. ' 
. 
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In repertory grid work using natural language, polysemy and multiple 
connotation abound, indeterminately. The construct labels are 
overdetermined. The terms used to identify the discriminations 
required by repertory grid methodology tend to be short and 
unqualified, and provide fertile soil for ambiguity to flourish. The 
respondent may set out with a particular discrimination in mind but, 
during the location of the elements on the construct, may shift the 
meaning of the terms used in order to accommodate new elements which 
were not part of the original discrimination procedure. In other 
words, like the often-found scale X concept interaction in the semantic 
differential, there may be an element X construct interaction in the 
repertory grid 
- 
and, as Mair (1967) suggested, people may sequentially 
use a variety of contrasts. Duck (1973) provided some evidence to 
support this argument when he found, in his work on friendship 
formation, that his respondents experienced difficulty in locating 
elements on constructs since the similarity pole required different 
contrasts when the construct was used in connection with different 
people31. In Kellian terms, it seems that a different construct 
might have been used for each individual person in the grid, yet the 
verbal label may have remained unaltered. 
A further case in point is Jane's grid (Shaw, 1980 a). In this grid 
Jane articulated in some detail a number of construct poles to which 
elements were allocated in the original Kellian dichotomous manner. 
Jane's grid is of particular interest in that it highlights the 
problem of compromising between specificity of the construct meaning 
on one hand, and general applicability(or'permeability') on the other= 
a problem which seems to me often to remain unnoticed or unacknowledged 
in repertory grid research. 
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Any of the eight constructs elicited from Jane would have served to 
illustrate how construct poles are very frequently components of 
larger meaning-complexes: 
- 
construct 6 (see Figure 7.8) is taken as 
an example, the argument in respect of which can be generalised to 
the remaining seven. 
Enjoy intellectual discussion Affectionate 
Difficult to understand initially Humble 
City livers versus Sensitive 
Seek challenges* Musical 
Insecure backgrounds Involved with those 
immediately around 
Compassionate* 
Philosophical 
Figure 7.6 Construct 6 from Jane's grid (Shaw, 1980 a: 79). 
Note: Jane summarized the construct in terms of the asterisked 
labels. 
From the grid presented by Shaw it appears that Jane was able to assign 
eight people to the left hand pole (summarised as 'seek challenges') 
and four to the right hand pole ('compassionate'). It seems extremely 
improbable that all the people construed by Jane fell unambiguously 
into one or other of the two categories, for the meaning-complexes 
represented by the polar labels are very broad and are probably not 
mutually exclusive. It is difficult to see what analysis of this grid 
would reveal about Jane's construing of each of the people-elements as 
an individual, since it can be persuasively argued that they have all 
been force-fitted into a mould appropriate for perhaps only the three 
involved in the triadic elicitation32. To have used a rating scale 
would have done nothing to resolve the difficulties posed by the 
manifest portmanteauism of the construct poles and the allocation of 
elements to such wide-ranging dimensions. 
If, as I am led to conclude, Jane's verbal labels are attempts to 
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specify the characteristics of individuals or particular pairs of 
people, the nomothetic use of such comparatively precise labels is 
likely to be invalid for the remainder of the element sample. The 
vagueness of the typical repertory gridsverbal labels has been 
exchanged for inaccuracy in construing the majority of the element 
sample. 
The vagueness of verbal labels seems to be an approximate function of 
the distance of the construct from the realm of sense-data. Physical 
attributes such as those involving the units of mass, length and time 
can be expressed with considerable precision, and are very likely to 
obtain intersubjective agreement. Some functional or descriptive 
constructs such as 'compulsory-voluntary' which, whilst not referring 
to physical attributes, have the force of rule to underpin them and 
are also precise in that respect. 
Ogden (1967*)made a broad distinction between two classes of adjectives 
- 
those related to sensation and those relating to the functional or 
descriptive features of events33. He pointed out that the latter 
class could be treated as analogous to 'sensation' adjectives, the 
result being a variety of vague contrasts. Moscovici (1981) seems to 
be standing in the same area of territory when he makes the point 
that the image associated with an idea tends to become reified and 
endowed with a quasi-physical, quasi-autonomous existence 
34. In 
other words, concepts slip towards becoming perceptsi psychological 
states, for example, can be 'observed' and 'recognised' as if they 
were physical attributes. In classrooms, children may be identified 
and described to others as 'extrovert' or 'introvert's the currency 
of such exchanges very often passes unquestioned, no-one calling at 
the bank to cash the notes. It is only when the idiosyncratic 
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meanings of these terms are explored that the quasi-physical construct 
is revealed in all its imprecision. 
There is an implicit claim in respect of the repertory grid that, as 
a systematic idiographic methodology, it is appropriate for the 
rigorous investigation of personal construct systems. Yet if the 
grid is used in respedt of subject areas in which vague construdts 
are likely to emerge - the area of personality is but one example - 
it would appear that it cannot, on its own, sustain the implicit 
claim of methodological rigour. 
7.7 SUMMARY 
Kelly's assumption that construing is fundamentally dichotomous, 
involving mutual exclusivity of construct poles under some super- 
ordinate construct, is a very strong statement of bipolarity which 
is open to challenge on a number of grounds even when it is weakened 
slightly (as in the semantic differential) by allowing polar member- 
ship of elements to be graded. Although the empirical evidence drawn 
from research into both semantic differential and repertory grid is 
not entirely satisfactory, it is probably strong enough, when taken 
in conjunction with a conceptual analysis of bipolar construing, to 
suggest that many constructs do not fit the semantic differentials 
model of functional antonymy. Membership of construct poles is shown 
to be neither necessarily mutually exclusive nor even complementary: 
a variety of possible construct types appears to exist, ranging from 
pseudo-bipolar gradations of a single attribute to constructs whose 
underlying metric seems to be at minimum not a simple linear function 
and may be indeterminately complex. Some constructs seem to come 
close to existing as contrastive sets, and if they do, it is ironic 
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that the best way of characterising elements upon them may be in 
terms of binary categories 
- 
thus returning, but at a much finer 
level of analysis, surprisingly close to Kelly's original thoughts 
on construing. 
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8 Completing the grid matrix 
Practical and conceptual issues 
Between the idea 
And the reality 
Between the motion 
And the act 
Falls the shadow 
T. S. Eliot 
The hollow men 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter the challenge to the Kellian view of 
dichotomous construing was extended to embrace the broader notion of 
bipolarity, the case being made that assumptions of linearity, 
continuum and mutual exclusivity of two antonymic poles may frequently 
not be justified. In this chapter I take up the theme from the point 
of view of the practicalities of completing a grid matrix, blending 
theoretical discussion with empirical evidence. Relatively little 
attention has been given in the literature to the task of completing 
a grid matrix: the argument presented in the previous chapter suggests 
that a detailed consideration of the issues involved is overdue. The 
greatest attention is given to rated grids in this chapter (on the 
grounds of their wide use in research), but many of the points raised 
have general application to both dichotomous and ranked grids. 
8.1.1 Dichotomous grids 
The completion of the grid form of Kelly's original Role Construct 
Repertory Test requires the respondent to place each element at one 
or other pole of each construct, making the assumption that all of the 
elements fall within the range of convenience of the constructs being 
used (an assumption about which he himself entertains some doubts i). 
Where an element is located at the emergent pole of a construct, 
Kelly puts a check mark in the appropriate cell in the grid matrix: 
the cell is left blank if the element is not assigned to the emergent 
pole. (There is a further assumption at this point 
- 
that 'not 
allocated to the emergent pole' implies allocation to the implicit 
pole). Kelly places no restrictions on the number of elements to be 
assigned to either pole, save that the emergent pole must subsume a 
minimum of two elements because of the nature of the triadic elicitat- 
ion procedure adopted. 
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This procedure results in the production of many 'lopsided' constructs 
in which the allocation of elements to construct poles often falls 
considerably short of a rough equivalence2. In itself, this is not 
a problem 
- 
indeed, the very presence of lopsidedness may be of 
distinct psychological interest at the individual level. 
Lopsidedness has proved to be of considerable nomothetic interest to 
Adams-Webber3. He and his associates have been forcibly struck by 
the tendency for elements to be allocated to construct poles in the 
proportion 62: 38 rather than 50: 50. He notes that this nomothetic 
lopsidedness is very close both to the Pythagorean concept of the 
'golden section' and to the more recent notion of 'strikingness' 
derived from information theory, and suggests that by allocating 
elements to the negative pole approximately 38 per cent of the time 
negativity is made maximally striking as a 'figure' against a 'ground' 
of positiveness. The argument is aesthetically appealing, but it 
conceals issues which offer some threat to the establishment of a 
kind of golden section theory of judgment. First, the proportion 
quoted as 0.62: 0.38 is a mean value: standard deviations for the 
data are of the order of 0.10, implying that individuals may differ 
quite markedly from the allocation of elements according to a 'golden 
section' criterion. Second, the research so far has used personality 
constructs and it is unclear whether a similar tendency towards 
lopsidedness may obtain in respect of other realms of experience. 
Third, the personality constructs used have been 'logical' oppositionsi 
yet (as was argued in the preceding chapter) many constructs may have 
structures that are less straightforward, and again it is unclear 
whether the golden section hypothesis 
- 
if valid for the area of 
personality 
- 
could be applicable more generally'. The empirical 
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evidence regarding the golden section hypothesis is considered in 
more detail later in this chapter when some psycholinguistic aspects 
of scales are discussed: suffice it to say at this point that the 
hypothesis rings a little hollowly 
- 
perhaps faintly echoing the 
music of the spheres. 
Lopsidedness has analytical implications. Kelly's original non- 
parametric factor analysis is based upon the number of matches (tick 
with tick, and blank with blank) between rows or columns. However, 
the use of matching scores can lead to some spurious associations, as 
Bannister and Mair (1968) make clear6. Recognition of this problem 
led to the suggestion that the elements be allocated to construct 
poles on a 'split-half' basis7. Lopsidedness is thus defined out of 
such a grid, and false associations arising from the statistical 
properties of matching scores are eliminated. 
The trouble with the 'split-half' form of the grid is that it forces 
the respondent to divide the elements equally between the two poles, 
whether or not this reflects the particular discrimination that he 
or she wishes to make. Bannister and Mair are aware of the difficulty 
that this causes, giving the example of the construct 'male-female' 
where the numbers of male and female elements are unequal. This 
forces them to admit that constructs which are unavoidably lopsided in 
the respondent's eyes would have to be eliminated from consideration 
8. 
This defect in the 'split-half' grid is sufficiently serious to 
warrant its rejection except where only the construct inter-relation- 
ships are of interest and elements can be provided which do not demand 
a 'lopsided' response. Examples where the use of the 'split-half' 
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grid can be justified include the Grid Test of Schizophrenic Thought 
Disorder (Bannister and Fransella, 1966) and Salmon's (1969) 
investigation of differential conforming and the developmental 
processes of children. In both of these examples the respondents 
were asked to evaluate photographs of unknown people against a set of 
supplied adjectival constructs, and 'split-half' allocation presented 
no problems9. 
8.1.2 Ranked grids 
The rank order form of the grid avoids a number of the difficulties 
associated with the dichotomous allocation of elements, but brings in 
a new problem as far as analysis is concerned. Lopsidedness ceases 
to be an issue when elements are ranked, and ranking allows the 
respondent to provide more information in the location of elements 
along constructs. It is possible to rank elements according to the 
extent to which they possess a (unipolar) attribute X, which amounts 
to much the same thing as ranking with respect to the pseudo-bipolar 
construct 'X 
- 
not V. Ranking appears to be best achieved by 
presenting all of the elements, asking which of them has the most 
'X-ness', removing that element and repeating this sequence until the 
elements have been ordered according to their 'X-ness'10. Fransella 
(1972) exemplified this approach in her research on stuttering, the 
elements being twelve situations involving talking and the constructs 
being nine unipolar statements of the type 'situation in which I am 
most likely to stammer'. Sequential elimination of elements gave 
Fransella a picture of the respondent's construing of the relationship 
between situational context and stutteringii. 
'Not applicable' elements present a problem in ranking on an 'X 
- 
not 
X' construct. If one ranks from the 'X' pole, where are such elements 
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to be located? My suspicion (lacking any evidence on the matter) 
is that they would probably be placed towards the 'not X' pole on the 
grounds of lacking X-ness, thus coalescing the meanings of 'not 
applicable' and 'not V. It seems unlikely that they would appear 
in the middle of the order (as might be the case with rating, where 
respondents are often instructed to use the central category for 
such elements), unless the ranking can be done 'inwards' from the two 
poles of the construct. Ravenette (1975), for instance, asks children 
to rank on the basis of 'the situation when it is most most/least 
likely that you would be pleased with yourself'12, 
Ranked grids allow the use of rank correlations between constructs, 
enabling their interrelationships to be presented in a variety of ways, 
but Humphreys (1973) points out that ranking along constructs (the rows 
in the usual grid) implies that the element-similarity data (pertaining 
to the columns) loses nearly all its meaning13. This represents a 
loss in comparison with the dichotomous forms of grid in which the 
matches between elements and between constructs are as meaningful as 
each other. 
The ranked grid, therefore, would seem to have some advantages where 
the focus of interest is upon construct interrelationships and where 
unipolar or pseudo-bipolar constructs are to be employed. There are 
practical advantages in using ranking, particularly where successive 
elimination of elements allows the respondent to make discriminations 
sequentially, rather than en masse14. It may be the case that asking 
respondents to discrin hate in this way elicits subtleties of gradation 
that would be obscured in dichotomous or rated grids. Clift et al 
(1978), who used rated grids, later felt that rating had been a 
mistake since some discriminations appeared not to have been faced by 
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their respondents. On the construct 'likeable 
- 
less likeable', for 
instance, discrimination was poor, and the authors suggest that the 
forced preference of ranking would have avoided the social desirability 
effect and would have spread out the people-elements with respect to 
their likeableness15. This procedure, however, does not get over 
the problems of the meaning of the 'not X' or 'less X' poles. 
Ranking tends to become more difficult as the number of elements rises 
and 'bunching' on the construct occurs (often 
- 
but not always 
- 
at 
the middle of the dimension being used). If fine discrimination is 
not deemed to be of paramount importance it may be more appropriate, 
and less stressful to respondents, to use a rated grid instead. 
8.1.3 Rated grids 
Widely used in research involving repertory grids, rating overcomes 
two of the problems associated with rank ordering. These two 
advantages of rating are first that it allows the respondent to 
indicate the extent to which each element fits one or other of the 
construct poles and, second, that it once again becomes possible to 
compute fairly meaningful element similarities. 
The use of rated grids raises a number of issues for discussion, both 
methodological and conceptual. Many of these apply to other forms 
of grid and they are treated here under the heading of 'rated grids' 
merely as a matter of convenience. The practical, methodological 
issues are discussed first, the conceptual issues being treated in 
the latter part of the chapter. 
8.2 PRACTICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
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8.2.1 Problems of rating 
Hopwood and Keen (1978) present their respondents with a TARGET grid 
blank in which the elements are labelled and the triadic sorts are 
specified16. The respondent then provides a bipolar construct in 
respect of the first triadic sort and rates all the elements, beginning 
with those of the triad. The process is repeated for each row of the 
grid until either the grid matrix has been completed or the respondent 
is unable to produce further constructs. 
In responding to such a grid (not as a naive respondent, but as one 
who had begun to study Personal Construct Theory and had administered 
some rated grids in pilot work) I found myself influenced in the 
following ways 
- 
all of which could be expected to be detrimental to 
the validity of the grid which I was producing. 
(i) Unfamiliar 
- 
and unremarkable 
- 
elements too vaguely 
recollected for construing to be clear. 
(ii) Some awareness of 'pattern' as the grid matrix was 
building up, leading to the possibility of intrusion 
of a 'halo effect'. 
(iii) Accidental reversal of the rating scale, mentally 
switching from 5= high to 1= high (perhaps because 
'five points' on the five-point scale and 'first' 
are both ways of indicating high quality). The problem 
seemed greater when negative (or negatively-valenced) 
terms were used in respect of the emergent pole, to 
which ratings of 5 and 4 apply in the TARGET protocol. 
It is worth recording that accidental reversal of the rating scale can 
happen in respect of a subset of the elements as well as with the full 
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set, as I have found from test-retest reliability checks which I have 
carried out. The effect can be suspected when the differences between 
test and retest ratings tend to be multiples of two, and is particularly 
well exemplified by the two sets of ratings drawn from a pilot grid 
which I administered, and which relate to the construct 'irrelevant... 
- 
relevant to students': this was treated as a five-point scale with 
the negative 'irrelevant 
... 
' scoring 5. 
(a) Original ratings 42214242322 
(b) Retest ratings 24452424344 
Difference: I(a)-(b)l 22242222022 
Suspecting reversal, I asked the respondent to re-rate the elements 
on the construct, and he produced a set of ratings very close to the 
original set: 
(c) Second retest 42214241311 
In iffy experience of grids I have found two further problems. 
(iv) Variation, during the administration of the grid, of the 
context within which the elements are construed. 
(v) Failure to follow the rules of the rating procedure. 
(An example presented by Hopwood and Keen, n. d., of a 
TARGET response shows this clearly. In this grid, 
where the similar pair had to be rated towards the high 
end of the five-point scale and the singleton at the low 
end, triads are rated as 5,4,4; 1,1,2 and 1,2,417. Errors 
of protocol such as these must inevitably call in question 
at least the validity of the construct rows involved). 18 
Most of the problems (i) to (v) above have shown up in grids 
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administered to groups of individuals, and it would seem probable 
that elicitation of grids in these circumstances, or in the absence 
of 
-the researcher 
19, 
would-increase the risk of unsatisfactory results 
for three reasons: 
(i) the researcher may not become aware of errors or 
difficulties in responding, as a result of 'remoteness' 
from the respondent; 
(ii) the respondent may be unaware that he or she is failing 
to follow the instructions correctly; and 
(iii) even if the respondent is aware of difficulties, he or 
she may not wish to draw attention to the fact by asking 
for help. 
It would seem prudent, therefore, to avoid the administration of grids 
to groups of respondents unless elements and constructs are supplied, 
and a simple procedure is adopted for the location of the elem+. nts 
on the construct dimensions (cf. Salmon, 1969); or, if elicitation is 
to be involved, the procedures should be somewhat simpler than is 
often the case with triadic protocols. 
Whereie grid is completed by an individual respondent in the presence 
of the researcher many, if not all, of the problems noted above can 
be overcome. In my work with the science teachers I used the triadic 
'opposition' method of eliciting constructs (sampling from a set of 
fifteen supplied elements), probing for dimensions which were seen as 
meaningful within the fairly tightly defined context of teaching 
science to first year secondary school pupils. I tried not to 'lead' 
the respondents during the elicitation procedure, and used a portable 
cassette recorder to check whether the administrative procedure had 
introduced an unacceptable le%'el of bias. 
13 rl) 
I placed in front of each respondent a large sheet of paper divided 
so as to make a 'ladder' representing the seven grades of rating, an 
eighth 'step' being available for use when an element fell outside 
the range of convenience of the construct being considered. The 
high and low ends of the rating scale were then labelled according 
to the elicited construct and the respondent was asked to locate 
each element (which was written on a small card) in an appropriate 
position, as is shown in Figure 8.1. Having previously recorded the 
elicited construct poles on another form (Figure 8.2), I wrote down 
the initials of the element against the appropriate rating category. 
The whole process was repeated for each construct elicited and, when 
convenient, the record of ratings and constructs was-transferred to 
a standard grid blank in order to have it in a format suitable for 
analysis. 
It was important to treat the whole procedure outlined above as a 
conversation, for this enabled potential errors and misunderstandings 
by the respondent to be detected and corrected immediately, as proved 
necessary on a number of occasions. By undertaking all the recording 
of data myself, the respondent was able to spend more time on the 
construing and rating than would otherwise have been the case (an 
important point where the time available is limited), and interference 
between the cognitive aspects of elicitation and the mechanics of 
writing down responses was eliminated. 
8.2.2 Distribution of ratings 
There is little in the repertory grid literature regarding the 
distribution of ratings given by respondents. Such as there is 
suggests that there is a tendency to rate at the ends of the scale or 
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near the centre, but the sampling is very thin in respect of the 
vast number of grids that have been reported. 
Orley (1976), using a five-point scale, found ratings of 2 and 4 to be 
less used than an even distribution would require, the other ratings 
20 
being more frequent than would be expected. The percentage 
frequencies, with expected frequencies in brackets, were 
1 and 5s L55 (40) ;2 and 4 23% (40) ;3: 32% (20). 
Slater (1977), without giving any data, states that raters tend to 
21 ignore ratings of 2 and 6 on a seven-point scale. 
An analysis of the distribution of the ratings in 37 of my own grids 
suggests that no general conclusions can be drawn. Figure 8.3 
summarises the findings from 27 grids in which the 15 elements were 
aspects of science teaching and from 10 grids in which the 10 elements 
were pupils. 
Grid 
Elemente 
No. of 
grid. 
analysed 
No. of 
constructs 7 6 
Rating level 
543 2 1 
Not applicable 
or omitted 
(a) 
Aspects of science 
teaching. At beginning 14 205 22.3 14.1 11.7 13.5 7.7 10.9 18.4 1.4 
of probationary year. 
(b) 
Aspects of science 
teaching. At and of 13 184 20.0 14.5 12.2 14.0 8.3 8.6 18.9 3.5 
probationary year. 
Pupils 10 126 15.8 16.4 13.9 14.9 11.7 12.0 12.9 2.4 
Figure 8.3. Percentages of rating categories used in 37 grids. 
Rows (a) and (b) refer to the same group of teachers 
on two separate occasions, whilst row (c)refers to a 
completely different group. 
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There is, for each group of grids, a tendency for the highest three 
ratings to be used more frequently than the lowest three, with ratings 
2 and 3 being the least preferred categories. This may be an artefact 
of the 'rating ladders' used (see Figure 8.1) in that the top of the 
scale may catch the eye more easily and therefore act more strongly 
as a referent. It would be unwarranted to assume that this bias 
would be present when other rating strategies are used23. 
However, the distributions in respect of the science teaching elements 
differ from those when pupils are the elements, in that the extreme 
ratings are more favoured. This could reflect a tendency to 
dichotomise ratings in a situation where some constructs did not lend 
themselves as easily to the shadings of meaning possible with 
personality and behavioural constructs. Where the construing of 
pupils was concerned, there was a tendency for evaluatively positive 
poles to be given first (and hence be presented at the top of the 
'. adder'), and the asymmetric rating distribution here might be a 
reflection of a weak 'Pollyanna hypothesis' bias'. 
These nomothetic trends, however, mask considerable differences 
between the ways in which individuals apportioned their ratings. 
The patterns of some were dominated by extreme ratings whilst others 
tended to avoid extremes, and there is evidence that some respondents 
assign ratings roughly evenly across the full range of categories. 
The evidence from the science teachers (who completed grids at the 
beginning and end of their probationary year) points quite strongly 
to the stability of personal rating style25. 
Whilst the broad trend of my findings supports most of what little 
has been claimed, the variance that is hidden by averaging and the 
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diversity of rating formats available make a general statement on 
rating behaviour unwise. 
8.2.3 Range of convenience 
Elements falling outside the range of convenience of constructs 
present a considerable problem for the analytical routines widely 
available, as is discussed in the next chapter. It is often 
suggested to respondents that they use the mid-point of the scale 
if they cannot locate an element on the construct under consideration. 
This is an expedient to get the researcher off the hook of analytical 
limitations and, although its effects may on occasion be small (as 
Olson, 1980a, foind26), it is a dubious practice that subordinates 
meaning to methodology. 
Keen (1979) invited his respondents to use a zero when an element 
fell outside the range of convenience of a construct, but he gives 
no indication of how zero ratings were handled during the analysis of 
the data which he collected27. Lipschitz (1972), reflecting upon 
her grid methodology, remarks that it was probably a mistake not to 
have a 'not-applicable' category since this omission made it 
difficult to determine the limits to the range of convenience of a 
construct 
28 
. 
The problem seems more serious in grids in which the elements are 
situations29 rather than people. In the latter case constructs 
relating to personal characteristics are typically elicited, and it 
would appear both from the literature and my own empirical experience 
that respondents find little difficulty in subsuming a range of people 
under such constructs. Where situations are the elements it is 
quite possible for there to be a 'range of convenience problem' with 
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'X 
- 
Y' constructs, though not with 'X 
- 
not X' constructs. Olson 
(1980a), using classroom activities as elements, found on average ten 
per cent of missing values, similar to Forthman's (1973) finding that, 
if people were given the opportunity to strike out particular semantic 
differential scales which they felt were inapplicable to the concept 
being rated, the proportion was of the order of ten per cent. 
In my work with science teachers the overall average percentage of 
'gaps' in the grids was 2.7, the vast majority arising because 
elements were deemed to be out of the range of convenience of 
particular constructs. A small proportion of these gaps were due to 
errors or omissions in the rating procedures not surprisingly, the 
bulk of these appeared in retest grids which the respondents completed 
in their own time. For the record, the percentages of gaps for each 
occasion of administration are given in Figure 8.4 
OCCASICI; 
Number 
of Grids 
Total 
Number of 
Constructs 
Total 
Number of 
Grid Cells 
Total 
Number 
of Cape 
Peroenta4e 
of Caps 
First grid; researcher present 14 205 7075 42 1.4 
Retest of first grids researcher absent 14 2020 3030 94 3.1 
Second grids researcher present 13 184 2760 98 3.6 
Retest of second grids researcher absent 11 157 2355 65 2.8 
All 
- 
748 11220 299 2.7 
Figure 8.4 Incidence of 'gaps' in grids in which the elements were 
classroom activities. 
Note *Indicates three occasions in which respondents failed to 
re-rate on a particular construct. 
The percentages of gaps shown in Figure 8.4 must, if anything, be 
viewed as an underestimate of non-applicability. As was noted in 
the previous chapter, the insistence on bipolarity clearly constrained 
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the construing of respondents such that there were occasions on which 
they wished to tell me more than the bipolar format would allow 
- 
for 
instance wanting to construe 'pupil practical exercises'in terms of 
manual skills when the construct insisted on 'visual-verbal' as the 
dimension. A mid-point rating in such circumstances is equivalent 
to stating that the element lies outside the range of convenience of 
the construct. There were a number of such instances whose 
implications escaped me at the time, but which press themselves 
forcibly upon me in the light of hindsight. 
The tenor of this evidence and discussion is towards the recognition 
and acceptance of the fact that, in certain types of grid, some 
elements can be expected to lie outside the range of convenience of 
the constructs being used. As far as grid elicitation is concerned, 
this presents no particular problems. It is in respect of analysis 
that major difficulties arise: discussion of these is held over till 
Chapter 9. 
8.2.4 Interim appraisal and reorientation 
As far as obtaining a completed grid matrix is concerned, the problems 
mentioned in the preceding pages are not insuperable. Careful 
procedures of elicitation, and a willingness to accept 'gaps' in the 
grid, can go a long way towards ensuring that a data matrix is 
technically satisfactory. However, it must be remembered that a grid 
matrix is predicated upon a number of assumptions which the previous 
chapters have indicated should not be taken for granted, and whose 
validity may need to be assessed anew in respect of each grid that is 
designed. 
261 
In comparison with the conceptual issues that remain to be discussed, 
the methodological matters considered in the first part of this 
chapter are trivial. In what follows, necessarily the lengthiest 
section of this chapter, attention is directed to further aspects of 
the psychology of rating. 
8.3 CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RATING 
8.3.1 Social judgment in the light of construct theory 
Esser and Ströbe (1972) point out that most explanatory models of 
social judgment are derived from psychophysical principles assumed to 
operate in judging physical objects in terms of sensations 
- 
for 
instance, the estimation of weights. Such a model is shown in 
Figure 8.5, and is of a mediated stimulus-response type. 
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II Sensation Overt Stimulus in 
Respondent response 
(measured on (measured on (measured on 
a physical a psychological a judgmental 
continuum) continuum) or response 
continuum) 
Figure 8.5 A mediated stimulus-response model of judgment (from Eiser and Strebe, 1972: 7) 
In psychophysics 'hard' measurement is available for stages 1 and 3, 
and Eiser and Strobe indicate that most theories of absolute judgment 
in that field attempt to account for the relationship between the data 
gathered in those particular stages. In social judgment ( and I use 
the term to subsume the construing of a wide range of social phenomena), 
often the only 'hard' measure available is at stage 3- the judgmental 
response30. In the present context this is the rating which the 
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respondent gives to an element in respect of a particular construct. 
From a personal construct perspective the model represented in Figure 
8.5 is inadequate. A personal construct theorist would wish to 
expand stage 2 to indicate more clearly the involvement of the 
respondent's construct system in the process of judgment. It was 
argued earlier that new constructs were unlikely to be formed dining 
the process of elicitation in a repertory grid31, and it seems 
reasonable to extend that argument to cover the rating phase. The 
element, then, is construed within an already-established framework 
in which the construct being used is also located. It is possible to 
envisage an iterative process in which the 'match' of element to the 
construct dimension is progressively refined from an initial 'yes/no' 
decision regarding the construct's relevance to the decision as to 
whether the rating should be one value or another. The argument can 
be advanced that a construct does not exist in isolation as regards 
rating and that the refining process that eventually produces the 
actual rating inevitably calls into the proceedings such 'neighbouring' 
constructs in the system as are relevant32. 
In effect, the judgment process is closely related to the assimilative 
cycle shown in Figure 3.1, though the behaviour is internal during 
perhaps a number of refining cycles before it is made overt in the 
production of a rating. This personal construct perspective on the 
process of judgment is presented in broad outline in Figure 8.6 
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The Social Arena 
Figure 8.6 A model of judgment deriving from a Personal Construct 
Theory perspective. 
In Figure 8.6 the concentric arrows symbolise the cycles of refining 
of judgment: the actual mechanism is likely to be indeterminable. 
The possibility exists of sub-loops within the construct system as 
implicative relationships of the construed element and/or rating scale 
are explored, not necessarily consciously. In Kellian terms internal 
sensations would be regarded as discriminations of one sort or another 
and hence as sub-sections of the whole construct system of the 
respondent (of which the act of rating the element E on the construct 
X-Y involves only a part). 
What is the point of offering a model of social judgment from a personal 
construct point of view? The point I wish to make, and strongly, is 
that rating probably involves very complex processes within the 
respondent's construct system. An element is not 'just an element' 
like the standard kilogram, stable for all time. It is construed 
according to an initial cognitive set 
- 
to limit the domain of the 
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argument 
- 
but maybe significantly reconstrued as its implications 
are revealed or different dimensions of construing come to mind. 
Similarly, a rating scale is not likely to be a fixed entity like the 
standard metres its meaning is likely to shift with reconstrual of 
the element, as a result of calling other elements to mind, or as a 
result of related constructs coming to mind. 
a 
The danger is that the researcher will read too much into the rating 
being given. As one moves further from 'concrete' elements and 
physicalist rating scales the probability of intersubjective under- 
standing between respondent and researcher will decline, though 
neither of them may realise how approximate their mutual understanding 
may be in such circumstances. It is only by cross-checking under- 
standings using other modes of inquiry that the breadth of meaning 
of, say, a rating of 5 on a seven-point scale labelled 'extrovert- 
introvert' is likely to be narrowed down sufficiently for meaningful 
interpretations to be made. 
8.3.2 Rating Scales: the problem stated 
It is surprising that rating scales are so widely taken for granted. 
Whilst standard texts on psychometrics 
- 
such as Guilford (1954) and 
Remmers(1963) 
- 
deal with the practicalities of their use and adduce 
a mass of empirical evidence regarding systematic errors in rating 
behaviour, there is little attempt to question the assumptions of 
rating scales or to set them in any kind of theoretical perspective 
other than the quasi-physical. 
From a personal construct perspective the question of rating scales 
has to be approached from a different direction - that of the 
individual's method(s) of using thsm. Little seems to be known 
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about how scales are actually used in responding to grid protocols - 
or in cognate situations, for that matter. Evidence was presented 
in Chapter 6 suggesting that extremity of rating tends to be higher 
with increasing personal meaningfulness of the construct being used, 
irrespective of whether the construct is elicited or supplied 
- 
though elicited constructs are likely to be more personally meaning- 
ful. Pathology may exert a significant effect under conditions of 
high involvement. In presenting his interaction model Bonarius 
(1971) goes somewhat further, suggesting that rating extremity is a 
function of the element being rated, the construct, and the rater 
him- or herself. 
The above may well act as influences upon the practice of rating, 
but they are at a level of generality above the existential experience 
of actually assigning ratings to elements. In inquiring how a 
respondent may use a rating scale it is necessary to look at a number 
of theoretical matters such as the metrics of scales, anchoring, 
psycholinguistics, construct complexity and interaction effects. 
There is far more here than can be encompassed by the present work. 
All that I can attempt in the space-time at my disposal is to discuss 
briefly some of the issues that have emerged whilst I have been work- 
ing with grids: it will be apparent that fauch of what follows can be 
applied to other contexts in which rating scales are used. 
8.3.3 Stevens's work on scaling 
A rated grid treats each construct as if it is linear and bipolar; 
that is, the poles are oppositionally related and mutually exclusive. 
Further, it is assumed that the rating scale itself is consistent 
during use, and 
- 
as Humphreys (1973) points out 
- 
that it possesses 
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equal intervals33. This last assumption is deeply embedded in the 
statistical routines used in the widely-available methods of grid 
analysis. 
Stevens (1957) draws attention to the distinction between qualitative 
('metathetic') and quantitative ('prothetic') scales. The former is 
essentially substitutive as one moves from one scale position to the 
next: he gives the example of musical pitch. The latter is additiver 
the further up the scale one moves, the more of the attribute is 
present 
- 
for instance, as in a scale of loudness. There is an 
important difference from the point of view of the subjective use of 
scales. The 'just noticeable difference' for metathetic scales tends 
to relate to a constant interval on the scale irrespective of the 
section of the scale involved, whereas for a prothetic scale the 
magnitude of the 'just noticeable difference' depends upon the scale 
position. For instance, Stevens points out that it is easier to 
discriminate 0.5 from 1.0 seconds than it is to discriminate 3.5 from 
4.0 seconds. In the prothetic case the subjective scale of judgment 
may be markedly different from the physical, objective scaling of 
time. 
It is difficult to transport Stevens's distinction into the realm of 
the repertory grid since bipolar labelling makes the scaling more 
complicated (see Chapter 7, and below). It would seem that pseudo- 
bipolar constructs can be discussed in Stevens's terms, though the 
actual distinction between prothetic and metathetic cannot be settled 
at the level of abstraction 
- 
it must rest upon the way in which the 
respondent actually uses the dimension. 'High... 
- 
low frequency of 
assessing pupils' might plausibly be argued to be prothetic, whereas 
'Lead to high 
... 
- 
low pupil self-reliance' would seem to be more 
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metathetic in character in that the psychological substrate relates 
to the qualitative aspects of the classroom activities being construed. 
The point being tentatively put forward here is that, if the researcher 
is using scales which are susceptible to analysis of this sort, it 
is passible that some of the subjective continua used by the 
respondent may systematically deviate from the metric being implicitly 
assumed by the researcher (see Figure 8.7). The relationship between 
such subjective continua and assumed metric will be monotonic, but 
the deviations may have implications for the method of analysis to be 
used and for the interpretation of the data. 
Respondent's subjective scale 
Low 
". 
' 
"'. " 
". 
High 
12345 
Scale assumed by researcher 
Figure 8.7 An illustration of the possible systematic deviation 
between the respondent's subjective scale and the 
researcher's assumed scale when the dimension is 
'prothetic'. 
Where scales are labelled antonymically (such as in the semantic 
differential) the mid-point may be the point of meaninglessness, 
in which case the scale could be 'cut' in the centre with each half 
being treated as a separate entity: the above conceptual analysis 
could then be applied. But, as will be shortly illustrated, many 
bipolar scales are likely to be more complex (I would argue so in 
respect of many semantic differential dimensions), involving cross- 
currents of meaning between the headlands of the verbal labels. In 
this choppy and confused sea it tray be difficult to resolve what is 
observed on the surface into its pattern of undercurrents. 
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8.3.4 Anchoring 
The typical rating scale in a repertory-grid is labelled at each end 
but not at any of the intermediate positions, and is thus similar to 
what Sherif and Hovland (1961) describe as a scale without a graded 
stimulus series. The point of the comparison is that Sherif and 
Hovland assert that such a scale 'is markedly influenced by internal 
anchors devised by the individual, if he judges alone... 
34 
. 
It 
would seem more likely that if anchoring does occur in grid dimensions, 
the anchor will lie within the dimension (or, at worst, be slightly 
outside it) - in contrast with some of the extremely distant anchors 
used in psychophysical research (for instance, in the judgment of 
weights). If this is the case, it follows that any distortion in 
rating is probably assimilative (i. e. towards the anchor) rather than 
contrastive (away from the anchor). 
Assuming the possibility of anchoring effects, what might serve as an 
anchor? Volkmann (1936) suggested that any psychophysical referent 
could be selected by the observer and used as an anchor, and Eriksen 
and Hake (1957) took a broader view in their suggestion that a person 
might select a few stimuli in the series being presented (in their 
case, colours) and use them as standards for judging the rest. 
Physical entities are relatively accessible as reference standards, 
but there is only the indirect evidence of inferences from observed 
outcomes to support the 'internalised standards' argument. With 
intangible elements, such as recollections of specific instances or 
people. the chain of inference is longer, and it is not surprising that 
little attention has been given to anchoring in such circumstancesi 
the quasi-physicalism dominant in psychology may have discouraged 
the use of other approaches to the problem. I do not have the space 
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here to explore all the possible avenues and concentrate on a brief 
consideration of the possible contribution of 'self' in grids dealing 
with people, and of the verbal labels themselves. Some other 
observations on the practice of rating will be found later in this 
chapter during the discussion of possible element x construct 
interaction. 
Landfield (1951) based a study of threat upon an early formulation of 
Personal Construct Theory and made use of rating scales (the repertory 
grid presumably not having been invented then) on which scale points 
were explicitly defined by people. Some scales were functionally 
dichotomous and some dimensional. The construct poles were 'fixed' 
by named people and, where the scale was dimensional, the mid-point 
was treated in a similar fashion. The anchoring seems to have been 
a matter of practical convenience rather than a reflection of a 
theoretical standpoint regarding rating methodology, and Landfield 
does not elaborate on the possible effects. 
Taking the more general issue of triadic elicitation in the context 
of rated grids related to people, the elements in a triad are aids to 
the identification of a scale, and hence can be hypothesised to exert 
an anchoring effect upon it. If such an effect exists, it is likely 
to be at its strongest when the grid is built up row by row and all of 
the elements axe rated on the construct in question before moving on 
to the next elicitation. 
The heterogeneity of the elements in TARGET grids makes the possibility 
of anchoring more difficult to assess. The 'self', 'most effective' 
and 'least effective' teachers are likely to be stronger anchors than 
the 'video-elements' 
- 
and all, some or none of the three personally 
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meaningful elements tray appear in the various triads. Anchoring 
here may be differentially powerful depending on the nature of the 
triad. 
More generally, if 'self' is an element but not in the triad being 
construed, there may be an identification of the 'self' with at least 
one of the triad - and this could lead to an implicit, almost ghostly, 
self-anchoring effect. 
A clue to the possible role of 'self' as an anchor is given by 
Leventhal's (1957) suggestion that similarity to the self might be a 
feature of judgmental behaviour's. Leventhal was only suggesting 
this of 'simple' judges, but if self-reference does occur in judgment 
there seems no good reason why it should not occur with the most 
'complex' of judges. In many grids 'self' appears as an element, 
implicitly creating an ambience in which self-reference could flourish 
36 
The ambience is strengthened when 'self' appears in each triad in 
order to make the elicited construct specifically meaningful to the 
respondent37: 'self' is therefore bound to be oppositionally related 
to at least one element in a triad, and it may be that all of the triad 
members (which have, after all, 'defined' the construct) act as anchors 
in their own right. 
Adams-Webber (1979) reviews a number of studies in which people have 
been assigned dichotomously to the poles of the 'like self - unlike 
self' dimension, and finds a consistent tendency for approximately 62 
per cent of the assignments to be made to the 'like self' pole8. He 
interprets this as showing some support for assimilations Benjafieid 
and Adams-Webber (1975) suggest that assimilative projection seems to 
underpin a number of grid indices where the dichotomous allocation of 
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elements is permitted to be lopsided. Thh situation may be more 
subtle, however, since respondents given a free choice may tend to 
select as elements those with whom they share a positive relationship 
and hence who are more likely to be 'like self' than 'unlike self's 
assimilative projection may well have taken place much earlier (at 
the stage of friendship formation, for instances Duck, 1973), and 
hence not necessarily have resulted from some form of anchoring in the 
grid. 
The situation is complicated still further where rating scales are 
being used in grids since the 'self' may be located at different 
positions on different scales, making it difficult to assess any 
influences on the underlying metric. Where the 'self' appears 
towards one end of a construct the respondent may add another, 
contrasting, anchor at the other end39 
- 
perhaps from the triad of 
elements used in the elicitation of the contrast: following Sherif 
and Hovland (1961) and Adams-Webber (1979), one might expect a 
measure of displacement of ratings towards the ends 
- 
perhaps 
particularly towards the presumably more salient 'self'. 
Isaacson and Landfield (1965) conducted a study which suggested that 
there might be a connection between self-reference and personal 
construing, though the data are not presented in a form suitable for 
a definite conclusion to be drawn. They gave 99 psychology under- 
graduates Kelly's Role Construct Repertory Test, eliciting 15 constructs. 
40 of the students returned for the subsequent task which was to rate, 
on a nine-point scale 'least... 
- 
most like me', 30 items constructed 
by splitting the individual's constructs and rewording them in a 
self-referential form (e. g. 'I am friendly') and 74 statements from 
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the Butler Haigh Q-sort procedure. A re-test of the rating procedure 
was administered three weeks later. The results from both occasions 
of rating showed a strong tendency for items derived from personal 
constructs to be rated 'most like me', whereas the ratings tended 
to be only moderately 'like me' for the Butler-Haigh statements. 
Although the exanple Kelly gives of his test only uses 'self' as an 
element three times in the triadic elicitation procedure41, it would 
seem distinctly possible that there would be a measure of self- 
reference in the elicitation of each construct, a construing of others 
with reference to the respondents own experience of the characteristics 
or behaviour associated with the elements. In Isaacson and Landfield's 
study such self-reference would have probably been more distanced in 
respect of the Butler Haigh statements, where there seems to have 
been little, if any, bias associated with casting the items in the 
form 'I am V. It is odd, however, to find that more than half of 
the respondents were able to place at least half of the 'split' 
personal constructs in the category 'most like iie', since one would 
expect 
- 
if construing is broadly speaking oppositional 
- 
only one of 
the poles would be very 'like me', and hence a maximum of roughly 
fifty per cent of the split constructs would be expected to fit this 
categor42 
. 
It is possible that 'self' may be identified with certain of the 
construct poles in the grid, investing them with a psychological 
charge. Evidence from resistance to change grids shows that construct 
poles tend to be valued differentially, and that on certain constructs 
respondents are very reluctant to switch to the opposite: in other 
words, it would appear that certain poles are highly ego-involving. 
If this is the case it is difficult to see how some sort of anchoring 
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could not take place for -the most important poles. Where the 
respondent indicates only a marginal preference it is unlikely that 
there would be sufficient ego-involvement for any significant 
anchoring to take place. 
Rosch and Lloyd (1978) take a broader view of anchoring when they 
suggest that category 'prototypes' may act as salient reference 
items in respect of the dimension of judgment3. Their suggestion 
is somewhat reminiscent of Landfield's (1951) explicit anchoring, but 
in this case the anchors are likely to be internal constructions. If 
category prototypes are constructed by the respondent in response to 
the presented scale labels it is likely that each construct in a grid 
will have different anchors and it will be difficult to tease out the 
effects involved. 
The whole issue of nachoring is clearly complex, and it is difficult 
to assess the extent to which it is likely to influence the ratings 
given in repertory grids. The literature on anchoring suggests that 
any assimilative or contrastive distortion will not cause the ratings 
(assuming sufficient scale points) to deviate from monotonicity with 
ratings given in the absence of an anchor (though this may be an 
unapproachable yardstick in the light of the possibility of the 
respondent 'inventing' his or her own anchor). 
8.3.5 Lexical marking 
Boucher and Osgood (1969) put forward the so-called 'Pollyanna. 
hypothesis' which encapsulates a supposed human tendency to use 
evaluatively positive (E+) words with greater frequency, diversity 
and facility than evaluatively negative (E-) words. Esser and 
Mower White (1973) set out to test the Pollyanna hypothesis by asking 
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60 children to allocate twenty nonsense words to the poles of twenty 
bipolar constructs, treating the nonsense words as if they were the 
names of people. The twenty constructs were formed by splitting 
antonymic pairs (similar to those used in semantic differential work) 
and negating each adjective with the prefix 'not'. Each child was 
thus presented with a set of 'X 
- 
not X' constructs in which the 'X' 
adjectives were E+ and E- to an equal extent. However, Eiser and 
Mower White found virtually no difference in the proportion of elements 
allocated to the E+ and E- poles. Adams-Webber (1978) replicated 
this study with 60 Canadian undergraduates and obtained similar results, 
supporting the suggestion that the Pollyanna hypothesis was inadequate. 
Adams-Webber (1978) also reanalysed the data gathered by User and 
Mower White and found that allocations to 'X' poles were markedly more 
frequent than to 'not X' poles, irrespective of whether 'X' was E+ 
or E-: the same pattern was found in his own results, and the 
relative proportions of 'X' to not V allocations in the two studies 
gave strong support to the golden section hypothesis44. But what 
Adams-Webber seems to have overlooked is the lexical significance 
of using 'X - not X' constructs in each study. The 'X' pole defines 
the dimension, and 'X-ness' decreases as a function of distance from 
the 'X' pole (a loose analogy can be made with the decrease in 
gravitational potential the greater the distance from a star). If 
'X' is more meaningful than 'not X', one would expect some measure of 
bias in that direction. 
The 'X' pole in an 'X 
- 
not X' construct is linguistically unmarked458 
that is, in a bipolar construct it serves to define the superordinate 
concept under consideration, whilst the marked pole is a negation of 
some sort which is not used in the naming of the superordinate. 
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Marking is not restricted to 'X - not X' constructs, but can apply 
to 'X 
- 
Y' constructs as well. If the dimension 'happy-sad' is taken 
as an example, the superordinate concept would normally be taken as 
'happiness' (with a range of values subsuming 'unhappiness' as well), 
'happy' being the unmarked pole and 'sad' being marked. Marking is 
often accomplished by a minor transformation of the unmarked term 
such that it remains evident in the marked form - for example, in 
'happy 
- 
unhappy'. The situation regarding 'X - Y' constructs is 
not as straightforward as that described above, for two reasons. 
First, if the 'X 
- 
Y' opposition is 'peculiar' (in Resnick and 
Landfield's, 1961, sense) it will be unclear what the position 
regarding marking will be, since a 'peculiar' construct may be formed 
from the union of two separate emergent poles both of which could be 
said to be unmarked. Second, it may be the case that the pole 
assumed on linguistic criteria to be marked may in practice be used 
as an unmarked pole: if the dimension is 'happy - sad' there is 
nothing to prevent a melancholic construing this in terms of sadness. 
Markedness, in practice, could be a function of the psychological 
constitution of the rater. That psychological constitution may 
influence marking is suggested by the work of Adams-Webber and 
Benjafield (1973), discussed below. 
Using twelve comparatively 'pure' bipolar scales from semantic 
differential research, Adams-Webber and Benjafield (1973) found a 
significantly greater tendency for respondents to rate people more 
extremely on the marked, rather than unmarked, poles when the 
construct poles wero presented separately. In only two of these 
constructs was the marking 'obvious' (involving a negative prefix)s 
'unfair' and 'unpleasant' being the marked poles. The authors also 
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found that the more preferred the construct 
, 
the greater the tendency 
to locate the elements dichotomously at the unmarked pole, though there 
were some occasions when the majority. of the acquaintances being 
construed were located at the marked pole. More extreme ratings1 
tended to be given in respect of the marked pole irrespective of the 
direction of asymmetry of the dichotomous assigning of elements. As 
far as rating extremity is concerned, Adams-Webber and Benjafield see 
asymmetry of element allocation as an individual parameter which seems 
to override the general linguistic norms of lexical marking. 
Adams-Webber and Benjafield found women to be inclined more often 
than men to assign acquaintances to the marked pole, though this 
occurred in a small minority of cases of the twelve constructs used. 
They were unable to suggest why this may have happened, but two 
possible explanations can be advanced 
- 
if only speculatively, since 
the authors do not give the details on which a convincing argument 
might be based. The first possible explanation derives from the 
nature of the twelve scales used, which were designed to sample the 
three major factors of the semantic differential 
- 
evaluation, potency 
and activity 
- 
and it is largely with respect to the quartet selected 
as representative of potency that the argument is advanced. These 
four dimensions were 'strong 
- 
weak', 'bold 
- 
timid', 'hard 
- 
soft' 
and 'rugged 
- 
delicate' and, given traditional cultural stereotyping, 
it would not be surprising to find women using at least some of the 
four supposedly marked poles in an unmarked way: I would hazard the 
guess that 'soft' and 'delicate' would be the most probable candidates 
in this respect. The guess has some support from Osgood et al (1957) 
themselves, since they noted that both 'rugged' and 'delicate, when 
used separately, appear to be evaluatively positive471 this suggests 
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that there might be two superordinate constructs present ('ruggedness' 
and delicateness') each with its own unmarked pole. 
The second possible explanation derives from the sampling of the 
elements. It is not made clear in the account given by Adams-Webber 
and Benjafield whether the twelve role titles selected from Kelly's 
Repertory Test were balanced for sex. If men tended to select men 
(and women tended to select women) to fit the role titles, then some 
differences in the allocation of elements might be expected, 
particularly if markedness is partially related to sex. Although no 
overall main effect was found for sex, the greater frequency with which 
women assigned elements to the marked pole (averaging 2.2, versus 1.3 
for men in respect of the twelve constructs used) was presented as 
statistically significant. 
The inference can be drawn from the work reported here that the 
relationship between lexical marking, evaluative valence and rating 
behaviour is more complex than is implied in the experiments cited. 
The suggestion is made that the sex of the respondent may be an 
influential factor in rating behaviour in respect of an indeterminate 
minority of bipolar constructs where sub-cultural norms could implicitly 
reverse the more generally-accepted marking. Further, the type of 
bipolar construct cannot easily be disregarded. In practical terms, 
'X 
- 
not X' constructs can be differentiated from 'X 
- 
Y' constructs 
on the ground of cognitive implications for rating behaviour, and 'X-Y' 
constructs themselves may be farther differentiated into three 
categories: antonymic pairs in which the marking is 'obvious', antany- 
mit pairs in which the marking is not immediately 'obvious', and 
'peculiar' constructs in which lexical marking is problematic. The 
distinctions are summarised in Figure 8.8. 
278 
RELATIONSHIP TYPE OF CONSTRUCT EXAMPLE 
STRICT NEGATION X- not X happy 
- 
not happy 
NEGATION NEGATION BY 
MODIFICATION OF 
UNMARKED POLE X-Y happy 
- 
unhappy 
'LOGICAL' OPPOSITION I-Y happy 
- 
gaß 
OPPOSITION 
'PECULIAR' OPPOSITION x-Y happy 
- 
businesslike 
Figure 8.8 Types of construct and lexical marking. The underlined 
poles would normally be considered to be lexically 
marked. The marking of 'happy-businesslike' is 
problematic. 
So far research in this area has concentrated upon 'simple' bipolar 
constructs of the semantic differential type. Multiple opposition 
has not been given any attention, and the fact that elicited constructs 
(often, but not always, adjectival in character) can be expressed in 
comparatively complex phrases48 makes the possible influence of lexical 
marking very difficult - perhaps impossible - to assess: consider, for 
example, the construct 'pupils being active with the teacher looking 
on 
- 
teacher being active with the pupils looking on', which is drawn 
from my work with the science teachers. 
Research has been sparse to date regarding lexical marking in repertory 
grids, although linguistic theorists have given the issue rather more 
attention , There would seem to be a need for a further exploration 
9 
of the practical aspects of marking, setting it clearly within a 
perspective of linguistic theory. As far as current repertory grid 
practice is concerned, probably all that can be suggested at this stage 
is that the researcher look very carefully, in the light of the points 
made in the preceding discussion, at the verbal labels being used 
(whether supplied or elicited) with a view to gaining some insights into 
the grid responses that are made. 
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8.3.6 The complexity of meaning 
- 
One of Kelly's assumptions regarding the elicitation of constructs is 
that the respondent does not shift ground between the labelling of the 
oppositional poles 
- 
in other words, the verbalisations do not reflect 
the emergent poles of two different constructs5O. The rating form of 
the repertory grid presses this assumption further in that it assumes 
the invariance and approximate linearity of the dimensions that comprise 
it. The range of meanings possible in respect of the mid-point (see 
page 296 below) casts some doubt on the tenability of these extended 
assumptions, a doubt which increases the further the construct is from 
the realm of the physical or quasi-physical (such as the physicalist 
criteria for judging the similarity of cars: Green and Carmone, 1969). 
The question of' the complexity of construct poles was raised in 
Chapter 7 during an initial discussion of Jane's grid (Shaw, 1980a), 
and it was argued then that it was highly unlikely that a meaningful 
dichotomous allocation of acquaintances could have been made to the 
construct poles, given the concatenation of meanings ascribed to each. 
The conversion of Jane's dichotomous grid to a rated grid would not 
have eliminated the problem because she would have been faced with the 
problem of striking a balance between the various attributes listed 
for both construct poles in order to provide a series of scale ratings. 
It is likely that 
-a separate balance would have been necessary for each 
acquaintance being construed, implying the possibility of element and 
construct interaction (the theme of the following subsection). 
But even if it were possible for Jane to identify, say, fixed meanings 
for five different scale positions (relating to specific complexes of 
verbal labels), it is doubtful whether such a scale would approximate 
a smooth continuum of meaning. And even if the 'espoused' scale were 
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linear, the 'scale in use' would seem in practice to be influenced by 
the differential salience of the attributes listed for each individual* 
the gradation would be rendered unstable by the establishment of a 
series of new meaning-complexes, a number of which could, for 
example, plausibly be rated at 2 on a five-point scale, but for very 
different reasons. 
Rated grids typically employ bipolar labels assumed to define a linear 
scale between them, but the assumption of scale in them has hitherto 
been left untested. The argument presented in respect of Jane's 
grid (which is a particularly obvious example of construct complexity) 
can probably be advanced in respect of many scales in that they are 
likely to subsume unarticulated, idiosyncratic meaning-complexes even 
though they may be stated in apparently simple terms. 
As part of a study into the metrics possible with construct dimensions 
(discussed below,, page 284f) some evidence was collected regarding the 
meaning that a number of respondents gave to supplied construct poles 
and to the mid-points of the dimensions being considered. The 
findings suggest that the meanings given to dimensions do not 
necessarily fall into the steady gradation assumed in much psychometric 
scaling. Examples of non-linearity included those presented in 
Figure 8.9, in which the supplied labels are presented in capitals 
and the respondents' elaborations in lower case. 
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RESPONDENT LEFT-HAND POLE MID-POINT RIGHT-HAND POLE 
No. 40 OVERCONFIDENT LAC1 NG IN CONFIDENCE 
Physics Unthoughtful Normal Thoughtful and 
PGCE and lacking in Able to considerate 
judgment but communicate Knowledjable but 
Aggressive and but Not Introvert 
Possessing a boorish Cood integrity 
reserve of but shy 
relevant skills 
No. 14. LOGICAL INTUITIVE 
English 
.... 
accepts Accepts some 
.... 
has an inherent 
History nothing that things on understanding of the 
PGCE cannot be face value subject and is 
supported by but is not sensitive enough to 
palpable afraid to appreciate ideas. 
evidence and stand by 
has the ability instinctive 
to structure judgment on 
his own thought occassions 
and draw own 
conclusions 
No. 18 CONSCIENTIOUS NOT CONSCIENTIOUS 
English 
... 
who attended 
... 
who took Careless. 
PGCE school regular- an average didn't hand In home- 
ly, handed interest in work* played truant. 
homework in on school work. 
time, took care If continual- 
over books and ly chased, he 
work. would hand in 
homework etc. 
Figure 8.9 EScamples of the elaboration of supplied constructs, 
showing their multidimensionality. 
The multidimensionality of meaning evidenced in Figure 8.9 in respeCt 
of supplied verbal labels was similarly apparent with elicited 
constructs when, in pilot work, a small group of M. Ed. students were 
asked to construe (using the triadic method) six acquaintances and to 
indicate what their own verbal labels meant to them. Two examples 
are shown inFigure 8.10: in this pilot work no attempt was made to 
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collect any background information about the respondents. 
LEE'T HAND POLE MID-POINT RIGHT HAND POLE 
STRONG MINDED TINDER MINDED 
Always takes a Will listen to other Always willing to take 
positive stand even points of view. other person's point 
if he is wrong: Always willing to of view 
Loves argument help people in need Does not like active 
Have strong Right or Weighs the evidence positive approach 
Left wing views and then decides Loves the underdog. 
Always willing to 
get involved 
INTRAVERT EXTRAVERT 
... 
prefer own 
... 
enjoys the Lively, interesting, 
company, never take company of others outstanding in terms lead, remain in but has no desire to of dress, conversation, background, wear be a leader, voice pitch, often 
acceptable clothes- 
... 
will join in initiating group 
never stand out. group activity but activity and leading Colourless also indulges in discussions, enjoys 
conversation if at activities alone, the company of others. 
all. 
... 
sometimes "People who wear odd 
motivates others to socks deliberately". 
do things, rarely 
draws attention to 
themselves by dress, 
voice pitch, actions. 
Figure 8.10 Examples of the elaboration of elicited constructs, 
showing their multidimensionality. 
Many other examples of meaning-complexes were produced by the 
respondents in elaboration of both elicited and supplied constructs, 
though some respondents were content to provide a synonym or 
synonymous phrase. Some of the meaning-complexes were more easy to 
see in terms of a rough grading scale than others. In Figure 8.9, 
for example, there appears to be a coalescence of three dimensions 
reflecting care, attendance at school and the completion of homework 
under the broad concept of conscientiousness as far as Respondent No. 18 
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is concerned. On the other hand, Respondent No. 40 elaborated 
'overconfident-lacking in confidence' in such a way that any 
subordinate dimensions were fairly well obscured. 
The evidence presented here suggests that constructs may well be far 
more complex than might be supposed from a simple inspection of the 
verbal labels. 
Construing the respondents' construing of the supplied or elicited 
verbal labels (shades of Romanoff and Juliet here51) leads me to 
doubt whether scales reflecting meaning-complexes such as those given 
in the examples can be meaningfully used in a graded manner52 in 
fact, it would not seem improbable that, as the verbal labels are 
used in practice, the respondent would flick from one to another of 
the meanings (or groups of meanings) subsumed under the verbalised 
label. Care must be taken not to claim too much for this argument, 
however, since it is by no means certain that an 'unprompted' 
respondent would elaborate the verbal labels in the same way or to 
the same extent. All that is shown here is that the potential for 
so doing must exist, since the respondents were able to produce their 
elaborations freely. 
8.3.7 Rating scales: a multiplex of metrics? 
Elicited scales 
- 
and, to judge from the literature, a number of 
provided scales 
- 
in repertory grids seem to be hurriedly constructed. 
Many grids contain mixtures of some or all of the following: 'logical' 
and 'peculiar' scales, dichotomies and continua, unipolar and bipolar 
scales, and some scales whose underlying metrics would appear to defy 
simple description. The implications of this state of affairs for 
analysis and interpretation are far-reaching, and it is necessary to 
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examine the problem of typal variation in constructs a little further 
in order to see whether it might offer a serious threat to the validity 
of grid methodology. 
An empirical investigation (fully reported in Appendix 4) of the 
potential variation in construct type suggests that the problem may 
be substantial. Fifty-one students in teacher education were each 
presented with seven bipolar constructs previously elicited from a 
class of in-service teachers. They were asked to write down what 
they would mean in using each pole and mid-point, assuming they were 
rating pupils on these dimensions. Having given their meanings, they 
were asked to select, for each construct, the most appropriate from 
eight diagrams designed to represent different ways in which a 
construct might be used in practice (see Figure 8.11) 
- 
or to supply 
their own diagram. For those unhappy with diagrammatic presentation, 
a verbal explanation was also provided. In the event, only five out 
of 351 responses were the students' on diagrams. 
In this investigation the problem of the size of the 'time-slice' was 
ignored. Models 1 to 7 (Figure 8.11) all indicate ways in which 
attributes may be construed in terms of gradations, but this conceals 
a potentially serious confounding of the frequency and the strength 
with which a particular attribute is exhibited. Thus, referring to 
the dimension 'kind-cruel', would the mid-point of the scale imply 
'neither particularly kind nor particularly cruel' being maintained 
consistently; flickering between kind and cruel actions (but these 
roughly balancing each other over a period); or the exhibition of 
kindness to some and cruelty to others 
- 
say, in a classroom 
- 
in a 
very short period? Rating scales in themselves cannot resolve such 
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issues: the implications of the question are discussed later in 
Section 8.4. 
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Figure 8.11 The eight diagrammatic representations of construct 
use presented to the 51 students. In the diagrams 
P and Q refer to the particular dimension being 
considered: thus, if the dimension being considered 
were 'Logical---Intuitive', P would refer to 'Logical' 
and Q to 'Intuitive'. The full version of this Figure 
is given in Appendix 4. 
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CONSTRUCT 1 
FRDZUENCY OF CHOICE OF DIAGRAM 
2345678 Own TOTAL. 
Logical---Intuitive 2 2 19 13 0 5 4 2 3 50 
Extrovert---Introvert 4 9 19 5 5 6 0 2 0 50 
Trustworthy---Untrustworthy 6 15 11 3 3 7 0 8 0 53 
Overconfident---Lacking in 
confidence 5 10 20 5 6 0 0 2 2 50 
Inarticulate---Articulate 19 3 14 3 2 6 0 2 0 49 
Thinks in concrete terms--- 
Thinks in abstract terms 3 0 13 14 0 6 10 2 0 48 
Conscientious---Not conscientious 7 13 15 4 1 6 1 4 0 51 
Figure 8.12 Frequency of choice of diagram from Figure 8.11 
for each of seven constructs. Underlining 
indicates a frequency greater than would be 
expected on average. 
Notes The totals for the rows vary because of 
incomplete response. Where the total exceeds 
51 two students each chose two diagrams as 
appropriate to the construct. 
The main findings are summarised in Figure 8.12, and reveal no massive 
consensus regarding the most appropriate model for any of the seven 
constructs. While one might expect a measure of 'error variance' in 
the performance of what is an unusual and complex task, the results 
suggest that there was a tendency for more than one model to attract 
more choices than would be expected on an assumption of randomness 
- 
in fact, the distribution of choices on each construct was significant- 
ly different from random (all p values less than 0.001; one sample 
chi-square test). 
The most immediately striking feature of Figure 8.12 is that each of 
the seven constructs attracted the choice of Model 3 more frequently 
than would be expected on average, though the proportion of choices 
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for this model in no case exceeded 110 per cent. It is perhaps worth 
recording that the overall mean proportion of choices of Model 3 was 
32 per cent, but this cannot be used as a basis for comparisons with 
the other models since to do so would overlook the effects of the 
heterogeneity of the particular constructs being considered. 
The choice of Model 3 suggests that both poles of each construct are 
being treated as representative of attributes meaningful in their own 
right, even though three of the constructs ('trustworthy-untrustworthy' 
'inarticulate-articulate', and 'conscientious-not conscientious') are 
explicit negations. In terms of linguistics, though 'untrustworthy', 
'inarticulate' and 'not conscientious' are lexically marked terms 
(which should logically derive their meanings through negation of the 
corresponding unmarked terms), it would appear that 
- 
for some 
individuals at least 
- 
each marked term may exist within its own 
meaning-complex (possibly of unmarked terms). 
Model 3 implies complementariness: as the degree of membership of 
one pole declines, so the degree of membership of the other increases. 
It may be that the comparative popularity of this model is drle to the 
potential it offers for 'averaging out' attributes inferred from 
behaviour over an indeterminate 'time-slice'. For example, if I am 
construed as inarticulate in committees and as articulate in the 
lecture theatre, Model 3 would allow the rater the options of rating 
me at 2,3 or 4 (weighting my in/articulateness as appropriate) on 
the dimension concerned. 
Model 3 also seems to be comparatively attractive where the mid-point 
of the dimension can be construed to be the most positively-valenced 
point. The mid-points of both 'extrovert-introvert' and 'overconfident- 
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lacking in confidence' were noted by some respondents as being 
connected with a notion of 'normality', and Model 3 catches the sense 
of the ideal person as 'a bit of both' better than any of the other 
models presented. It can further be argued that an ideally balanced 
person would be roughly equally logical and intuitive: the task then 
is to decide whether this is a complementary, substitutive matter 
(implying Model 3- which received 19 choices) or an additive matter 
(implying Model 4- 13 choices). It is a weakness of bipolar rating 
scales that they are insensitive to such differences. 
There would probably be a wide measure of agreement that 'extrovert- 
introvert' is a good example of the 'logical' opposition typical of 
semantic differential scales. If, as Osgood et al (1957) suggest, 
the mid-point of such scales reflects mmaninglessness (disregarding 
their instruction to rate at the mid-point when both poles apply to 
a concept), it would be expected that Model 5- or perhaps Model 6- 
would be chosen fairly frequently. However, for the dimension 
'extrovert-introvert', both of these models were chosen less frequently 
than average. Whilst it seems reasonable that a person construed to 
be at the mid-point of this scale would be 'a bit of both' in respect 
of the two poles (rather than 'neither', which does seem meaningless 
here), the evidence leads tae to wonder whether the assumption of polar 
mutual exclusivity which underpins the semantic differential is dubious 
- 
at least, as far as actual rating behaviour is concerned. 
Model 8 (the simple dichotomy) represents the principle of mutual 
exclusivity in its strongest form, while Models 5 and 6 retain mutual 
exclusivity but do allow gradation of membership of each pole. It is 
not surprising to find a number of respondents opting for Model 8 in 
respect of 'trustworthy-untrustworthy': a person simply is or is not 
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trustworthy in some eyes. The choice of Model 6 is interesting, 
perhaps indicating a recognition that there are shades of grey 
regarding trustworthiness and at the same time a realisation of the 
difficulty of placing a sensible interpretation on the mid-point of 
what is fundamentally a dichotomy. The more general choice of Model 
6 may reflect the vagueness with which mid-points often seem to be 
associated (see page 293f). 
It is interesting to find Model 2 being chosen with a frequency above 
average for both 'extrovert-introvert' and 'overconfident-lacking in 
confidence'. This suggests that respondents may construe some 
personality dimensions in terms of the more 'outgoing' pole, rather 
than in terms of the complementariness of the two poles: if so, the 
more 'outgoing' pole is acting as an unmarked pole (though both poles 
may be negatively valenced) and the lexical marking introduces a 
subtle semantic asymmetry to the dimensions concerned. As would be 
expected from the criterion of lexical marking, a substantial number 
of choices were given to Model 2 in respect of 'trustworthy-untrust- 
worthy' and 'conscientious-not conscientious', and to Model 1 in 
respect of 'inarticulate-articulate'. One would not, at first sight, 
expect Model 1 to be chosen in respect of 'trustworthy-untrustworthy' 
and 'conscientious-not conscientious' since this appears to imply an 
inversion of the lexical marking of the scale. But if the rater uses 
the positively-valenced term as a starting-point (perhaps as a gestalt 
'ground') for rating, it is possible for a negatively-valenced attribute 
to stand out (as figure) increasingly with its distance from the 
contrasting pole. As has beer noted, there is some evidence to 
support this view3 which has a grounding in information theory. 
It must be emphasised that I have not addressed the problem of actually 
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giving ratings to elements on the seven constructs provided. The 
study discussed above was not designed to investigate actual rating 
behaviour, but it is possible to make some tentative points in this 
respect. If the preceding discussion is valid, it is clear that 
there are a number of possible influences on the rater such as lexical 
marking, valence and semantics of the polar labels. I would hazard 
the opinion that, for the majority of the models concerned, the 
ordering of the elements on the constructs would be at most slightly 
affected by such influences, which might be anticipated to distort 
the subjective judgment metrics systematically in relation to the 
implicit equal-interval scale defined by the categories of rating. 
In other words, it would seem preferable-to use ordinal rather than 
interval statistics in the analysis of the numerical data, though to 
do so might still be to assume too much in respect of more 'peculiar' 
dimensions. This would cause some difficulty for the researcher 
interested in the element similarity matrix (see page äß$f). Apart 
from Bannister's consistency score, the most widely-known methods of 
analysis make use of the interval assumption, on which the bulk of the 
discussion in Chapter 9 is necessarily founded. Goodge (1979) also 
advocates ordinal statistics, but his method of cluster analysis is 
not entirely clear from his article. 
It is with constructs exemplified by Model 7 that the greatest 
difficulties may be found in respect of both rating and analysis. 
These difficulties can be highlighted by considering the construct 
'thinks in concrete terms 
- 
thinks in abstract terms', for which three 
models received more choices than would be expected on average. 
The most frequently chosen model (No. 4; 14 choices) allows both 
attributes to be maximally present together at the mid-point, in 
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contrast with the third most frequently chosen model (No. 7; 10 choices) 
in which this happens at the right hand pole. Given the sample of 
respondents, it is perhaps surprising that this model did not recieve 
more choices, since it is built upon assumptions consonant with 
Piagetian developmental psychology. Model 3 (chosen by 13 respondents) 
implies that concrete or abstract thinking are two distinct abilities; 
the more one is concrete, the less one is abstract, and vice versa. 
Consider for a moment these three models being applied to a group of 
children, and suppose that some of these children are capable of 
formal operational (abstract) thought. Model 4 would probably place 
such children at the mid-point unless there was no observable evidence 
of concrete thinking, in which case the right hand pole might be 
preferred. Model 3 might be used in a roughly similar way. But 
Model 7 assumes a platform of concrete thinking and only takes account 
of the abstract thinking evidenced in behaviour: the most highly 
abstract thinkers would be rated 5 at the right hand pole. It is 
therefore possible for raters to produce different orderings of pupils 
along the dimension according to the way in which the scale is used. 
The relationship between ordinality and semantics is not necessarily 
simple. 
The argument presented above bears out Gaines and Shaw (1981) in their 
claim that membership of construct poles is not necessarily determinable 
on the basis of mutual exclusion53. It also suggests that the ways 
in which people actually use scales may not be those dictated by the 
rigour of logical and mathematical thinking. Further, the empirical 
evidence gives reason to suspect that the method of use may vary with 
the scale and/or be a function of personal cognitive style. 
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It is important to stress that this investigation does not prove that 
people actually use scales in ways such as those presented here, 
- 
it 
only suggests what might be the case. A different type of study would 
be needed to explore the ways in which scales are used in practice. 
For example, a number of logically antonymic contrasts might be 
elicited from respondents in the context of 'person-perception', and 
the respondents could then be asked to rate the elements whilst 'talking 
through' the reasons for the ratings. A content analysis of the 
transcripts of the procedure would provide some evidence as to whether 
the construct is or is not being used in scalar fashion 
- 
though it 
has to be acknowledged that, at root, any grounding hypothesis would be 
metaphysical and not open to rigorous empirical test. 
8.3.8 The 'mid-point problem' 
The empirical work described in the preceding section draws attention 
towards the meaning of the mid-point of a bipolar rating scale. As 
part of that study, the 51 respondents were asked to indicate (having 
provided their on meanings) which of the two poles and mid-point of 
each of the seven constructs listed in Figure 8.12 were clearest, and 
which the vaguest, in their minds. More than one position on each 
construct could be assigned to either category of clarity. The 
results are shown in Figure 8.13. 
NUMBER OF OCCASIONS WHEN SEEN AS 
RATING CLEAREST VAGUEST 
1 233 62 
3 71 217 
5 194 80 
Figure 8.13 Clarity and vagueness of ratings 1,3, and 5 of seven 
constructs treated as five-point rating scales. 
(The seven constructs are those listed in Figure 8.12) 
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On the whole, the poles tended to be placed in the 'clearest' category 
and the mid-point in the 'vaguest' category, and this tendency applied 
for all of the seven constructs used. Where the tendency was weakest 
was where the mid-point could be (and was explicitly noted by some as 
being) associated with some notion of 'normality'. This obtained 
for the two constructs 'extrovert-introvert' and 'overconfident-lacking 
in confidence'. 
The evidence presented here dismisses the assumption often made (as 
in the semantic differential) that the mid-point is necessarily devoid 
of meaning. Keen (1979) did not go quite so far in his work with 
repertory grids, but his weaker assumption that the mid-point (the 
'origin' in his terms) represents the 'point of total uncertainty's 
is similarly called in question. 
It is readily conceded that for functionally antonymic constructs the 
mid-point may be a haven for total uncertainty. Given the limits 
enforced by bipolarity, it could also represent a balance between 
oppositional attributes: half the time a person may be manifestly 
'happy', and half the time 'sad'. It is doubtful whether either 
interpretation can be made so strong as to claim meaninglessness for 
the mid-point. But many constructs may have very meaningful mid-points 
take, for instance, the commonsense construing of 'extrovert-introvert'. 
Extremes of both extroversion and introversion are likely to have a 
negative valence, and 'normality' 
- 
however difficult to specify 
- 
would be represented at or near the mid-point: the respondent can 
presumably recognise a 'normal' person when he or she sees one. It 
would seem likely that any construct of the general form 'hypo X- 
hyper X' could be discussed in similar terms, even though the implied 
valence may be well concealed, such as in 'loquacious-taciturn'. 
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The point can be pressed a little further by drawing upon a physicalist 
parallel. Consider the dimension 'oblate... 
- 
prolate spheroid'. 
There are degrees of oblateness and prolateness, as is shown 1n_ 
Figure 8.14, and the mid-point is defined with the utmost precision 
as a sphere. 
Oblate Prolate 
Figure 8.14 The 'oblate... 
- 
prolate spheroid' dimension. 
Finally, when a scale represents a gradation of a property from low 
to high ('strength', for example), the mid-point represents some 
notion of a medium, or moderate amount of the property. 
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that a repertory grid can 
include a variety of scales and that no blanket conclusion can be 
drawn about the meaning of the mid-point. Each construct has to be 
treated on its own merits, and the researcher may have to enquire 
during the elicitation of the grid matrix the way(s) in which the 
respondent is using each scale. 
As was mentioned a few paragraphs ago, the constraint of bipolarity 
forces a variety of meanings into the mid-point category on a rating 
scale, Shaw (1980a)is one of the few writers who have addressed this 
issue, but makes the mistake of confounding the problem of the 
meaning(s) of the mid-point with that of 'bent' or 'peculiar' 
constructs55. In using rated grids researchers have very frequently 
offered the mid-point of the scale as a 'dustbin' for a range of 
responses that would have otherwise been difficult to locate: this 
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may not have been unconnected with the problems which 'missing' data 
pose for the statistical analysis of grids. Writing of survey 
research, Galtung (1969) criticised the practice of lumping together 
a variety of responses at the mid-point of a scale, arguing that to 
do so failed to differentiate between meanings such as 'don't know', 
'not applicable', 'not certain', and 'neutral' 
56 
. 
More recently 
Gaines and Shaw (1981) have looked at the problem from the point of 
view of logic and point out that to allow the mid-point to subsume a 
variety of meanings is to assign a single truth value in respect of a 
range of different circumstances'. 
There seem to be many possible ways in which the mid-point can be 
used. The list given in Figure 8.15 is not claimed to be exhaustive, 
nor is it intended to imply that the various possibilities suggested 
are either equi-probable or of equal importance: the letters symbolise 
an element E being located at the mid-point of a bipolar construct X-Y. 
1. E is neither X nor Y. 
2. E is half X and half Y. 
3. E is equiproportionately X and Y 
4. E is wholly X and wholly Y simultaneously. 
5. Half of E is entirely X and half of E is entirely Y. 6. Half of the time E is entirely X and half of the time 
E is entirely Y (i. e. E 'flickers' between X and Y) 
7. E is Z where Z is 'sort of' half-way between X and Y. 
8. E is sometimes X, sometimes Y and sometimes neither. 
9. E is sometimes X, sometimes Y and sometimes both. 
10. E is sometimes X, sometimes Y, sometimes neither and 
sometimes both. 
11. E's position on the construct X-Y is uncertain. 
12. E's position on the construct X-Y is unknown. 
13. X-Y is irrelevant to the construing of E. 
14. It is not wished to construe E in terms of X-Y. 
15. The respondent does not care about the location of 
E on X-Y. 
Figure 8.15 Fifteen ways of construing the location of element 
E at the mid-point of the dimension X-Y. 
Provided that more than one of these ways of using the mid-point stands 
up to scrutiny, there is a problem for the personal construct theorist. 
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To allow the mid-point to be a portmanteau of possibilities is to 
limit the capacity of the researcher to receive the information which 
the respondent is willing to provide 
- 
and this must surely be counter 
to the philosophy underlying Personal Construct Theory. Further, the 
possibilities made manifest in Figure 8.15 give a clear indication 
that different types of dimension, though superficially similar, are 
based on very different psychological assumptive structures. 
8.3.9 Element x construct interaction 
Throughout this and the preceding chapter there has been a ground- 
swell setting in the direction of a possible element x construct 
interaction analogous to the concept x scale interaction detected in 
a number of studies involving the semantic differential. A rp iori, 
there would seem to be good grounds for expecting such an interaction. 
Most elements are complex (whether they be people or situations), and 
the possibility of constructs subsuming meaning-complexes (rather than 
existing as unique, isolable and scalable attributes) was discussed 
earlier58. 
Verbally-labelled constructs reflect discriminations made between 
elements, and the range of constructs elicited reflects the range of 
different features of the elements involved. If cardboard packing- 
cases are to be construed, it is likely that constructs would cover 
aspects such as the toughness and thickness of the cardboard, the 
strength of the staples holding the case together, the size and shape 
of the case and the printing on the surface. In all but the last of 
these it could be expected that there would be a fair measure of 
consistency in the use of constructs, since they reflect physical 
attributes regarding which people are likely to have at least an 
intuitive and reasonably replicable subjective measuring scale. 
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It is when the notion of scale is less certain, such as when judging 
the aesthetic quality of the printing, that matters become more 
difficult. As elements become more complex, judgments become more 
difficult and the attention of respondents may flicker to different 
parts of the stimuli in turn, as Hollingworth (1913) found to be the 
experience of his judges of handwriting59. 
Even relatively simple 'complex' stimuli have been shown to be salient 
to respondents in respect of their component parts rather than their 
wholeness (cf Underwood et al, 1962)60. As far as repertory grid 
work is concerned, attention has already been drawn to the observations 
of Mair's (1967) respondents that the people they were called on to 
judge were complex, and Mair suggested that variation in attention to 
the elements might have been a contributory factor in his finding of 
a weaker bipolarity in constructs than might have been expected, though 
the possibility of variation due to construct complexity may also have 
been involved61. In contrast to Mair's findings, Duck's (1973) 
respondents felt that they needed a range of contrasts to a particular 
similarity when construing a number of acquaintances, implying the 
need for a different construct for each element even if one pole was 
nominally constant. Duck suggests that some parts of construct 
systems are relatively specialised and have specific relevance to 
only one or two of the elements being construed62. 
The evidence in favour of the argument for an element x construct 
interaction is scanty since what one might loosely call the 
phenomenology of rating has attracted little attention. What empirical 
support exists for the argument has to be drawn from the work which 
shows a consistent concept x scale interaction in the semantic 
differential. It is tempting to translate this effect directly into 
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the context of the repertory grid, but to do this would be to fail 
to take into account the contribution to scale x concept interaction 
of attempts to construe stimuli on inappropriate dimensions63. Some 
inferences can be drawn from the field of personality research and, 
within that field, the few repertory grid studies in which the problem 
seems to have surfaced. 
Features of elements that might contribute to an element x construct 
interaction include complexity, familiarity and affectivity, all of 
which overlap to some extent. The argument that elements are often 
complex was presented in Chapter 5 
64 
and a couple of paragraphs ago 
(when reference was made to Mair's (1967) findings), and will not be 
repeated here. 
That familiarity of people interacts with trait-perception is suggested 
by the work of Koltuv (1962) who found that familiarity and personal 
relevance of 'social objects' appeared to influence the inter- 
correlations between traits. Construing her findings from the 
perspectives of a possible element x construct interaction leads me to 
speculate that, if construct intercorrelations are 'disturbed' by 
familiar elements (to keep to the grid lexicon), then it might be the 
case that the constructs are being used in a different way when such 
elements are being considered65. In the light of the argument 
presented earlier, it could be that familiar elements are construed 
with reference to one or more specific incidents belonging to the 
construer's experience whereas less familiar elements may be related 
to less well-remembered incidents or to a more generalised framework 
derived from semantic memory. The construct label used would be the 
same in each case, the meaning qualitatively different. 
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The affective 'loading' of a person is likely to be related to 
familiarity. Mueller (1974) selected 64 students on the basis of high 
or low cognitive complexity as judged from scores on the Bieri test 
(Bieri et al, 1966). Two sets of role titles, differing in affective 
loading, were presented to the students who were asked to 'supply' 
appropriate people as elements. There were two tasks, which in brief 
were: to provide similarity judgments relating to the elements and 
to rate the elements on twenty supplied construdts presented as 
semantic differential scales. Mueller's results showed that 
affectivity appeared to influence the judgments made on both tasks, 
the effect being greater for those students identified as 'cognitively 
simple' 
. 
Mueller deliberately built the dimension of affect into his lists of 
role titles: in other words the construct 'like-dislike' suffuses 
the elements selected. Collett (1979) makes the more general point 
that, where role titles imply constructs, the salience of those 
constructs attaches to the elements involved. The question here is 
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whether this leads to an element x construct interaction when elements 
of differential affectivity are being construed in other ways, or 
whether a construct x construct interaction is taking place. This 
last point is taken up in the following subsection. 
8.3.10 Construct x construct interaction 
At first sight Mueller's (1974) work points towards the notion of 
element x construct interaction but examination of the nature of the 
elements reveals the 'like-dislike' dimension clearly, and his findings 
implicitly relate to the interaction of this dimension with the others 
which he used. In his article Mueller does not give the construct 
labels, but if they were person-oriented constructs elicited from pilot 
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work with University students it seems reasonable to assume that they 
would have shown a number of substantial intercorrelations with 'like- 
dislike' had that construct been administered in the same semantic 
differential format. The question at issue is not the existence of 
such intercorrelations, but whether the intercorrelations are 
distorted as a result of the respondent's construing on one dimension 
being affected by construing in respect of others. Or, put another 
way, do constructs which are 'naturally' positively correlated interact 
to produce a spuriously inflated degree of association? 
Tajfel's (1957) accentuation theory proposes an interaction effect 
between dimensions of judgment which Eiser and Strobe classify 
into focal and peripheral dimensions 
67. 
Translated into the Kellian 
lexicon, this theory suggests that if elements vary concurrently along 
two or more dimensions (i. e. intercorrelate), discrimination along 
the focal dimension should increase. The theory rests on the 
assumption that where correlation exists 'peripheral' cues are 
available to assist discrimination on the focal dimension. Thus 
judgments of the lengths of lines could be expected to be aided by 
drawing the lines in different colours in such a way that colour is 
correlated with length. Esser and Ströbe (1972) remark that any 
accentuation effect will depend upon the relative discriminability 
along the dimensions involved. Where discriminability along the 
peripheral dimension in so low as to be insignificant, accentuation 
of judgment on the focal dimension will not occur; and when 
discriminability on the focal dimension is low, peripheral cues will 
be unable to assist: in other words, there has to be a subjectively 
perceptible intercorrelation for accentuation to occur 
680 
Tajfel and Wilkes (1963) tested the accentuation theory in an experiment 
301 
which required respondents to judge line lengths. Eight lines, varying 
successively in length by five per cent, were presented on cards. Three 
conditions were established: (i) a superimposed classification in which 
the four shortest lines were labelled A and the four longest B= (ii) a 
random allocation of labels A and B; and (iii) no superimposed labelling 
whatever. Tajfel and Wilkes found a large increase in estimate of line 
length in condition (i) when respondents moved from class A to class B, 
but not in either of the other two conditions. The importance of 
peripheral cues was suggested in a further experiment by Tajfel et al 
(1964) in which two Canadians and two Indians were interviewed for eight 
minutes regarding books or films they liked. The authors found that, 
when the audience was asked to rate the interviewees on a series of 
bipolar constructs, the Canadians and Indians were construed in terms of 
established cultural stereotypes rather than in terms of intra-class 
differences. Whilst they admit that the interviewees might actually 
have been like the stereotypes, Tajfel et al suggest that the 'peripheral' 
cues relating to inter-class differences had overridden the 'focal' 
intra-class differences 
- 
but here 'focal' and 'peripheral' would seem 
to be referring to the researchers' view of the problem, and not 
necessarily to that of the respondents. 
It would appear that some aspects of stereotyping might be subsumed 
under accentuation theory. W Mischel (1973) suggests that in daily life 
people construe each other as being highly consistent even though the 
fragments of behaviour which give rise to the construing are 
inconsistent 69: differentiation may be overridden by the cognitively more 
simple act of focusing upon such similarities as present themselves, and 
perhaps upon the assimilation to 'prototypes'. 
What, then, are the implications of accentuation theory for the 
repertory grid? First, it is possible that a respondent could become 
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'locked' into a meaning-complex when constructs are being elicited. 
That is, the respondent might produce a construct such as 'active- 
passive' during elicitation, continuing in subsequent sorts to 
produce constructs related to 'active-passive' and perhaps derived 
from the meaning-complex of which that construct forms a part. This 
would be a kind of accentuation during the elicitation of constructs 
(connecting with the problem of sampling adequacy discussed in Chapter 
6) which does not fall under Tajfel's original formulation: it might 
be termed 'semantic accentuation' in contrast to Tajfel's theory which 
deals with judgmental accentuation. Semantic accentuation could be 
expected to produce highly associated constructs in the grid, and 
these could lead the researcher to interpret the analysis as showing 
the construct system to be dominated by one (or more) factors without 
realising that the dominance may merely be an artefact of the 
elicitation procedure itself. 
Second, a subjectively-construed correlation between two constructs 
could lead to accentuation in the rating patterns being used: there 
is a relationship here with Newcomb's (1931) 'logical error'. I 
would hazard the guess, based on Koltav's (1962) work, that where an 
element (such as a person) is well-known to a respondent, this 
knowledge would tend to override any accentuation 
- 
in contrast to the 
less well-known elements which might be more affected by the implicit 
theories held by the respondent. For instance, a relatively 
unfamiliar element might be viewed as 'highly intellectual' and, 
because the respondent tends to correlate intellect with being 
stimulating, give the same element a high rating on the 'stimulating' 
end of the dimension 'stimulating-boring' even though there was little 
'hard' evidence to justify the rating. This (a facet of implicit 
personality theory) would seem to come close to Tajfel's theory, but 
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without drawing the distinction between focal and peripheral dimensions 
which 
- 
in the absence of evidence from something like a resistance-to- 
change grid 
- 
would be difficult to ascertain. In any case, there 
does not seem to be any clear reason why accentuation should not take 
place in either direction (from peripheral to focal dimensions, and 
vice versa) even though a strictly logical approach might suggest a 
unidirectional relationship: in practice, focus and periphery are 
likely to be dependent on the way in which the particular individual 
(researcher or respondent) sees the problem. 
Third, there may be the pervasive influence of an evaluative construct 
like 'good-bad'. 
. 
If people construe others using a confirmatory 
strategy, then general evaluative ambience may induce deviations from 
the 'true' rating in the direction of the evaluative preconception. 
As with semantic accentuation, the net outcome in grid terms is likely 
to be the strengthening of associations between constructs in respect 
of which judgmental accentuation takes place. The result would be 
an overtightening of the factors produced in analysis. Such 
judgmental accentuation is not new, long ante-dating Tajfel's (195 ) 
formulation: E. L. Thorndike (1920) called it the 'halo effect'. 
8.4 THE PRACTICE OF RATING: CONCEPTUALISATION REVISITED 
The long preceding section of this chapter has pointed to the 
possibility of a number of interaction effects associated with 
repertory grids, but so far it has skirted around the question of how 
a respondent actually uses a rating scale when he or she construes a 
series of elements upon any particular d.;. mension70. That question, 
the crux of this whole chapter, must now be addressed. 
Gregson (1975) remarks that human judges are susceptible to cognitive 
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overloading in respect of both the amount of information to be 
processed and the number of logical operations needed to combine 
information. He postulates two possible strategies which may enable 
a judge to simplify the complexity of the task of judging overall 
similarities of entities. 
The first of Gregson's strategies is to estimate the differences 
between the entities in terms of each dimension separately, and 
subsequently to combine the judgments to arrive at an overall decision 
regarding similarity. The second is to take each entity in turn and 
to estimate its position on the several dimensions before combining 
the information in order to make an overall judgment. Gregson sees 
the distinction as important since the second strategy avoids a 
susceptibility to intransivity intrinsic in the first, the self-chosen 
order in the second being influential in determining to some extent 
the goodness of fit of behaviour to theory71. 
As far as repertory grid work is concerned, almost all the reported 
research requires the respondent to rate all of the set of elements 
on one construct before proceeding to the next. In the typical grid 
arrangement, the matrix is built up row by row. Little use is made 
of the second, column by column strategy. It is less convenient in 
terms of administration (when time is often at a premium) and it is 
more open to the halo effect than the row by row strategy. It seems 
doubtful whether Gregson's preference for a column by column strategy 
can be sustained in the context of the practicalities of typical grid 
administration, the intransitivity issue notwithstanding. 
Given, then, that rating in grids is typically done on a row by row 
basis, how does one actually go about it? Does one use the particular 
305 
scale as some kind of ruler, or is the actual rating derived from 
cognitive operations of a very different order? Have attempts to 
approach respondents' construing beoome stuck in the ruts of a track 
leading in the wrong direction? 
The literature having been no more than marginally helpful in consider- 
ing these questions, I am thrown back upon my own resources. Intro- 
spection leads me to suggest that one possible way of assigning 
ratings is to scan my experience for evidence pertinent to the 
dimension under consideration: if the elements are people, to take 
each person in turn, recall what I can from memory, and locate this 
information on one or more constructs which are subsumable under the 
actual verbal labels to which I am making explicit reference. I can 
exemplify this approach in respect of the construct 'generous-mean' 
and of four people I have known in the past fifteen years. 
Thinking of these four people in the context of 'generous-mean', I 
recall that 
A stood back and let me take the credit for something 
which I had initiated, but on which we had collaborated; 
B issued an open invitation to stay whenever I needed to 
retreat from the pressure of events; 
C- only a casual acquaintance 
- 
offered me the loan of 
a newish Volvo car in order that I might find out if 
I liked the model enough to buy one myself; and 
D was inclined to attach 'D' prominently to work for which 
I was largely responsible. 
To me these are, in the language of experimental psychology, 'the 
salient aspects of the stimuli' to which I am required to respond: 
they are, in this case, related to events in episodic memory 
- 
though 
Al B, and C are connected with individual events whereas D is connected 
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with a number of events spread over a substantial interval of time, 
and my response in respect of D is necessarily more generalised. The 
construct 'generous-mean' is being operationalised differently for 
each element being construed, using alternative combinations of poles 
drawn from the meaning 
- 
complexes subsumed by the poles 'generous'and 
'mean'. My ratings of A. B, C and D on the construct are shown in 
Figure 8.16, from which it is apparent that I construe A and B as 
equally generous (but for quite different reasons), that I discriminate 
between A and D in respect of a meaning-complex connected with giving 
and taking credit, and that I discriminate between B and C in terms of 
the complexes associated with the sharing of belongings. This is a 
far cry from the physicalism of the ruler and is much closer to the 
tenets of existential phenomenology. 
'Sharing B offers C offers 'Selfishness' 
belongings' use of loan of complex Complex house in- Volvo car 
definitely 
'Giving credit' A allows D takes 'Taking credit' 
complex others more than complex. 
to take ' fair share 
credit I . of credit 
C; Bgnous r. 5 ,, ter, 
Figure 8.16 1 Differential construing on the dimension 'generous 
- 
mean'. It is a simple matter to recast the data in 
the format of a typical repertory grid matrix of 
elements and constructs, though, given the content of 
the example, the matrix will be incomplete. 
Now, if time and stamina were no object, it would be possible to devise 
a grid which would allow ma to display all the nuances of meaning of 
'generous-mean' and of all the other constructs that could be elicited 
from me. Such an enormous grid would almost certainly be remarkable 
for an overwhelming number of vacant cells as the definition of 
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constructs becomes progressively finer and each individual construct 
becomes applicable to progressively fewer elements: the beginnings 
of such a situation are evident even with. the comparatively coarse 
discriminations in Figure 8.16. In other words I am drawn towards 
the conclusion that, as distinctions become finer, the element x 
construct intersection looms larger in importance than the more general 
notion of scaling to which the greatest attention has hitherto been 
given. 
No doubt many would wish to respond quickly to the preceding paragraphs 
and to say that in the real world one has to do with approximations and 
to try to perceive something through the haze of meaning surrounding 
each construct: the danger is that a construct 
- 
often only a 'simple' 
label 
- 
stands for a complex web of ideas whose differential salience 
is never explored. 
In discussing the rating of elements on constructs I have taken the 
considerable liberty of indulging in introspection72, and it is 
necessary to provide some support for the position I have taken. Forty- 
two teachers from Further Education on a day-release Certificate in 
Education course were asked to identify three people whom they knew 
well (and who came from the same life-context) and to rate them on one 
or other of the constructs 'generous-mean' and 'bold-cautious'. When 
they had all done so, they were asked to write down what had come into 
their minds at the time of giving the ratings. 
A small minority of respondents referred to aspects of the focal 
person's behaviour, for instance: 
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'Profiteer in business to an unacceptable degree but 
tight in company, esp when buying the beer. £L 
lasts all night yet he is never without a beer' (Respondent No. 22); 
'Despite a total income equivilent to many other 
families constantly pleads poverty, in domestic 
decoration or modification or in personal clothing 
etc. always buys cheapest materials etc, often to 
detriment of final product. 
Is quite loving in nature but this does not 
translate into much direct help to others'(Respondent 
No-15); and 
'A round dodger in the pub, goes to the toilet when 
its his turn to buy the beer' (Respondent No-17) 
It is interesting that aspects of behaviour relating to acts of 
meanness were the most sharply recorded 
- 
perhaps negativity standing 
out against a ground of positivity. 
The more frequently found response was to write down some more 
generalised dispositional statement such as might be provided in a 
character reference. Examples here include 
'Careful, slow to form opinions 
- 
qualifies opinions. 
Very reluctant to take risks or to offend. "Safe" 
lifestyle 
- 
would be unlikely to make drastic 
changes in this' (Respondent No. 25); 
'Forthcomming with ideas. Will accept any task. 
Uses own initiative. Will speak out opinions on 
any subject. A little disruptive' (Respondent 
No. 38); and 
'Constant help and assistance, thoughtfulness, 
unselfish nature, plays a major role in my life, 
a good relationship between us, never let me down, 
always available if needed, easy-going nature and 
considerate'. (Respondent No. 3). 
Other responses of this generalised kind were more laconic, the most 
terse being descriptions of three people as 'outspoken', 'diplomatic' 
and 'reserved', respectively (Respondent No. 23). Parsons et al (1983), 
in a detailed study of a single teacher, note that much of her 
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professional knowledge appeared to be stored in generalised memories 
of events. 
Immediately after the task was completed I probed further the way in 
which the ratings had been given, and nearly half of the group said 
that they had rated on the basis of specific remembered actions even 
though these had often been written down in more general terms. A 
further quarter of the group had used specific actions in respect of 
one or two of the three people they had rated, whilst nearly one third 
had not consciously referenced specific actions73. These results are 
summarised in Figure 8.17 
Reference to Reference to 
specific specific 
CONSTRUCT actions for actions for No reference 
all three one or two of to specific 
people being the people actions Total 
rated being rated 
Bold-cautious 10 27 19 
Generous-mean 986 23 
Figure 8.17 Methods of use of the constructs 'bold-cautious'and 
'generous-mean' by 42 teachers in Further Education. 
This very limited empirical enquiry provides some evidence for the 
argument that rating may be done by reference to specific circumstances- 
and also for the complexity of construct dimensions. I am not seeking 
to claim that all constructs are as-capable of subsuming a range of 
meanings as are the two instanced above. Nor would I wish to suggest 
that people necessarily construe with respect to critical incidents 
recalled from memory: first, specific actions may well have been 
forgotten and a generalised characterisation may be all that is available 
to consciousness; and, second, knowledge gained indirectly may be stored 
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in semantic memory as might be the case with labelling and stereo- 
typing. 
Despite the thinness of the empirical evidence adduced in support of 
the phenomemological74 approach to rating, the argument is not easily 
dismissed 
- 
and in some ways it is closer to Kelly's views of both 
construing and events than the (currently more popular) ranking and 
rating forms of grid allow. 
Kelly's use of the term 'events' is realist: events are 'out there' 
to be construed75. In discussing the Fundamental Postulate I argued 
that an event only has meaning in so far as it can be construed 
(however 'defectively' that might be done), hence - for me - an event 
is the 'intersection' of an instance (element) with, at minimum, a 
single construct and is therefore represented as an individual cell in 
a grid matrix. If constructs are associated in meaning-complexes 
rather than exist as isolable entities, the theoretical precision of 
the individual cell is lost, and the event is 'smeared' down the 
appropriate column of a grid which has an indefinitely large number of 
'meaning 
- 
possibilities', i. e. rows. These rows would be represent- 
ative of the contents of both semantic and episodic memory, and may 
well be dichotomous in their reference to presence or absence of 
- 
say 
- 
an attribute. 
-It is a truism to observe that different events 
are associated with different patterns of 'meaning-possibilities' in 
their respective grid columns. In other words, each event could in 
theory be represented by an enormously long binary number indicative 
of the constructs being used to give it meaning76. 
The 'cognitive algebra'77 involved in processing meaning is of truly 
staggering proportions, and far beyond the capacity of rational 
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analysis 
- 
and it should be noted that the binary number for each event 
would be dominated by zeros. Gregson's (1975) postulated strategies 
offer the possibility of reducing cognitive overload to manageable 
proportions but they are based on the implicit assumption of a 
relatively limited number of dimensions, as would seem to be the case 
with all grid work whether the elements be allocated dichotomously, 
ordinally or by some form of grading. 
I would, in the spirit of constructive alternativism, put forward a 
different view based on the phenomenological argument exemplified a 
little earlier. It is possible to aggregate meaning-complexes under 
verbal labels, but the constitution of meaning-complexes varies with 
the instance being construed. To subsume a set of instances under a 
bipolar construct implies that the bipolar construct must weight 
heavily (logically, restrict itself to) those aspects of meaning- 
possibility that are common across instances: in binary terms, 
matching patterns of check-marks in the (yet to be developed) grid 
matrix. In other words scales 
- 
if they are to approximate to the 
qualities of physical measurement 
- 
emphasise the normative at the 
expense of the distinctive. As exemplified in the simplistic example 
of Figure 8.16, the gradations of rating may well allow the possible 
discriminations of meaning to emerge. It is probably inadequate to 
assume that the uniqueness of instances will emerge from idiosyncratic 
patterns of ratings on broad construct dimensions: the picture that 
is shown by such a grid would seem likely to be about as fuzzy as a 
close-up photograph taken with the camera lens set for a distant 
panorama. 
If, instead of emphasising the rows of a grid matrix one emphasises 
the columns, a qualitatively different picture begins to appear. 
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The instances begin to emerge in sharper detail because of the 
combination of both the normative and the differentiating in the acts 
of construing. Similarity and contrast are both present, but in a 
subtly altered form in comparison with Kelly's use of the terms. The 
focus is on the 'thing 
- 
as-it-appears', but there would seem to be a 
sharp contrast with the 'bracketing' of Husserlian phenomenology, 
since explicit use is made by the construer of the full richness of 
his or her construct system. With events being described in greater 
detail than is possible within the framework of a grid's scales (and 
one need look no further than Rowes, 1978, book for evidence) it 
becomes unimportant to try to compare all the elements in terms of all 
the constructs. (I have the strong suspicion that many grids collect 
the answers to questions which are irrelevant to the researcher's true 
intentions, merely because a completed grid matrix is necessary for 
the analytical method to be used: a partially-complete matrix might 
suffice in terms of the information necessary for the problem at hand. ) 
As was argued in my discussion of the Dichotomy Corollary, construing 
of the instance becomes 'prototypic' under the particular phenomeno- 
logical rubric outlined here78. It allows the exploration of the 
constructs used rather than restricts their use to the broad generalities 
typical of grid methodology. Like the Cheshire cat, the relevance of 
the grid as an entity begins to disappear though columnar concatenations 
of cells remain in view, intersected by fragments of rows reflecting 
the comparative aspects of construing 
- 
the whole taking on the appear- 
ance, perhaps, of a sparsely lighted crossword puzzle. 
From such a standpoint rating and ranking decline to take on merely 
subservient and clarificatory roles. The quasi-physicalist assumptions 
of rating (here construed as involving the highly complex balancing of 
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semantics and action, and hence more problematic than is often taken 
to be the case) are thereby rendered comparatively unimportant. 
Pressed to its limits, the argument from phenomenology suggests that 
rating scales are at best a convenient fiction. At worst they are 
grossly misleading in that they purport to indicate a gradation of 
attribute which can be used without modification across a range of 
elements in a manner akin to a ruler measuring length and scales 
measuring weight. If, judged from the criterion of validity of 
communicated meaning, rating scales other than physical do not exist, 
those researching from a construct theory perspective will find that 
the implications are profound. 
8.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter has explored in some detail the nature of the processes 
of completing a grid matrix, focusing primarily on the practice of 
rating. A number of practical problems were identified, including 
the failure to follow the rating procedure accurately, accidental 
reversal of scales and uncertainties associated with the nature of 
elements and their context. The case was argued that most of these 
could be resolved by an approach requiring the researcher and respond- 
ent to engage in a systematic, structured dialogue in which the 
researcher takes the responsibility for recording the grid data. It 
was pointed out that, in many grids, the researcher can expect to find 
'gaps' in the data: whilst this causes no problem in the completion of 
the grid matrix, the demands of analysis can lead to the dubious filling 
of the gaps by using the mid-point value of the rating scale. 
The solution of the practical problems left a number of important 
conceptual issues unexamined, and these were taken up in the third 
section. Eiser and Ströbe's mediated sti. naulus-response model of 
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judgment was adapted to fit a Personal Construct Theory perspective 
on judgment, the point being made that most rating scales in repertory 
grid work are unlikely to be grounded in the assumptions of physicalist 
measurement, and may not be adequate vehicles for the communication of 
meaning between respondent and researcher. 
The physicalist assumptions of the naive user of subjective rating 
scales were challenged in a number of ways which suggested that, if 
constructs were viewed as continua, the level of measurement could be 
regarded as at best ordinal in view of the range of possible manners 
in which metrical distortion could occurs possible influences here 
included anchoring, lexical marking, complexity of meaning and 
interaction effects. Empirical evidence was produced which suggested 
that individuals might construe a given bipolar construct in terms of 
various models, not all of which could claim to entail mutual 
exclusivity of polest some of these models implied rating behaviour 
inconsistent with the limitations of bipolarity. The potential 
variation in scale use was supported by showing that the mid-point is 
open to a variety of interpretations, many of which are inconsistent 
with the principal of polar exclusivity. 
Finally, the validity of rating scales in repertory grids was 
challenged from a phenomenological standpoint. It was suggested that 
an 'event' is an intersection between an instance and a complex of 
constructs, the complex being different for each instance being 
considered. If construing of elements in the typical grid rests 
upon what can be called up from episodic or semantic memory of 
experience rather than from some sort of internalised scale, then 
rating scales are called seriously into question, with potentially 
profound implications for methodology. 
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9 Analysis 
... 
a dark 
Inscrutable workmanship that reconciles 
Discordant elements... 
W. Wordsworth 
The prelude (1805) I: 352-354 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
Notwithstanding the challenge to rating scales made in the previous 
chapter, completed repertory grids have to be subjected to analysis 
and interpretation. This is not as simple a process as much of the 
literature implies, there being a tension between statistics and 
semantics. 
A repertory grid produces a vast amount of information. A 10 x 10 
grid, for instance, provides responses to one hundred different 
questions. The problem for the researcher-is how to reduce this bulk 
of data to manageable proportions whilst retaining as much of the 
information as possible (the 'minimax problem', as Kelly put it): 
the two aims are contradictory, and compromise is inevitable. In 
this chapter some of the issues pertinent to this compromise are 
discussed, particular attention being given to two analytical 
approaches: Slater's Grid Analysis Package and the suite of programs 
based upon Thomas and Shaw's FOCUS algorithm. 
The analytical routines currently available gloss over a number of 
important issues, and these are addressed in the latter part of the 
chapter. The chapter ends with an echo of the radical critique of 
rating presented at the end of Chapter 8, in which the analytical 
correlate of an 'events-based' methodology is outlined as a 'trailer' 
to a fuller treatment in Chapter 13. 
9.2 GRID ANALYSIS BY HAND 
Kelly developed a nonparametric factor analytical method for the grid 
form of his Repertory Test2, making full use of the assumption that 
the elements (dichotomously assigned to the poles of each construct) all 
fall within the construct's range of convenience. The factor analysis 
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routine, applicable to both rows and columns of the grid, is based on 
the construction of a hypothetical row3 of ticks and blanks correspond- 
ing to the average distribution of ticks and blanks for all the rows 
taken together. This hypothetical row is then compared with each 
row of the grid taken in turn: where the number of 'matches' falls 
below half of the maximum total possible, the construct is 'reflected' 
(i. e. the verbal label and the pattern of ticks and blanks are 
reversed). This process is iterated until a maximal match between 
the hypothetical row and each individual row is obtained. The finalised 
hypothetical row then becomes the first factor to be extracted. 
The rows which exhibit a significant match4 with the first factor are 
assumed to load heavily upon it. These rows are then removed from 
consideration and further factors are extracted in the same way from 
what remains of the grid. 
Although Kelly's procedure is simple and straightforward, it is also 
tedious and time-consuming in operation. The power of modern 
computers has transformed analysis from a laborious chore into an 
almost effortless exercise. This is not without its dangers, as 
Cronbach (1956) points out. Whilst he acknowledges the indirectness 
and exceptional flexibility of the repertory grid, he observes that 
the complexity of the data has lured Kelly's students into ' analysis 
so involved as to obscure serious errors in reasoning'5. Little 
(1977), reviewing the collection of papers in Slater's (1976) book 
'Explorations of intrapersonal space', expresses concern that the 
sophistication of the statistical methods used is leading researchers 
away from the main focus of Kelly's philosophy, the problems of the 
real world. A broadly similar view is held by Fransella and 
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Bannister (1977), Watts and Pope (1982), and Adams-Webber (1979), the 
last of whom points to the 'confusion surrounding the meaning of many 
repertory-grid-based measures currently used in both research and 
clinical assessment'6. It would be unfair to lay all the blame for 
the problems of analysis upon computerisation, but the point can 
fairly be made that it is easy to slip into inferring that computer 
output is hard, objective and 'right'? 
- 
and just as easy to overlook 
the quality of the information loaded into the computer and the 
assumptions upon which the analytical routines are founded 
8. 
But not all analysis requires the sophistication of the computer. 
With small dichotomous grids 'hand focusing' may be adequate, all 
that is needed being a pair of scissors and a roll of sellotape in 
order to rearrange first the rows and then the columns (or vice versa) 
to maximise the match between the neighbouring strips of grid in both 
horizontal and vertical directions. Hall (1978) gives an example of 
hand focusing without explaining the steps needed to get to the 
required layout. 
Fransella and Bannister (1977), whose main interest appears to lie in 
the relationships between constructs9, describe how a ranked grid may 
be analysed by computing Spearman's rho for each pair of constructs 
taken in turn, the rank correlations then being used as the basis for 
a kind of factor analysis which can be represented graphically. They 
indicate that, in the example presented, there were high correlations 
between the first two axes of their analysis and the first two principal 
components of Slater's (1964) INGRID program, though the latter has the 
advantage that it allows the relationships between the elements to be 
explored. It would seem ( having worked through their 
procedure) that Fransella and Bannister's method 
- 
if used in hand- 
319 
calculation form 
- 
suffers from a degree of laboriousness equivalent 
to that of Kelly's original method of analysis. 
Another analytical approach which does not require the use of the 
computer, but which attempts far less than Fransella and Bannister's 
method, is the classification of constructs according to criteria which 
may be constructed a priori or developed from the information provided 
by the respondent. Landfield (1971) describes a category system 
designed to cater for the construing of people10. Fransella (1981) 
reports that it has proved less successful in Britain where a 
considerable number of constructs have been found not to fit 
Landfield's systemil 
It may be that classification is more successful when it is done on 
an a posteriori basis to suggest further lines of inquiry. The 
potential fruitfulness of the approach is suggested by Thompson's 
(1975) classification of constructs elicited from teachers at two 
different primary schools12. Whilst the teachers in one school 
produced a 'spread' of types of construct, those in the other 
emphasised personal qualities but not social behaviour. It would be 
dangerous to draw conclusions about the aims of education or the 
curricular structuring in the two schools from such limited evidence, 
but it does suggest potentially valuable lines of further inquiry. 
9.3 COMPUTER ANALYSIS 
There are several computer-based routines available for the analysis 
of repertory grids, and choosing from among them is not an easy 
matter 
- 
unless the range of choice is limited by what is available on 
the computer systems to which the researcher has access. Where choice 
exists, there is the danger that the researcher might give inadequate 
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attention to the assumptive bases of analytical methods13, possibly 
even choosing a particular method of collecting data because it fits 
a particular mode of analysis rather than because it fits the questions 
which the researcher wishes to ask. That it is important to look 
inside the packaging of an analytical method is indicated by the 
disagreement between Rump (1974) and Slater (1974) over the relative 
merits of cluster analysis and principal components analysis, and 
Sneath and Sokal's (1973) comment that different methodological 
approaches require different analytical routines14. These last 
authors point out that principal components analysis is suitable for 
major clusters (but is 'notorious for falsifying distances between 
close neighbours'15), whereas agglomerative cluster analysis is reliable 
for within-cluster similarity though the reliability falls as the 
cluster size increases16. In other words, there is no single, 
obvious 'best buy' on the markets each situation has to be appraised 
anew regarding data analysis. Whatever routine is selected, it would 
be naive to assume that it will deliver a correct and fully meaningful 
output reflecting the way the respondent views the world 
- 
or, at 
least, that part of it providing the focus of the investigation. 
Even a part-world view is more complex than can be caught in the broad 
sieve of grid method. 
Computer algorithms are sets of rules by which data is reduced to 
manageable proportions, and the patterns output by them depend on the 
ways in which these rules are combined. Shaw (19804, for instance, 
shows how a change in an algorithm can result in a different cluster- 
ing of elements17, and (on a larger scale outside the area of repertory 
grid research) similar variation of clustering with algorithm is shown 
in the contrast between Bennett's (1976) original analysis of teaching 
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style and the subsequent reanalysis of the same data18. 
Evidence such as this tends to cast a cold shadow over Hope's (1969) 
somewhat breezy assertion that 
... 
if he has prepared the data matrix in conformity 
with the requirements of the field of study, the 
research worker knows that his interpretation is not 
subject to the distorting influence of artefacts 19 introduced by the computing techniques employed'. 
Hope's opinion also conceals the question of the quality of the data, a 
point clearly exposed in Shepard's (1972) recognition that some data in 
the social sciences are too fragmentary or unstable to support the deter- 
mination of a well-defined spatial representation. And evidence has 
already been presented which suggests that the data in a grid matrix are 
likely to be surrounded by an atmosphere of uncertainty, and that 
different constructs may have been scaled in very different ways. Cattell 
(1957) recognises the problem in the context of research into personality, 
where scales reflecting both antonymic opposition and degree of possession 
of an ability may coexist20. However, Cattell seems to be unaware of the 
potential variations in oppositional scaling when he states that a single 
mathematical convention will enable the outcome of analysis to be 
mathematically correct. Correctness of mathematics there may be, but it 
may be making erroneous assumptions about the scaling actually being 
used 
- 
and the semantic aspects of the data are ignored, aspects to which 
a Kellian approach would probably give primacy. 
Analytical techniques, then, all have their drawbacks. Blashfield (1976), 
writing of the emergent cluster analysis routines, advocated a sceptical 
attitude to the results from them: whether his scepticism implied 
outright dismissal is an open question, but scepticism's connotation 
of critical appraisal might well be taken up by the user of any 
technique for analysing repertory grid data. It is possible 
" 
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to run a data matrix through a series of different routines and to 
identify the most consistently-obtained patterns (as Everitt, 1974, 
suggests, in respect of cluster analysis21), but that presupposes the 
availability of programs and time 
- 
both of which are often in short 
supply. A number of writers 
- 
among them Anderberg (1973), writing 
of cluster analysis, and Fiske (1971), writing of factor analysis 
- 
suggest that the program output should be used as the basis of further 
exploration rather than be treated as an end in itself: the output 
can be discussed with the respondent both to check whether it represents 
what he or she wanted to communicate and to allow elaboration of the 
original information which was given. 
9.4 SPECIFIC METHODS FOR ANALYSING REPERTORY GRID DATA 
Two methods for analysing repertory grids have become well established 
in Britain; Slater's Grid Analysis Package and the suite of programs 
based on Thomas and Shaw's FOCUS algorithm. Other methods do exist, 
though they have yet to become as widely used as the two mentioned 
above: Olson (1980a)used the principal components analysis PA1 from 
the SPSS suite; Boxer (1981) uses LITTLE NIPPER, his on creation; 
Pope and Keen (1981) describe Keen and Bell's GRIDDLE package; Smith 
and Leach (1972) used Johnson's (1967) hierarchical cluster analysis; 
Ravenette (1975) uses McQuitty's (1966) single linkage analysis; and 
Leach (1981) describes a method based on single linkage analysis which 
appears close to Thomas and Shaw's FOCUS but has the advantage of being 
able to cope with missing data. Such is an indication of the range of 
methods being made available to the grid analyst. The range is too 
large to allow most of the methods more than this brief mention, and 
discussion is limited to the central algorithms of the packages devised 
by Slater and by Thomas and Shaw: fuller details are given in Slater 
(n. d. and 1977) and in Shaw (1980a)respectively. 
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9.4.. 1 Slater's INGRID program 
Slater's INGRID program, first published in 1964, has been developed 
over the years and in its currently-available form INGRID 72 forms the 
heart of the Grid Analysis Package. INGRID 72 applies principal 
components analysis to the grid matrix, and is capable of handling 
dichotomous, ranked or rated grids. For simplicity, the discussion 
presented below will concentrate upon rated grids. 
Slater (n. d. ) sees the most important advantage of principal components 
analysis as lying in the orthogonal nature of the components produced 
22 
the first component accounting for the largest proportion of the 
variance, the second accounting independently for the largest 
proportion of the variance remaining after the extraction of the first 
component, and so on. However, Fiske (1971), writing generally about 
factor analysis, points out that in personality research many observed 
dimensions exhibit considerable covariation and he leaves as a moot 
point whether the greater conceptual simplicity of orthogonal structure 
will prove to have greater theoretical advantages than oblique 
structures23. 
The heart of the INGRID program is the product-moment correlation 
coefficient. This has been widely criticised as a similarity measure 
24 
on the grounds that it fails to take into account both elevation and 
scatter, Gregson (1975) being particularly pungent in his dismissal of 
the use of this coefficient for indicating similarity as 'a statistically 
illiterate practice'25. The weakness of the Pearson r is simply 
demonstrated by examining the correlations of a set of ratings 1,2,3 
with other sets 4,5,6 and 2,4,6: 1,2,3 correlates + 1.0 with each of 
the others although it is obvious that the inter-set distances are 
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different and quite marked26. As Brennan (1972) remarks, the Pearson 
r is only a partial measure of similarity27, and Keen (1979) makes the 
further point that there is no guarantee that the construct ratings 
are wholly independent 
28 
. 
Slater's approach is also open to criticism on the grounds that, to 
produce a table of correlation coefficients and angular distances 
between the constructs, his method normalises the sets of ratings given 
on each of the constructs. Whilst there are statistical advantages 
in minimising skewness in the distribution of scale ratings, such a 
procedure inevitably removes some of the original meaning from the 
data. The researcher has the option to extend the use of normalisation 
to the full principal components analysis, and Slater indicates that 
the arguments for and against exercising this option are finely 
balanced29. On one hand, the rating scales are arbitary and likely- 
to be incommensurate despite any restriction on length imposed by the 
researcher. Further, extremity of rating may not reflect a carefully 
measured distinction, for the respondent may in effect be dichotomising 
the ratings 
- 
in which case the variance contributed by such a 
construct would be disproportionate, a point of which Slater himself 
is aware3O. On the other hand, 'one should not tamper with the 
evidence'31: the respondent has exercised choice in the manner of 
responding and this should be respected 
- 
and imbalance in response 
may be of signal interest. In his doctoral research Keen (1979) used 
the normalisation option, but records in a handwritten marginal note32 
that he would subsequently have reversed this decision, a position which 
reflection upon the issues involved would lead me to endorse. 
A problem with the INGRID program is the decision regarding the number 
of components to be considered significant. The program includes a 
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routine devised by M. S. Bartlett which tests, via chi-square, whether 
the residual variation following the extraction of components is dis- 
tributed randomly in the component space. The variation in the smallest 
component is tested against the penultimate component, and the routine- 
sequentially tests the total variation in the h+ (n-1) + 
.... 
(n-k) 
components against that in the kth. Slater recognises that this pro- 
cedure can give enigmatic results33 (and I have found in one of my grids 
that nine components were significant according to this test, the ninth 
contributing a mere 0.52 per cent of the variance in the matrix"'), and 
it seems reasonable to treat this test with a great deal of caution. 
A further problem with Slater's method is the difficulty it has in 
coping with missing data. Slater points out that a single missing 
value prevents that construct from being located in element-space 
(or the element to which the same 'void' intersection applies from 
being located in construct space). He indicates that either the 
relevant row or column must be deleted35, whichever would do least 
damage to the researcher's needs 
- 
and he does not 'take the easy way 
out' by suggesting the interpolation of a value such as that of the 
mid-point of the scale. In grids in which people are the elements 
there is often no problem with missing data since people all tend to 
fall within the range of 'people' constructs. In my experience (using 
the method described on page 254 for completing the grid) there have 
been very few cases indeed of missing data, and those few seem to 
have arisen by accident. 
However, once the researcher moves away from grids dealing with people 
and moves on to use situations as elements, the range of convenience 
problem appears. It was noted earlier that Olson's (1980a) work 
with science teachers using classroom activities as elements gave rise 
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to some ten per cent of 'blanks' in his grids, whereas my broadly 
similar work was accompanied by 2.7 per cent of blanks. Appropriately 
dispersed, ten per cent of blanks could eliminate an entire 10 x 10 
grid from INGRID analysis, using Slater's procedure! The problem 
increases with grid size; only seven per cent of blanks could 
eliminate a 15 x 15 grid. The inescapable conclusion is that for 
grids in which there is more than a very small proportion of blanks, 
INGRID analysis will be unsuitable if rows and/or columns are 
eliminated, since the program will only be able to output an analysis 
based on that part of the grid that has survived evisceration. 
The great virtue of INGRID is its ability to present the various 
element-construct relationships in a single composite diagram. 
Whilst computing centres are now able to print plots of the location 
of elements and constructs with respect to pairs of components 
(e. g. 
Component I versus Component II), the presence of an orthogonal third 
component which accounts for a substantial part of the variance makes 
these two-dimensional plots difficult to interpret. Slater remarks 
that the first three components often account for over 90 per cent of 
the variance in grids of typical size, though in my 27 'science 
teacher' grids the percentage fell within the range 71-91 (mean 80; 
s. d. 5.6). Built into INGRID is the capacity to compute polar 
co-ordinates, which allows the location of elements and constructs 
with respect to the first three components to be displayed on the 
surface of a globe or, more usually, on some form of geographical 
projection. Allowing for the reservations expressed in the preceding 
paragraph (a few of my grids were noticeably pruned by Slater's 
procedure for missing data), I have found geographical projection to 
be helpful in obtaining a synoptic view of the various element-construct 
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relationships whilst being aware that to compress hyperspatial 
information into three dimensions is bound to introduce some 
distortion. 
Element and construct orientations are specified by horizontal and 
vertical angles akin to longitude and latitude. Also computed is a 
radial measurement which indicates the extent to which each function 
is represented in the three-dimensional subspace of the hyperspace 
defined by all the components. Where this radial measure is 
comparatively small it suggests that the relevant function is 
inadequately represented within the first three components and that 
its relationships within the grid might be better revealed by 
inspection of the minor components and the original grid data. 
Whilst the researcher can, by this device, obtain a space-satellite 
view of the respondent's world, the latter does not have the advantage 
of such detachment. Shaw (1980a)points out that the presentation of 
data which have been processed in a manner which mystifies the 
respondent can be very alienating36. It also runs the risk of 
presenting the respondent to him- or herself through the constructs 
implicit both in the computer program and in the interpretation, which 
is not in the Kellian spirit. In my work with the science teachers a 
few found difficulty in relating to geographical projections based on 
INGRID when I went back to them to discuss the outcomes of their 
analyses. The existential view at the surface of the world is not 
always commensurate with that of the astronaut. 
9.4.2 Thomas and Shaw's FOCUS program 
The problem of presenting computer output in a form intelligible to 
the respondent was taken into account by Thomas and Shaw in the 
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development of the FOCUS program from earlier work at Brunel University. 
The aim of FOCUS is to rearrange the rows and columns of a grid in such 
a way as to maximise the similarity between any row or column and its 
neighbour(s). The similarity measures used are based upon the 
Minkowski 'city block' distance metric, which is transformed by 
mappings which recognise the differences between elements and constructs. 
If d is the aggregated difference, disregarding sign, between two columns 
of elements, the similarity measure used in FOCUS is given by 
Element similarity =- 100d 
n T- 
+ 100 1c 
where n is the maximum value on the rating scale (assumed to run from 
1 to n), and c is the number of constructs. Element similarity values 
can range from zero (no match) to 100 (complete match). 
Construct similarity has to take into account the possibility, because 
of bipolarity, of negative matching. The above formula is adjusted 
as below to give a range of similarity values from 
- 
100 (complete 
negative match) to + 100 (complete positive match): 
Construct similarity = 
-200d 
n T-1 e+ 
100 
where e is the number of elements and the other symbols retain the 
meanings from the preceding formula37 
The FOCUS program 'reflects' constructs (and the relevant ratings) 
where an improvement in the positive matching between constructs can be 
achieved by so doing. This enables a dendrogram of positive inter- 
construct matches to be attached to the grid, similar to that possible 
in respect of elements. The practice of reflecting constructs is 
assumed to be valid, yet it might be questioned whether a respondent 
would produce exact reflections of ratings when the order of 
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presentation of the construct poles is reversed, i. e. the construct is 
presented as Y-X rather than as X-Y. The point might be more 
sharply pressed where the construct is 'peculiar' or 'X 
- 
not X' in 
character. However, the investigation reported in Appendix 6 
indicates that this assumption is tenable in practice. 
Shaw (1980 a)gives the choice of the 'city block' metric a somewhat 
sketchy justificationl8. In preferring the city block metric to the 
Euclidean distance, she sees it as an advantage that the elements or 
constructs can be considered to be the same distance apart whatever 
the pattern of differences between the two sets of data. I would 
argue to the contrary: Figure 9.1, although a fraction of a hypo- 
thetical grid matrix in which the data represent an, extreme instance, 
nevertheless illustrates the point I wish to make. 
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CONSTRUCT a 
ELEMENT 
bc 
... e 
CITY BLOCK 
DISTANCES. 
a-b b-c 
EUCLIDEAN 
DISTANCES 
a-b b-c 
A-A' 2 1 7 16 1 36 
B-B' 3 2 2 10 10 
C-C' 4 3 3 10 10 
D-D' 5 4 4 10 10 
E-E' 6 5 5 10 10 
F-F' 7 6 6 10 10 
11 0.41 1 
Mean character Mean Euclidean 
differences differences 
Figure 9.1 An illustration of the difference in effect of using 
the city block and Euclidean metrics in the computation 
of difference values (and hence similarity scores in 
the FOCUS program). 
It can be argued strongly on psychological grounds that the difference 
between elements b and c is likely to be of greater interest than that 
between a and b because of the marked distinction in respect of 
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construct A-A's one might be tempted to place relatively little 
psychological significance on the one-point differences between 
elements a and b (which would, incidentally, show a product-moment 
correlation coefficient of + 1.0). The Euclidean distance, by 
summing squares of differences, would seem to capture more success- 
fully than the city block metric the psychological distinction likely 
to inhere in the data 
4O. 
In practice, however, it seems to make little difference which metric 
is chosen for cluster analysis. This appears to arise from the fact 
that ratings on constructs very rarely show such marked differences in 
the pattern of distances as is exemplified in Figure 9.1. Work 
reported in Appendix 14 shows that there appears to be little 
difference in the patterns of clustering produced by FOCUS (using the 
city block metric) and the cluster analysis program CARM41, when the 
Euclidean distance is used, the rank ordering of element distances 
computed by the two metrics correlating very highly (Spearman rho 
ranging from 
- 
0.95 to 
- 
0.99). Unfortunately, it was impossible to 
undertake a direct comparison since FOCUS does not have an option to 
use the Euclidean distance and CARM does not offer the city block 
metric. Indirect comparison was possible by us. ing the similarity and 
distance matrices output by the respective programs as inputs into the 
nonmetric multidimensional scaling program NINISSA 
- 
1B (Roskam and 
Lingoes, 1970; Roskam, 1975). Two-dimensional plots were produced 
from six original repertory grid matrices for the FOCUS element 
similarities and the CARM Euclidean element distances, and only minor 
differences in configuration were observed. 
Despite the conspicuous similarities of configuration resulting from 
the use of the city block and Euclidean metrics, it nevertheless seems 
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preferable on psychological grounds to use the latter. Where complex 
stimuli are involved, there is some evidence from studies of perception 
that the Euclidean distance is more appropriate where attributes not 
easily measured physically are involved. In contrast, for attributes 
such as size and form, the city block may be the more appropriate 
metric 
42. 
In most repertory grids it would seem that judgmental 
criteria are used which would suggest the use of the Euclidean metric, 
and it is worth noting that Burgoyne (1981) found a decision model 
based on this metric to be superior to both the city block metric and 
a metric based on the summation of the square roots of the individual 
differences. 13 
Whilst the choice of metric is under discussion it is worth pointing 
out that the Euclidean distance could be useful where differences are 
being computed by both element and row in respect of two nominally 
similar grids. A shift of one scale-point might not occasion much 
comment, but marked shifts might be of considerable importance. For 
instance, two shifts of three scale-points are likely to be of more 
psychological interest than six shifts of a single point 
- 
but such 
matters are easily available to direct inspection if each grid cell is 
divided diagonally with the first rating placed in one corner and the 
second in the other (cf Kevill et al, 1982). Coloured inks could be 
used to highlight changes, using a colour-code for both direction and 
intensity of change. 
Like INGRID, the FOCUS program is unable to cope with 'gaps' in the 
data. Thomas and Shaw state explicitly that omissions or 'not 
applicables' must be entered at the mid-point of the rating scale5 
. 
The authors do not discuss the implications this might have for 
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clustering but, as was noted earlier, some types of grid are prone 
to 'gappiness' 
- 
in which case the arbitrary use of the mid-point 
might distort the relationships and meanings which the respondent 
wishes to convey. 
McQuittv's (1957.1966) linkaae analvsis46 has been the basis from 
which the FOCUS clustering algorithm has been developed via an interven- 
ing program written by Thomas and Garnons-Williams (1973). The virtue 
of FOCUS is that it reproduces for the respondent, in an intelligibly 
rearranged form, the data that he or she originally supplied. The 
hierarchical clustering dendrograms show clearly what fusions have 
taken place, but the authors offer no guidance regarding levels of 
significance associated with the stages of clustering, and this makes 
the interpretation of clusters somewhat arbitrary. The separation of 
element and construct dendrograms makes it difficult to see quickly 
what the main relationships between elements and constructs actually 
are: this has latterly been improved in the SPACED variant which lays 
out the data in such a way that clusters of elements and constructs are 
separated by matrix spacings that are wider than average, thus giving 
an improved visual display 
47. 
In the two-dimensional display printed 
by FOCUS or SPACED, the interrelationships between all the elements 
(and, similarly, between all the constructs) cannot be depicted, and 
it is easy to infer, possibly erroneously, that the separation of one 
element from another by a number of intervening elements in the printout 
implies a large distance between the two elements being considered. 
It is important not to overlook the information available in the tables 
of element and construct matching scores, since it is in these that a 
truer picture of the interrelationships may be found. 
The mathematical validation of FOCUS7 is dependent upon a number of 
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assumptions which are not made available for scrutiny. If scaling 
metrics vary as much in practice as the previous chapter suggested 
might be the case, mathematical validation is an extremely complex 
process indeed, and involves a consideration of the semantics involved 
in scaling. Shaw and Thomas (1978) get the matter in better 
perspective when they writes 
"As an articulator of conversation, the focused 
grid is a crude but useful tool. It is the 
beginnings of a psychological reflector which 
can reflect back to a person a view of himself 
as seen with his own eyes. " 48 
9.4.3 Cluster analysis and profile 
If the primary interest of the researcher lies in the elements it may 
be preferable to use cluster analysis to identify groups of like 
elements which can then be presented in profile form against the 
constructs 
9. In the examples given by Youngman (1979) a number of 
groups are shown superimposed on the same profile blank: however, 
my own interests have lain in the characterisation of individual 
groups of elements (rather than with inter-group comparisons), and I 
have deliberately separated the profiles of the identified groups. 
I have used the cluster analysis program CARM with the error sum 
metric option, judging group membership by inspection of the printout 
(in particular taking into account sharp increases in the error plot, 
which signify the clustering of rather dissimilar sub-groups). I 
plot each group's average ratings on a separate, previously prepared 
blank profile form, indicating where intra-group variations occur 
(see Figure 9.2). In the context of working with the science 
teachers, this provided a convenient summary of element-construct 
relationships. It will be noted that there is little emphasis on 
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construct interrelationships: this arises from my interest in the 
ways in which respondents construed the elements, aspects of science 
teaching. Where construct interrelationships are also important, 
Hope's (1969) suggestion of a combination of factor analysis and 
cluster analysis might be worthy of exploration. Hope advocates 
factor analysis for the variables (i. e. constructs), allowing their 
interrelationships to be shown by contiguity in the profile (somewhat 
akin to FOCUS and SPACED), and the use of taxonomic techniques (such 
as cluster analysis) for the entities (elements). 
Cluster analysis followed by profiling overcomes some of the problems 
associated with INGRID and FOCUS9 in particular that of missing data. 
With one exception which was too 'gappy' for this approach, clustering 
of the elements was performed with respect to all constructs for which 
there was a complete set of ratings. Constructs with missing data 
could be added to some group profiles where all the members of the 
group had been rated, but the 'gappiness' of such constructs excluded 
them from contributing to the determination of group membership by 
cluster analysis. 
If the centre of interest lies in the similarities between elements, 
Youngman's set of randomly-generated distances provides a yardstick 
against which the significance of any observed distance may be tested. 
He has available a range of distances for different sizes of grid, with 
cut-off points at the 1 and 5 per cent levels for the smallest distances, 
and 95 and 99 per cent levels for the largest distances: a sample is 
given in Youngman (1980). 
Cluster analysis procedures continue to be developed and, despite 
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Blashfield's (1976) scepticism regarding the available cluster 
analyses, he suggests that the centroid relocation method (of which 
CARM is a representative) is superior to the linkage method used by 
workers such as Rump (1974), Ravenette (1975) and Thomas and Shaw 
(n. d. ). However, this superiority is based on moderately large 
samples and it is unclear whether it extends downwards to the 
clustering of small numbers of instances typical of repertory grid 
data. 
9.5 MINIMISING THE PROBLEM OF MISSING DATA: ONE APPROACH 
The problem of missing data is not solved satisfactorily in any of 
the three methods of analysis discussed above. Though the approach 
using cluster analysis and profile offers a partial solution, it is 
still vulnerable to a wide dispersion of blank cells in the grid 
matrix. Frane's (1976) method of interpolation, based on regression 
techniques, does not seem to offer much practical help to the grid 
user since the three assumptions which it requires are difficult for 
the grid user to sustain: 
(i) data must be missing at random; 
(ii) each missing variable must be highly correlated with 
one or more of the available variables; and 
(iii) the amount of missing data should not be large. 
Given the likely quality of much grid data, it seems improbable that 
satisfactory interpolations can be made where data is missing. It 
would seem better to accept the fact that some gaps exist and to adopt 
an analytical strategy which minimises their disruptive influence. 
One strategy to do this is to compute, as before, the distances 
- 
the 
same applies to similarities 
- 
between elements but to build into the 
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program the ability to delete from consideration any pair of entries 
containing one or two blank cells. If this deletion is applied only 
to pairs of entries instead of the whole construct row, some pair- 
data is retained instead of being lost and the distance measure is 
minimally impaired. The hypothetical example of Figure 9.3 
illustrates the point. 
CONSTRUCT a 
ELEMENT 
bc.... 
A-A' 1 15 
B-B' 5 
-2 
C-C' 
- 
61 
D-D' 4 67 
E-E' 2 41 
F-F' 
see* 
7 32 
Figure 9.3 Illustration of a 'gappy' grid. 
The distance between elements a and b is calculated with respect to 
constructs A-A', D-D', E-E' and F-F'; between a and c with respect 
to constructs A-A', B-B', D-D', E-E' and F-F'; and between b and c 
with respect to constructs A-A', C-C', D-D', E-E' and F-F'. The 
deletion of whole rows of the matrix would have meant that B-B' and 
C-C' would not make any contribution whatever to the distance 
measures. Having been faced by me with this problem Youngman 
developed a program to compute distance measures on this basis and 
to output a triangular matrix of interelement distances5° together 
with the number of paired observations taken into account in computing 
each interelement distance. This I have found very useful in the 
processing of 'gappy' grids. 
If the distance measure is calculated as the 'mean Euclidean difference' 
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(or in city-block terms, Sneath and Sokal's, 1973 'mean character 
difference'), the individual inter-element distance measures are 
rendered comparable, and the distance matrix itself may be input 
into a multidimensional scaling program to enable a visual display 
of clustering to be presented. Alternatively, the distance measures 
can be checked for significance against the tables produced by 
Youngman (1980), care being taken to allow for the number of paired 
observations relevant to each distance measure. 
9.6 PROBLEMS OF INFERENCE 
The analytical techniques briefly considered above have in common the 
ability to present their particular forms of data-reduction in a 
structured format. The point was made earlier that different methods 
of presenting the output of analysis are likely to prove differentially 
meaningful to the respondents. But what of the researcher? What 
is legitimate for him or her to infer from the output? 
In most circumstances it is difficult to decide what constitutes a 
cluster of elements or constructs51. Shaw (1980a)appears to leave 
the decision to the researcher's subjective opinion, hollowing 
further discussion with the respondent. The 'error plot' shown in 
the CARM cluster analysis output offers some guidance to the 
composition of clusters but is not always a clear enough aid to 
decisions. In Slater's INGRID analysis tables of correlations and 
angular distances between elements and constructs are provided, the 
former allowing tests of significance to be made. However, it should 
be noted that the geographical projections can distort the hyperspatial 
relationships quite considerably and that visual inspection of the 
projections can therefore be misleading52. 
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Whichever analytical approach is adopted, there seems to be a strong 
argument for treating the analytical output as the basis for further 
exploration rather than as an end in itself. To accept this would 
seem to accord with Kellian philosophy and such writers on analytical 
approaches as Fiske (1971), Anderberg (1973) and Shaw (1980a). 
9.6.1 Individual grids 
In an ambitiously-titled paper Smith and Stewart (1977) suggest that 
the repertory grid is an appropriate technique to render people's 
mental maps objective and explicit. Disregarding the embedded 
assumptions, it is instructive to examine the empirical evidence of 
Joe's grid from the point of view of the inferences made. Joe 
construed predominantly a variety of workmates in terms of constructs 
which were largely work-oriented. The INGRID analysis shows Joe as 
closer to his ex-mates than to his wife, and the authors interpret 
this in terms of his being 'a very traditional working class male' 
without considering the likelihood of contextual bias in the grid and 
the narrowness of the basis of the judgment53. To interpret thus 
is to jump to conclusions, and in the following paragraphs evidence 
is presented showing that this is not an isolated case. The point 
being made is that interpretation on the basis of grid evidence alone 
is likely to be inadequate unless it is linked to further correlative 
information and, perhaps, exploration. 
An opportunity for the further exploration of grid analysis output 
is available in the TARGET teacher self-appraisal grids of Hopwood 
and Keen (1978), and the authors report that about 60 per cent of 
their respondents availed themselves of this options. Judging 
by the example given, this is not surprising. However, the irony 
3o 
here is that the respondents, whose construing has been processed, are 
asking the consultants what they themselves meant. The exploration 
is an inversion of what a researcher would need to do. 
In its feedback to respondents TARGET presents three bar charts which 
are 'weighted profiles' of effective teaching, 'self' teaching and 
ineffective teaching. Each bar indicates the percentage contribution 
of each of the components found to be significant (in the example 
given there are four which together account for 65 per cent of the 
variance), and the four constructs listed against each bar are listed 
in descending order of capacity to define the component in question 
(although the visual display suggests equivalence in-this respect). 
Some bars appear as negative weightings, yet where this occurs it is 
by no means clear whether this represents some kind of lack in terms 
of the construct poles listed, or whether it represents the qualities 
denoted by these poles. How the bar chart helps the respondent to 
define and clarify his or her superordinate construct system is not 
made clear55. 
The analysis, based on Slater's principal components analysis, can 
produce strange components. For instance, in the example provided 
by the authors, Component 3 indicates both poor subject knowledge and 
nervousness as part of the profile for effective teaching. Whilst 
it is possible to envisage a positive correlation between nervousness 
and effective teaching6, it is hard to see how poor subject knowledge 
can be positively associated with effective teaching. The suspicion 
exists in my mind that this outcome is an artefact of grid methodology 
and/or analytical approach rather than a reflection of existential 
reality. I have, for the purposes of making this point in a seminar, 
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concocted a grid whose analysis by INGRID 'showed' Margaret Thatcher 
to be a man 
- 
all that was necessary was to construct high inter- 
correlations between (stereotypically) masculine-feminine constructs 
relating to 'action' and the construct 'male-female's Margaret 
Thatcher, as a 'woman of action', was distorted by INGRID and the 
three-dimensional geographical projection to come close to the 'male' 
pole of the 'male-female' construct. 
This critique of the TARGET output accords with Shaw's (1980a)desire to 
avoid mystifying the respondent when presenting grid feedback, and to 
use feedback as an opportunity to elaborate on what has already been 
contributed to the grid. 
There is a danger in repertory grid analysis that the researcher will 
seek to identify and label factors or components from analyses, in a 
sense reifying them. Hope (1966) suggests that Slater's use of polar 
co-ordinates avoids the reification of factors on the grounds that the 
geographer's reference lines are arbitrary57s the thought surfaces 
that this hope might be arbitrary, too. 
Kelly was very much aware that to interpret the outcomes of analysis was 
to construe, with respect to the researcher's own construct system, the 
construct system of another, 
. 
He was also very-much aware that, 
whatever technique of data-reduction was used, the factors arising from 
it only related to the elements and constructs in the grid itself, and 
that generalisation beyond the framework of the grid was unwarranted59. 
Yet once an interpretation is offered for any set of data, that is 
tantamount to naming factors 
- 
however provisionally 
- 
and to establish- 
ing a cognitive 'set' in the mind of -the researcher (and perhaps in the 
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mind of the reader of the research report). Even if the interpretations 
are themselves construed as speculative hypotheses, they nevertheless 
tend to define and delimit the boundaries of future exploration. And 
people are not in general unbiased scientists (if extrapolation is made 
from Snyder'and Swann's, 1978, findings) in that they show a distinct 
tendency to search for supportive rather than refutational evidence 
regarding hypotheses in the field of interpersonal relationships. 
A number of writers appear to assume that clusters of constructs can 
be subsumed under a superordinate label which may never have been 
articulated by the respondento that is, factors derived from analysis 
6 
can be identified as representing superordinate constructs. Others 
label as superordinate that construct which has the highest number of 
significant correlations 
6i, Makhlouf-Norris et al (1970) develop 
the latter theme by claiming that correlational analysis of grid data 
allows the hierarchical level of constructs in the system to be 
assessed62. Correlational analysis, as was pointed out in Chapter 4, 
does nothing of the sort. Whilst it may indicate the degree of 
'overlap' between constructs in terms of shared variance, of itself it 
provides no direct evidence whatever about the implicative relationships 
involved, nor does it necessarily carry any implications about the 
relative importance of constructs to the respondent. Simply put, 
these authors are confusing structure and cluster. 
Sneath and Sokal (1973) make the point that clusters are generally 
based on phenetic resemblances and have no necessary phyletic 
connotations 
63. 
Pat terson(1982) makes it clear that the set- 
inclusions in cladistics (comparable to the situations where clustering 
dendrograms are 'cut off' at particular levels) can only give clues as 
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to possible phyletic relationships but make no specific claim for 
phylogeny: there can be many different 'trees' underneath any 
particular pattern of set inclusion. As far as biology is concerned, 
the structural relationships are almost invariably more complicated 
than the phenetic approach of Linnaean classification would suggest. 
The complexity of construct systems would suggest an extension of 
Pattersorn's point to repertory grid data. 
Patterson makes the further point that cladograms (cladistic 'trees') 
vary according to the level of the data that are used. If hominoids 
are classified at the level of observable physical features one obtains 
a different cladogram from that based on molecular data. In other 
words, there is a problem of deciding on the relevant features to be 
considered 
-a problem that users of repertory grids gloss over in 
their treatment of constructs as equivalent irrespective of their 
degree of superordinacy. 
A further confusion in interpretation derives from the failure of some 
authors to recognise the ambiguity inherent in the word 'hierarchy'. 
Applied to construct systems it implies the notion of superordinacy/ 
subordinacy, whereas when it is applied to cluster analysis it refers 
to the sequence of operations (divisive or agglomerative) undertaken 
in the search for the most informative way of clustering the cases 
being considered. With respect to cluster analysis, 'hierarchy' 
contains no necessary implications for superordinacy/subordinacy in 
the psychological sense. This confusion lies at the heart of Smith 
and Leach's (1972) investigations into cognitive complexity. They 
assume, following Kelly, a hierarchical organisation of construct 
systems but then use this as a justification for using Johnson's (1967) 
3 
cluster analysis on their correlation matrices because it 'provides a 
hierarchical picture of the way in which the constructs group 
together'6 
. 
In fact, they have fallen into the same trap as 
Makhlouf-Morris et al (1970), for Johnson's method is no more than a 
method of reducing the complexities of a correlation matrix to 
manageable proportions. Smith and Leach assumed that pairs of 
constructs were functionally equivalent when the correlations between 
them were significant at the 5 per cent level, and that such pairs 
could be collapsed into new single constructs. The new reduced 
correlation matrix was then subjected to cluster analysis, the 
assumption being made that if the fine detail of construct systems 
were more important for complexity the impoverishing of the grid 
matrix would have a more dramatic effect on the clustering of the 
elements for cognitively complex respondents 
- 
and thus lead to a new 
measure of cognitive complexity. The shaky foundations of this 
exercise, together with the slender relationship between their results 
and those based on the Biert et al (1966) measure of cognitive 
complexity (itself a dubious index), give few grounds for confidence 
that they found what they sought65. 
9.6.2 Aggregated grids 
Interpretation presents considerable problems when grid data collected 
individually is subjected to a nomothetic analysis. Both Slater (1977) 
and Shaw (198a)have developed programs which can compare individual 
grids and which can analyse aggregated grids66. Slater's PREFAN 
analysis, for example, aligns all the grids by element to give, in 
Harrison and Sarre's (1975) term, a 'supergrid' composed of a set of 
common elements and all the constructs produced by the respondents. 
The use of the routine implies that the elements are identical for 
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the respondents, but the output can still prove difficult to interpret 
when a long 'tail' of components each accounting for a small 
proportion of the variance is obtained. Riley and Palmer's (1976) 
study of the construing of 25 holiday resorts by 60 respondents 
resulted in a 25 x 672 grid which produced 24 principal components, 
the first six of which accounted for 16,11,10,6,5 and 4 per cent 
of the variance respectively (52 per cent of the total), and it is 
evident from their account that they were struggling to interpret 
this diffuse mass of data. 
Where elements are not identical for all respondents, such as when 
idiosyncratic nominalising of role titles is used (e. g. Langrish and 
Smith, 1979 ) the validity of PREFAN analysis is very much open to 
question. 
The extension of the 'supergrid' horizontally, by keeping the 
constructs constant whilst allowing the elements to vary from respond- 
ent to respondent, can be accommodated by Slater's ADELA program. 
Here the assumptions seem to be on shakier ground than in PREFAN 
analysis, since the constructs (which are already abstractions) are 
assumed to be commonly construed by all respondents. The polysemic 
character of language, and the individual differences of experience 
acknowledged in Kelly's Individuality Corollary, together make ADELA 
analysis a dubious undertaking. 
Grids in which both elements and constructs are supplied also make 
the massive assumptions of common experience and meaning, and these 
assumptions ars extended if the analysis seeks to extract regularities 
from the superimposed data matrices. 
-111A 
, FTw 
The problems associated with combining data are exemplified in a study, 
reported by Perrott et al (1976), which explored teachers' reactions 
to a self-instructional microteaching course on 'Effective questioning'. 
The teachers attended the course at one or other of two centres and, 
as part of the feedback procedures, were asked to complete a repertory 
grid in which seven people nominated in respect of role titles 
constituted the elements (Figure 9.4). 
1. Your on teaching as you see it now. 
2. Any teacher whose work you generally respect. 
3. Any specific teacher whose work you think is in general 
rather poor. 
4. Your own teaching as it was before the microteaching 
course. 
5,6. Two other specific teachers whose work you know. 
7. The sort of teacher the microteaching course seems to 
try to produce. 
Figure 9.4 Role specifications for the elements used in Perratt 
et al's (1976) evaluation of a microteaching course. 
The seven elements were then rated on fifteen supplied constructs 
which were presented in a semantic differential format. It was 
noted earlier that the constructs appear not to be closely related 
to the aims of the microteaching course, but rather to teaching at a 
more general leve167. 
Disregarding the problem of treating individual teachers and teaching 
as elements at the same level of abstraction, considerable difficulties 
present themselves when the authors' analytical procedure is examined. 
They first produced two 'average' grid matrices from the two centres 
and, on finding a high correlation between these 'average' grids, 
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decided to pool all the data into a single 'consensus' matrix which 
was then submitted to principal components analysis. It was found 
that the first two components accounted for 88 per cent of the total 
variation in average ratings, and these were interpreted as relating 
to 'professional competence' and 'degree of formality'. 
It is not surprising to find such a high percentage of the variance 
explained by the first two components, for the averaging procedure 
will have concealed variation at the individual level: the'average' 
grid represents the means of the ratings, but the importance of the 
standard deviations has been overlooked. Perron et al are also 
assuming the respondents' consensus regarding their understanding of 
the constructs and the equivalence of the respective elements. The 
former is questionable, the latter invalid. None of the seven 
elements is common to all the teachers 
- 
in fact, it is highly likely 
that each of the seven elements was unique to each individual. The 
diagram purporting to show the interrelationships between elements 
and constructs is therefore meaningless: there is surely no one point 
at which 'respected teacher', for example, can exist for all who 
completed the grids. A diffuse cloud drifting in the wind of social 
desirability would seem more likely to represent the reality of this 
data than a single J)oint in component space, though it would be 
probably no more helpful to the interpreter. And what is meant by 
the two points on the diagram representing elements 5 and 6 (two 
other specific teachers)? These completely defy interpretation, for 
they can in no way be termed the average teacher, or teachers in 
general 
. 
Their function in this research is unnecessary and 
totally redundant: perhaps they serve no more useful purpose than a 
coccyx on the evolutionary rump of Kelly's role titles. 
'111A 
rT"lj 
Had Slater's ADELA program(whioh aligns grids by common constructs) 
been available to Perrott et al, some of the above errors would have 
been avoided69 
- 
though the conceptualisation of the problem which 
they sought to investigate via grid methodology and the associated 
research design would still have remained open to question. 
It is perhaps unfair to single out this research paper for detailed 
criticism, save that it does highlight a number of traps for the grid 
user with a penchant for the nomothetic approach. Harrison and 
Sarre (1975) who investigated the construing of Bath by twenty female 
residents, also used a consensus matrix based on supplied elements 
(locations in the city) and constructs. In contrast to Perrott et al, 
their elements were common to all respondents. Not surprisingly, 
principal components analysis revealed a massive first component 
accounting for 79 per cent of the variance. Subsequent PREFAN 
analyses (using idiosyncratic constructs) gave a more meaningfully- 
interpreted output, the details of which are not of concern here. 
The tendency to work with averaged data has existed for a long time in 
psychological research and its normative nature is often unquestioned. 
This is not to attack 'mass' statistics as such, but to point out that 
the focus of the research is often ill-served by averaging the numbers 
collected: whilst the mean may be important, there is considerable 
interpretive value in the standard deviation. Thus Watson et al 
(1976), investigating stress in long-term prisoners, might well have 
obtained more understanding of the problem by looking at individual 
construing instead of aggregating ranked grid data to produce two 
major components accounting for 92.5 per cent of the variance. 
Similarly Jones et al (1980), in asking students and teachers to rate 
(on 33 supplied constructs) 16 vignettes of models of teaching derived 
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from Joyce and Weil (1972), lose the richness of the data gained by 
only analysing a matrix of median values. 
Though there have been sporadic papers in the literature pointing out 
the fallacy of averaging (e. g. Sidman, 1952 ; Bakan, 1954; Baloff and 
Becker, 1967) it is rare for a writer to have looked into the 
variations contained in the data and to have realised the implications 
of a nomothetic analysis. Stringer (1972), for instance, observes 
that the nomothetic analysis of grid data 'hid' a substantial number 
of deviant idiographic responses 
- 
in fact; ten out of 34 
- 
but he 
does not pursue the issue; and Katz (1982b), in a smaller-scale study 
of the relationship between physiology and construing, gives evidence 
showing that one response of five ran counter to the more general 
trend70. Whilst acknowledging that not all of their samples ran 
true to the trend of the majority, neither of these writers look for 
a superordinate explanation. 
At the level of theory du Mas (1955) is interested in the single case 
and discusses what he terms 'idiographic nomothesis', which amounts 
to the generalisation by averaging from the number of individual cases 
involved71. In Chapter 13 I argue that this type of approach to 
generalisation is inappropriate to studies in which the individual's 
construing or behaviour is the centre of interest and that research 
based on a personal construct position requires a radically different 
concept of generalisation. 
9.7 SOME FURTHER UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS OF GRID ANALYSIS 
A number of the problems already mentioned in this chapter remain 
unresolved in repertory grid work even though they have been 
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recognised by some researchers. There are, however, three further 
problems 
- 
there may well be more 
- 
associated with analysis that 
seem to have received little attention to date: the 'hairpin 
construct', highly correlated constructs and the inequivalence of 
constructs. 
9.7.1 The 'hairpin construct' 
The 'hairpin construct' is a construct which would probably find 
general acceptance as a 'straight' oppositional construct (likely to 
represent the scaling of an attribute) yet which can appear to be 
sharply bent when set alongside other constructs. Consider the 
construct 'extrovert-introvert', for example. Many people, to judge 
by the study of rating scales described in Chapter 8 (page 284f), 
appear to give the most positive valence to the middle of the construct 
on the ground that it (E+) represents some notion of normality, whilst 
both ends are negatively valenced (E-) in that extremes of personality 
are considered undesirable and perhaps pathological. This E-/»/E- 
'evaluative overlay' would seem to apply to many constructs (especially 
personality constructs) in which a 'happy medium' could be said to 
exist. 
Suppose now that the grid contains a number of constructs whose 
evaluative overlay is monotonic with the rating continuum (for 
examples 'conscientious 
- 
not conscientious'). Analysis treats the 
constructs as mathematical entities, aligning them according to the 
co-distributions of ratings: the situation is represented symbolically 
in Figure 9.5(a). 
But place an E-/E+ construct together with an E-/E+/E- construct in 
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the grid, and the evaluative relationship is more complex than the 
mathematical, yet the grid analysis will treat the E-/E+/E- construct 
as if it were E-/E+. Aligning the two constructs in terms of their 
valence shows how the E-/E+/E- construct bends to a hairpin under the 
pressure: this situation is symbolised in Figure 9.5(b). 
731 
Extrovert Introvert 
E- E+ E- 
76421 
Consc3en ous Not conscientious 
E+ E- 
(a) Symbolic representation of mathematical alignment 
7 Extrovert E- 
E*4 
1 Introvert E- 
Conscientious 76521 Not conscientious 
E+ E- 
(b) Symbolic representation of evaluative alignment. 
Figure 9.5 Ali ent of constructs according to the criterion 
of a) mathematics; (b) valence. 
The mathematical analysis will not 
- 
it cannot 
- 
reveal the evaluative 
relationships latent in the data. An orthogonal relationship is 
insufficient on its own to indicate whether there is a complex 
evaluative relationship underlying the mathematical calculations. 
It might be felt at this point that the argument is trivial, but it 
seems distinctly possible that the problem may pervade grid work 
involving 'person perception'72 and could extend further. Repertory 
grids dealing with children or teachers often focus on qualities, 
many of which have a simple evaluative structure monotonic with the 
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numerical scale being used. However, there are likely to be many 
instances where the mid-point is the most positively evaluated 
(perhaps particularly with respect to extremes of behaviour) and thus 
would render evaluative interpretations problematic. 
As cases in point, a number of the constructs supplied by Perrott. et 
al (1976) come into this category 
- 
for example, 'realistic-idealistic'; 
'pupils usually talking-pupils usually listening' and 'teacher 
controls course of discussion-pupils control course of discussion'73: 
it will be noted, in the light of Chapter 8, that none of these 
constructs has an easily-discerned oppositional evaluative structure. 
The problem of the 'hairpin construct' is, as far as I know, 
unresearched in repertory grid work since I first mentioned it 
(Yorke, 1978). A tentative solution advanced in that paper was to 
split the 'hairpin construct' at the middle and treat it as two 
separate halves at the cost of obtaining two vaguely defined poles 
at the point of severance. That solution did not go far enough, 
however, since it implicitly assumed that the researcher would know 
when the respondent was supplying a 'hairpin construct'. It would 
therefore seem desirable to ask the respondent where the most 
positively valenced and most negatively valenced points are on any 
construct, perhaps splitting potential 'hairpin constructs' into 
component parts. Though this practice remains somewhat crude the 
researcher can obtain some idea of how the respondent feels about 
the construct and the elements located on it, and it is likely to be 
rather simpler to use in practice than a technique such as Coombs's 
(1964) unfolding procedure74. 
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9.7.2 Highly correlated constructs 
Highly correlated constructs pose a problem for the grid analyst 
since it is difficult to determine the extent to which they are 
replicating the same information content, and hence to determine the 
degree of redundancy in the grid. 
When highly correlated constructs are present in the grid principal 
components analysis will reveal this through their loading heavily on 
to particular components (usually the first). There are obvious 
advantages in reducing the data matrix to a form that is more easily 
interpreted. The price to be paid may be the presence of a first 
component accounting for a large proportion of the variance, leaving 
other components to share out the residue. In the process of sharing 
out this residue such components (which might largely represent single 
constructs uncorrelated with the majority) could become underemphasised. 
The problem for the researcher is that he or she does not know whether 
the respondent really does construe the part of the world under 
investigation in a predominantly unidimensional way, or whether such 
unidimensionality has arisen as an artefact of methodology. 
Hierarchical cluster analysis of elements presents the problem less 
obviously. The closer the relationship between a group of constructs, 
the more this group will influence the dendrogram showing the element 
clustering. Not only could a cluster of elements appear 'tighter' 
than it might really be, but also the effect of construct inter- 
correlation could cause elements to be 'misclassified' into groups 
during the clustering routine. As with principal components analysis, 
there is no way of telling from statistical analysis whether the picture 
revealed by the computer is a fair representation or a distortion of 
the respondent's world. The two-way cluster analysis in Thomas and 
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Shaw's FOCUS program does reveal the high associations between 
constructs and between elements (the SPACED version highlighting the 
clusters visually), allowing the thoughtful researcher to ponder upon, 
say, the clustering of the elements in the light of construct inter- 
correlations. However, the determining effect of intercorrelations 
upon the output of the cluster analysis algorithm remains beneath 
the surface. 
The same problem exists with the 'cluster and profile' approach, 
more severely if no attempt is made to look at the interrelationships 
between the constructs. Hope (1969) argued for the variables 
(constructs) to be subjected to factor analysis and for taxonomic 
techniques to be used for the entities (elements). 'Cutting off' 
the hierarchical taxonomic analysis at a suitable point would enable 
profiles to be drawn, the variables being rearranged according to the 
outcomes of the factor analysis (in the interests of maximum clarity), 
This does not, of course, remove the problem of interpretation when 
highly correlated constructs are present in the grid. 
The essential point to be made here is that the grid, coupled with 
whichever form of statistical analysis is adopted, does not in itself 
provide the answer to this dilemma of interpretation. Again the need 
is emphasised for a more extended dialogue with the respondent than is 
likely to occur during the completion of a single grid, for the 
researcher will probably be unable to detect and probe high inter- 
correlations as the elicitation of the grid develops unless he or 
she is using an interactive computer program with the respondent. 
9.7.3 Construct equivalence/ineguivalence 
The analytical routines discussed in this chapter all weight the 
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constructs equally, yet it is apparent both from life-experience 
generally and from specific techniques such as resistance-to-change 
grids that some constructs weigh more heavily than others. There is 
a further problem in that, as Kelly recognises, construct systems are 
not rigid and fixed in their relationships but labile, their 
component constructs varying in importance depending on the 
circumstances75. 
Honikman (1976) found that occasionally a subordinate construct proved 
more important than others which were superordinate according to the 
canons of laddering 
76. Bearing in mind my earlier criticism of 
Hinkle for laddering in the abstract, it may be that Honikman's 
respondents were switching from an abstract (espoused) conceptual 
framework to a specific action-oriented framework (theory-in-use)77 
in which certain 'low-level' constructs emerged as salient and 
potential determinants of action 
- 
that is, the context promoted them 
to superordinacy78. Reflection on human action at points of crisis 
suggests that this is not an unreasonable interpretation 
- 
and that 
the 'elevated' constructs may be given a comparatively superordinate 
position in the 'espoused' system long after the precipitating event 
has passed. 
It is doubtful whether a useful distinction can be drawn between 
salient and superordinate constructs if both are seen in terms of 
having more implications for others than the reverse. One cannot 
draw a sharp contrast between 'espoused theory' and 'theory-in-use' 
in terms of action, for the giving of an espoused theory to an 
interviewer is itself an action governed by that particular context. 
If espoused theory and action are discrepant 
- 
as they may turn out 
356 
to be 
- 
then it is the case that construct systems are more unstable 
with respect to circumstances than the personal construct theorist, 
looking for something other than shifting sands in which to anchor 
a theoretical position, would prefer to admit. 
Although various attempts have been made to rank constructs in order 
of importance, or to rate their degree of importance,. the information 
seems not to have been incorporated into the analytical routines 
themselves. Some use has been made of weighting where research has 
been undertaken in the field of decision-making. McKnight (1977) 
managed to get seven respondents to work through an extremely lengthy 
protocol for determining their preferences for long-playing records 
In a variety of circumstances. Having completed this protocol, his 
respondents were asked to rank their elements in order according to 
each of the various purposes: from the four who completed the research 
task without interference from extraneous matters, McKnight obtained a 
series of correlations between 'protocol preference' and subjective 
ranking ranging from + 0.782 to + 0.976. He concluded that these 
correlations supported the preference-determining protocol he had 
used. One might be tempted to conclude, on the basis of these 
figures, that the simple subjective ranking procedure was (on the 
criterion of the effort needed to acquire the information) equally 
valid and distinctly preferable. 
McKnight's work related to element preference. In contrast, Gardiner 
and Edwards (1975) describe an approach to social decision-making which 
takes into account construct preference. They asked their respondents. 
to rank a number of constructs relating to property development (such 
as the area of the development in square feet, and the aesthetics of 
the development running on a subjective scale running from poor to 
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excellent), and then to transform the rankings to ratings on a scale 
ranging from 0 to 100 whilst trying to preserve preference ratios. 
Each construct's raw weight was then divided by the sum of weights 
for all constructs, giving each construct an individual percentage 
weight. Each proposed development (i. e. each element) was then 
rated on each construct (scaled from 0 to 100), and the utility of 
each proposal was calculated by summing its weighted ratings on each 
construct, each rating being multiplied by the weightings computed 
for the constructs. As with McKnight's work, the procedure is 
complex and time-consuming and is likely to find few adherents in 
repertory grid work. 
Preference does not necessarily imply superordinacy since the 
constructs could be subsumed ordinally (at the same level of 
abstraction) by the dimension of preference. Some connection may 
exist in a rather general way which may not be sustained in respect 
of individual cases. On the whole the issues of superordinacy, 
salience and preference have been neglected by the grid analysts 
- 
perhaps because of the complexity of the problems involved. Yet to 
fail to grapple with these problems is once again to miss an 
opportunity of enriching one's understanding of the data contained in 
the grid matrix. 
It may be that the answers to the problems of salience and super- 
ordinacy are not to be found in ever more sophisticated methods of 
analysis. It is necessary to treat analytical routines with a 
measure of circumspection, and to support these by an exploration with 
the respondents of the importance of elements and constructs. Though 
such information may be no more than qualitative, it may be sufficient 
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to give the researcher a level of understanding adequate to the 
purpose of the investigation. 
Sneath and Sokal (1973) make the point that a priori weighting is 
objectionable since it presupposes a sound basis for the weighting77. 
Unless the researcher can obtain a set of meaningful weightings in 
the course of administering the grid, it is probably least damaging 
to assume equivalence of weight. It could, however, lead to the 
sort of distortion that was earlier noted in respect of highly 
correlated constructs, and it would seem highly desirable that the 
'hard' assumption of weighting equivalence be softened for the 
purposes of interpretation as a result of using of appropriate 
questioning techniques during grid administration. 
9.8 CONCLUDING HERETICAL POSTSCRIPT 
As with the previous chapter it is possible to conclude by proposing 
an alternative view of analysis that threatens to undercut the typical 
discussion of the technicalities of analysing rating data, by question- 
ing the assumptions upon which it is predicated. 
In all the analytical techniques considered in this chapter there is 
an idiographic nomothesis78 in the sense that the individuals' 
constructs are treated as quasi-physical scales upon which an element 
can be located with a fair degree of accuracy. The problems this 
poses for meaning are strongly implied by Giorgi (1966) who writes 
that '... the transformation of an essentially qualitative phenomenon 
into a quantitative expression such as is done in many scaling 
, 
79 
techniques, does not capture the essence of the qualitative as such 
The argument set out at the end of Chapter 8 develops Giorgi's thesis 
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and suggests that the normative assumptions of scaling may be 
untenable, and that each construct may take on a meaning specifically 
related to its context: in other words, the event (i. e. the inter- 
section of element and construct system) is of critical importance in 
determining meaning. 
If the position is adopted that the meaning of a construct may only 
be understood by considering its contextual relationship with other 
constructs80, then it is not legitimate to talk of correlations (or 
other indices of association) between constructs since in repertory 
grid terms an event (the singularity defining the context) is 
represented by a single column in the matrix and hence no meaningful 
correlation or association between rows can exist. The rejoinder 
might be made that constructs are generalisable across elements, but 
this can be countered by arguing that the broader the range ä elements 
the less the commonality of meaning across them. 
The situation is symbolised in Figure 9.6. 
Y 
fi4 
X 
(i) Construct meaning 
in respect of a 
single element. 
(ii) The same nominal 
construct applied 
to two elements 
showing the core 
of common meaning 
(iii) As (ii), but 
involving three 
elements 
Figure 9.6 A symbolic representation of the decline of commonality 
of meaning as a nominally-constant construct is applied 
to an increasing number of elements. 
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Correlations computed to any number of significant figures cannot 
ultimately conceal the vagueness of such an indeterminate yardstick 
as that of a non-physical construct treated as if it were a physical 
scale. 
If events are given primacy over the generalising of constructs, it 
becomes much more important to focus upon the implicative relationships 
between the relevant constructs in a system. Hinkle's implications 
grids fail in this respect since they treat constructs nomothetically 
(and as if they held their meaning static) in an indeterminate 
context: I would argue that relationships between constructs cannot 
generally be established in the abstract81 and that in order to 
complete an implications grid the respondent has to invent a context 
- 
and this may vary markedly during the course of filling the 
implications matrix. 
It is at this point that Eden's work makes a strong claim for 
attention. Working as a management consultant, Eden has perforce 
been faced with his clients' construing of particular problematic 
situations and so his method of approach reflects the uniqueness of 
the 'event' or situation. Constructs are elicited with reference to 
the specific problem at hand and to institutional factors such as 
norms and constraints. This is not to claim that the individual is 
construing without a personal nomothetic frame of reference, for if 
- 
following Posch 
- 
construing makes reference to 'prototypes' abstracted 
from experience, any new experience will be related to a greater or 
less extent to the relevant prototypes contained in long-term memory 
(and will ultimately exert its own influence upon the store of 
prototypes). 
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Eden's work clearly treats each situation being construed as a 
historical event with a unique and complex concatenation of 
antecedents. It implies that repertory grid methodology er se 
is fundamentally misconceived, and hence that the currently available 
modes of analysis are grounded on a fiction too insubstantial to 
sustain the pressure of forensic examination. Insufficient evidence 
is available to come to a firm decision as to which pole of the 
opposition'construct nomothesis 
- 
construct singularity' is the more 
appropriate for the researcher to choose, or whether some pragmatically 
intermediate 'ideal point' can be found. The challenge posed by 
this postscript to the main discussion in this chapter highlights 
the taken-for-grantedness of much that is done in repertory grid 
methodology. It will have served a useful purpose if it stimulates 
the grid users' critical senses. 
9.9 SUMMARY 
Rather than concern itself with a detailed appraisal of the currently 
available methods of grid analysis, this chapter has sought to explore 
some of the underlying problems. Slater's INGRID, Thomas and Shaw's 
FOCUS, and 'cluster and profile' were examined from the perspective 
of an inquiry into their assumptive bases: each was shown to embed 
a different subset of analytical assumptions and to exhibit 
particular strengths and weaknesses. Computer analysis of grids is 
generally vulnerable to the effects of missing data, and it also runs 
the risk of being treated as 'hard' and objective despite the 
researcher's awareness of the limitations of whichever diagrammatic 
representation of relationships is employed. The conclusion was 
drawn that analytical output in itself is of limited value and requires 
inference and further exploration of the maximum is to be extracted 
from the data available. 
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As far as the interpretation of analytical output is concerned, this 
needs to be undertaken with more care than some researchers have 
hitherto given it (as witness the failure to distinguish between the 
meaning of 'hierarchy' as applied to construct systems and to cluster 
analysis). Problems which have gone largely unrecognised are those 
of the 'hairpin' construct, of high intercorrelations between 
constructs, and of indeterminacy of the hierarchical levels of any 
particular construct. 
The problems of analysing and interpreting idiographic data are 
compounded when they are aggregated to-produce nomothetic conclusions, 
and it was argued that such a procedure is at best simplistic and at 
worst misleading. 
The chapter concluded by advancing a view of analysis (based on the 
'alternative' perspective on rating put forward at the end of Chapter 
8) which challenges grid methodology and analysis at a level much 
deeper than would arguients about how to tinker with statistical 
techniques in order to produce a superior output. This challenge, 
whilst consistent with the broad brush strokes of Personal Construct 
Theory, suggests a dimension of debate hitherto neglected in repertory 
grid methodology. 
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10 Stability 
Since 'tis Nature's law to change, 
Constancy alone is strange. 
J. Wilmot, Earl of Rochester 
A dialogue between Strephon and 
Daphne, I: 31 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is invalid to talk of 'the reliability of the grid'1. Writers on 
the subject of reliability point out that the variations possible in 
grid content preclude the establishment of a reliability coefficient 
for the grid. The reliability of a grid must necessarily be determined 
with reference to the context of its use. This statement is no 
different from statements on reliability made in other contexts: as 
Guilford and Fruchter (1973) put it, writing with psychological test- 
ing in mind, 'One should speak of the reliability of a certain 
instrument applied to a certain population under certain conditions'2. 
That there is a wide range of conditions under which repertory grids 
have been used is attested by the research discussed in previous 
chapters: however, the notion of 'population' merits further consider- 
ation. At one level it can be taken to refer to the totality of a 
group presumed to be homogeneous, such as thought-disordered 
schizophrenics or head teachers in comprehensive schools. To use 
'population' in this way is, in research terms, often to imply the 
drawing of a sample from that population with a view to generalising 
the research findings from the sample to the population from which it 
was drawn. Snow (1974), for example, has emphasised practical 
difficulties of sampling and generalisation3, and the arguments he 
develops call in question the uncritical use of psychological instru- 
ments for nomothetic purposes. As far as repertory grids are 
concerned, it will have become clear from the preceding chapters that 
there exists a case for a radical scepticism, based upon both 
conceptual and practical considerations, regarding the nomothetic use 
of grids in most circumstances. 
But in repertory grids 'population' can be construed in a more limited, 
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idiographic sense. It can be argued that any construct system must 
contain a finite 
- 
if indeterminate 
- 
number of constructs, and that 
a repertory grid samples this idiosyncratic population. As with the 
nomothetic aspects of sampling and generalisation, the validity of the 
sample of elements and/or constructs appearing in any grid is indeter- 
minate. However, in the case of individuals there is a greater 
opportunity to cross-check the sample (for instance, through 
conversational approaches) to enable some qualitative estimate of face 
validity to be made. 
Bannister and Mair (1968) use the term 'population' in a still more 
restricted sense when they treat the responses in a grid as a 
population5. There would seem to be nothing wrong in so doing, 
provided that the data is treated as complete in itself and is not 
used as the basis for inferring generalisations. However, the 
practical realities of grid use would suggest that inferential inter- 
pretation is a likely consequence of a grid analysis. It seems 
reasonable to argue that the validity of interpretation of a grid 
analysis would generally be higher when the respondent's construct 
system is allowed to contribute to the interpretation, rather than 
when the statistical relationships are subsumed solely by the 
construct system of the researcher. 
The reliability of grid measurements reflects this last notion of 
population. Guilford and Fruchter (1973) identify three different 
approaches to assessing the reliability of a test. 
(a) computing the internal consistency of a test taken on a 
single occasion; 
(b) comparing results from parallel (alternate) forms of the 
test; and 
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(c) comparing results from the same test taken on more than 
one occasion6. 
Of these three, internal consistency would seem to be inapplicable to 
repertory grids on account of their likely heterogeneity of content 
and hence the impossibility of identifying comparable 'split halves'. 
A case can be made for 'parallel form' reliability calculations, 
particularly where equivalent sets of elements are being employed7, but 
to judge from the literature the main emphasis on reliability in grid 
methodology has related to the stability of various measures over time; 
that is, test 
- 
retest reliability. 
10.2 RELIABILITY AND PERSONAL CONSTRUCT HEORY 
Before examining some of the literature relating to reliability in 
repertory grids it is worth spending a little while looking at the 
issue of reliability from the standpoint of Personal Construct Theory. 
Kelly sees people as 'a form of motion'8, implying that physical and 
mental change are a normal state of affairs 
- 
in sharp contrast with 
homeostatic conceptions of the person. It is not implied here that 
change is random, for such would destroy the purposive, anticipatory 
character of human behaviour: as Hampshire (1959) observes, there 
must be a certain minimum of consistency and regularity in behaviour 
for human action to be accounted intentional 
9. 
The implications for reliability are clear. It is not to be expected 
that identical 
- 
or, acknowledging the likelihood of 'experimental 
error', nearly identical 
- 
grid responses will be obtained whether 
either parallel forms of the grid are used or the same grid is used 
on two or more occasions, for both would reflect a homeostatic 
perspective. As Bannister and Mair (1968) put it, the notion of 
reliability should be construed in terms of predictable stability and 
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predictable change 
101 in other-words, very high reliability 
coefficients should not generally be anticipated in research based 
upon Personal Construct Theory. The problem then is whether a low 
reliability coefficient implies unreliability in the use of the grid 
technique itself, or whether it is a valid indicator of change in the 
person concernedll 
Be that as it may, it does not alter the fact that, within a Personal 
Construct Theory framework, both stability and change have their place. 
MaIr (1970) suggests that stability might be studied by encouraging 
movement and seeing what stays still 
12: 
there are arguments both for 
and against such an idea. But it has to be remembered that stability 
itself ban be deceptive. Slater (1972) makes the point that inter- 
correlations in the grid can remain stable provided that change on the 
related variables has taken place in a consistent manner across all of 
them13. Stability may be present according to one index whilst the 
test-retest reliability may be low. Slater's point calls to mind the 
constant level of the Liberal Party's support in Britain during the 
mid-1960's, in which opinion poll findings were actually masking a 
dynamic equilibrium between a large influx and a large efflux of 
supportl4ý 
It is possible to consider the reliability of ratings across a grid as 
a whole 
- 
indeed, this is discussed at various points during this 
chapter 
- 
but from the point of view of understanding what the 
respondent is saying it may be preferable to 'partition' the grid 
responses into areas of stability and areas of change. The partition- 
ing might highlight change on particular elements and/or constructs, but 
is not necessarily limited to the rows and columns of the grid: 
individual grid cells may exhibit psychologically significant change 
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against a background of stability. 
Reliability can be construed in terms of the respondent's ability to 
reproduce on a subsequent occasion the lists of elements and/or 
constructs already elicited. Some discussion of this aspect of 
reliability was presented in Chapter 5 (elements) and Chapter 6 
(constructs) and the matter will not be considered further here. 
In this chapter attention is given to 'test-retest' and 'parallel form' 
stability since these can be used (with a range of validities) in grid- 
based research. Missing data continues to present problems for the 
grid user, and an alternative approach to overall grid stability is 
discussed. A small-scale comparison of grid stability indexes is 
presented, and the chapter ends with a discussion and summary of 
factors which are likely to affect stability. 
10.3 TEST-RETEST STABILITY 
Although the majority of research into the reliability of grid measures 
has been devoted to test-retest reliability, the evidence is rather 
difficult to weigh. This is because a wide range of grid-based 
indexes has been used, making meaningful comparison problematic. 
A full analysis of the issues involved is beyond the scope of the 
present work: what is offered in this section is a summary of some of 
the main findings from the literature together with a preliminary attempt 
to draw some general 
- 
albeit tentative 
- 
conclusions from what is a 
very diverse collection of information. Given the argument presented 
in the preceding section, I use the term 'stability' rather than 
'reliability' in that it does not have the latter's somewhat pejorative 
connotations regarding the undesirability of change. 
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Bannister suggests a consistency score pertaining to the stability with 
which the rank order of construct interrelationship is maintained over 
time15. In an experiment reported by Bannister and Mair (1968) 
respondents were asked to rank fifteen common objects on six supplied 
bipolar constructs relating to physical attributes, and ten photographs 
of people on six supplied unipolar constructs relating to personal 
attributes. On retesting after a period of six weeks the mean 
consistency score for objects was + 0.93 and for photographs + 0.86. 
However, in a further study involving fifteen photographs the mean 
consistency score over six weeks was only + 0.56. Bannister and Mair 
surmise that many of their respondents may have been unable to use 
personal attribute constructs on a task requiring such fine dis- 
criminationi6. It might also be suggested that the ranking of photo- 
graphs of unknown people is open to considerable 'error variance' on 
the grounds of 'element vagueness' even though the constructs being 
used might be fairly well internalised. Whilst some elements may 
'stand out' as extremes in relation to particular constructs (and thus 
be consistently ranked low or high), those in the middle of the range 
may well be subject to shifts in construing and hence their rank 
ordering might tend towards random. The greater the number of 
'middling' elements in the set, the more likely it seems that the high 
stability in construing the 'end' elements would be undercut by near- 
random shifts in construing in the middle of the order: an explanation 
of this type would appear superior in accounting for the results. 
Although most work on consistency has referred to the pattern of 
construct interrelationships (perhaps because of the predominant interest 
in construct systems as such17), there is no reason why such an approach 
to stability should not be used in respect of element interrelationships. 
Fransella and Joyston-Bechal (1971) used both measures in a year-long 
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study of a psychotherapy group which involved five administrations of 
a grid whose eight elements were (for each person) 'self' and the seven 
other patients, and for which twenty constructs were supplied. The 
authors found that, although there was no significant change in 
construct pattern consistency, element consistency showed marked 
changes; the suggestion is made that the construing of individuals had 
changed markedly with time whilst the individuals' construct systems 
remained relatively unchanged. 
Reid (1976) suggested that the issue of element and construct stability 
might be clarified by classifying elements and constructs in terms of 
their stability over a number of administrations. He proposed three 
categories of element or construct : stable, transitional and unstable. 
Stability was associated with the sequential replication of ratings to 
a statistically significant level, whereas instability was associated 
with sequential inconsistency as judged by the same criterion. 
'Transitional' elements and constructs were defined as those which, 
whilst exhibiting consistency in early and late grid administrations, 
nevertheless showed a discontinuity in the middle of the sequence. 
Using this classification (which appears to be something of an over- 
simplification), Reid showed that constructs relating to people tended 
to be more stable than the construing of the individual people them- 
selves18, thus paralleling the findings of Ftcansella and Joyston-Bechal 
(1971). 
Gathercole et al (1970) also used consistency scores as the index of 
test-retest stability. Using 8x8 grids with either acquaintances 
or photographs of people as elements, and either supplied or elicited 
constructs, they found a range of consistency scores from + 0.08 to 
+ 0.91 (median + 0.72) from their 53 respondents. They also found 
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that test-retest consistency was higher for supplied rather than 
elicited constructs (though this is confounded with the types of 
respondent used), but unfortunately they did not investigate whether 
the type of element used might have had an influence on the consistency 
scores. Gathercole et al's procedure, which also incorporated a study 
of parallel-form stability, involved each of their subjects in complet- 
ing three grids in a single session: in other words, the interval 
between test and retest was very short. Lansdown (1975), who 
investigated consistency over time using 8x8 grids with 59 children 
aged nine to eleven, found that two thirds of his sample had consistency 
scores greater than 0.70. Approximately one third of Lansdown's 
sample were retested on the same day (it was more often than not the 
case that the retesting took place within 30 minutes), the retesting 
of the remainder being largely completed during the subsequent week. 
As one might expect, Lansdown found a negative rank correlation 
(rho 
=-0.35) between consistency and time to retesting. 
Slater (1972) devised a coefficient of convergence designed to be more 
generally applicable than Bannister's consistency score: where both 
can be used Slater indicates that the two indexes are likely to have 
similar values. Slater's DELTA program, on the other hand, computes 
(as the general degree of correlation between two grids) a kind of 
element consistency score rather than one of construct consistency. 
Watson et al (1976) used this latter index in their study of long-term 
prisoners, finding (for the 32 who completed two grids) a range of 
element consistencies from + 0.30 to + 1.00 (mean + 0.74). Orley 
(1976) reported that seven out of ten DELTA consistencies were higher 
than + 0.60, the remaining values being + 0.55, + 0.21 and + 0.03. 
Stability indexes based on the Bieri et al (1966) grid measure of 
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cognitive complexity have frequently appeared in the literature despite 
the considerable uncertainty regarding what cognitive complexity might 
be. Bieri's (1955) original study of cognitive complexity involved 
retesting at the end of the same experimental session in which the 
original grids were completed. In this study ten bipolar constructs 
were elicited, the elements being ten acquaintances selected on the 
basis of role titles19. Bieri found an overall reliability of + 0.78, 
which seems to have been broadly replicated in other studies in which 
the retest took place after an interval of one week (e. g. Tripodi and 
Bieri, 1963: reliability + 0.86 for supplied constructs, + 0.76 for 
elicited constructs; Tripodi and Bieri, 1964: average reliability + 0.71). 
Vacc and Vacc (1973), using a modification of the standard Bieri grid 
with children aged seven to eight, found a reliability of + 0.82 - 
though when the instrument was tested on two samples of college 
students the cognitive complexity scores correlated only + 0.51 and 
+ 0.55 with those from the standard Bieri grid. Schneier (1979) 
showed that for a substantial sample of students (N = 176) and managers 
(N 
= 37), results from the Bieri grid (modified in the light of Vannoy's, 
1965, critique) gave reliability coefficients of + 0.54 and + 0.82 
respectively. The sting in the tail of these findings was that the 
Bieri/Vannoy measures only correlated + 0.08 with those from the 
standard Bieri grid! 
Bavelas et al (1976), in a study of a wide range of grid-based scores, 
found a reliability for the standard Bieri grid of + 0.67. The 
reliability of most of the other grid-based measures employed by these 
researchers did not decline over a three-week period (judging by cross- 
sectional evidence) and ranged between + 0.26 and + 0.66 (median + 0.53). 
However, it i not clear to what many of these measures were actually 
related. The difficulty of interpreting this study is compounded by 
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the authors' idiosyncratic reading of Kellian theory and by errors in 
their statistical reasoning. 
The findings of Bavelas et al however, seem in broad agreement with 
those obtained earlier by Mair and Boyd (1967) when they collected 
test-retest data in respect of both split-half and ranked grids, the 
interval between the two grid administrations being two weeks. Mean 
test-retest correlations for the relationships between each of the 
three whole-figure constructs 'like self', 'like father' and 'like 
mother' and the remaining constructs in the grid ranged from + 0.43 to 
+ 0.72. However, at the level of the individual construer there was 
a range of stabilities from 
- 
0.56 to + 0.93" 
Other work which has a bearing on test-retest stability tends to 
support rather moderate values. Hayden et al (1977) used a repertory 
grid with thirty emotionally disturbed boys in residential treatment, 
in which the elements were photographs of a boy working on a block- 
design puzzle. Constructs were elicited regarding the boy's feelings 
or thoughts, and the photographs were then rated on each construct, 
Repeating the ratings with the same elements and constructs produced a 
reliability of + 0.489 which the authors described as 'satisfactory' 
in the circumstances. Caine and Smail (1969) found an average element 
rank stability of + 0.68 in terms of hysteroid-obsessoid traits 
paralleling those contained in the Hysteroid-Obsessoid Questionnaire. 
Whilst there is a problem in comparing the two instruments since the 
actual tasks differ, the grid stability compares unfavourably with the 
+ 0.93 of the Questionnaire. Finally, Frost and Braine (1967) report 
'satisfactory' levels of test-retest reliability in the field of market 
research. No figures are given in their account which is of interest 
only in that the retest procedure required the sorting of the constructs 
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in terms of the elements 
- 
although the test and retest grid matrices 
would have been in the same form, the route by which the retest grids 
were obtained was very different from that leading to the production of 
the original grids. 
On the evidence presented here mean test-retest stabilities would seem 
to be moderate, spreading about a median value of the order of + 0.60. 
At the level of the individual the variation in test-retest stability 
is very wide, and this again calls in question the practice of averag- 
ing data nomothetically. 
10.4 PARALLEL-FORM STABILITY 
There are two practical ways of assessing parallel form stability in 
repertory grid work: either one may 'fix' the constructs and vary the 
elements according to some criterion of parallelism, or one may 'fix' 
the elements whilst varying the constructs20. Taking the latter first, 
it seems unlikely that an argument for 'construct parallelism' can 
sustain a scrutiny which would point to the variations due to both 
idiosyncracy and cultural polysemy: validity in these circumstances 
would appear to be irredeemably compromised. At best, this deficiency 
can be partially rectified by allowing the respondent to select the 
parallel forms to be used, but it remains improbable that such nominal 
parallelism would be justified in practice. Referring to 'equivalent 
form' reliability, Bannister and Mair (1968) are surely overoptimistic 
when they remark that it is 'reasonable to regard different sets of 
constructs as equivalent, in the sense that they are a "fair sample" 
of the system'21 
. 
Whilst they are aware that stability coefficients 
calculated on this basis would have structural rather than content 
implications, it seems unlikely that such an index would have a great 
deal of meaning. 
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Calculations of stability would seem to be on less uncertain ground 
where the constructs are 'fixed' and parallel sets of elements are 
used. In repertory grids parallel sets of elements often seem to 
consist of photographs of unknown people or people nominated by the 
respondent according to lists of role titles. Evidence regarding 
such stability coefficients is relatively sparse. 
Bannister and Mair (1968) report a reanalysis of work conducted by 
Bannister (1965) in which eighteen 'normal' respondents were asked to 
rank, on six supplied unipolar constructs, ten photographs of people 
unknown to them; the whole process was repeated twenty times over ten 
days with different photographs being used on. each occasion. Bannister 
was interested in the effects of validation and invalidation on the 
'construct pattern' (i. e. the interrelationships between constructs), 
and showed that the validational fortune of respondents was reflected 
in the stabilities of their construct patterns. However, it is 
Bannister's third group of six respondents (who were given no 
information regarding the accuracy of their judgments) whose results 
are of particular interest here. Bannister calculated for each 
individual a set of 19 mean reliability coefficients by relating each 
test to its immediate successor, and he found a range of stabilities 
between + 0.04 and + 0.78 (grand mean + 0.585). 
Work which Bannister and Mair (1968) conducted using as elements 15 
common objects (ranked on six supplied 'physical' bipolar constructs) 
and 10 photographs of people (ranked on six supplied unipolar constructs 
relating to personal attributes) gave mean parallel-form stabilities 
of + 0.92 and + 0.72 respectively, the interval between testing being 
six weeks. In another study involving 15 photographs of people the 
stability fell to + 0.54: reasons for this drop in stability were 
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suggested in the previous section22. 
Gathercole et al (1970), whose work regarding test-retest stability 
was also mentioned in the preceding section, investigated parallel-form 
stability using 8x8 ranked grids in which the elements were either 
photographs of people or persons named in response to a list of role 
titles. Where those of their 53 respondents were 'vormals', construct 
were elicited; where they were psychiatric in-patients, the constructs 
were supplied. Parallel-form stabilities based on consistency scores 
ranged from 
- 
0.16 to + 0.88 (median + 0.66), these being marginally 
lower than those found in respect of test-retest stability. It was 
also found that, for both parallel-form and test-retest stabilities, 
the consistency scores were significantly higher when the constructs 
were supplied rather than elicited. The authors make the suggestion 
that, as the supplied constructs were highly evaluative, they may have 
been easier to construe. No evidence is presented regarding the 
comparison of the supplied with the elicited constructs, but if the 
former happened to stimulate greater 'evaluative spread' in the 
respondents' minds (untypical of research on extremity of rating, but 
not impossible), then ranking of the elements might have been more 
definite and less susceptible to 'error variance'23. 
Element consistency was measured in a different way by Sperlinger 
(1976), whose reliability figure of + 0.95 after an average interval 
of 7.7 months has been widely quoted in the literature. Unfortunately 
it is not always made clear that this coefficient relates to the 
distances (computed by an early version of Slater's INGRID program) 
between 'self' and eleven other elements based on the role titles and 
that a fresh set of constructs was elicited on the second occasion. 
One would expect intuitively that distances would be high and stable 
377 
with respect to elements such as 'former close friend' and 'person who 
is hard to get along with', and low for elements of positive affect. 
And when it is realised that Sperlinger is presenting not the 
individuals' distance measures but a mean value from 25 respondents in 
the first test and from 18 in the second, it is probable that a lot of 
individuals' variance has been left by the wayside 
- 
in fact, the 
standard deviations of each set of distances (of the order of 0.25 
where the means themselves average slightly less than 1.0) suggest 
that this is the case. It seems probable that Sperlinger has 
identified a reliable nomothetic tendency for people to be psychologic- 
ally close to those they like and relatively distant from those with 
whom they feel uncomfortable. 
The more important of Sperlinger's findings seem to have been consistent- 
ly overlooked, these being based on the correlations (Pearson r) 
between the two sets of 'self' 
- 
'other' distances for each of the 18 
individuals who completed both grids. Sperlinger reports here an 
average correlation of + 0.57. It is to be regretted that he does not 
give a fuller set of data: he indicates that eleven correlations were 
significant beyond the 0.05 level, that three others were 'quite high' 
and that the remaining four ranged between 
- 
0.06 and + 0.18. It would 
seem that Sperlinger's findings are of a similar order to those obtained 
by Gathercole et al (1970) although the two studies used different grid 
measures and stability indices. 
As with test-retest stability, parallel form stabilities seem, on the 
whole, to be moderate and to centre upon a median value of the order of 
+ 0.60. 
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10.5 TEST-RETEST AND PARALLEL-FORM STABILITY: A CONCLUDING COMMENT 
The heterogeneity of construct dimensions would appear to rule out of 
consideration any form of internal consistency measure, and hence 
attention has been focused upon test-retest and parallel-form 
stabilities. The advantages and disadvantages of each are well 
documented in the psychometric literature 
24 
, 
and it is not proposed to 
repeat these here. 
The results discussed in the two preceding sections are not markedly 
inconsistent with Fransella and Bannister's (1977) review of the 
literature regarding construct pattern consistency which suggests a 
typical range of + 0.60 to + 0.80 for both test-retest and parallel- 
form measures. The implication of these findings is that generalisation 
from one set of elements or constructs to another is suspect. 
The stability levels reported here would appear to be lower than those 
recorded for many psychometric tests, and this may reflect a tendency 
for grid elements and constructs-to be less stable than test items, 
even when they are nominally identical on successive occasions. The 
potential for variation would seem to be greater for constructs than 
for elements, since constructs are more open to 'movement' within their 
meaning complexes. Where elements are not physical entities (such as 
photographs or recollected people), their potential for variation 
would appear to approach that of constructs. A grid stability index, 
then, is open to the indeterminate effects of element, construct, and 
element X construct interaction variance: whether reliabilities of 
the order quoted are satisfactory is a matter for the researcher's 
judgment. 
As a form of test which elicits aspects of the respondent's world view, 
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this level of reliability would appear insufficient to sustain any 
conclusions based on a single grid administration. It would seem 
preferable to treat each grid as a limited snapshot needing supporting 
information to provide a qualitative check on the reliability of its 
contents. With such an approach the researcher might choose to use 
the grid as an indicator of potentially fruitful avenues of inquiry 
rather than as an end in itself. 
Where a respondent completes more than one grid, the overall stability 
index may be of less interest than the patterns of stability and 
change. This may require analysis at the level of row or column, or 
even at that of individual cells. The difficulty is that the research- 
er will find it difficult to partition the observed change between 
that due to the administration of the earlier grid in any pair, and 
that due to those events extraneous to the grid procedure whose 
meanings the researcher is trying to tap. Respondents sometimes 
claim that the administration of a repertory grid causes them to think 
in new ways about the subject under investigation, as both Olson (1980a) 
and I have found. Reid (1976) goes a little further when he remarks 
that grid procedures are as likely to precipitate changes in construing 
as to measure them25. 
Further, it is difficult to determine whether (in test-retest terms) 
the respondent has reappraised the elements in the light of unchanged 
constructs or has reconstrued the constructs (despite using the sane 
labels) and relocated 'fixed' elements upon them. (It may be, of 
course, that both types of shift contribute to grid instability). 
Where the respondent provides a different set of constructs on a 
readministration of a grid, there is the additional difficulty of 
trying to determine whether the second set of constructs represents 
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a new and distinctive sample from a stable system or whether 
instability in inter-element distances is an indicator of important 
changes in the construer's system. 
Where feedback is provided after a grid has been administered it is 
likely to diminish stability: Hopwood and Keen (1978) claim to have 
observed this in respect of TARGET grids, though the incompleteness 
of their statistical data does not allow an estimate to be made regard- 
ing the magnitude of the effect. 
If there is one main point to be made regarding stability in repertory 
grids, it is that stability cannot be treated in a simplistic manner. 
10.6 THE PROBLEM OF MISSING DATA 
This section runs the risk of being construed simplistically in that 
it focuses on technique rather than on meaning. However, it is a risk 
that has to be run if the problem of missing data 
- 
which is largely 
overlooked in the literature 
- 
is to be addressed. 
Elements falling outside the range of convenience of a construct or 
capable of being assigned to both poles pose a threat to stability 
coefficients. More generally, the wide range of possible mid-points 
on a bipolar scale (see page 293f) is likely to present difficulties - 
in terms of meaning, if not in terms. of mathematics. Fjeld and 
Landfield (1961) did recognise problems of this sort in their study of 
personal construct consistency and used, in contrast to Kelly's 
dichotomous procedure, a four-category scheme for the allocation of 15 
elements (acquaintances) on 15 elicited constructs. As well as allow- 
ing respondents to allocate the elements to whichever pole best 
described them, Fjeld and Landfield made available the additional 
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categories 'not able to decide' and 'not applicable'. Retesting after 
two weeks produced 83 per cent agreement in allocations and a high 
contingency coefficient of + 0.80. 
Fjeld and Landfield's approach would seem to be valuable where there 
are 'gaps' in the grid matrix, whether these gaps arise deliberately 
or by accident. It suggests that, in these circumstances at least, 
a stability index based upon comparisons of equivalent cells in 'test' 
and 'retest' grids might be generally useful. This could provide a 
general indication of stability in the grid as a whole,: and could be 
applied on a 'per-element' or 'per construct' basis to indicate the 
pattern of stability and change in the grid. 
It might be suggested (following Fjeld and Iandfield's study) that 
the contingency coefficient might be suitable, using an (n + 1) x 
(n + 1) contingency table to relate the two distributions of ratings, 
where n is the number of rating intervals. It would often be 
necessary to include an extra row and column to cater for blank cells. 
This presents the first problems often the number of blank cells is 
small and this would produce a table with too many low expected 
frequencies. The second problem is similar in that, unless the 
number of elements and/or constructs is large compared to the number 
of rating intervals, there will be too few instances per cell. This 
second problem can be countered by 'collapsing' the rating intervals 
- 
but at the expense of some sensitivity in the data. On the whole, 
these points militate against the use of the contingency coefficient 
in most circumstances. 
In her study of student teachers' construing before, during and after 
teaching practice Pope (1977) used an index based on comparisons 
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between individual grid cells, to which she gave the acronym CHAT 
(changing after teaching). She calculated the change for each cell in 
each grid, ignoring the sign of the difference, and summed these changes 
in order to obtain a percentage change score in which actual change was 
26 
related to maximum possible change Reanalysis of some of Pope's 
data shows that she overlooked the influence of the ratings in the 
original grid on the maximum change possible. 
The maximum possible change on a scale is a function of the extremity 
of the original rating. Thus, for a five-point scale such as Pope 
used, the position can be shown as below: 
ORIGINAL RATING 5 4 3 2 1 
MAXIMUM POSSIBLE CHANGE 3 2 3 4 
Pope's assumption that all possible changes were at the maximum value 
led her to underestimate slightly the proportion of change in her 
respondents' grids (and, for the purposes of the discussion here, to 
overestimate the stability)27. The point is illustrated in Figure 10.1 
28 
which draws on data provided by Pope's Student No. 19. The coeffic- 
ients are converted to decimal proportions here in order to remain 
consistent with standard practice in reporting stability coefficients. 
Measure Grid 2-Grid 1 Grid 3-Grid 2 Grid 3-Grid 1 
CHAT change score 0.10 0.09 0.14 
Corrected CHAT 
change score 0.13 0.13 0.17 
Corrected stability 0.87 0.87 0.83 
Figure 10.1 CHAT scores and stabilities for Student No. 19. (Original data, from Pope, 19771 225). 
Pope appears to have had few, if any, problems with 'gaps' in her 
grids. This may have been because she required the elimination of 
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constructs from consideration if they could not subsume the disparate 
ranges of elements elicited. In my own work using situations as 
elements there were a number of instances in which an element fell 
outside the range of convenience of a construct. Rather than 
eliminate rows or columns in the analysis, and wishing to gain an 
indication of the stability of the data collected, it was necessary 
for me to devise an index of stability that could be used where 'gaps' 
existed in the data (and the gaps were not necessarily in the same 
cells in repeat grids). Accordingly, and independently of Pope, the 
stability index based on 'per cell' comparisons with original grid 
ratings was used as an indication of the overall stability of the grid 
ratings. 
The design of my research required that an initial grid be completed 
as soon as possible in the first term of the science teachers' 
probationary year, a second grid (using the same elements but a new 6 
set of elicited constructs) being completed as late as possible in the 
third term. The test-retest stabilities were determined for both of 
these administrations after roughly four days by asking the respondents 
to complete a postal version of their original grid. This clearly 
could not be administered in an identical manner to the original grid, 
but the style of presentation adopted was as close as possible to that 
previously used despite the absence of a live administrator. 
At the beginning of the probationers' first academic year, stabilities 
calculated on the basis of change per cell (eliminating any pair of 
cells in which there was at least one blank) produced fourteen 
coefficients ranging from 0.66 to 0.81 (median 0.75). At the end of 
the year the same group of teachers (apart from one who had left his 
school and two who did not complete the second retest grid) produced 
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eleven coefficients ranging from 0.69 to 0.87 (median 0.81). Treating 
rating consistency as the dependent variable, and ignoring the changes 
in elicited constructs between the beginning and end of the year, the 
change in stability for the eleven respondents who completed all four 
grids was statistically significant (Wilcoxon test: T=8; N= 10; 
p<0.05)29. No a Priori hypothesis had been advanced in respect of 
any change in stability being a function of time. One possible a 
posteriori explanation'is that familiarity with the grid procedure 
might have reduced the 'error variance' of what to the uninitiated 
might initially have appeared as a complex and perhaps confusing task. 
Another possible explanation is that a year's experience might have 
crystallised the teachers' construings of science teaching and so 
have enabled them to be more definite and consistent in their ratings. 
Repeating the procedure with experienced teachers might allow a 
judgment to be made between the two suggested explanations (and others), 
but the problems of meaning-shift in nominally identical constructs or 
of using a different set of constructs on each occasion would not make 
that judgment easy. 
As a side-issue to this investigation into grid stability it was 
recognised that test-retest comparisons could be undertaken on a 'per- 
element' or 'per construct' basis. In Chapter 9 it was argued that 
the city-block metric (effectively the metric used in the calculation 
of whole-grid stabilities) was less suitable than the Euclidean distance 
when looking for the more important changes in grids. It might be felt 
that this position is inconsistent with that adopted in respect of 
whole-grid stability, but the distinction is defended here by pointing 
to the two different types of question being asked of the data. The 
whole-grid stability index is a response to the question 'Given a set 
of grid ratings, to what extent are these replicable? ', whilst the 
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identification of element or construct change is a response to the 
question 'In respect of which elements (or constructs) is the respondent 
tending to fluctuate most widely? ' 
The question of whether different types of element may be associated 
with different levels of grid stability was discussed in Chapter 5 
(page 193') in respect of an investigation which I conducted. It 
suffices here to reiterate the finding that when the elements were 
pupils chosen by their teachers the stability index was significantly 
higher than when the elements were either specific teaching situations 
from personal experience or general teaching situations ( Smirnov 
test: both p values less than 0.05, one tailed, )31 The results 
are summarised in Figure 10.2. 
NUMBER OF RANGE OF STABILITY MEDIAN STABILITY 
TYPE OF ELEMENT RESPONDENTS COEFFICIENTS COEFFICIENT 
Pupils 9 0.83 to 0.89 0.87 
Specific teaching situations 7 0.74 to 0.90 0.83 
General teaching situations 4 0.55 to 0.83 0.81k 
Figure 10.2 Stability coefficients for different types of element, 
constructs having been elicited from respondents. (* signifies the arithmetic mean of the two central 
coefficients) 
The coefficients in respect of pupils shown in Figure 10.2 are broadly 
similar to those obtained in an earlier investigation whose primary 
focus was not upon stability although the data collected allowed 
stability coefficients to be calculated32. The respondents in this 
case were ten serving teachers undertaking an in-service B. Ed. course 
who were asked to name ten pupils as elements, from which sets of 
constructs were elicited. The respondentsthen rated the pupils on 
each of their constructs, the rating procedure being repeated seven 
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days later. The stability coefficients ranged from 0.75 to 0.92 
(median 0.855), one of the lower coefficients being suspected to be 
an underestimate in that it appeared that reversal of the poles of 
one construct had occurred unnoticed during the second rating. 
10.7 STABILITY INDEXES: A SMALL SCALE COMPARISON 
In the previous section I argued for the advantage of a stability 
index based upon 'per cell' comparisons on the grounds that it could 
maximise the use of the data when there were blank cells in one or 
other (or both) of the grid matrices. The collection of the ten 
pairs of grids mentioned in the preceding paragraph made it possible 
to undertake a comparison of a 'per cell' index with three indexes 
currently available; namely, Bannister's consistency score15, Slater's 
coefficient of convergence (as computed in his COIN and NEW COIN 
programs), and Slater's general degree of correlation (as computed in 
his DELTA program)33. 
The above four stability indexes were calculated for each pair of grids, 
fourteen of the 126 constructs being eliminated from consideration 
because of blank cells34. The indexes are given in Appendix 12 s 
it is sufficient for my purposes here to present in Figure 10.3 the 
correlation matrix for the four sets of indexes. 
Bannister 'Per cell' Coeff. of 
consistency index convergence 
'Per cell' index 0.51 
Coefficient of convergence 0.96 0.53 
General degree of correlation 0.75 0.92 0.80 
Figure 10.3 Correlations between four stability indexes. 
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Whilst there is a high positive correlation between the Bannister 
consistency score and the coefficient of convergence (congruent with 
the value of 0.943 quoted by Slater in respect of 46 grids35), their 
separate low correlations with the 'per cell' index necessitate a 
further analysis. 
One of the ten grids exhibited what was almost certainly a reversal of 
the rating scale for one construct, giving it a markedly low Bannister 
consistency and coefficient of convergence, 0.50 and 0.49 respectively. 
In contrast, the 'per cell' index for this grid was 0.84 and the 
general degree of correlation was 0.71, the former being in the middle 
of the range of 'per cell' stabilities36. On removing the 'offending' 
construct from that grid, the four indexes became 
Bannister consistency 0.96 
Coefficient of convergence 0.96 
'Per cell' index 0.89 
General degree of correlation 0.89 
The evidence suggests that the Bannister consistency and the coefficient 
of convergence are particularly vulnerable to inadvertent construct 
reversal because of their methods of computation. Briefly, a half- 
matrix of inter-construct rank correlations (Bannister) or distances 
(convergence) is produced for each of the two grids, the relevant index 
being computed as the correlation between the two sets of rankings or 
distances. If, as in this case, one construct out of eleven is 
reversed on one of the two occasions, its ten relational measures with 
the other constructs will be out of kilter with the remaining 45 (with 
eleven constructs in all, there are 55 inter-construct measures). 
With such a high proportion of 'aberrant' values, both the Bannister 
consistency and the coefficient of convergence are likely to be sharply 
lowered37. The cumulation of variance and covariance of the aligned 
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constructs in computing Slater's general degree of correlation seems to 
make this index less vulnerable to the effects of construct reversal. 
However, the 'per cell' index, which takes each pair of ratings as 
separate, is the least vulnerable of the four indexes considered. 
Since reversal can occur with part-constructs as well as with whole 
constructs it would seem that neither the Bannister consistency score 
nor the coefficient of convergence are sufficiently robust to give the 
grid user a meaningful indication of the general degree of stability 
in the grid. The evidence presented here indicates that the argument 
for the 'per cell' index has the greatest strength, particularly when 
its capacity for coping with blank cells is taken into account. 
10.8 SOME FACTORS WHICH MAY AFFECT STABILITY 
The less than definite title to this section is indicative of a number 
of aspects of repertory grid methodology which may have a bearing on 
the stability to be expected in grid measures, yet to which little 
attention has been given. In consequence, the discussion at this 
point is speculative rather than definitive. 
10.8.1 Rapport 
Where grids are completed on an individual basis the degree of rapport 
between researcher and respondent may influence the contents of the 
grid. To draw on personal experience, I found it easy to establish a 
rapport with some of the science teachers and yet with others I would 
have to acknowledge that the relationship was more distant whilst still 
being friendly. One woman (Ms. A) found the grid administration an 
opportunity to 'talk through' aspects of science teaching which 
appeared to be of considerable concern to her. She was very willing 
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to co-operate in completing the grid and embellished the constructs 
and elements with comments (given in confidence) on the school and 
individual colleagues. A lot of thought went into this particular 
15 x 15 grid (which took 70 minutes to complete), and I have to admit 
that I am uncertain as to that proportion of it represented new 
structuring of constructs as opposed to the reiteration of previously 
stored structuring. 
In contrast, Mr. B completed a grid of 15 elements x 17 elicited 
constructs in the short time of 50 minutes. The rating pattern showed 
high extremity, but my subjective feeling here was that this reflected 
a lack of involvement, a 'hurrying to get it over', rather than the 
high involvement that the literature on extremity of rating would 
suggest. On readministering the grid at the end of the year, a 
similar reaction was obtained. 
These two instances represent, subjectively, the extreme cases among 
the fourteen science teachers with whom I worked. The stabilities of 
the three grids involved (Ms. A did not complete a 'retest' of her 
second grid) were: 
Ms. A Grid I+0.81 
Mr. B Grid I+0.76 Grid II + 0.69 
These figures are an inadequate basis on which to claim a positive 
relationship between degree of rapport and stability, though one might 
speculate that a link might exist from rapport through commitment to 
the task to stability. It is worth noting that the stability of Mr. 
B's second grid was markedly lower than any other second grid stability, 
and that he was one of only two teachers whose stability coefficients 
were lower on the second occasion. 
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Unlike many inventories and schedules, the repertory grid is 
comparatively difficult to 'fake', and it seems improbable that much 
deliberate faking occurs during the completion of grids. This is a 
different matter from the carelessness born of indifference, to which 
some reference has already been made. It would seem reasonable to 
conclude at this stage that the quality of the interaction between the 
researcher and respondent is likely to have an influence on the latter's 
commitment and carefulness, and hence indirectly upon the stability of 
the measures contained in the grid. 
10.8.2 Loose construing 
Loose construing is likely to contribute to grid instatýility. Whilst 
most researchers (following Kelly38) have looked at loose construing 
from the point of view of the movement of elements on constructs 
(perhaps because the latter were insufficiently specific), the case 
was argued in Chapter 5 that 'element fuzziness' or complexity might 
contribute to the problem as well39. Pope (1977) provides good 
examples of both from her research with student teachers: a sample 
is given below 
40. 
Student No. 4. '... sometimes look at it from one view and 
put it in one place, and then from another 
viewpoint you could put it somewhere else. ' 
Student No. 15. '... in the gaps between one grid and the 
next you tend to forget if some of the 
constructs were ambiguous. ' 
Student No. 24. '.., sentence too short 
- 
couldn't remember 
what was meant by each construct. ' 
Looseness of construing is also reported by Tippett and Silber (1965) 
who found their respondents to flick between alternative facets of the 
definition of a personality trait 
41. 
Interpreting 'traits' as 
'constructs' indicates the polysernic character of the latter and hence 
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implies the possibility of instability in their use. 
Where elements are relatively unfamiliar it is likely that they will 
be instable components of the grid. Though the issue is 
. 
(as far as 
I know) unresearched, one might anticipate that the ratings of 
relatively unfamiliar people chosen to fit given role titles would be 
less stable than those of people who are very familiar to the 
respondent. If such an effect exists it might be expected to appear 
at its greatest in dichotomous grids where no mid-point provides a 
haven for all those elements not easily subsumed under one pole or the 
other. Photographs of unknown people would seem prone to a similar 
indeterminacy, particularly where their features are not construed as 
representative of extreme positions on constructs. The sharp decline 
in stability of the rankings of photographs when the number of elements 
increased from ten to fifteen (Bannister and Mair, 1968) was earlier 
interpreted as being possibly due to uncertainty of rating elements 
which did not appear to be extreme in respect of the construct being 
used42. It is not at all evident (in constrast to the authors' 
suggestion) that it is the respondents' powers of discrimination that 
are at fault, since it can be counter-argued that photographs provide 
inadequate evidence for anyone to make meaningful and stable judgments 
regarding personality. A task such as this is in no way commensurate 
with the task of ranking fifteen named common objects on six constructs 
relating to physical attributes. 
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10.8.3 Extremity of rating 
The literature suggests that extreme ratings tend to be more stable 
than those nearer to the mid-point of a scale, and the discussion in 
the preceding paragraph is consistent with such a thesis. Evidence 
for the thesis comes not only from experiments with 'physical' stimuli 
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(such as Erlksen and Hake's, 1957, work on judgments of the size of a 
sequence of squares), but also from the field of social judgment 
(exemplified here by Miller and Bieri, 1963, who provided trainee 
social workers with brief case vignettes and found that judgments 
were more reliable in respect of two 'extreme' 
44), 
Support from grid work for a connection between extremity of rating 
and stability is given by A. Ryle (1975), who tested the hypothesis 
that constructs with the highest variance in a grid would be more 
resistant to change (i. e. be more stable) than those of low variance. 
Nineteen respondents completed pairs of grids, the intervals between 
the grids ranging from twelve to twenty months. Instead of testing 
the stability of all the constructs, Ryle chose a questionable method 
of testing this hypothesis in that he took the three most stable and 
the three least stable constructs (judged on the basis of the 
consistency of the elements' ratings) and looked back to the first 
grid to see the proportion of the variance for which each accounted. 
He found that the more stable constructs accounted for a higher 
proportion of the grid variance in fourteen of the nineteen cases 
considered45. 
Bannister and Mair (1968) discuss, under the heading of 'Construct 
variance', what at first sight appears to be cognate evidence. 
However, a closer inspection reveals that their discussion (of a 
reanalysis of work by Bannister and of a subsequent paper by Mair and 
Boyd, 1967) refers to the stability of inter-construct relationships 
46 
and not to the stability of constructs themselves. Further, it is 
probably inappropriate to compare these two studies since B miister 
and Mair appear to have used a "whole matrix" approach to relationship 
stability, whilst Mair and Boyd employed as a criterion the stability 
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of match of each construct with the single referent construct 'like I 
am . 
47. It may be the case that some relationship does exist between 
the variance associated with individual constructs and that of construct 
matching scores, but on the evidence presented by the respective authors 
its strength is indeterminate. 
The limited evidence reviewed abtve suggests that there might be some 
validity in the extremity-stability hypothesis in respect of repertory 
grid work. It can be plausibly argued that high variance (or 
extremity of rating 
4-8) 
on a construct implies that the respondent wishes, 
and is able, to make a substantial number of discriminations using the 
full range of the scale. Those elements allocated to extreme positions 
are likely to remain there or thereabouts over time, whilst those in 
middling positions might (but would not necessarily) fluctuate in a 
manner approaching randomness. An element at the end of a scale, 
although theoretically 'free' to move the full length of the scale, is 
only able to move in one direction (and typically this movement is 
small) since there is no scope to give a rating more extreme than the 
end of the scale. The ratings of elements near the end of a scale 
might fluctuate randomly where all the elements are clustered together 
- 
that is, when rating extremity is high and construct variance is low. 
On the argument presented here, the construct with high variance is 
likely to be 'locked' into high variance by stability at the ends, 
irrespective of fluctuations around the mid-point. Where the 
construct's variance is low, such 'end-locking' is likely to contribute 
in smaller proportion towards the overall stability of that construct, 
making the stability coefficient more vulnerable to ratings near the 
mean. 
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However, the argument is an oversimplification because it neglects the 
influence of meaning upon the construct dimension,. Central ratings do 
not necessarily fluctuate in a near-random manner: for instance, if 
the mid-point of a construct is meaningful for the respondent 
49 
1, 
ratings in that region could remain stable and the construct as a whole 
exhibit high stability even if it did not account for a particularly 
large amount of the variance in the grid. In Section 8.3.7 it was 
argued that there were many possible ways in which bipolar scales 
might be used, each with a different "semantic metric", and it may be 
that a connection between extremity of rating and stability exists in 
respect of some types of construct but not others (depending on the 
way the construct is used in practice). Moreover, extremity does not 
necessarily imply stability: Mr B's two grids were notable for the 
extremity of their rating (the most extreme of the sample on both 
occasions), yet the stability of his ratings on the second occasion 
was the lowest by a substantial margin 
So what is the status of the extremity-stability hypothesis? 
Two sets of grids which I elicited shed a little light on the problem51. 
High positive correlations were found between the average construct 
variance per grid on two occasions of testing for 
(i) 11 science teachers, grids approximately seven months apart, 
same elements, different constructs (r =+0.92, p 
-C. 01); and 
(ii) 10 in-service B. Ed. students, grids one week apart, same 
elements, same constructs (r =+0.95, p x. 01) 
These findings strongly suggest a consistency of rating style, taking 
each whole grid as the unit of measurement. Within individuals, the 
B. Ed. students exhibited more variation in construct variance when the 
construct was taken as the basis of measurement, the correlations 
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between the sets of construct variances on the two occasions ranging 
from 
- 
0.51 to + 0.74 (median + 0.51). 
When, for each individual, the correlation between construct variance 
in the first grid and an index of change per construct was calculated, 
in each of the three sets of grids a wide range of coefficients was 
obtained centring near to zero (see Figure 10.4) 
SET OF GRIDS N RANGE MEDIAN 
Science teachers, occasion 1 14 
- 
0.61 to + 0.30 
- 
0.04 
Science teachers, occasion 2 11 
- 
0.74 to + 0.62 + 0.04 
In-service B. Ed students 10 
- 
0.71 to + 0.68 
- 
0.10 
Figure 10.4 Correlations between construct variance in the first 
grid and change per construct. 
Note: negative correlations axe consistent with the 
extremity/stability hypothesis since 'change' is an 
inverse function of stability. 
The data presented in Figure 10.4 conceal the levels of the two 
variables concerned 
-a well known fault of the product-moment 
correlation coefficient. Thus grids with high overall construct 
variances could be highly stable without this being detected in 
idiographic correlations, since individual construct variances could 
be consistently high yet not be systematically related to individual 
construct stabilities (or changes). At the nomothetic level, however, 
a non-significant association was found (for the in-service B. Ed. 
students) between average construct variance per first grid and whole- 
grid stability (r =+0.33). A weaker association was found in 
respect of the first pairs of grids completed by the science teachers 
(r 
=+0.23, n. s. ), but even this low figure was not sustained on the 
second occasion (r 0.05, n. s. ). In other words, in the circum- 
stances of these empirical studies there is little evidence for a 
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general relationship between extremity of rating and stability. 
The evidence from this limited study suggests that, whilst respondents 
are likely to be consistent in their style of rating, on the whole 
they may be much less consistent in the way in which ratings are 
allocated. Only one of the eleven science teachers who completed two 
sets of me/post grids evidenced stable rating behaviour that is 
consistent with the extremity-stability hypothesis. It would appear 
that the connection between extremity and stability 
- 
if such exists 
- 
is much more complex than may be commonly supposed, perhaps involving 
parameters such as rating style, number of elements to be rated, length 
of the rating scale and the respondent's construing regarding the 
semantic and psychometric characteristics of the scale. 
It is clear that, as far as the stability of grid data is concerned, 
the researcher needs a finely-tuned ear to detect the signals among 
the noise. 
10.9 STABILITY: SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS. 
It is difficult to draw firm conclusions from what is a diverse 
collection of stability coefficients obtained under very varied 
circumstances: the variation between the studies reported here and 
the range of different grids used militate against trying to establish 
some kind of norm for repertory grid work. The objectives associated 
with repertory grid use also influence the way in which a stability 
coefficient is used: for example, if the research involves the study 
of change in an individual or group over a period of time, then overall 
stability may be less important than the identification of where change 
takes place. To make such a point is not to dismiss the importance 
of stability Per se for, as was observed at the beginning of this 
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chapter, some stability is essential to provide a ground against which 
the figure of movement may stand out. In other words, stability has 
to be construed within the context of the research being undertaken. 
That said, what are the main trends to be detected in studies which 
bear on the issue of stability? Since most of the evidence relates 
to short-term stability, the question can only be answered within that 
further limitation. The following points are suggested by the 
evidence. 
(i) Stability tends to be raised when the context of the 
rating procedure is clearly defined. 
(ii) Stability tends to be raised when the elements are 
familiar or relatively simple to construe. (Familiar 
elements include well-known acquaintances and relatives, 
and common objects. Common objects may also be simple 
to construe, particularly with respect to 'physical' 
dimensions. ) 
(iii) Stability tends to be raised when constructs are 
personally meaningful. 
(iv) Stability tends to be raised when constructs are deeply 
culture-embedded; that is, when there appears to be a 
broad consensus regarding meaning (even though this 
consensus might break down under the pressure of probing). 
(v) Stability tends to be raised when respondents are allowed 
to indicate that elements fall outside the range of 
convenience of constructs (for example, by leaving blanks). 
(vi) Grid administration on an individual basis is likely to 
reduce errors in completing the grid matrix and hence 
enhance stability. 
52 
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(vii) Test-retest and parallel-form stabilities tend to be of 
an equivalent order of magnitude under equivalent 
conditions 
- 
cf points (i) to (vi) above. Median values 
appear to be moderate. 
(viii) Individuals appear to exhibit stability in rating style. 
(ix) Extreme ratings do not appear to be directly related 
with stability (in contrast to the 'received view' in 
the literature). 
When the conditions (i) to (vi) do not obtain, stability is likely to 
be lowered. The demands of research may require a compromise to be 
reached regarding some of the points listed above, in which case the 
identification, of areas of potential weakness may enable some estimate 
of error 
- 
albeit subjective 
- 
to be made. A question which seems to 
be rarely asked of stability data is that of the psychological 
significance of the change and/or stability detected in the grid 
matrix, yet this might be more important than attaining stability 
values normally deemed appropriate to a good psychometric test. 
Consistency for consistency's sake, as Emerson might have put it, is 
the hobgoblin of little minds. 
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11 The intolerable wrestle 
Words, meanings, and the repertory grid 
The imperfect is our paradise. 
Note that, in this bitterness, delight, 
Since the imperfect is so hot in us, 
Lies in flawed words and stubborn sounds. 
W. Stevens 
The poems of our climate 
11.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the discussion of the Construction Corollary1 Kelly was taken to 
task for his failure to take account of the crucial role of language 
in construing (though he does acknowledge, in passing, a cultural 
relativism2). It may be that language was, for Kelly, a truly 
transparent templet through which he viewed his world3. Perhaps it 
was such a commonplace that he failed to recognise it for what it was, 
like the 'blind' observers of the postman-murderer in G. K. Chesterton's 
story. 
The theme of this chapter, then, is the exploration of the relation- 
ship between language and construing, particular emphasis being given 
to the standing of that relationship in the context of grid methodology. 
It is only now that the hints and guesses contained in the earlier 
chapters can be drawn together; faint beams of light brought to a 
focus by the lens of linguistic theorising. Properly, this is a 
large undertaking, and it is not possible here to do more than give 
a few indications of the linguistic factors which I believe research 
within the framework of Personal Construct Theory needs to acknowledge. 
For me, this chapter is the necessary link between the critique of 
theory and method already set out and the possible developments essayed 
in Chapter 13. 
11.2 LINGUISTIC RELATIVISM 
At a number of points in his writing Kelly claims that people create 
their own ways of seeing the world which they experience; these are 
their frameworks for construing, or construct systems. Construct 
systems are developed through experience. Kelly's emphasis here is on 
the anticipatory, purposive aspects of behaviour, and the determinism 
of a person's history is noticeably underplayed5. Though Kelly does 
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not use the terms in 'The Psychology of Personal Constructs', his view 
that a person can use construing to gain freedom for the self and can 
make free choices suggests that he is close to the notion of the 
autonomous ego or the self-actualizing person6; his is a Romantic 
position that is open to challenge in the light of sociolinguistic 
theorising. 
Kelly never fully explores the implications of the cultural relativism 
whose existence he recognised, perhaps because his opposition to 
behaviourism led him to reject looking at a person as 'a lump of 
matter shaped by the happenings of the past'?. Yet at the same time 
as he was writing, linguistic relativism was well established in 
America through the work of linguists such as Sapir and Whorf8. 
Chomsky's transformational grammar had not yet threatened the position 
of the linguistic relativists (a threat which in retrospect seems to 
have evaporated with the realisation that Chomskian syntagmatics and 
the semantics of linguistic relativism deal with largely different 
aspects of linguistics)9. 
Some writers have sought to weaken the Sapir-Wharf theory of linguistic 
relativism. Brown and Lenneberg (1954), for instance, argue that 
Americans can 
- 
like the Eskimos 
- 
discriminate between three types 
of snow if they are forced to do it10. The point they miss is that 
normatively the discrimination is unimportant to most Americans: that 
they can discriminate if they need to (but typically do not) is 
evidence for relativism, rather than against it. Cole and Scribner 
(1974) are prepared to accept only a weak. relativism on the grounds 
that language is a less powerful factor in constraints on perception 
and thought than Whorf believed to be the case. More recently 
ll 
J. R. Anderson (1980) has taken a stronger position: though he 
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recognises that language can influence people he sees this in terms 
of the communication of ideas and not as a determinant of the ideas 
12 
that can be thought about. 
Concurrently with attacks on linguistic relativism, others 
- 
for 
instance, Gadamer (1975 *) and Lacan (1977*) 
- 
have pressed its cause 
much more strongly than Whorf. Gadamer, following von Humboldt, 
writes: 
'Language is not just one of man's possessions in the 
world, but on it depends the fact that man has a 
world at all. ' 13 
and Lacan (surprisingly laconically for him) puts it: 
'The world of words creates the world of things'. 
14 
Corroboration of the power of language to determine the ways in which 
people construe events comes from work across a broad range of settings15. 
Freire (1972) shows how language is involved in the oppression of 
subjects within state systems; feminist writers such as Daly (1979*), 
Miller and Swift (1979*) and Spender (1980) point to the power of male- 
dominated language to place women in an inferior position in society; 
Berger (1972) shows how a radically different critique of art can be 
mounted once the traditional language categories of appreciation are 
replaced; du Preez (1979) indicates the National Party's subtle shift 
in political terminology from that of racial discrimination to that of 
national self-determination of ethnic groups in South Africa; Kuhn 
(1970) chronicles the power of 'normal science' to influence the content 
and methodology of scientific research: the list could be extended 
indefinitely16. The balance of evidence presented here is consonant 
with Peters's (197+) opinion that 'our minds are mainly social products'17, 
a perspective which underpins Berger and Luckmann's (1967) thesis of 
18 
the social construction of reality. 
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At the level of individual construing an early experiment by Dearborn 
(1910) is of interest, in which he conducted an introspectionist 
investigation of similarity and difference in the perception of 
inkblots. He recorded that all but one of his twenty subjects 'made 
no progress in characterising the norm-blot to themselves until words 
had arisen in their minds to make its character or characters definite 
and sharp. He further remarked that the process of cognition '19 
'does not ordinarily find issue until the actual word symbolic of a 
concept is fairly clear in consciousness'20. Dearborn's findings 
bear out G iddens's (1976) conclusion that intentionality (in the 
phenomenological sense) cannot be seen as an expression of an 
ineffable world of private mental experience, but should be construed 
21 
. 
as necessarily grounded in the communicative categories of language. 
Language is a 'third universe' midway between the phenomenal reality 
of empirical experience and the internalised structuring of 
consciousness 
22. Its formal symbolism is thus a limiting factor in 
respect both of what people can construe and of what they can 
communicate to others23. This is not to claim some kind of Platonic 
purity for language, for it is a socially constructed universe open to 
the influence of those who use it 
- 
as witness the propagandist who 
talks of 'clean bombs', thus allowing the juxtaposition of terms to 
24 imply the attribution of moral and physical integrity to destruction. 
This 'third universe' subsumes the series of commonsense constructs 
that Schütz (1962*)sees social scientists as using to pre-select and 
pre-interpret the world; it provides the 'givsnness' of the world25. 
Schütz contrasts the social scientist with the natural scientist who 
(in Schütz's view) defines 
- 
according to the procedural rules of the 
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science 
- 
and determines the facts, data and events relevant to the 
purpose in hand. The contradiction expressed here exposes the 
autonomy of the scientist as a fiction: pressed hard, it is difficult 
for the notions of autonomous ego or transcendental self to be sustained 
in any human context. Wilden (1980) makes the point tartly that 'the 
traditional epistemology of the life and human sciences is founded on 
an essentially religious belief in the real existence of such popular 
fictions as the "autonomous ego" 
.... 
[which] necessarily generates a 
further fiction, essential to its own survival'26. 
Seen in this light the importance of language to Personal Construct 
Theory is obvious. Personal construing is influenced strongly by 
language27: in its strongest form this is stated in the structuralist 
claim that 'the language speaks us'. Research within a construct 
theory framework neglects at its peril the contribution of language. 
The fragmented nature of the linguistic components of repertory grids 
poses a palpable threat to the validity of conclusions drawn from 
grid-based research. 
11.3 THE REPERTORY GRID: A LINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVE 
In Chapter 4 it was suggested that the labels typically used in 
repertory grids were impoverished fragments of language, and possessing 
an indefinite set of connotative meanings28. Since researcher and 
respondent will hold different meaning-complexes for each fragment, 
the researcher's inferences may not correspond to the respondent's 
communicative intention. In such circumstances the amplification of 
verbal labels by conversation (or other means) was seen as essential. 
My critique of the repertory grid would be seriously deficient if the 
linguistic aspects of construing were neglected. In this section I 
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consider the semiotics of individual words and then broaden the 
discussion to semantics. Taken together, these two strands of 
argument lead to a further consideration of grid methodology. 
Peirce suggested a threefold division of signs in terms of 
(i) icon (directly representative of that being signified); 
(ii) index (indicative of the presence of the signified); and 
(iii) symbol (learned, rule-like associations between the 
signifier and the signified). 29 
As far as grid work is concerned, the last of these 
- 
the symbol- 
is of greatest importance, for most constructs are related by 
convention to the qualities, attributes and such that they signify 
and do not generally possess iconic or indexical features. 
Saussure (1974. *) emphasised the distinction between the 'signifier' 
(the acoustic image) and the 'signified' (the concept). Both of these 
are abstract psychological representations, the former of the phonetic 
aspect of the word and the latter of 
- 
in Kellian terms 
- 
the element 
or constructs together they make up a unified piece of knowledge 
- 
the unity of the sign. Saussure realises that, on its own, this is 
not enough, for the meaning of any signification is determined by its 
relationship with other terms. Part of the meaning of, say, 'dinghy' 
resides in the fact that it is not a liner, a power boat, a houseboat, 
and so on: it is a member of a 'contrastive set' (Miller and Johnson- 
Laird, 1976). But a dinghy also has features appropriate to a dinghy, 
such as sails, centreboard and tiller 
- 
here a link with Rosch's work 
on prototypes suggests itself. A 'concrete' object such as a 
particular dinghy is not at first sight the best basis for an argument 
which will need to consider adjectival 'signifieds'; however, it serves 
well enough as a point of departure. 
4,06 
The difficulty in dealing with abstract terms is that the relationship 
between signifier and signified becomes more complex than a one-to-one 
denotative correspondence. The adjectival signifier is very often 
not anchored to a single sense-datum but is defined by its location 
in a connotative mesh of similarly functioning terms. These terms may 
stand in different implicative positions vis 'd-vis the articulated 
signifier: in a weak sense they may be regarded as 'signifieds', 
though once they are brought to consciousness they become in effect 
further signifiers and riffling through the pages of the personal 
construct dictionary becomes a limitless exercise. For the purpose 
of the present argument the articulated signifier will be treated as 
connoting an indefinite set of signifieds whose further relationships 
are acknowledged but will not be discussed. 
Even this oversimplification is sufficient to indicate the problem 
facing the grid user. If, for example, I construe someone as 
introverted I may have used this term to signify a meaning-complex of 
attributes including being broody, self-analytic, introspective, 
solitary, withdrawn, egotistic 
.... 
It may be that only a sample of 
this indefinite set is sufficient for me to make the judgment of 
introversion. Alternatively, different samples of the indefinite set 
(or differential weightings of all set members) may be sufficient to 
characterise a range of acquaintances as introverted: 'introverted' 
is therefore overdetermined by its connotations. 
Constructs may well overlap. 'Selfish' might connote self-indulgent, 
egotistic, mean, stingy 
... 
and so on. If it appears in the same 
grid as 'introverted', there could be an overlap of meaning via 
'egotistic'. This would result in a 'natural' correlation whose value 
would be governed by the subjective influence of 'egotistic'. Not all 
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constructs will overlap (even though they may derive their meanings 
contrastively from each other), but work in the area of personality 
such as implicit personality theory) indicates that a complex over- 
lapping system of constructs is very likely to exist. As was noted 
earlier, the network relationships are not necessarily on a single 
hierarchical level. Having articulated 'introverted' and used it in 
a grid, the respondent may become aware of the connoted 'broody', 
name this as a new signifier, and use it in the grid. Implicative 
relationships of this sort become very difficult to identify by 
statistical analysis, and it is necessary to probe further through 
the use of language (it being an irony that the complexity of language 
produces the problem in the first place). 
Accepting into the grid labels such as single adjectives or short 
phrases, the researcher is faced with a problem of meaning, which can 
be subdivided into the following components. 
(i) The verbal label is a cover for a range of connotative 
meanings. 
(ii) The researcher cannot tell which of the connotative 
meanings underpin the use of the construct in the 
circumstances being studied, nor assess the weightings 
which might apply to each. 
(iii) The connoted meanings and their weightings might well 
vary according to the element being construed (i. e. 
element x construct interaction). 
(iv) 'Connotation', in common usage, is an ambiguous 
concept capable of subsuming both associative meanings 
and defining attributes30. 
(v) The researcher has his or her own set of connotative 
meanings, which places a limitation on inference from 
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the label provided by the respondent. 
(vi) Both researcher and respondent operate within sets 
of socially constructed meanings (which may or may 
not be coextensive), over each of which has been 
laid a symbolic idiolect born of individual experience 
within the social world. 
The richness of language derives from connotative rather than denotative 
meaning31 and, as Richards (1942) once put it, a word can be seen as a 
set of possibilities of understanding32. The analysis laid out above 
bears out Campbell (1969) in his assertion that the smaller the 
linguistic fragment, the more equivocal is the meaning33. 
Saussure made the important distinction between 'langue' and 'parole', 
the former being the culturally-established language and the latter 
being (somewhat loosely) language-in-use. In the grid the link between 
respondent and researcher is made through the normative aspects of 
language, filtered by the researcher's on construct system (and 
limited by social conventions and expectancies)34. This can be 
expected to introduce a measure of distortion whose extent is likely 
to be a function of the cultural matching between the two individuals 
involved. 
I shall give the grid the benefit of the doubt at this point and ignore 
the problem of cultural disjunction between researcher and respondent 
whilst recognising the potential difficulties involved. The Point I 
want to make here is that the grid is likely to lead the researcher to 
interpret the information provided by the respondent in normative 
terms. 'Extrovert', 'happy', 'loving', 'stingy', 'cynical; for 
example, are likely to be construed in terms of cultural norms of 
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meaning, the current language structure 
- 
or, in Sanssure's terms 
'i. As. Bergson (1910) pointed out, the language-norms only fix 
the 'objective and impersonal' aspects of meanings35. If this is the 
case (and synchronically it seems not unreasonable), the grid user is 
faced with the knotty problems of working out how a quasi-physicalist 
rating scale can indicate grades of objective meaning between function- 
ally antonymic poles, and how the subjective aspects of meaning can be 
conveyed. 
Whatever is subsequently done with the data in the interests of 
generalisation, the construct theory researcher places great value 
on the individual respondent's construing. This implies that the 
focus of interest is the individual's language-in-use (Parole') rather 
than its normative framework, since it is that which enables the 
individual to stand out as figure in contrast to the ground of 
generality. The respondent may well offer constructs that are 
idiosyncratic, but the researcher will never detect the idiosyncrasies 
unless further exploration takes place: 'parole, filtered through 
the mesh of the grid, becomes 'langue' - or (worse still) the 'parole' 
of the researcher. 
The linguistic reductionism in the grid is, in my view, a strongly 
contributing factor to the method's failure to do other than scratch 
the surface of meaning. By restricting verbal labels to brief tags 
the grid comes close to locking its content into semiotics rather than 
semantics, when it is clear from the discussion of connotative meaning 
that semiotics (based on the relationship between signifier and 
signified) is inadequate on its own to deal with the complexity of 
human discourse. Natural language goes beyond the semiotic into the 
semantic. It is the combination of signs into lengthier units of 
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language (such as sentences) that allows intentions and meanings to 
be made manifest36. As Ricoeur (l978) puts it, the semantics of 
discourse is not reducible to the semiotics of lexical entities37t 
the whole is both more than the sum of the parts (in that meaning 
emerges from the interaction of signs) and less than the sum of the 
parts (in that a sentence, say, closes off certain possibilities of 
meaning contained within the signs being used). 
There is a difference between the linguistic impoverishment of the 
grid and the highly elliptical (and on the face of it, impoverished) 
communication of much day-to-day interaction that has been highlighted 
by the work of Garfinkel (1967)38. Constructs in grids are often less 
firmly grounded than the fragmented communication typical of much 
conversation, the latter being very heavily context-based and 
dependent upon a mutual awareness of context on the part of the 
protagonists. If the grid construct is applied across a range of 
elements it falls somewhere between being well contextually-grounded 
in respect of a few (and therefore strictly speaking irrelevant to the 
rest) and operating at a diffuse level of generality across them all. 
In neither case (nor in any of the possible intermediate positions) 
can a construct maintain a close contextual grounding across all the 
elements. 
The pressure of the argument is in the direction of acknowledging 
context to a greater extent than most grid-based work would allow. 
It urges in the direction of speech act theory in which Searle (1969) 
sees contextt'ally-grounded sentences as the units of communication39. 
This is not inconsistent with the Kellian notion of a relevance- 
conditioned contrast theory of meaning: contextual grounding provides 
the relevance framework, and the meaning of terms in the sentences can 
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be seen in terms of both 'positive' matching to prototypes and the 
contrasting sets of alternative possibilities. 
But contextual grounding implies an increased emphasis on the event; 
on action past, present and future. The researcher becomes more 
interested in exploring the event through dialogue with the respondent, 
listening carefully to what is said, the way in which it is said 
- 
and noticing what is left unsaid. For the purposes of this chapter I 
shall concentrate on the manifest rather than the latent (which is 
taken up in Chapter 13). 
What is said may or may not be true as far as the respondent is 
concerned: untruth may range from downright lies through the present- 
ation of self in a socially desirable way to an idiosyncratically 
distorted picture of the 'reality' seen by the world at large. The 
researcher may see the respondent as self-deluding. Extended 
conversation will offer clues to the value positions held by the 
respondent and may suggest contradictions that would pass without notice 
in grid administrations (where the researcher is often under pressure 
to get the matrix completed). 
The failure to cater for how things are said is a crucial weakness in 
grid methodology. Tone of voice, the pattern of stress in sentences, 
and 'body language' can convey a great deal of meaning when taken in 
conjunction with the actual words uttered. For instance, "I'm not 
accusing X of bending data" can be delivered 'straight' (as it were) or 
with an inflection leaving the listener in no doubt of the irony 
intended. 
The particular choice of words is important. Synonyms are never 
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identical; each has its own connotative net giving it a distinct 
colouring 
- 
'dread', 'fear', and 'be afraid' all convey different 
meanings, and it may be possible for the researcher to estimate the 
significance of the words chosen. Qualifiers change in meaning 
according to what is qualified: 'attractive' has a different 
connotative 'ring' when used in connection with buildings as opposed 
to people 
- 
and people may be 'attractive' for very different reasons41. 
Where the qualifier is an adverb, its precise location in the sentence 
can give a subtle shading to the meaning being conveyed: contrast, 
for instance, 'she deliberately walked down the pavement', 'she walked 
down the pavement deliberately' and 'she walked deliberately down the 
pavement'. Though no absolute readings can be given, the first 
sentence foregrounds the deliberateness of the choice to walk down the 
pavement, whereas the third emphasises the manner of the walking. The 
second sentence seems to leave 'deliberately' hovering between the 
possibilities of meaning present in the other two sentences: without 
further evidence it is difficult to resolve 
- 
even probabilistically 
- 
the ambiguity, and one's attention switches back and forth in a 
linguistic analogue of the phenomenology of the Necker cube 
42 
In other words, different forms of linguistic expression are not 
cognitively equivalent43. Yet a repertory grid itself minimises 
the chances of emergence of forms of expression which give clues to 
the meaning intended by the respondent44 
. 
The researcher using the 
grid may be so set upon the task of completing the grid matrix that 
its contextual embedding 
- 
the conversation by means of which the 
administration of the grid takes place 
- 
is overlooked. Method may 
be given priority over meaning. 
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The argument so far presented in this chapter has much in common with 
the position of Austin and Searle regarding ordinary language philosophy. 
The sentence in its context is taken as a more appropriate unit for the 
conveying of meaning than its constituent words, notwithstanding the 
contribution that semiological analysis is able to offer. Although 
- 
as Labov (1973) points out -a limited number of words can produce an 
almost unlimited number of meanings, the problem of semantics is 
lessened when the influence of both rules of language and context of 
use are taken into account. 
And whilst on the subject of words it is worth mentioning that people 
may well have a far greater number of words available than the typical 
repertory grid investigation tends to suggest. Elicitation normally 
seems to produce between ten and twenty constructs before the 
respondent 'dries up'. The elicitation procedure, however, usually 
requires the respondent not to produce constructs broadly similar to 
those already elicited, on the grounds that the researcher is seeking 
to explore the various boundaries of discrimination within which the 
respondent operates. Thus grosser distinctions may be emphasised at 
the expense of the fine discriminations which the respondent could 
make if asked, and this seems to be an unacknowledged feature of much 
grid research. Whilst individuals probably do not have an infinite 
personal dictionary 
45 
of constructs available to them, Oswalt's (1974) 
work suggests that the number of constructs capable of being articulated 
by an individual may be large. Using a range of open-ended elicitation 
procedures (i. e. not triadic or dyadic elicitation) Oswalt obtained 
from eight university students roughly 3,800 words to describe 380 
people, though the total number of different words seems to have been 
of the order of 400. Oswalt does not indicate the number of different 
words used by each of the individuals in characterising people, but an 
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estimate of around 100 would appear not unreasonable. This would re- 
present something between five and ten times the number of constructs 
appearing in typical repertory grids even allowing that many of the 
words elicited by Oswalt could probably be 'collapsed' into antonymic 
pairs 
46 
. 
11.4 DOES FUZZY SET THEORY OFFER A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS 
OF GRID METHODOLOGY? 
A section on fuzzy set theory might, at first sight, seem out of place 
in a chapter dealing with linguistics. However, the work of Zadeh 
(1976) and his followers makes a specific connection between the two 
which is beginning to make its influence felt among the avant-garde of 
construct theorists. It is therefore necessary to consider some of 
the issues involved. 
The empirical work presented in Chapter 8 regarding the psychological 
structuring of scales suggested that it is possible that a scale 
appearing to be a simple opposition (in the semantic differential sense) 
could in practice have a complex psychological structure. In other 
words, membership of the construct poles may not be mutually exclusive 
(one can, for example, think in both concrete and abstract terns even 
though the bipolar construct elicited might imply opposition of 
concreteness and abstractness). In such circumstances one could, say, 
have a full membership (1.0) of the 'concrete' pole and a partial 
membership (0.3) of the 'abstract' pole. A 'standard' repertory grid 
is incapable of coping with the problem. 
Roberts (1981) has been experimenting with the assessment of the degree 
of membership of each pole of a bipolar construct taken separately= for 
instance, showing that an in-service F. E. teacher construed another 
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teacher as being wholly student-centred (membership 1.0) and partially 
subject-centred (0.4). She therefore collects two matrices, one for 
all the left-hand poles and one for all the right-hand poles. These 
are superimposed to give a 'D matrix' which indicates the degree of 
overlap between the poles. Whilst the analysis and interpretation of 
the D matrix present the researcher with problems, there are difficulties 
with the initial assumptions. What Roberts is in effect doing is to 
convert a bipolar construct into two eleven-point unipolar constructs 
and to ask for ratings of elements on each. Whilst the labelled ends 
of such unipolar constructs may be clearly construed, the unlabelled 
ends lack definition, leaving the researcher with the problems of unipolar 
scaling noted in Chapter 8. Responding to such a grid I found difficulty 
in assigning meaningful ratings once the element was noticeably distant 
from the 'full' membership of the pole being considered. Ranking could 
be a way out of that problem 
- 
but at the cost of the statistical meaning 
of the D matrix. Even if one is prepared to accept the numerical basis 
of Roberts's fuzzy grid, there still remains the vital question of 
meaning. 
Zadeh (1976) emphasises the importance of linguistics in humanistic 
systems where, as the complexity of the system increases, the ability to 
make precise and yet significant statements about its behaviour decreases. 
Precision has to be sacrificed in the interests of significance, leading 
to the substitution of the fuzzy set for the unit of measurement typical 
of 'hard' science. This requires the use of linguistic modifiers such 
as 'extremely', 'very', 'quite', 4more or less' and so on within a frame- 
work of fuzzy logic 
47. 
Gaines (1976), following Zadeh, takes the view that there is no difference 
in principle between physical and abstract constructs as far as reasoning 
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based upon fuzzy set theory is concerned: 'tallness' and 'beauty' are 
as primitive as each other in everyday reasoning despite the greater 
ease of explication of the former and the multi-dimensionality of the 
latter. However, at the level of rating (or degree of membership) 
practice there would seem to be a difference. Elements can be fairly 
easily ordered on physical constructs such as those connected with 
mass, length and time 
- 
and measurements can often be made with 
considerable precision. Where the construct is less precise (for 
example, 'big') the degree of membership of the pole implies measure- 
ment on a scale whose nature lies somewhere between ordinal and interval, 
whether membership is presented in terms of numerical proportions or 
linguistic qualifiers. One would expect a monotonic relation to hold 
between the two modes of describing membership of such a pole. It is 
not surprising to find that fuzzy set theory is successful in applications 
such as the control of an industrial process whose complexity defies the 
operator to fine-tune each parameter continuously and where a measure of 
slack can be permitted in the cybernetics of the technology 
49. 
'Beauty' and 'generosity', to take two examples, present greater 
problems. It is possible, as Zadeh does, to classify women in terms of 
their membership of the construct pole'beautifu] (Helen's membership 
being 0.8 and Jillian's 0.85) 
- 
but this provides no information as to 
the grounds on which these judgments have been made, unlike the pole- 
membership of physical construct. Helen's rating may have been given 
largely because of her skilful use of taste and style in dress whereas 
Jillian's rating might reflect physiological parameters such as skin, 
bone-structure and body-proportions. Further, this approach does 
nothing to disentangle the confounding of frequency of occurrence with 
strength of occurrence 
-a critical problem for grid methodology in 
particular, and rating procedures in general. Put another way, the 
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fuzzier the basic concept, the greater is the possibility for element 
x concept (construct) interaction and the less is the likelihood of 
monotonicity between numerical and linguistic representations of the 
membership of construct poles. It seems that manipulations of either 
form of data- presentation will be making very considerable assumptions 
about the basic nature of the data, and the legitimacy of operating on 
data such as '0.3 (or fairly) generous' is very much open to question. 
A Kellian perspective could be expected to put more emphasis on the 
semantic implications of the terms used than upon statistical or logical 
manipulations and, with the element x construct issue surfacing yet 
again, the thrust of construct theory is given a further nudge in the 
direction of construing 'the events as they appear'. 
Concepts in ordinary language exist in a haze of fuzziness, as has 
already been demonstrated by Rosch's work on category membership. 
G. Lakoff (1972) draws upon Rosch's early work in his presentation of 
the idea of 'linguistic hedges' which are imprecise but indicative 
qualifiers of category membership. Lakoff emphasises the 'hedging' 
possible in statements of noun-category membership (X is [to some extent] 
a member of category Y), but the potential for fuzziness seems rather 
greater in the situation pertaining to fuzzy grids where the statements 
are typically couched in the form of an adjectival relationship (X is 
[to some extent) Z). The range of connotations embedded in the adjective 
Z would seem to give elements more latitude to move within the meaning 
of a particular degree of pole membership. 
Linguistic hedges present further problems for the analyst seeking some 
form of monotonic transformation from hedges to numerical relationships 
capable of statistical analysis. Mosier (1941) and Sapir (1944), for 
instance, indicate that in ordinary language qualifiers exhibit complex 
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and subtle effects which cannot be accommodated in monotonic transform- 
ation5O. There may be semantic confusions. Lakoff (1972) shows how 
these can arise from the metaphorical nature of langvage (contrasting 
'Esther Williams is a regular fish' with 'John is a regular bachelor'), 
and makes it plain that the truth value of the sentences as a whole 
depends not only on the literal meanings of the predicates involved, 
but also upon their contexts and connotations5l. 
Lakoff sees hedges as offering a strong challenge to logicians and 
indicates that their characteristics ? render them unamenable to 
operations within the framework of fuzzy logic. Given the complexity 
of signification and reference in language and the state of the art of 
fuzzy logic as applied to linguistics, it is hard to avoid the conclusion 
that the ways in which people construe their worlds are unlikely to be 
greatly elucidated through the use of the fuzzy set theorist's high 
technology. 
11.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR METHODOLOGY 
The analysis presented in this chapter offers a serious challenge to 
grid methodology at the level of the semiotic, in that construct labels 
may be an inadequate sample of those available and that their meanings 
may remain ambiguous if they are unrelated to a broader linguistic 
context. It ill be recalled that some of Pope's (1977) students were 
unable to remember the meanings of their own constructs during a 
subsequent grid administration, the verbal tags on their own having 
proved insufficient to 'lock' the meaning52. 
Further, the analysis challenges grid methodology at the level of the 
semantic on the grounds that its inherent limitations make it difficult 
if not impossible 
- 
for subtle shades of meaning to be conveyed. Where 
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sentences are used, they tend to be treated adjunctively to the task of 
completing the grid matrix, rather than to constitute evidence in their 
own right: the researcher's attention may be focused upon the grid at 
the expense of the total communication of the respondent. 
What, then, are the implications for methodology? 
It is clear from the preceding argument that methodology must go beyond 
the semiotic, important as the semiotic is for understanding53. The 
linguistic signifiers 
- 
which I an here loosely equating with construct 
labels 
- 
are likely to be indeterminate unless they are embedded in a 
framework of utterance which indicates the bounds of meaning intended 
by the respondent. 
Structuralist analysis of grid data might be considered to be a way out 
of the problem, but 
- 
as Wildei (1980) points out 
- 
structuralist think- 
ing confuses the building blocks from which meaning is constructed with 
meaning itself: 
'In spite of the important contributions it has made... 
structuralism fails in the life and social sciences in 
exactly the same way and for exactly the same reasons 
that both structural linguistics and information science 
fail in those areas. They are all anti-semantic in that 
they substitute the supposed characteristics of a 
theoretically neutral INSTRUMENT OF ANALYSIS (the 'bit') 
for the USE to which it is put, as an INSTRUMENT OF 
COMMUNICATION, at given levels in a given goalseeking 
system, where no information is ever neutral. Meaning 
- the goal 
- 
becomes bounded not by the structure of the 
context in which it occurs, but by the structure of 
'science'. As a result the methodology implicitly 
becomes an ontology'. 54 
Ricoeur (1978*) seems to be making a broadly similar point when he 
identifies signified meaning with the semiotic order and intention 
with the semantic. Critical weaknesses of structuralism are its 
55 
implicit assumption that language and communication are isomorphous, 
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and its consequent failure to develop a theory of levels of communicat- 
ion56 
If personal construing relates to a nexus of meaning, intention and 
action 
- 
as I so construe it 
- 
the reductionism of the grid would seem 
to eliminate a considerable proportion of the information which the 
researcher grounded in construct theory might be seeking. At the end 
of Chapter 8I suggested, parenthetically, that the grid might actually 
be collecting answers to questions in which the researcher had no 
interest. Putting this another way, it is unlikely that the researcher 
will be interested in the location of each element on each construct 
(suspending for the moment my reservations regarding the physicalist 
nature of scales), and might prefer to concentrate the inquiry on those 
cells of the grid matrix most pertinent to the problem at hand. It 
would appear that a number of researchers working from a construct 
theory base have allowed themselves to become locked in a prison cell, 
the outlook from which is barred by the framing of grid methodology. 
To be fair to those researchers, the developments in methodology have 
tended to be concerned with refinements of grid technique and analysis 
rather than with a fundamental reappraisal of what the grid seeks to 
achieve. In practical terms, these relate to the semiotics of verbal 
labels rather than the semantics of meaning, intention and action. It 
is perhaps now appropriate to begin to develop an alternative conceptual 
framework for the methodology of research founded upon Personal Construct 
Theory. 
If this research is to draw upon the arole' of the respondent, it 
follows that he or she must be given the opportunity to articulate as 
full a response as possible in order that the possibility of misconstruction 
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on the part of the researcher might be minimised. To expect this 
level of exploration in respect of each cell in a typical repertory 
grid would clearly be unrealistic: the choice has to be made between 
a superficial skimming over the whole grid (the present position) and 
a study in depth of those aspects of the grid believed to be most salient 
to the investigation. The argument I put forward leans heavily to the 
latter, though in practice the selection of events from a formalised 
grid framework might not take place - instead., the researcher might 
seek to build up a partial grid whose boundaries would be progressively 
defined through interaction with the respondent. 
This latter approach emphasises the contextual embedding of sentences 
in the attempt to gain an understanding of the respondent's construing 
and, as such, is closer to speech act theory than to semiotics. The 
meaning of an event is likely only to be communicable through a set of 
sentences which are oriented in its general direction and which 
progressively refine the boundaries of possible meanings there is a 
loose analogy here with the notion of successive approximations to a 
limiting value which can never be precisely defined or reached. 
The methodological implications of this position are twofold. First, 
a deep study of selected events is likely to require extended 
conversation in order that their features and meanings be explored as 
fully as possible. The evidence from conversations will inevitably 
be extensive, making some form of electro-mechanical recording almost 
essential if some of the paralinguistic aspects of communication are 
to be retained. There is a real danger that conversations will ramble 
round the foci of interest without fully exploring at least some: the 
researcher needs a systematic framework for the investigation which is 
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not a set of imposed prescriptions but which derives from what the 
respondent is wishing to communicate. It is at this point 
- 
rather 
than at the point of analysis 
- 
that the computer may be able to assist 
the research given its capacity to act as a very efficient administrator. 
Eden's work at the University of Bath is suggestive of ways in which an 
interview might be structured along the lines of the respondent's 
thinking without allowing too many conversational 'loose ends' to 
remain. This line of thought is explored a little further in Chapter 
13. 
Eden's work is also of interest in respect of the second methodological 
implication I wish to pursue, that of analysis. It is transparently 
obvious that the standard statistical approach to analysis is inappro; P 
priate for the type of evidence collected as a result of conversation. 
The outcome of a conversational approach - the 'sparsely lighted cross- 
word puzzle' relating elements and constructs (to return to the metaphor 
used at the end of Chapter 8) may, however, allow a relational analysis 
to be undertaken. This would relate elements and constructs by way of 
implicative networkd such as those produced by the COPE program developed 
by Eden and his colleagues. Examples of this type of analysis are given 
in Eden et al (1979,1982)58, but the computer is not essential to the 
approach since statements made by the respondent can be converted 'by 
hand' to an implicative flow diagram. However, this rapidly becomes a 
very complex process as the number of statements increases 
- 
and there 
are many problems associated with the need to make inferences, and with 
the validity and reliability of any inferences that are made. 
The mesh of sentences minimises the potential for polysemy in each one 
taken in isolation. Each speech act is accompanied by a contextual 
linguistic framework in which it is located, enabling the researcher to 
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maximise the chances of arriving at a meaning consistent with its setting - 
a setting which, in addition to the words used by the respondent, is 
'.... made up of all he mows about the person who pronounces 
it, about his past experiences, his plans, about what the 
author of the phrase knows and thinks about those for whom 
the phrase is intended, and so forth 
... 
' 59 
This is not to imply that each component of the mesh of sentences is 
completely consistent with the remainder - an assumption that Kelly is 
at pains to dismiss when he writes that the Modulation Corollary 
'tolerates inconsistency between subsystems'6o. The statements made 
by the respondent may well reveal contradictions, double-binds and 
suchlike which are of importance to the researcher. Of equal 
significance may be the dogs that didn't bark - those matters which 
might have been mentioned, but which were not. 
The point I have been working towards, and which can now be articulated, 
is this. Even though the fundamental unit of the speech act may be the 
contextually grounded sentence, this is likely to be too molecular a 
unit for the purposes of research aimed at elucidating meaning. Although 
the sentence may serve as the fundamental unit in some contexts, I would 
wish to press 
- 
from the point of view of the researcher 
- 
that the 
paragraph, or perhaps even the text in toto, should be considered the 
fundamental unit of meaning 
61. 
Meaning unfolds over time in an interview or a conversation. In addition 
to setting the respondent's statements against an external context, the 
researcher has the opportunity to test the 'text' for internal consist- 
ency as it is sequentially revealed, and a comprehensive reading 
requires its component parts to be tested against its wholeness (and 
vice versa). Such an approach will draw on semiotics and semantics, 
but its conceptual framework is superordinate to these. It is towards 
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hermeneutics that the attention of the construct theorist is inexorably 
drawn. 
0 
11.6 SUMMARY 
In this chapter the 'transcendent self' implicit in Kelly's theoretical 
formulation was strongly challenged from the standpoint of the power of 
language to influence construing, evidence being adduced from a wide 
range of contexts. 
The case was argued that the fragments of language typically used as 
verbal labels in repertory grids impoverish the communication of meaning 
between researcher and respondent, and that they leave it unclear as to 
whether what the researcher subsequently reports reflects the respond- 
ent's language-in-use ('parole'), the normative aspects of language 
('langue') or the researcher's own arole'. Signifiers are over- 
determined by meaning, and the communication of specific meaning requires 
more than the simple adjectives or adjectival phrases often found in 
grids. Semiotics, though necessary (and illuminating), is insufficient 
to deal with the semantics of discourse. 
The claim of ordinary language philosophy that the 'speech act', or 
contextually grounded sentence, is the fundamental unit of communication 
advanced the argument into the realm of semantics. The important 
distinction was made between language and communication for the purpose 
of showing that structuralism is unable to do other than contribute to 
an understanding of communicated meaning. 
The development of the methodological implications foreshadowed in 
previous chapters led to the view that the researcher operating from a 
construct theory standpoint might well gain a greater understanding of 
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the topic being investigated by trying to probe certain element X 
construct relationships in depth whilst ignoring those that were 
peripheral or irrelevant. This position was sharply contrasted with 
the blanket coverage of all element X construct relationships in the 
repertory grid. The consequence of this argument was that it would 
be necessary to examine relationships in terms of implications rather 
than statistics, and that this would enable contradictions, double-binds 
and 'silences' to be explored. Such an approach, which would explore 
part-whole relationships, is fundamentally hermeneutic in character. 
This chapter is the point of transition between the retrospective 
analysis of theory and method contained in Chapters 3 to 10 and the 
speculations in Chapter 13 regarding possible developments in both 
theory and research practice. It signals a rereading of Kelly the 
scientist as Kelly the historian, but before this is done, it is 
necessary to draw together in Chapter 12 my main conclusions regarding 
repertory grid methodology. 
I 
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12 Sieve or riddle ? 
The question of validity 
And what you thought you came for 
Is only a shell, a husk of meaning.... 
T. S. Eliot 
Little Gidding 
12.1 VALIDITY AND REPERTORY GRID METHODOLOGY 
Beneath all the preceding discussion of repertory grid methodology has 
lain 
- 
ever present, but largely unacknowledged until now 
- 
the question 
of validity. There is no single determinant of what constitutes the 
validity of repertory grids, for the validity of any grid will depend 
upon the purposes for which the grid is being used. 
Cronbach and Meehl (1955) draw the now familiar distinction between 
four ways of construing validity: 
predictive validity 
- 
in which future performance is the criterion 
against which the test data are set; 
concurrent validity 
- 
which depends upon the correlation between 
the test and another, established test; 
content validity 
- 
in which the validity depends on the demon- 
strations that the test is composed of a 
representative sample from the relevant 
universe; and 
construct validity 
- 
referring to the extent to which the test 
can be taken as a measuring instrument for 
a particular attribute or quality. 1 
Of these four aspects of validity, the discussion regarding the sampling 
of both elements and constructs (Chapters 5 and 6, respectively) has 
indicated that content validity of the grid is indeterminate and open 
to some doubt. Construct validity is difficult to assess since the 
grid user is often not seeking to measure a particular attribute or 
quality 
- 
and, when he or she is attempting such a measurement (such as 
cognitive complexity or intensity) the meaning of what is to be measured 
proves to be as elusive as plankton in a shrimping net. 
Kelly is often quoted as saying that validity 'refers to the capacity 
of a test to tell us what we already know' This is tantamount to 
2 
defining validity in terms of concurrency 
- 
the extent to which the 
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information derived from the repertory grid correlates with some accept- 
ed yardstick of the attributes, characteristics or suchlike being 
measured. But he was well aware of the circularity of construing 
validity in terms of concurrency, and preferred to view validity in 
terms of usefulness3 
- 
thus keeping faith with pragmatism (or, at least, 
that version espoused by William James). Clearly, embedded in the 
notion of usefulness is the idea of prediction which is, after all, a 
central tenet of Kelly's theorising. 
Fransella and Bannister (1977) point out that usefulness is not seen 
by Kelly in terms of the prediction of 'some arbitrarily chosen and 
relatively trivial aspect of human behaviour', but they evade the 
discussion of the actual nature of usefulness by presenting a number of 
examples culled from the literature and covering a range of repertory 
grid investigations. This is not entirely satisfying, since any 
application of a grid can be claimed to have produced something useful 
- 
if not (say) to the clients in psychotherapy, then to the clinicians or 
researchers involved. Fransella and Bannister offer the ironclad 
definition of the validity of a technique as 'its capacity to enable 
us to elaborate our construing'S, and they continue by pointing out 
that this elaboration may be in terms of extension or definition, in 
accordance with the Choice Corollary. 
Validity depends upon context. If the purpose of administering a grid 
is to acquire information in order that the researcher may predict the 
respondent's future behaviour, then the criterion of validity is the 
extent to which behaviour matches prediction. The situation can be 
inverted, in that the researcher may already have data (such as 
information, or behaviour) recorded about a respondent and use the grid 
to try to seek underlying cognitions that might help to provide an 
429 
adequate explanation for what is known. In this circumstance the grid 
is valid to the extent that it can contribute to the explanation. In 
each of these two examples there is, embedded in the notion of validity, 
an Ui clnowledged ' concu Tent' component which is the normative conceptual 
framework within which the researcher develops predictions or deems 
explanations adequate or otherwise6: the grid helps the researcher to 
focus on those parts of the vast cognitive reservoir likely to prove 
relevant to the purposes at hand. In that sense, the grid 
- 
as any 
other method of inquiry 
- 
will, if valid, 'tell us what we already 
know'. 
What is missing from Fransella and Bannister's definition of validity 
is a relativistic perspective. Methods other than the repertory grid 
may be superior for particular types of investigation without necessarily 
implying the need to abandon a personal construct perspective. It will 
not always be possible to give a numerical coefficient to the validity 
of research based on Kellian theory, and validity may have to be 
assessed on the qualitative grounds of procedural evidence and argument. 
If validity is treated in this way, this 'procedural validity' will 
have to be established afresh for each piece of research and its 
justification will need to be included as an essential section of any 
research report in order that the reader may properly evaluate it. 
Fransella and Bannister assert that 'it is not sensible to dispute the 
validity of the grid as such'7. In so far as there is a wide variety 
of grids constructed to fulfil a variety of purposes, this is fair 
enough: they, too, make the point that the validity of a grid can 
reasonably be evaluated only with reference to the grid user's purposes. 
They go on to suggest that, if a particular grid were to prove to have 
no prEdictive value, they would look for flaws in the format rather 
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than make any general statement concerning grid methodology. 
However, the evidence and argument presented in the preceding chapters 
suggest that there are generic problems regarding grids as investigative 
instruments. A grid is of little value if its conceptual base has not 
been thought through 
- 
and their remark that grid use 'is only limited 
by the user's lack of imagination'8 tends to divert the reader from the 
task of rigorously conceptualising both problem and method. 
My appraisal of the repertory grid leads me to suggest that the problem 
of validity is much larger than Fransella and Bannister imply, and that 
many general points can be made which bear, explicitly and implicitly, 
on the validity of grid methodology9. These are presented in the 
following section and represent the main inferences I have drawn from 
the evidence and argument contained in the preceding chapters. 
12.2 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE VALIDITY OF A GRID 
The statements listed in this section are a distillation of Chapters 4 
to 11, and are based on an appraisal of the evidence in the literature, 
empirical enquiry, and reflection upon principles and practice. Whilst 
all the statements are either explicitly or implicitly concerned with 
the validity of grid methodology, they also act implicitly as recommend- 
ations for practice. Each statement is supported by a brief outline of 
the evidence and/or argument adduced in support, and cross-references are 
given to the main discussions given in the body of the text. 
12.2.1 The grid itself 
A. Validity is compromised when the context of the grid is not defined. 
In some of the studies surveyed it has been possible for respondents 
431 
to slip from one context to another during the completion of 
the grid. (Section 5.2) 
B. The larger the segment of time explicit or implicit in the context 
of the grid, the greater the scope for the 'averaging-out' of 
responses. 
In grids dealing with personality, for example, there is typically 
no explicit limit on the duration which respondents are expected 
to bear in mind when they complete the matrix. Thus a person 
who is arrogant in some situations and humble in others may be 
construed at either pole or in an 'averaged' way, depending on 
how the respondent construes the task. This potential vagueness 
is reduced as the 'time-slice' to which the grid applies is made 
smaller: in the limit, the grid is reduced to single events 
which may no longer be commensurate. (Sections 8.3.7; 8.4) 
12.2.2 Elements 
A. The validity of a grid is a function of the match between the 
elements and the context in which the grid is set. 
If extraneous elements are allowed to enter the grid they may 
influence the elicitation of constructs and the subsequent rating 
procedure. It then becomes difficult to interpret the findings 
in respect of those elements which are appropriate to the context 
of the grid. Where no control is exercised over the elements 
included in the grid, the meaning of the procedure approaches the 
vanishing-point. (Section 5.2) 
B. Elements which are irrelevant to the respondent may have an adverse 
effect on validity 
There is a danger that elements which seem relevant from the 
researcher's point of view may be irrelevant to the respondent 
- 
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particularly when elements are provided. Such elements merely 
provide 'noise' in the grid. (Section 5.3) 
C. 'Homogeneous' elements tend to enhance the validity of a grid matrix 
If the elements used are a diverse collection, it becomes difficult 
for the respondent to provide constructs which apply to all of 
them. This leads to outcomes such as grids with a limited range 
of 
- 
probably trivial 
- 
constructs, grids with many vacant cells, 
or (if a rated grid is used) the allocation of many elements to 
the mid-points of the scales being used. 
(Sections 5.2; 5.3) 
D. The validity of grid procedures depends upon the representativeness 
of the sample of elements 
The representativeness of elements is a difficult criterion to adopt. 
The sampling of elements has to be justified in qualitative terms 
where circumstances are such that the population of elements is 
indeterminate. Where the population is isomorphic with the sample 
(such as when a class of pupils is used), the question of represent- 
ativeness does not arise. (Section 5.3) 
E. The more specific the elements, the greater the validity of the 
grid procedure is likely to be 
The more precisely specified are the elements, the less scope there 
is for the respondent to move around in a cloud of vagueness whilst 
construing. Such evidence as is available suggests that there is 
a descending order of specificity from concrete objects through 
well-known individuals and specific incidents to generalised 
aspects of life-experience. (Section 5.5) 
F. The decision whether to supply or elicit elements (or to use a 
combined approach) is a factor to be taken into account in 
evaluating the validity of a grid. 
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There is no simple relationship between the origin of the elements 
and the validity of the grid. Any statement regarding validity 
must take into account the researcher's purposes and the 
justification given for the particular procedure adopted. 
(Section 5.4) 
12.2.3 Constructs 
A. The decision whether to supply or elicit constructs (or to use a 
combined approach) is a factor to be taken into account in 
& Ikiating the validity of a grid. 
The argument is similar to that given in point 12.2.2F above, 
save that although the researcher may choose to specify the 
elements (and justify doing so in the interests of defining the 
problem to be addressed) the grounds for specifying constructs 
are typically much less firm. (Section 6.6) 
B. The validity of grid procedures depends upon the representativeness 
of the sample of constructs. 
This point parallels that of point 12.2.2D above, but is much more 
difficult to justify in practice. Within a grid there is no 
guarantee that the researcher has gained a representative view of 
the way the respondent construes that part of the world which forms 
a focus for the research: it is naive to assume that, because a 
respondent has apparently exhausted his or her stock of dimensions, 
an asymptote of communication has been approached. Though it is 
impossible to assess the extent to which the ideal of represent- 
ativeness has been reached, this ideal is likely to be more closely 
approached where the researcher seeks to cross-validate the 
constructs elicited. This may be attempted by referring to other 
available information such as recordings of the elicitation 
procedure (which can contain constructs that do not reach the 
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formalisation of the grid), and the actual behaviour of the 
respondent. (Sections 6.3; 6.4) 
C. The nature of the sample of constructs obtained may be determined 
by the particular elicitation procedure adopted. 
In other words, the method of elicitation may facilitate or 
block the respondent's production of constructs. Whilst the 
'triadic' form of elicitation appears to be the most widely 
used in repertory grid work, it does not always facilitate the 
elicitation of constructs, for some respondents appear to find 
the cognitive demands of the procedure alien to the way they 
think, or would prefer to respond. 'Dyadic' elicitation has 
been used on a number of occasions, apparently successfully, 
without compromising the Kellian assumption of similarity and 
contrast. Freer forms of elicitation (such as interviewing) 
have been used in clinical situations, but in general these have 
not been used to provide constructs for use in grids. Their 
potential richness suggest that further exploration in this 
direction may prove profitable to researchers working within a 
construct theory perspective. (Section 6.5) 
D. Without careful specification of the grid procedure the 
existential status of a construct may be unclear. 
There is little evidence in the literature that researchers have 
given attention to whether the constructs they elicit are oriented 
to the past, the present or the future 
- 
the verbal labels actually 
supplied by respondents may imply any or all of 'what was', 'what 
is', 'what is expected to be ', 'what ought to be' and their 
subvariants. Further, the more the elicitation relates to the 
construing of the unfamiliar (i. e. is a problem-solving activity), 
the greater is the possibility that the respondent is elaborating 
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his or her construct system (and the extent of recourse to pre- 
existing construct relationships would be lessened) 
(Section 6.8) 
E. No valid claim may be made, on the basis of a repertory grid, for 
the hierarchical level of any construct. 
Assuming, with Kelly, a hierarchically organised construct system, 
it is necessary to use instruments oriented towards structure in 
order to gain an indication of the hierarchical level of any 
construct and its implicative relationships. 
(Sections 4.6; 4.7; 6.5.4; 9.6.1) 
F. No valid claim may be made, on the basis of a repertory grid, for 
the salience of any construct to the individual. 
Whilst there is likely to be some positive relationship between 
the salience of a construct and its hierarchical level, it is 
doubtful that this is monotonic (in any case, both salience and 
level may vary with context). The probable lack of monotonicity 
may reflect the tension between - referring to Hinkle's methods - 
the logical entailment of an implications grid and the ego-involve- 
ment of a resistance-to-change grid. Evidence relating to this 
would have to be sought beyond a repertory grid. Anticipating 
the conclusions regarding analysis (Section 12.2.6), it is a 
mistake to relate salience to the size of factors derived from 
principal components analysis or from the grouping of constructs 
by cluster analysis. (Sections 3.3.3; 9.7.2; 9.7.3) 
12.2.4 Bipolarity 
A. It is doubtful whether Kelly's claim for the universality of 
dichotomous construing can be sustained. 
Linguistic qualifiers frequently have meaningful antonyms, though 
there are examples where the only possible opposition is a 
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negation (if 'peculiar' constructs are to be avoided). Noun and 
verb constructs frequently seem to have no specific opposites, 
but stand instead in opposition to 'contrastive sets' of terms. 
Further, evidence has been presented which suggests that construing 
may, in many circumstances, be of a positive pattern-matching type. 
(Sections 3.3.23 8.3.7; 8.4; Chapter 6, Passim ) 
B. Some constructs appear as negations (i. e. X- not X) rather than 
Kellian relevance-conditioned contrasts (of the X-Y type). 
Although this point is made in 12.2.4A it is worth emphasising 
because of the difficulty the researcher may have in interpreting 
the 'not X' end of the construct. Negations also call in 
question Kelly's assumption that all construing is limited to the 
relevant range of convenience, and also his insistence on rejecting 
the tenets of classical logic. (Sections 3.3.23 8.3.5) 
C. There is a considerable risk that elicited constructs (especially 
'peculiar' constructs) will be 'bent'. 
'Bentness' may arise when a contrast pole is selected from a group 
which includes both a superordinate contrast and its subordinate 
implications. In effect, this amounts to the use of the emergent 
poles of two different constructs 
- 
and it may cause difficulty 
when the respondent attempts to locate elements on a dimension 
whose extremes are defined in such a way. (Section 7.3) 
D. There appear to be loose associations between 
(i) the 'oppositional' method of elicitation and 'logical' 
constructs, and 
(ii) the 'difference' method of elic! ±ation and 'peculiar' constructs. 
Whilst the 'oppositional' method appears to elicit a greater 
proportion of constructs that are functionally antonymic, the 
'difference' method may produce the more personally meaningful 
discriminations on the part of the individual 
- 
even though the 
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oppositions elicited are 'peculiar'. There is a particular 
threat to validity of the grid (not necessarily to 
- 
say 
- 
triadic 
discrimination) when 'peculiar' constructs are used, since tray 
are more likely to exhibit restricted permeability than 'logical' 
constructs: there is an increased likelihood that elements will 
fall outside their range of convenience. 
(Section 7.2) 
E. Oppositional construct poles are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
The point is openly acknowledged in respect of semantic differential 
work and seems equally valid in respect of repertory grid invest- 
igations. Although an opposition may be elicited as a result of 
considering 
- 
say 
-a triad of elements, it is possible for other 
elements to claim membership of both poles within the context of 
the grid. Whilst the problem is reduced by decreasing the explicit 
or implicit time-slice to which the grid procedure refers, the cost 
is likely to be the 'collapsing' of the grid. 
(Section 8.3.7; Chapter 6, sim ) 
F. Construct poles tend to be inherently vague, and vagueness 
compromises bipolarity of construing. 
Many construct poles 
- 
especially those at levels of abstraction 
beyond sense-experience 
- 
are portmanteau terms. It is unlikely 
that respondents maintain a fixed content in each portmanteau as 
they construe a range of elements in terms of the relevant dimension. 
Thus a person construed as highly extrovert may nevertheless exhibit 
a few introvert characteristics: the generality of many grid 
dimensions may fail to resolve the fineness of such distinctions. 
(Section 8.3.6) 
12.2.5 Completing the grid matrix 
A. Dichotomous allocation of elements to construct poles does not 
reflect the shadings of reality and produces problems for the 
grid analyst. 
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Shades of meaning are often important, and the crudity of 
dichotomous allocation can do violence to that the respondent 
wishes to convey. 'Lopsidedness' creates problems for analytical 
routines which are based on matching scores: the 'split-half' grid 
suggested as a possible remedy solves some analytical problems 
- 
but often at the expense of meaning. 
(Section 8.1.1) 
B. The ranking form of the grid is useful when unipolar scales are 
being used, but tends to limit analysis to interrelationships 
between constructs, 
There are advantages in using ranking techniques with respondents 
(for instance, children) who might find rating too complex, but 
ranking becomes more difficult as the number of elements increases. 
Rank correlations between constructs can be computed, but element 
similarity scores derived from the grid matrix lose most of their 
meaning. (Section 8.1.2) 
C. The labels given to the ends of construct dimensions (presented as 
rating scales) are likely to be more clearly construed than the 
mid-point of the scales. 
This is not to claim that the mid-point is necessarily unmeaning- 
Puls it may be unmeaningful, but it is not necessarily so. 
(Section 8.3.8) 
D. There are many ways of construing the mid-point of a rating scale. 
The underlying metric of each rating scale is rendered problematic 
to an extent determined by the number of possible constructions of 
the mid-point. (Section 8.3.8) 
E. There is empirical evidence to suggest that a bipolar rating scale 
is open to use in manners which vary between individuals and which 
have differential metrical implications. 
In conjunction with earlier points which question the validity of 
the assumptions of mutual exclusivity (12.2.4E) and functional 
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antonymy (12.2.40 and 
. 
4F), the evidence strongly implies the 
need for the researcher to find out how the respondent actually 
uses the scales contained in a rating grid. Further, it may 
be possible to make some assessment 
- 
even if only qualitative 
- 
regarding any possible anchoring effects. 
(Section 8.3.7) 
F. Whilst there is evidence to suggest that extremity of rating is a 
function of personal meaningfulness and perhaps psychopathology, 
it is possible that the respondent's attitude to the research may, 
on occasion, be a dominant factor. 
A fair measure of research has probed extremity of rating from 
the point of view of personal meaningfulness and psychopathology, 
but little has been done with regard to the way the respondent 
approaches the task of completing a grid matrix. Personal 
experience suggests that extremity of rating could be a strategy 
through which the respondent gets through the task in the minimum 
of time and with the minimum of effort, though the evidence for 
this proposition is at present extremely thin. 
(Sections 6.6: 2; 10.8.1; 10.8.3) 
G. There is some evidence to suggest that rating procedures are 
vulnerable to human error, especially when grids are administered 
to groups of respondents. 
The most probably error would seem to be that of reversing the 
rating scale, particularly when the pair (in triadic elicitation) 
is labelled in negatively-valenced, or implicitly negatively- 
valenced, terms. It is easy to fail to notice the occurrence 
of scale reversal and other errors, and some procedures have been 
suggested which appear to be successful in overcoming the main 
difficulties. 
(Section 8.2.1) 
H. Rating behaviour appears to be influenced by social aspects of 
language. 
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Given the present state of knowledge, all that can probably be 
said here is that the effects of lexical marking, evaluative affect 
and cultural stereotypy may all interact in a complex way to affect 
rating behaviour. Unexplored to date are the complications 
introduced by the range of possible oppositional and negational 
constructs. (Section 8.3.5) 
I. Element X construct interactions are likely to be a prominent 
feature of the rating patterns in grids. 
There is substantial evidence for this claim in the annals of 
research using the semantic differential. The argument has been 
presented that the effect is highly likely to feature in repertory 
grids since the associative meanings of the construct poles are 
likely to vary according to the particular element being construed. 
The assumption of the stability of the meaning of a construct, 
irrespective of element, seems to be based on a positivistic 
theoretical position which is at variance with other aspects of 
Kelly's theorising. 
(Sections 4.8; 8.3.9) 
J. There is a possibility that construct X construct interactions 
may feature in the rating patterns in grids. 
This point is advanced rather tentatively since it seems to be 
unresearched in repertory grid studies. Tajfel's accentuation 
theory gives some grounds for considering the possibility of such 
an interaction. 
(Section 8.3.10) 
K. A phenomenological view of the use of rating scales suggests that 
the tacit physicalist assumptions often underlying grid work may 
be intenable. 
The argument has been presented that in construing elements in 
terms of a rating scale a respondent may be making reference to 
411 
personally-experienced events and to mediated knowledge stored 
in memory, rather than using the scale in a quasi-physical 
manner. If the argument is justified the implications for the 
validity of grid methodology are profound, and require a radical 
reappraisal of methodology subsumed under a Personal Construct 
Theory framework. 
(Section 8.4) 
12.2.6 Analysis and interpretation 
A. Each of the analytical routines generally available has its 
particular strengths and weaknesses in respect of its capacity 
to deal with grid data. 
Each approach to grid analysis contains its own embedded assumptions 
regarding the statistical quality of the data with which it deals. 
The validity of analysis is raised when the researcher maximises 
the congruence between the purposes of the research and the 
characteristics of the analytical method. 
(Sections 9.4.11 9.4.2i 9.4.3) 
B. Missing data causes difficulties for the I'rid analyst 
None of the methods of analysis that have been discussed completely 
overcomes the problems of missing data. Whilst the use of the 
mid-point rating or the elimination of rows or columns containing 
blank cells allows statistical computations to be undertaken, 
there axe potentially serious implications for the meaning of the 
output of such analyses. (Sections 9.5; 9.4 aý ssim ) 
C. The analysis of combined, or averaged, grid data ex Berates 
commonality at the expense of idiosyncrasy. 
In other words, the variance between individuals is ignored. 
Aggregation of data becomes meaningless where dubious assumptions 
of equivalence are made, such as when verbal labels are treated 
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as identical across a range of respondents or when a role title 
is implicitly taken as a constant despite the fact that 
respondents may choose to construe different individuals who fit 
that specification. (Section 9.6.2) 
D. Statistical analyses are not necessarily concordant with meaning 
relationships. 
Statistical analysis relates solely to the mathematical properties 
of a grid matrix and does not take into account its semantic 
characteristics. This is illustrated when the 'evaluative 
overlays' to constructs are not monotonic with the mathematical 
scaling: in such circumstances what appears, in logical terms, 
as a 'straight' construct may become sharply bent when its 
overlay is aligned with that of a construct with a 
simple E 
-/E+ gradation of valence. 
(Section 9.7.1) 
E. Analysis of a repertory grid gives no indication of the implicative 
relationships between constructs. 
A similar point was made in 12.2.3E above. Relationships between 
constructs cannot be inferred directly from grid analysis, but 
require the importing of other evidence if any such claim is to be 
made. A number of researchers have made the mistake of confusing 
the phenetic with the phyletic, and some have confused the concept 
of 'hierarchy' in the separate fields of construct theory and 
cluster analysis. Further, large clusters and factors do not 
necessarily imply dominance in a construct system despite the claims 
often made in the literature. 
(Section 4.6; 9.6.1) 
F. If the challenge to the quasi-physicalism of rating scales in grids 
is sustained, the assui tive base of standard analytical methods 
is undercut. 
Following 12.2.5K above, if the respondent's use of a rating scale 
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is grounded in the memory of personally-experienced events and 
mediated knowledge, then the emphasis in the grid lies towards 
the matrix columns and the unique way in which each construct 
is applied to each element. In these circumstances standard 
analytical methods axe revealed as inadequate, as is 'standard' 
grid methodology. (Section 9.8) 
12.2.7 Stability 
A. The evidence reviewed suggests that the stability of grid data 
is highest when the elements are specific, familiar and 'simple', 
and lowest when elements are general, unfamiliar and complex. 
Concrete objects construed in terms of constructs of high inter- 
subjectivity tend to produce high stabilities. Stabilities 
tend to be somewhat lower when people are construed in terms of 
personality and other attributes, and to decrease further with 
with increasing generality of the elements. 
(Sections 5.5; 10.3; 10.4) 
B. It is open to doubt whether there is a consistent relationship 
between extremity of rating and test-retest stability. 
Whilst respondents appear to exhibit consistency in the extent to 
which they rate towards the extremes of scales, such consistency 
appears not to obtain in respect of correlations between construct 
variance and stability within individual grids, and (nomothetically) 
between indexes of construct variance and stability which are based 
on 'whole-grid' data. (Section 10.8.3) 
C. A stability index for the grid as a whole can be based on the 
cumulated change per cell and this minimises the problems 
associated with missing data and instability of rating in a small 
minority of constructs. 
Stability calculations based on standard correlational coefficients 
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are at the mercy of gaps in the data, and some are markedly 
affected by instability in rating in a single construct. A 'per 
cell' coefficient allows stabilities to be computed for a grid as 
a whole or for its constituent rows and columns without them being 
inordinately influenced by either of these problems. 
(Sections 10.6 10.7) 
12.2.8 Language 
A. Short verbal labels in grids are likely to be ambiguous. 
Everyday language contains a considerable degree of redundancy, 
but often that redundancy allows its near-synonymity to triangulate 
the meaning intended. A single short verbal label has no capacity 
for triangulation and hence is likely to be ambiguous 
- 
and there 
is evidence that respondents, faced with their own labels, may 
find it difficult to recall what was originally meant. The 
ambiguity present in verbal labels allows the respondents the 
opportunity to move within their range of associative meaning as 
each element is successively construed. 
(Sections 6.2.3; 10.8.2; 11.3) 
B. The typical grid, with its emphasis on producing markedly 
different constructs from their predecessors, may constrain the 
the respondent from using the full range of meanings available to 
him or her. 
There is some evidence that respondents have a wider range of 
verbal labels available than is typically evidenced in repertory 
grid work. Whilst this evidence is derived from the field of 
personality characteristics, it would seem not unreasonable to 
expect the same to be the-case in grids dealing with other 
subjects. (Section 11.3) 
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C. The use of short verbal labels may make it difficult for the 
researcher to understand what the respondent wishes to convey. 
In a sense this is a corollary to 12.2.8A in that it focuses 
specifically on the problems that construct labels pose for the 
researcher. Whilst culturally-embedded terms may, to a first 
approximation, be intersubjectively communicable, there is some 
evidence to suggest that labels which appear straightforward to 
interpret are occasionally used in distinctly idiosyncratic ways. 
(Sections 6,6.3; 11.3) 
D. Short verbal labels for constructs are very likely to be an 
impoverished version of what respondents could, or do, convey. 
The grid has been seriously called in question regarding its 
linguistic impoverishment, and it offers minimal scope for 
expression of, for example, the metaphoric, metonymic and nnthic 
aspects of communication 
- 
often those aspects which convey with 
the greatest vividness what the respondent is seeking to indicate. 
Further, the precise location of words in sentences offers addition- 
al clues as to the meaning intended by the respondent. 
(Sections 4.4; 6.2.3; 11.3) 
E. It seems unlikely that fuzzy set theory will prove to be helpful 
to repertory grid methodology. 
The complexity of language (in respect of multiple connotations, 
metaphoric relationships and suchlike) render problematic the degree 
of membership of a construct pole, whether this is expressed 
numerically or in terms of linguistic hedges. Logical operations 
upon such problematic data can only produce outcomes which are 
themselves problematic. (Section 11.4) 
Many of the points summarised in the preceding pages of this chapter pose 
a serious challenge to the validity of the repertory grid as a research 
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instrument. Lest users of other research methods take undue comfort 
from this, it has to be said that many of the problems confronting 
repertory grid methodology also aonfrcnt other approaches to psycho- 
logical investigation and may, in those milieux, prove more intractable. 
Kellian theory and its methodological progeny the repertory grid have 
at their centre the construing individual and seek to expose the ways 
in which individuals 'see' the world, rather than to try to fit them 
into a framework representing the researcher's construction of reality. 
Whilst this theoretical position is defensible in ontological terms, 
it is clear from the evidence and arguments deployed at length in this 
study that the portcullis in the outer wall of methodology is vulnerable 
to attack. Far from being an accurate and precise method of gaining 
access to people's contruct systems, the repertory grid is revealed as 
partial and vague, and as requiring considerable support from cross- 
validational inquiry and from the researcher's interpretive skills. 
On its own, it is manifestly inadequate to bear the burden of the 
purposes for which some researchers have employed it - but the same 
may be said of other methods of investigation such as the semantic 
differential, personality inventories and attitude scales whose 
connections with theoretical formulations may be rather more tenuous. 
12.3 THE REPERTORY GRID AND BEHAVIOUR 
One aspect of grid methodology that lies outside the strict terms of 
reference of the present study nevertheless needs to be considered 
briefly here 
- 
the issue of the relationship between the repertory grid 
and behaviour. This has implications for validity in terms of external 
criteria rather than in terms of the internal criteria with which this 
study has been primarily concerned. 
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At the beginning of this chapter I suggested that Kelly's construing of 
validity in terms of usefulness implied prediction. The grid can be 
evaluated in terms of predictive success in at least two ways. First, 
the grid may reveal sufficient of a respondent's construct system to 
enable the researcher or clinician to predict (on the basis of his or 
her own construct system) the future behaviour of that respondent. 
Second, the grid data might suggest ways in which the researcher or 
clinician could deal with the respondent in order to facilitate a 
particular behavioural outcome. In either case, there is a danger 
that too much may ba claimed for the grid if the predictions are 
successful (the fact that I see a black raven does not strengthen the 
thesis that all ravens are black). And if the prediction does not 
turn out successfully it is indeterminable whether 'the grid itself is 
to blame or whether the fault lies in the chains of inference and 
behaviour that links the grid data with the ultimate observation of the 
'target' behaviour. The use of the grid in predictive studies has 
resulted in both successes and failures (on this criterion), ranging 
from Fransella and Bannister's (1967) study of voting behaviour (which 
can broadly be accounted a success) to Bannister and Bott's (1973) 
failure to elicit crucial constructs related to a couple's sexual 
relationship. 
I also suggested that the grid can be evaluated in terms of its 
explanatory capacity. Here the grid may be employed in the hope that 
it will elicit sufficient data to enable the researcher or clinician 
to make some sense of behaviour that has already occurred and regarding 
which no satisfactory explanation is yet available. Fransella and 
Adams (1966) report an interesting study of this type in which repertory 
grid technique was used in order to discover how an arsonist himself 
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construed the act of fire-raising, for which a number of competing 
constructions existed (such as illness, crime and-distorted sexual 
activity). In the event Fransella and Adams found evidence from grid 
technique to suggest that the patient construed the act of arson in 
terms of retribution for sinners, and that this unexpected outcome of 
the grid-based investigation might provide the framework for an 
explanation of his poor response to treatment. 
The majority of studies in which repertory grid methods and behaviour 
have been linked appear to lie in the clinical field, although examples 
of this connection exist in other settings, for instance, voting 
behaviour (Fransella and Bannister, 1967), friendship formation (Duck, 
1973) and social adaptation (Hayden et al, 1977). Adams-Webber (1979) 
remarks that the last of these examples is 'one of the few studies which 
have succeeded in demonstrating a direct relationship between formal 
characteristics of an individual's construction processes and his "real- 
life" behaviors' 10 
It is possible to infer from Adams-Webber's words a criticism of a 
Kellian psychology perhaps too concerned to look inward at construction 
systems and insufficiently outward-looking towards their relationship 
with behaviour. Or, in Argyris and Schön's (1974) terms, has personal 
construct psychology given too much emlhasis to 'espoused theory' at the 
expense of 'theory in use'? Ought not research to be more explicitly 
focused on the link between construction systems and behaviour? If the 
answer is in the affirmative, there are serious implications for research 
methodology. Problems in the world outside the psychology laboratory 
are messy, multifaceted and difficult to solve, yet, if psychology is 
to define its range of convenience to include the life-world, it is 
with issues of such complexity that it must engage. 
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12.4 ZHEORY AND METfiODs A REPRISE 
Before I attempt to sketch an approach towards linking construct theory 
with research in the life-world it is necessary to revisit the relation- 
ship between theory and method in order to indicate why I am led to the 
conclusion that the repertory grid stands in fundamental contradiction 
to its parent theory (and hence why its validity is compromised at the 
level of theory rather than of practice). And therefore why a reappraisal 
of method 
- 
and to some extent theory 
- 
is a necessity. 
It will have been evident at a number of points in my writing that there 
is a tension between my 'readings' of Kellian theory and of repertory 
grid methodology. I take the view that the theory, in essence, stresses 
the primacy and uniqueness of events which 
- 
in grid terms 
- 
are captured 
in the interactions between elements and constructs. A strong case has 
been put forward that constructs, in the vast majority of circumstances, 
cannot be treated as if they were physicalist scales but alter their 
meaning according to the particular element being construed. Thus if 
the elements 
- 
i. e. the grid columns 
- 
are clearly defined (by no means 
always the case) the same cannot be said of the constructs, or grid rows. 
The theory, in my view, emphasises the columns of the grid and tends to 
treat the rows qua rows as of little value, whilst the method makes 
no such distinctions despite the problems of validity associated with 
both 'within row' and 'between row' relationships. 
Put another way, the notion of similarity and contrast (which is 
explicitly captured in the rows of the grid) is far more complex than is 
acknowledged in the naive nomothesis and latent positivism of a repertory 
grid's construct dimensions. Whilst it seems wholly reasonable that 
contrast plays a role in the determining of meaning it is perhaps being 
over.;. reductionistic to press this line of argument too far when there is 
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evidence to suggest that elements may well be construed in terms of 
prototypic instances or attributes, in which case the contrast 
- 
not 
necessarily dichotomous 
- 
is implicit rather than explicit (or, in 
Kelly's term, is 'submerged'). 
The argument briefly put forward here (which was presented at greater 
length in Section 8.4)leads me to suggest that the notion of similarity 
and contrast is elevated to too important a position in repertory grid 
methodology, with the result that it tends to blur, rather than sharpen, 
the researcher's construction of the respondent's construct system. 
At first sight such a claim appears to be a heresy in Kellian terms, 
yet I hope to demonstrate that 
- 
at a deeper level 
- 
there is no need 
for my committal to the heretic's pyre. 
In order to substantiate my claim it is necessary that I develop the 
argument at some length (drawing upon points made, Passim 
, 
in Chapter 
8) since it is crucial both to the question of grid validity as such 
and to the direction in which research in the Kellian tradition might 
wish to take. Although I present my case in terms of a specific example 
(in the interests of making my intentions plain) it is a case which can 
be construed in terms of superordinate generality. 
Consider the rating of a teacher T on the dimension 'kind-unkind': what 
is actually involved on the part of the rater (whom I take to be myself, 
for convenience in presentation)? 
If the dimension arises from triadic elicitation I will have characterised, 
say, two teachers as kind and one as unkind. In other words, the 
dimension relates to my construing of the behaviour of real people and 
not to the abstractions at the ends of supplied constructs or semantic 
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differential dimensions (though I acknowledge that I might have to 
relate such poles to my experience of kind and unkind actions in order 
to use supplied scales). Given that I possess some existential under- 
standing of what 'kind' and 'unkind' mean 
11, I have three initial 
problems to solve in determining a rating for Ts 
(a) I have to come to some decision about the frequencies of 
kind and unkind actions on the part of T; 
(b) I have to take into account that the various actions of T 
have differing intensities of kindness and unkindness; and 
(c) I have to find some way of combining the information from 
(a) and (b) in order to produce a single rating value. 
But step (c) involves me in a comparison of T with those teachers whose 
behaviour is effectively acting to 'anchor' the dimension: there are 
no absolutes of kindness and unkindness, and the dimension is 
- 
strictly 
speaking 
- 
'relatively kind 
- 
relatively unkind' in practice. 
Having anchored the scale in essentially behavioural terms, there is a 
problem associated with the differing contexts in which the triad of 
'anchoring' teachers were construed as being kind or unkind. There is 
no justification for assuming that these contexts are commensurate 
- 
indeed, they must inevitably differ from each other and from the context 
in which T is being rated. (At this point Kelly might well have wished 
to argue that the problem demands the abstraction of behaviour to a 
superordinate level in the construct systems this point is taken up a 
little later in this chapter and more fully towards the end of Chapter 
13. ) 
In comparing T with the anchors I am making the assumption that I know 
all four of them 
- 
and any other elements I wish to involve - equivalently 
t. K* 
well. It may be that the triad of elements that happened to frame the 
elicitation of the construct 'kind-unkind' were not particularly well 
known in respect of this distinction, which would then rest upon an 
extrapolation of the little I know of them: put another way, it is 
possible that the triad 
- 
and T, for that matter 
- 
may be more vaguely 
construed than the ratings appear to suggest. 
For the purposes of my present argument, it is important to point again 
to crucial failure in the rating procedure to give any weight to the 
problems of the frequency and intensity of actions 
- 
see (a) and (b) 
above. Frequency and intensity depend upon the ability to construe 
acts according to the dimension being used ('kind-unkind') and to 
recognise gradations along the scale. Such recognitions are complex, 
and would seem to demand the construal of each act within its context, 
rather than the application of stereotypical labels. It seems probable 
that I need to have already stored in my memory an appropriate schema 
prototype' appears to have insufficient dimensionality here) to enable 
me to undertake these tasks: if this be the case it seems unlikely that 
I have any need to make specific reference to the 'anchoring' elements, 
save in so far as they already appear in the schema. To return to the 
issue of abstraction raised in parenthesis a couple of paragraphs ago, 
it would seem that a 'schematic' approach to construing is broadly 
concordant with Kelly's ideas on the subject, but does not require the 
anchors implicitly provided by triadic elicitation and its simplistic 
substrate of similarity and contrast. 
Summing up the argument I have advanced, it is doubtful whether overt 
comparison with others helps me generally to construe the kindness or 
unkindness of T in the classroom 
- 
which is not to deny the possibility 
(or the value) of direct comparisons in certain circumstances (T2, for 
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instance, might be known to behave in a very different way from T under 
broadly similar conditions). The difficulty of comparative construing 
increases according to the number of elements involved, and all that a 
rating scale seems to offer is a relativistic evaluation of T against 
T2.... Tn in terms of a meaning-criterion which varies according to the 
reference person. The meaning of each rating is reduced to a glimmer 
of light shining through the mist of uncertainty. And such would be 
the stern critic's conclusion regarding grid validity. 
12.5 REORIENTATION: FROM FORMISM TOWARDS CONTEXTUALISM 
What, then, can be salvaged? Does the phenomenological orientation 
towards 'the things as they appear' offer a way round the repertory grid 
impasse without giving away too much of Kelly's theory? The remainder 
of this study attempts to sketch a justification for some movement in 
the general direction of existential phenomenology (captured by Roche's, 
1973, phrase about people being 'in a state of society'12) in order to 
offer a new orientation to research conceived within a personal construct 
psychology framework. 
I do not wish to pre-empt what is presented in the following chapter, 
save to reiterate the claim for the primacy of events and their unique- 
ness. The approach which I seek to map out relies ihpon the researcher's 
observatinn and construing of events, and/or upon the respondent's 
(re)constructions of the events that he or she has experienced. In each 
case, the heart of the methodology is the schematic construing of events 
(as presented a few paragraphs ago), stripped of the obfuscation 
introduced by the misplaced precision of rating (or other allocative 
procedune). The Kellian insistence on similarity and contrast still 
remains, overtly in the case of direct comparisons and more obliquely 
when the respondent is construing in terms of schemata sedimented 
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through experience. The grid, however, fades into insignificance. 
An approach based upon events has the potential to allow the detail of 
events to be more closely observed and more richly interpreted than 
seems possible with the repertory grid. There is a price to be paid, 
but it is a price that many researchers might be prepared to pay - 
that of a much greater mass of information and the consequent need to 
find a way of reducing it to manageable proportions without losing its 
richness. 
Pepper's (1942) world hypotheses of 'contextualism' and 'formism' 
capture something of the distinction I have been trying to make. These 
should not be regarded as mutually exclusive propositions13, but as 
representative of contrasting emphases regarding events. Contextualism 
takes as its point of origin the historical event, with all that implies 
about the complexity of elements and their interrelationships: it is 
also dynamic, in that it presupposes change and novelty. Formism, on 
the other hand, subsumes within its root metaphor the notion of 
similarity, and Pepper's explication foreshadows Kelly's interest in 
similarity and contrast and - more indirectly 
- 
the notion of 
dichotomous construing. 
The contrast between contextualism and formism can be expressed in terms 
of such polarities as holism versus reductionism, and synthesis versus 
analysis. Pepper sees them as similar in so far as the facts dealt 
with underneath their assumptive structure are 'taken one by one from 
whatever source they come and are interpreted as they come and so are 
left'140 From this standpoint the universe 'is not in the end highly 
systematic'15. The implication is of imprecision, in contrast to the 
root metaphors of mechanism and organic ism which are more limited in 
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their scope 
16. 
Sarbin (1977) refers to Kellian theory as contextualist. At the 
general level this seems a reasonable characterisation, particularly 
in the'light of Pepper's linking of this root metaphor to the 
pragmatist tradition of American philosophy, but it should be pointed 
out that traces of the other root metaphors are detectable in Kelly's 
writing. On the other hand the repertory grid, with its strong 
emphases both on analysis and on similarity and contrast, seems best 
located under the heading of formism. Granted this distinction, there 
exists a philosophical tension between theory and methodology which is 
only partly dissolved by grafting contextualist methods (such as 'freer' 
forms of interview, or observation) on to the repertory grid rootstock. 
The changes I wish to make to Personal Construct Theory do not diminish 
what I accept as a contextualist stance 
- 
if anything, they strengthen 
it. In this redefined context it can be expected that the repertory 
grid will have little, if any, part to play as a research instrument 
- 
which is not to deny its utility as a tool for clinical exploration, 
that being an issue with which I have not concerned myself here. 
But even within its current theoretical framework the validity of the 
repertory grid has come under severe questioning, and it is open to 
doubt whether it can stand up to the pressure to which it has been 
subjected. The arguments developed and sustained through the preceding 
chapters lead towards the general conclusion that, in terms of the 
collection and interpretation of constructions of the world, the 
repertory grid is more a coarse riddle than a fine-meshed sieve. 
Fransella and Bannister (1977) come to much the same evaluation when 
they write 
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'To the extent that a grid gives us a map of an individual's 
construct system, it is probably about as accurate and 
informative as the maps which Columbus provided of the 
American coastline'. 17 
They continue, however, 
6 
'At that, it may be a good deal more sensitive to the 
nature of the person than the kinds of psychological 
instrument we have tended to use to date'. 18 
The evidence of this study indicates clearly that grid users have no 
grounds for complacency. Cartography has advanced to a high degree 
of sophistication and accuracy since the fifteenth century. Can research 
within the framework of Personal Construct Theory make similar progress? 
In the following exploratory chapter I offer a programmatic sketch, 
a propaedeutic, of the direction which I believe theory and method 
should now take. 
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